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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Public Law 897--81st Congress

Chapter 1182--2d Session

S. 4234

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YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950. Authorizes the President to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act.

INDEX AND SUMMARY OF HISTORY ON S. 4234

November 29, 1950	Hearings: House, H. R. 9853.
December 5, 1950	H. R. 9853 was introduced by Rep. Richards and was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Print of the bill as introduced.
December 7, 1950	House Committee reported H. R. 9853 with amendments. House Report 3179. Print of the bill as reported. Senate Committee reported S. 4234. Senate Report 2588. Print of the bill as reported.
December 8, 1950	House Rules Committee reported H. Res. 878 for the consideration of H. R. 9853. House Report 3181. Senate began debate on S. 4234. Prints of amendments to S. 4234 proposed by Senators McCarran and McMahon.
December 11, 1950	Senate concluded debate and passed S. 4234 with amendments.
December 12, 1950	House began debate on H. R. 9853.
December 13, 1950	House concluded debate and passed H. R. 9853 with amendments. Then passed S. 4234 with the language of H. R. 9853 inserted as an amendment. House conferees appointed.
December 14, 1950	Senate conferees appointed.
December 15, 1950	House received the conference report. House Report 3204.
December 18, 1950	House agreed to the conference report.
December 19, 1950	Senate agreed to the conference report.
December 29, 1950	Approved. Public Law 897.

YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

ON

H. R. 9853

A BILL TO PROMOTE THE FOREIGN POLICY
AND PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE AND GEN-
ERAL WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES BY
FURNISHING EMERGENCY RELIEF
ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

NOVEMBER 29 AND 30, 1950

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1950

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YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1950

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10:30 a. m., Hon. James P. Richards, acting chairman, presiding.

Mr. RICHARDS. The committee will please be in order. We shall continue hearings on the proposed Yugoslavia Emergency Aid Act. We have with us again today Mr. Perkins, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Before the Secretary begins his testimony, I should like to put in the record at this point a statement by the Department of Defense concerning the Yugoslav emergency food assistance program. It will be printed at the proper place in the record, if there is no objection. (See p. 35.)

Mr. Perkins, we are glad to have you with us again this morning, and you may continue with your testimony in your own way.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE PERKINS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY RANDOLPH HIGGS, GEORGE TRUESDELL, AND MICHAEL CARDOZO.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make an initial statement, if I may.

A situation has arisen in Yugoslavia which is of such importance to the United States and to world peace and security that the Congress is being asked to take emergency action to meet it. That country has been hit by one of the worst droughts in its history.

The American people have a tradition of sympathy and generous action when other peoples are stricken with such disasters. Here, moreover, the humanitarian appeal is reinforced by the hard factor of national interest. The hunger and extreme privation with which the Yugoslav people are faced in the coming winter months could seriously weaken their ability to defend the independence of their country against Soviet attempts to destroy it, and consequently represent a danger to peace and stability in that part of Europe.

The interests of the United States, together with those of our allies in western Europe, are directly involved. The Soviet threat to destroy the independence of Yugoslavia is a threat to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty countries and of Greece and Turkey.

In our recent consultations with the North Atlantic Treaty governments concerning the extension of food aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, they all agreed that the maintenance of Yugoslavia's ability to defend itself was vital to the security of the North Atlantic

area. The food shipments which the Congress is now being asked to authorize represent a logical and necessary step in guarding our own security and that of our friends and in fulfillment of the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

For the past 2 years, following the break between Tito and the U. S. S. R., the United States has pursued a cautious policy of limited economic support to Yugoslavia, to assist in the reorientation of its trade from east to west and to help strengthen its ability to resist the severe pressures exerted by the U. S. S. R. and the Cominform states. These pressures include economic blockade, subversive activities, a war of nerves supported by troop movements and frontier incidents, and an increasing barrage of propaganda calling for the overthrow of the Government by Communists loyal to Moscow. Other western nations, particularly Great Britain and France—and even Italy and Greece, which had no reason to feel well disposed toward Yugoslavia—concurred in and contributed to the policy of economic support to that country because of its obvious advantages to them. The present extension of extraordinary food aid is in furtherance of the same objectives. In the light of what is at stake the amount is small.

What is the meaning, for the United States and for the cause of freedom, of Tito's break with the Kremlin? First, let me say that there is no doubt of the reality of the break. The gap between Belgrade and Moscow, as both sides openly proclaim, has become unbridgeable. The Soviets are trying to overthrow the Tito government and replace it with a regime subservient to them. They have used all available methods except, as yet, open military force. The Yugoslav Government has dedicated itself to the defense of its independence against Soviet pressures or aggression. Tito has exposed to the whole world Moscow's methods of dominating and exploiting those weaker nations which are nominally its allies. Yugoslavia's experience has shown that the Soviet system has no place in it for independent nations, or even for independent Communist Parties. So long as it is able to make good its defiance of Moscow, Yugoslavia continues to be a significant factor weakening the power and influence of Stalinist communism throughout the world.

More concretely, Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet orbit has pushed back the iron curtain. It is, of course, still a Communist country. But the western limit of absolute Soviet power in that part of the world—if we exclude Albania which is now only an isolated outpost—runs through the middle of the Balkan Peninsula instead of along the shores of the Adriatic Sea.

Yugoslavia's withdrawal of support to the guerrilla campaign against Greece was a prime factor, along with the great efforts of the Greek Army and the assistance from the United States, in bringing to an end the war in Greece. So long as Yugoslavia stands firm, Greece has a sense of security which it needs to go on with the work of recovery and reconstruction.

Should Yugoslavia fall under Soviet control, Greece would face the threat of a renewal of the guerrilla warfare which in the past has been so costly both to Greece and to the United States. Similarly, if we look at Italy, Soviet power no longer presses directly on the Italian frontiers or on those of the Free Territory of Trieste,

where American and British troops are stationed. There is now at least the possibility of a settlement of the dispute over Trieste, a possibility which would disappear if Yugoslavia were to lose its independence.

In recent months Yugoslavia has improved its relations with Greece, with Italy, and with Austria (another country where the United States has direct responsibilities and commitments) with a view to the settlement of outstanding differences. With these countries Yugoslavia has many common interests. Especially, all confront a common danger and have an interest in cooperation against aggression, direct or indirect, from any quarter.

Yugoslavia, in maintaining its independence, serves as a force for peace in Europe. Its people, in their determination to defend their independence, serve the independence and the security of other peoples. And their army is a factor in the world balance. The existence of this force, ready to defend its homeland, is a deterrent to adventurous policies and aggression, both in Balkans and elsewhere in Europe.

Yugoslavia is a Communist state. It is a dictatorship. No attempt is being made to disguise those facts. The American people, unquestionably, believe that the Yugoslav people have a right to liberties which they do not now enjoy. The United States Government, over the past several years, has repeatedly made clear that its maintenance of normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Yugoslavia and its extension of financial assistance did not in any sense imply approval of the internal policies of the Government.

The issue here is a different one. Yugoslavia is resisting Soviet imperialism. The issue is the right of that country to national independence, and the will and ability of its armed forces and of its people to defend that independence against outside pressures and aggression. This is an issue on which all who stand by the United Nations should be of one mind.

Yugoslavia, during the past year, has been increasingly cooperative in working for peace through the United Nations. At the present session of the General Assembly the Yugoslav Delegation has shown a willingness to work with the United States Delegation and other delegations to make the United Nations more effective in dealing with threats to the peace and acts of aggression, and in exposing the hollowness of the proposals of those who have used a propaganda peace campaign to cover up their aggressive policies.

During the course of the past year the Yugoslav Government has taken a number of steps to normalize and improve relations with the United States and other western nations. It has fostered trade and other economic ties with the West. Relations with neighboring Italy, Greece, and Austria are now much better than before. Some of the Greek children long held in Yugoslavia were returned to Greece just a few days ago. The Yugoslav Government now permits American officials and private citizens to travel freely within its borders. It has agreed to allow some 350 American citizens, who are dual nationals to leave Yugoslavia. These measures, taken by the Yugoslavs themselves without pressure, all indicate a trend which is favorable. There is good reason to believe that the trend will continue, and that our food assistance will help it along.

Not until early this autumn, when the Departments of State and Agriculture were first able to estimate with some degree of accuracy

the serious effects which the lack of rainfall would have on the food situation, did it become apparent that Yugoslavia would require assistance from abroad to feed its population this winter.

On October 20 the Secretary of State received from the Yugoslav Ambassador a formal request for assistance. After a careful review of the situation by the Government agencies concerned, the President decided that it was essential that some aid be granted and that shipments of food be begun as soon as possible.

The principal reason for speed lay in the approach of winter and the difficulties of transport and distribution in some parts of Yugoslavia which were in need of food and would be virtually inaccessible later in the season.

It was necessary to utilize existing authority where possible to inaugurate a program of immediate assistance. Accordingly, the Export-Import Bank made available for food purchases approximately \$6,000,000 in credits already authorized; the Economic Cooperation Administration arranged for the shipment of approximately \$11,500,000 worth of flour from Italy and Germany, to be replaced by later shipments of wheat from the United States; and foodstuffs up to \$16,000,000 in value are being shipped under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 as amended, in support of the immediate food requirements of the Yugoslav armed forces.

These stop-gap measures were limited ones, intended to meet the immediate emergency. They were taken in order that the program could be effective and the food arrive in time. The total amount now being requested takes into account what is expected to be available through the stop-gap measures described above and through the efforts of other countries and private American sources. It represents the minimum required to meet the most urgent needs and to achieve our objectives.

The American people, in making possible the shipment of food to the Yugoslav people, have a legitimate interest in the equitable and nondiscriminatory distribution of that food. They will also wish to have the assurance that the Yugoslav people will know where the food is coming from. These questions have already been raised, in connection with the stop-gap aid program. The Yugoslav Government has given written assurances to the American Ambassador in Belgrade that it will be possible for officials of the United States Government and representatives of the American press freely to observe the distribution of the food with a view to noting that it is equitably distributed and the Yugoslav Government is prepared to give the assistance full publicity and to afford the United States Government the opportunity to give similar publicity, including the use of special labels on the packaging of the foodstuffs made available. This agreement will apply, in addition to the stop-gap program, to any provision of food aid made possible by action of the Congress.

The proposed program of food assistance is not a large one. It is definitely an emergency program, intended to help carry the Yugoslav people through the difficult period until the next harvest, a period in which they will be exposed to the rigors of winter and to mounting pressures from their Cominform neighbors. Next spring will be a time of danger. But if the emergency food needs are met, Yugoslavia can face these dangers with confidence.

In regard to the long-run economic position, agricultural and mineral resources, under normal conditions, should provide sufficient exports to pay for the necessary imports. Because of the necessity of reorienting its trade from east to west and as a consequence of some of its own investment policies, Yugoslavia has had a problem of insufficient foreign exchange. They have, however, recently shown a more realistic attitude in reviewing their capital-investment program, and have resumed negotiations with the World Bank for credits to finance a long-term program of reconstruction and development. While these measures are being worked out, credit assistance from the United States and other countries, on a relatively small scale, has helped toward meeting the problem.

This year's drought, however, is an unforeseen calamity which calls for outside help. The British Government has already announced its willingness to extend £3,000,000 credit. Other North Atlantic Treaty countries have the matter under consideration. But the major food needs must be met primarily by the United States. It is clearly in our national interest to meet them.

As I have indicated some \$30,000,000 of foodstuffs has been programed under existing authority to meet the Yugoslav minimum needs. The President has approved a request for an additional program of \$38,000,000 which is the amount I hope this committee and the Congress will authorize. We are prepared to discuss this program with you in whatever detail you desire, and give you any information that you would like to have.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Secretary, what opportunities are given American businessmen in Yugoslavia?

Mr. PERKINS. In what sense; you mean to buy or to sell?

Mr. RICHARDS. I mean to operate business there, to make investments there?

Mr. PERKINS. My impression is that there is no opportunity to make investments there or to operate a business, but let me check and see if I am wrong in that. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDS. I remember that one of the objections to giving any kind of aid to Spain was that allegedly American businessmen were not given a fair deal in Spain. I just wanted to know whether the situation is any different in Yugoslavia. It is even worse in Yugoslavia?

Mr. PERKINS. I think it was even worse in Yugoslavia.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chipperfield, have you any questions?

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Ribicoff—

Mr. RIBICOFF. Don't some of Yugoslavia's problems in the matter of food stem from their program of collectivization of the peasants and the farmers?

Mr. PERKINS. I think perhaps you will get a more satisfactory answer to that question from the representatives of the Department of Agriculture. The information that we have leads us to believe that that is not the case. The crop which they had in 1949 was an average crop and there was about as much collectivization in 1949 as there is now. There has been very little change in that situation in the last year.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Have they stopped their program of collectivization during the past year?

Mr. PERKINS. They have very substantially slowed down their drive for collectivization during the past year and they have almost stopped it. I think figures indicate that about 21 percent of the arable land is under collectivization, while another 6 percent is given over to state farms. Some of that was already collectivized or at least was in common ownership even prior to the Second World War, so that that does not represent a figure of the amount of collectivization that has taken place under the Tito regime.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Are not some of their troubles also due to their too rapid industrialization program?

Mr. PERKINS. That is perfectly correct.

Mr. RIBICOFF. In other words, during the past year, much of food-stuffs were shipped out of Yugoslavia in exchange for industrial equipment; is that right?

Mr. PERKINS. Normally they do export food, but that is not nearly as serious as the fact that they used up all their available assets in addition to their food export returns, pushing forward an industrialization program which was beyond their capacity.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Is it their intention to slow that down?

Mr. PERKINS. There is very indication that they are now realizing that they overstepped themselves in that direction and that they have got to slow down. This has been a very bitter pill for them to take, with their Communist theories; but they seem to be alert to that and are willing to talk sense in their investment program.

Mr. RIBICOFF. In other words, they are willing to modify their theories in the face of the bitter realities; are you satisfied that that is the case?

Mr. PERKINS. That seems to be the case. I think the evidence of that is that they are conducting negotiations now with the World Bank, and the World Bank, I am sure, would not conduct them on any but a realistic basis. The fact that they are willing to enter into those conversations is a very encouraging sign from the point of view of their realizing what the facts of life are.

Mr. RIBICOFF. No further questions.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Vorys—

Mr. VORYS. You mentioned the fact that the British are furnishing a £3,000,000 credit?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. Is it our purpose to make this a credit?

Mr. PERKINS. No; it is not our purpose to make this a credit.

Mr. VORYS. Why?

Mr. PERKINS. Because of their very substantial shortage of dollars; it would be an indefinite period before they could repay it.

Mr. VORYS. We could wait for the money, of course.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; but it is a question whether that is not such a drag on their credit which they need to use for other purposes, that it would slow down their whole recovery program to a point where it would become practically impossible.

Mr. VORYS. Is it the idea that this aid should be furnished in dollars or that we should ship from our surpluses that we hold?

Mr. PERKINS. We would ship largely from our surpluses. There would be other items which they require that would not be available in our surpluses; that is right, is it not?

Mr. TRUESDELL. Their largest deficit is in grains.

Mr. VORYS. And that is our largest surplus, too.

Mr. TRUESDELL. The Department of Agriculture, I believe, feels that the grains that they have on hand are part of our strategic stockpile and would not consider them surplus.

Mr. VORYS. Shall we receive later a description of just what their shortages are, and that sort of thing?

Mr. PERKINS. I am not sure but that is not in the book which has already been distributed.

Mr. HIGGS. Yes; it is.

Mr. PERKINS. I think you will find a table in the papers which were handed out on Monday, which gives a list of the commodities.

Mr. TRUESDELL. If you look at table I, sir.

Mr. PERKINS. Table I gives a more detailed breakdown of the items than table III.

Mr. VORYS. Just glancing over it, it would look as though wheat and corn are the two main items and, in bulk, that would be 160,000 metric tons of wheat?

Mr. PERKINS. In quantity, that is right. Those are the two main items.

Mr. VORYS. And 150,000 tons of corn. Also dried eggs. We have certainly plenty of those; also dried milk. Shall we get any further explanation than the mere statement that somebody thinks that these are part of our strategic stockpile?

Mr. PERKINS. I think you might get a more satisfactory answer on the details of this from the Department of Agriculture as to the status of these commodities. They, I understand, are appearing before you tomorrow.

Mr. HIGGS. May I answer specifically one question, as to whether this is to be in dollars or commodities? No dollars are being turned over to them, only commodities.

Mr. VORYS. That is what I was wondering.

Mr. HIGGS. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. No dollars, but only commodities?

Mr. HIGGS. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. Have any of the supplies that we have provided reached there yet?

Mr. PERKINS. I think the first arrival was yesterday. I know there was a shipment that came in yesterday. Was that the first one?

Mr. HIGGS. The first one was about a week ago.

Mr. TRUESDELL. 1,600 tons of beans arrived about a week ago. We had a cable in this morning reporting the first shipment of German flour had entered Yugoslavia on the twenty-seventh.

Mr. VORYS. Do we know how that stuff that arrived a week ago is being distributed? What is actually being done with it? Have we observers there to see what is happening to it?

Mr. PERKINS. We have a statement on that.

Mr. HIGGS. These initial shipments are being observed by the Embassy staff itself. The Ambassador met the first ship, with photographers, and so forth, and the staff there is sufficient to take care of these initial shipments and additional personnel are being sent as the thing gets flowing.

Mr. VORYS. Have you any information as to what publicity was given, according to the agreement, to the fact that it came from the

United States; and do you know whether it is being equitably distributed?

Mr. HIGGS. The publicity we know about. The Ambassador's statement at the time was rebroadcast over the Yugoslav radio and appeared in the official newspapers.

Mr. VORYS. Do you know anything about its being distributed equitably?

Mr. HIGGS. We have no report on that yet. We will get that in due course.

Mr. PERKINS. As I understand, they are making a special effort with these first shipments to get them into areas which are inaccessible and the inequality of the distribution does not enter so much into these first shipments. They are concerned with getting it into the less accessible areas which may get closed in and they are taking measures to see that it is being as well distributed as it can be.

Mr. VORYS. As I understand it you took \$16,000,000 out of the MDAP appropriation for food for the army. Has any of that been shipped, and is it intended that it shall go directly to the army?

Mr. PERKINS. Answering the latter part of your question, the \$16,000,000 is intended to be sufficient to meet the needs of the Yugoslav army, but not all of this food will go directly to the armed forces.

Mr. TRUESDELL. None has been actually shipped.

Mr. VORYS. How long would that feed the army?

Mr. TRUESDELL. It is estimated that it would fill a 4 months' requirement for the army.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Carnahan.

Mr. CARNAHAN. No questions.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. I am just pursuing the matter of distribution so you will be alert to the problems that are besetting us.

I have a great many Yugoslavs in my district, and I am getting a great deal of correspondence on the matter of how very little distribution there has been to those people who are not out-and-out Titoists. The poor little people at the bottom are getting nothing.

I have no questions, only to alert you that you should be getting assurances that we can really count on having the people of Yugoslavia fed.

Mr. PERKINS. Perhaps I might read you a wire that we just received this morning from United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, George V. Allen. It bears on this subject. He says:

Foodstuffs supplied under the aid program are to be distributed within normal channels. Food will be delivered by each republic to regular consumer outlets where it will be sold for fixed dinar prices. Persons within the rationing system will require ration cards as well as dinars; others (chiefly in rural areas) will require only dinars, and not ration cards. Needy persons lacking sufficient dinars will receive food free of charge. The Yugoslav Government plans to rush food to the stricken areas first. The first shipment of beans was distributed among five republics because the Yugoslav bean crop, such as it was, had previously been distributed all over the country to equalize its shortage. (The first shipment of beans from the United States was divided as follows: Serbia 523 tons; Croatia 490; Bosnia 340; Slovenia 160; Montenegro 30; Capo district area 70.)

The bulk of the first shipment of German flour was allocated to Heregovina, one of the hardest hit sections. The main distribution center for this shipment is Tuzla (about 50 miles north of Sarajevo); the flour is due to arrive there on the morning of November 28.

Whether that will work out or not, we will have to see, but they have given us every assurance that they will correct unfair practices if they are found to be unfair.

Mrs. BOLTON. From what most of us know of George Allen, we can have confidence in his work.

Mr. SMITH. I am very much concerned also about this matter of distribution. You have just said that the food will be going into the regular channels of trade.

Mr. PERKINS. The regular channels of distribution.

Mr. SMITH. What do you mean by that?

Mr. PERKINS. Their normal method of distributing food and selling food in Yugoslavia.

Mr. SMITH. In other words, in the ordinary course of business?

Mr. PERKINS. That is right.

Mr. SMITH. Much like the relief program that was administered under UNRRA; is that right?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. Of course, we know what a stench that was.

Mr. PERKINS. Let me check that. I am not familiar with the UNRRA operation. The UNRRA operation, as I remember it, set up its own organization of distribution and did not go through the regular channels. Is that right?

Mr. TRUESDELL. They had their representatives there, but the aid was distributed through Government channels.

Mr. PERKINS. I have been told that I was wrong; that it was done through the Government.

Mr. SMITH. It was done through the Government and in regular channels of trade, and the food would get into the areas and the people would be compelled to buy it if they had the money. If they did not have any money they went hungry. That is what I fear about this program.

Mr. PERKINS. This wire says that the needy will get it free.

Mr. SMITH. We always had that assurance under UNRRA also.

Mrs. BOLTON. Perhaps if they are adherents of Tito they will get it free.

Mr. HIGGS. We could give you two decrees on distribution. We could have them for the record a little later. We do not have them with us at the moment.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

BORBA, September 27, 1950.

On the basis of article 1, of the law authorizing the government of the FPRY to issue decrees on the questions connected with national economy, and on the proposal of the president of the FPRY Cabinet Council for Commerce and the president of the FPRY Cabinet Council for Agriculture and Forestry, the Government of the FPRY issues the following:

ORDER ON THE MEASURES TO ENSURE FOOD FOR THE POPULATION AND PRESERVE THE LIVESTOCK FUND

I

On account of the reduction in the yield of agricultural products, caused by drought, and in order to ensure food for the population, preserve the livestock fund and successfully carry out the economic and other plans in the coming year,

all the competent government agencies are obligated to undertake special measures for the realization of these tasks, and in the first place to realize the plans for buying up the bread-yielding grains; to carry out the strictest saving of food products; to pay special attention to the question of feeding the population in those parts of the country which have suffered from the drought; and to undertake special measures for the preservation and feeding of livestock during the winter. In connection with this, the government of the FPRY specially decides:

(1) On the basis of the estimate of the realized yield, made by government agencies by means of special commissions, the plan of buying up the 1950 maize crop is hereby changed and reduced throughout the FPRY to 42.64 percent.

	<i>Percent</i>
PR Serbia -----	46.8
PR Croatia -----	36.1
PR Slovenia -----	69.85
PR Bosn a and Heregovina -----	12.4
PR Macedonia -----	53.57
PR Montenegro -----	10

On the basis of these reduced plans, the governments of the people's republics shall fix the average percentage of reduction for various economic regions in accordance with the yield realized in those regions.

(2) The executive boards of the people's committees in those regions in which the maize yield has been poor shall immediately start revising the maize delivery quotas and reduce the obligation signed by the producer if it does not correspond to the yield. The executive board of the people's committees shall carry out this revision within the framework of the reduced buying-up plan which they get from the executive board of the people's committee of the country.

(3) The norms of guaranteed bread rations reduced are reduced on an average of 10 percent. The president of the FPRY Cabinet Council for Commerce is hereby authorized to fix, within the framework of this reduction, a new norm for individual consumer categories.

(4) Those households which carry out their obligations for delivery of maize and lard in the fourth quarter of 1950 shall have their quotas for lard and fattened hogs reduced for the first half of 1951.

The Agencies of the State Control, Public Prosecution, and Commerce Inspection, as well as the competent state agencies, shall exercise control over the application of the above-stated measures and commerce procedure against those persons who, without authority or in contravention to the prescriptions and orders of higher agencies, dispose of the food-articles funds, who unnecessarily spend or squander food articles, or otherwise do not keep to the said measures.

(5) The governments of the people's republics shall immediately start paying attention to those regions which have been hit by drought so that the inhabitants of those regions who have not been included in the guaranteed supplies system could be given help in food, by way of giving them grain in exchange for other agricultural products by way of employing them on investment projects and the like and also by extending help to those households which have not sufficient agricultural products for the purpose of exchange nor labor force for participation in investment projects.

(6) With the object of a successful carrying out of the above-mentioned tasks and for the purpose of an as-even-as-possible dividing of the difficulties created by the drought among the entire population of the country, the competent agencies are obligated to carry out in full the plans for the buying up of wheat and rye, as well as the reduced plans for the buying up of maize.

(7) The competent state agencies are obligated to pay strict attention to the fact that only those consumers who according to the existing prescriptions are entitled to guaranteed supplies be included in the guaranteed-supply system. With this object in view, they shall exercise strict control over the issuance of ration cards.

The executive boards of the people's committees of the localities and countries are obligated to pay strict attention that food articles sold and bought on the tied-prices system be supplied to only those consumers who do not have their own sources of supply.

Maximum attention must be paid to the preservation of products and to their proper manipulation in the buying up and distribution networks, so that losses in trade with these products be reduced to the smallest degree.

(8) The Foreign Trade Minister of the FPRY is hereby instructed to undertake, in agreement with the president of the FPRY Cabinet Economic Council, the necessary measures in order that, by importation of the most necessary quantities of food articles, the shortage of these articles, caused by drought, be reduced.

The FPRY Cabinet Council for Commerce and the governments of the people's republics shall ensure a rational economical spending of these articles and immediately undertake measures against those who squander them or spend them in an uneconomical way and thus inflict damage upon both our foreign trade and capital construction.

II

(9) For the purpose of feeding and preserving the basic livestock fund, the councils for agriculture and forestry of the people's republics and the people's committees shall undertake the following measures:

(a) Organize the creation of as-big-as-possible stocks of food for the winter with all the agricultural producers, state-owned agricultural estates, peasant working cooperatives and private peasant households.

Immediately ascertain the disposable quantities of livestock food in the various regions and on the territories of individual people's committees, and organize transportation of livestock food from those regions where there is a surplus to those which have not sufficient livestock food. The buying up and distribution of livestock food shall be carried out by the state procurement agencies in cooperation with the agencies of the ministries of agriculture of the people's republics.

Carry out strict saving of livestock food by way of reducing the normatives of livestock feeding with the state-owned agricultural estates and peasant working cooperatives, by way of processing livestock food, etc.

(b) Most strictly forbid the slaughter of breed-animals.

The councils for agriculture and forestry of the governments of the people's republics shall issue the necessary instructions for the carrying out of the above-mentioned measures.

(10) For the sake of saving winter food for livestock and for the sake of insuring the necessary meat reserves for feeding the population during the spring months, the councils for commerce of the governments of the people's republics shall organize the buying up and slaughtering of livestock, and preservation of meat, by way of an intensified production of the canning industry, by way of preserving meat in refrigerator rooms and by way of smoking the meat. The councils for commerce of the governments of the people's republics shall carry out these tasks through the buying-up enterprises of the food industry, through the state-owned agricultural estates, through the state-owned farms, through the peasant working cooperatives, and through the organizations in charge of the problems of feeding the populations.

In order to facilitate the carrying out of the obligatory delivery and in order to save livestock food, the buying up enterprises shall endeavor, both when buying up under the obligatory delivery system and when buying on the free market, to buying during the fall as-big-as-possible quantities of lard and numbers of livestock. Those producers who have been assessed with delivery of livestock and lard may already in the course of this year carry out the delivery obligation which falls due in 1951.

For this purpose, the State procurement agencies may issue to private peasant households and peasant working cooperatives the necessary permissions for slaughtering livestock and smoking meat, which they will deliver during the coming year in respect to their obligations for the delivery of fresh meat.

The workers' supply services, as well as the other consumers who are included in the guaranteed-supply system, may accept livestock or meat in respect of rations for the coming months, and themselves ensure smoking (preservation) of meat.

(11) More detailed prescriptions and instructions for the carrying out hereof shall be issued by the FPRY Cabinet Council for Commerce and the FPRY Cabinet for Agriculture and Forestry.

(12) The present order enters into force immediately.

The Premier of the FPRY and Minister of National Defense, Marshal of Yugoslavia.

(Signed) JOSIP BROZ-TITO.

Member of the Cabinet of the FPRY and President of the Council for Commerce.

(Signed) OSMAN KARABEGOVIĆ.

Member of the Cabinet of the FPRY and President of the Council for Agriculture and Forestry.

(Signed) Engin. MIJALKO TODOROVIC.

BORBA, September 27, 1950.

OFFICIAL GAZETTE, No. 59

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On the basis of the article 1 of the law authorizing the Federal Government to pass regulations concerning our national economy, and upon the proposal of the president of the economic council of the Government of the FPRY and president of the council of legislature and promotion of the people's authority of the Government of the FPRY, the Federal Government issues hereby the following:

ORDER ON STEPS FOR SAVING ARTICLES INTENDED FOR BROAD CONSUMPTION

(1) All foodstuffs and industrial articles destined for the guaranteed rations system from stocks (fund) of the guaranteed ration system which are to be handled by competent managements of the guaranteed ration system. The guaranteed ration fund is given priority in getting produced or purchased goods. Articles from the guaranteed ration fund cannot be used for any other purposes except for the requirements of the guaranteed ration system.

Only goods of the guaranteed ration system and that sold at tied prices can be sold at low special prices but even then only to consumers entitled to them. Goods cannot be sold to certain categories of consumers or to particular persons at special prices (low uniform, commercial, or free prices) differing from those fixed for such goods by competent officers for prices.

(2) No one is entitled under any condition to get articles of the insured supply at low uniform prices in excess of the quantities determined for the R-1 category of consumers, except workers classified into categories R1a (miners), R-1b, R-forest workers, Rz-1 and Rz-2 for foodstuffs, and IR-1a for industrial articles, as well as persons quoted under paragraph 2, article 2, of this order.

For persons performing particularly responsible and strenuous federal and republic state and social functions and for those engaged in important scientific work, the council of trade of the Government of the FPRY is to set up norms in accordance with which they will get foodstuffs below the quantities provided for consumers of the R-1a category, and industrial articles up to the quantities provided for IR-1a category, but maximum

Grams of bread per day-----	700
Grams of flour per day-----	70
Kilograms of lard per month-----	1.5
Kilograms of meat per month-----	6
Grams of sugar per day-----	60
Grams of coffee per month-----	210
Grams of beans, peas or such like, per day-----	300
Grams of marmalade per day-----	70
Points and coupons valued at 1,000 dinars for industrial articles-----	192

Members of families of persons mentioned above are to be classified into categories of consumers in accordance with the general provisions and they are to enjoy no other privileges.

(3) All enterprises and stores which were specially supplying particular categories of consumers are hereby abolished. Exception from this is made for workers' supply services of enterprises, including restaurants and messes of

enterprises, institutions, and offices, enterprises supplying sailors and stores for persons mentioned under paragraph 2, article 2, of this order.

All the existing enterprises and stores for special supplying, abolished by this order, such as enterprises of people's committees, social and political organizations, particular branches of state administration, and so on, are to cease working and fuse with the general commercial network on the basis of their inventories which are to be made within 30 days from the date this order is put into effect.

(4) All farms engaged in specially supplying certain categories of consumers, irrespective whether they are owned by the state or social organizations, are to be handed over to the Republic Ministries of Agriculture which are either to form from them agricultural estates or deliver them to certain enterprises or to the county or local people's committees for the purpose of increasing supplies of consumers of all categories. These farms are to be taken over by officers of the competent ministries of agriculture within 2 days from the date this order becomes effective, with the provision that all the transfer formalities be completed 8 days thenceforward. Excepted from this are farms of the producing enterprises (including transport), farms for supplying persons mentioned under paragraph 2, article 2, of this order, farms for supplying hospitals and those belonging to enterprises supplying exclusively restaurants and messes. Articles obtained from these farms, insofar as they are included in the guaranteed ration system, are to be sold at the free market prices. Farms belonging to enterprises are to supply exclusively their own workers and employees engaged in such enterprises, but not those engaged in directorates, ministries, and other high-rank bodies.

(5) Forbidden is the existence and formation of all kinds of special recuperation centers, picnic grounds, villas, and such like destined only for use of certain persons, institutions, or enterprises, irrespective of whether they are owned by the Government or social organization. Excepted from this are workers' recuperation centers under the administration of the central board of the labor unions of Yugoslavia. Certain of these buildings may be used for indispensable purposes of representation on approval of the Prime Ministers of the Federal or Republic Governments.

The president of the Committee for Tourism and Hotel Industry of the Government of the FPRY may approve, in agreement with the president of the Council of Trade of the Government of the FPRY, the existence of recuperation centers for members of certain state as well as of social organizations acting on the entire territory of the FPRY.

Special recuperation centers and other objects quoted under paragraph 1 of this article, together with their total inventories, are to be delivered to the general tourist-hotel industry network within 15 days from the date this order is put into effect.

(6) It is forbidden to give out foodstuffs from the insured supply system fund, and from other funds free of charge, or on account of the budget or at low uniform prices for receptions, feasts, conferences, or other manifestations. Excepted from this are receptions with the object of state representation held by the Prime Ministers of the Federal or Republic Governments, presidents of the Federal or Republic National Assemblies, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, president of the council of science and culture of the Federal Government and by persons designated by them in agreement with the council of trade of the Government of the FPRY as well as by the highest rank scientific and cultural institutions of the Government of the FPRY.

(7) It is forbidden to supply snack bars and such like of Government offices, institutions, and enterprises with articles from the insured supply fund and from other funds at low uniform prices. Special provisions of the president of the council of trade of the Government of the FPRY are to stipulate articles to be sold by such snack bars.

Also forbidden is the extension of any kind of service or sale of foodstuffs by these snack bars free of charge or at low uniform prices, as well as sale free of charge or at low uniform prices of industrial or other articles for the purpose of representation except such as quoted under article 6 of this order.

(8) Priority from the guaranteed ration fund is given to hospitals, health institutions, and institutions for protection of children, as well as to consumers of the categories D-1, D-2, D-3, B, and T (B and T stand for sick people and pregnant women).

Employees and workers of such institutions are not to get supplies from funds engaged in supplying such institutions nor can they avail themselves of their priority.

Milk from the insured supply funds is not to be given to any consumers for any purpose until consumers of the categories D-1, D-2, D-3, B, and T, as well as hospitals, are fully supplied.

(9) No priority with regard to supplies is to be given to any category of consumers or any persons which would deviate from the order established by the president of the council of trade of the Government of the FPRY in conformity with the priority mentioned under article 8 of this order.

It is forbidden for workshops or enterprises, no matter under whose management they are, to supply certain persons or offices and institutions with their products free of charge or at low uniform prices except through the regular insured supply channel for particular categories of consumers.

(10) State offices, institutions, and enterprises, as well as administrative institutions of social organizations are forbidden to buy any kind of furniture, pictures, carpets, curtains, or any other articles for decorating their office premises, or any raw materials for such purposes.

All contracts signed with this object in view are to be canceled.

No repairs, adaptations, and so on, of state buildings is permitted except with the object of their proper maintenance. All repairs already begun are to be carried out only to the level which construction rules permit for proper protection of buildings.

Exceptionally and upon approval of the respective Minister of Finance one will be permitted to buy material for the proper upkeep of furniture and such-like, but exclusively at the free market prices for goods of broad consumption which is not included within the insured supply system.

(11) Economic enterprises or institutions are forbidden to barter among themselves one kind of product for another except if such a barter is permitted by special provisions.

(12) Sale from funds of the insured supply system of textiles, wood, or any other kind of raw materials, building materials or industrial products at low uniform prices for the purpose of public performance, manifestation, rallies, and such like, is forbidden.

(13) Free supply of fuel for motorcars of any persons will not be permitted under any grounds. Ministers and category of persons designated by the Prime Minister of the Government of the FPRY are entitled to a fixed allowance for paying fuel for the minimum official use of their cars.

With the object of proper utilization of motorcars for official purposes one may organize certain auto-taxi services.

The due date for implementing these provisions is 30 days from the date this order is put into effect.

Detailed provisions for implementing provisions of this article are to be passed by the president of the council of communications of the Government of the FPRY in agreement with the president of the council of legislature and promotion of people's authority of the Government of the FPRY.

(14) Control commissions of the state and other bodies, ministries of finance and all officers of the financial service, councils of trade and all trade inspectors are hereby ordained to see that this order is implemented strictly and to report every infringer to the public prosecutor.

(15) All provisions and special decisions contrary to this order are rescinded.

(16) Orders issued contrary to this order are not to be executed. Enterprises are obliged to report such orders to the public prosecutor immediately.

(17) Individual deviations from this order in case of exceptional necessity may be permitted only by the president of the council of trade of the Government of the FPRY in agreement with the Federal Minister of Finance.

Implementation of this order and issuance of detailed provisions for its application is assigned to the president of the council of trade of the Government of the FPRY and to the Federal Minister of Finance.

(18) In case that their acts are not of criminal nature, infringers of this order are liable to a fine up to 30,000 dinars or to imprisonment up to 15 days as follows:

(a) Persons infringing provisions quoted under articles 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, and 13 of this order;

(b) Persons availing themselves of their positions, who are trying to get for themselves or for others privileges to which they are not entitled, that is, persons issuing orders or instructions contrary to articles 8 and 9 of this order;

(c) Persons who through their information or otherwise should assist others in getting certain advantages with regard to the foodstuff or industrial articles supply;

(d) Persons who should fail to hand over farms within the specified period under article 4 of this order or who would hinder implementation of measures concerning such transfer;

(e) Directors of enterprises who should fail to report orders issued contrary to this order (article 16) to the public prosecutor immediately;

(f) Persons who would barter their products contrary to the article 11 of this order.

The administrative-punitive proceedings will be conducted and decisions in the first instance passed by executive boards of county people's committees. President of the council of trade of the Government of the FPRY or Republic ministers of Trade and Supply may on their own take up the proceedings in the first instance, irrespective of the stage it is at at that time, conduct them and pass their decisions.

(19) This order is effective from November 1, 1950.

BELGRADE, October 10, 1950. No. 5140.

(Signed by) JOSIP BROZ-TITO,
The Prime Minister.

BORIS KIDRIC,
Minister of the Federal Government.

ENG. MILENTIJE POPOVIC,
Minister of Foreign Trade of FPRY.

Mr. HIGGS. I might add that just recently the Yugoslav Government abolished the preferential treatment on foodstuffs which went to the members of the party. Members of the party now do not have preferential treatment over other citizens.

Mr. SMITH. Is this program designed for civilian relief, or is the army also to share under this legislation?

Mr. PERKINS. It is for all the people of Yugoslavia, and that would include the army.

Mr. SMITH. Is there any breakdown as to what the percentage would be?

Mr. PERKINS. What percentage would go to the army?

Mr. SMITH. And what percentage would go to the civilians.

Mr. PERKINS. We can get that for you. I do not think we have it available.

Mr. SMITH. I wish that you would get it for the record.

(The information requested is as follows:)

It is not possible to state what percentage of the total foodstuffs supplied by the United States will go directly to the Yugoslav armed forces. However, foodstuffs up to \$16,000,000 in value, equivalent to the needs of the Yugoslav armed forces for a period of 4 months at the rate of \$4,000,000 a month, are being shipped under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended. It should be noted that the foodstuffs supplied with MDA funds under the stopgap program, or other foodstuffs in the total program, will not be specially earmarked for the Yugoslav armed forces. The bulk of the food requirements of these forces are being met from indigenous sources. The Yugoslav Government, however, has been able to draw on these sources for the army because it has the assurance that supplies will be available from the United States to offset the drain on supplies available for the civilian populace.

Mrs. BOLTON. I thought you said the \$16,000,000 was given the army already, and that would satisfy their whole need for 4 months.

Mr. PERKINS. It was estimated for 4 months. I am not certain.

Mrs. BOLTON. And what we are discussing now begins after the end of the 4 months' period. The help, the food, the aid we are talking about, begin only after the 4 months' period is over?

Mr. PERKINS. No; the amount of food which is being shipped under the MDAP is estimated to take care of the army for 4 months.

Mrs. BOLTON. Not the stopgap food?

Mr. PERKINS. The stopgap food.

Mrs. BOLTON. That is what I mean.

Mr. PERKINS. The reason that I hesitated to draw a conclusion regarding that \$16,000,000 against the total is because I am not sure that is the total requirement for the whole army.

Mr. SMITH. Is it not true, Mr. Secretary, under the collectivization of the farm, there is 11 percent less production today than there was in 1939?

Mr. PERKINS. That I do not know. As I said earlier, I think you would probably get more information on that from the agricultural attaché who will be here tomorrow.

Mr. SMITH. Are there any conditions at all to be attached to this aid, or are we going along on faith, simply hoping and praying that they will do what is right?

Mr. PERKINS. We are going to attach the conditions, of course, of equality of distribution, fairness of price, and publicity, and that we have the right to inspect to see that the food is properly distributed.

Mr. SMITH. No definite conditions as to the disposition of that vexing problem of Trieste?

Mr. PERKINS. No.

Mr. SMITH. Nothing so far as guaranteeing freedom of speech or the right to have free elections?

Mr. PERKINS. We have not proposed anything of that kind, sir.

Mr. SMITH. What would be your attitude if such amendments were offered on the floor of the House in the event the committee approves this legislation?

Mr. PERKINS. I think that we would oppose such amendments as strongly as we could. We believe basically that our strength is getting on with free people, and not in dictating to them. One of the reasons that Yugoslavia broke away from the Kremlin is that they they were being told what to do and how to do it. I think that it would be very embarrassing and unwise for us at this time to try to adopt the Kremlin tactics in telling people what to do.

Mr. SMITH. Do you think the people in Yugoslavia are free today?

Mr. PERKINS. I think they are relatively free. They are freer than the rest of the people back of the iron curtain.

Mr. SMITH. If I understand your statement, you said that it was an absolute dictatorship.

Mr. PERKINS. That is true, but there are degrees of dictatorship.

Mr. SMITH. Define them.

Mr. PERKINS. There is a certain amount of free speech in Yugoslavia. There is access to information from the west which does not exist in countries farther to the east. They are decentralizing government controls, which we think is an encouraging sign. They have taken steps to grant amnesty to some of their political prisoners and have released several thousand already.

As has already been mentioned, they are removing the privileges of the Communist Party members and placing them on an equality with other people in Yugoslavia. I think those are the main differences.

Last, of course, and perhaps in a sense the most important, is they have a more liberal attitude toward religion than the other Communist states. That does not mean that they do not ever interfere with religion, but they are certainly more liberal about it.

Mr. RICHARDS. You say that the Government will get the food and then sell it to the people for local currency. How are the people going to buy it in the drought-stricken areas? Has the Yugoslav Government a program to provide currency to those people who cannot make it?

Mr. PERKINS. The statement from Ambassador Allen is that needy persons lacking sufficient dinars will receive food free.

Mr. RICHARDS. The Government will not sell it to them. It will be distributed by the Government?

Mr. PERKINS. Part will be distributed by the Government.

Mr. MERROW. Did the Tito Government formally request aid from us?

Mr. PERKINS. Do you mean did they make a formal request?

Mr. MERROW. Yes.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; they did make that request on October 20.

Mr. MERROW. I am very much interested in Mr. Smith's statement with reference to conditions being attached to this aid.

Has any thought been given to setting up conditions with reference to Yugoslavia assisting the Atlantic community in stopping the drive of communism to engulf the earth?

Mr. PERKINS. Thought has been given to that. I think the feeling is that at the present time this is not the time to do that.

Mr. MERROW. It seems to me one of the major mistakes all along the line has been that we have not attached any conditions to the aid that we have extended. Now we are requested again to assist another country, and apparently there are not going to be any conditions attached to this aid. How can we expect cooperation and assistance if we do not lay down some conditions as we go along?

Mr. PERKINS. I think the question is, Do you expect cooperation if you do lay down conditions? I think that you would have great difficulty in getting cooperation if you did lay down the conditions.

We have been very much encouraged by the actions the Yugoslavs have been taking recently which have not been conditioned, but have been a result from suggestions that we have made to them.

They have released finally some of the Greek children, and they are taking steps to proceed with that. They have tackled this program of dual nationals in Yugoslavia, and on some of the religious matters they have relaxed somewhat.

Mr. MERROW. We have made suggestions for some time with reference to what ought to be done in western Europe, but there does not seem to be the progress that there ought to be. It seems to me the time has come to work out carefully a set of conditions that might be precedent to our aid. It seems to me we ought to have some insurance from Yugoslavia or other countries that they would assist the Atlantic community in preventing the movement of communism.

You say that some thought has been given to this. Will you elaborate a little?

Mr. PERKINS. I wonder if I might hold that for an executive session.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. Could we look at this program for a minute and see what it really is. This program is certainly not the humanitarian approach, is it?

Mr. PERKINS. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. This program cannot be fitted into the United States program in Greece and Turkey of containing communism, can it?

Mr. PERKINS. Not completely; no.

Mr. FULTON. Well, not at all, because Yugoslavia is a Communist government.

Mr. PERKINS. From that point of view, absolutely. The question is what communism we are talking about containing.

Mr. FULTON. You said this is probably a better type dictatorship than some of the worst dictatorships, did you not?

Mr. PERKINS. That is right.

Mr. FULTON. Tito says that he is a Lenin Communist and had a statue or picture of Lenin right behind his chair in his office, as recently as last month.

With that as an area of reference, would you then say that the Lenin type of communism and dictatorship is better than the Stalin type communism and dictatorship, and therefore, because of that ideological difference, the Government of Yugoslavia should be aided?

Mr. PERKINS. I am not sure that I am enough of an expert on variations of communism to answer that question very well. What Tito has said is—

Mr. FULTON. I would rather have your own ideas, please.

Mr. PERKINS. Let me express what I have in my mind, if I may. He thinks that Stalin has perverted communism. I do not know whether that is true or not, or whether Tito has perverted communism. Certainly he does not agree with the Stalinists' interpretation of communism and is going off on a different tangent and is avoiding some of the worst features that we recognize in the Stalinist Communist. That, we feel, is significant and important because it tends to break down the authority of the Stalinist Communist tenets, one of which is that you must always be subservient to the dictates of the Kremlin.

Mr. FULTON. Suppose that you had two tigers in the back yard, a little one and a big one, would you go out every morning and feed the little tiger? If he does not like you any better than does the big one, would it not be possible that in a short time you might have two big tigers instead of a big tiger and a little tiger?

Mr. PERKINS. I think that is possible. That is also true of some of the other countries that we have helped. They could conceivably turn to evil ways later on. We have to figure on the law of probabilities, I think, and there are certain calculated risks that have to be considered.

Mr. FULTON. Archbishop Stepinac is in prison yet. And, regarding the treatment of the Catholic church, or any church, for that matter, you said that the Yugoslavia Government was a little better toward the church than other dictators. I can hardly see that when I think of people who have opposed them like Mihailovitch.

May I just say this: American policy must not be just arms, bombs, and bread. There is something of the spirit, too. People in this country and this Government have something of the feeling that people in distress can come to us and we will help where we can. We must make sure we are not gardening a group of pet dictators. Under such circumstances I think that you cannot have arms and bread enough

to sustain the world, as principle would not be on our side, and there is no standard to which the wise and the just can repair.

Mr. PERKINS. The point I meant to make, in more detail; they have allowed the appointment of two new Catholic bishops. They released another one who served 2 years of an 11½ years sentence. They have allowed several Lutheran churches to open and apparently the Orthodox church gets along better with the Government than it did formerly. I am not trying to say that their record is perfect or right. All I am trying to indicate is that some progress is being made and it is encouraging. They are beginning to see the light on some of these matters.

Mr. FULTON. Has any discussion been made on the settlement of Trieste as a part of this aid?

Mr. PERKINS. There has been no suggestion that that should be a condition to this aid.

Mr. FULTON. Has there been any suggestion that Yugoslavia give up its claim of exclusive citizenship and control over people of Yugoslav descent who are naturalized citizens of, say, America or other countries? This is the problem of dual citizenship.

Mr. PERKINS. That has not been taken up in this connection but it has been taken up.

As I said earlier, progress is being made, and they are willing to consider the releasing of any of those people. The American Embassy at Belgrade and the American consulate at Zagreb currently have listed approximately 900 cases of persons who are claimants to American citizenship. About one-third of these have not indicated their desire to return to the United States at this time. About another third have not satisfactorily established with the United States their claims to United States citizenship. Most of these persons are regarded by the Yugoslav authorities as Yugoslav nationals. The Embassy at Belgrade and the consulate at Zagreb have repeatedly intervened with the Yugoslav authorities in behalf of those who have established United States citizenship and desire to leave Yugoslavia. Ambassador Allen saw the Yugoslav Minister of Interior in this connection in mid-November, as a result of which we now have assurance that exit permits will be issued as rapidly as possible to the some 350 persons to whom the United States is willing to issue passports.

Mr. FULTON. On what basis do you place this program then? What is your specific basis if it is not humanitarianism, it is not containing communism, it is not having Yugoslavia join the Atlantic Treaty nations, it is not having them even join the Marshall-aid countries, or at this time even a request or an offer to get on the western side? Is not the basis that you are placing for this program, that you are financing a fellow who will be a new neutral in Europe when the overall policy of this Government has been that there can be no neutrals in this dispute between the west and Russia? Are you not by this program making the first exception to the State Department position that there can be no neutrality in Europe?

Mr. PERKINS. We have given aid to other neutrals, so I do not know, if that were the case, that it would be a new departure.

Mr. FULTON. In Europe?

Mr. PERKINS. In Europe. I do not think that is the real story.

What we are concerned with is containing, or driving a wedge, if you will, into Communist totalitarianism, and in containing in particular the Stalin breed of communism, doctrine, or whatever you want to call it.

We feel very strongly that it is essential that Tito, having made the break with Stalin, will succeed in that break because we can only break it down by driving wedges into it, and that is one of the most important wedges that has appeared. If we let that effort fail, whether we like Mr. Tito or not, it will be a very devastating thing from the point of view of anybody else who is going to think about trying to break away from the Stalinist doctrine.

Mr. FULTON. You said earlier that the events that are taking place in Yugoslavia evidently are of a beneficial nature and are "resulting from pressures and suggestions we have made to them."

As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I know of no pressures that we have put on Yugoslavia. Will you please explain what those pressures are?

Mr. PERKINS. Perhaps I should not use the word "pressure."

Mr. FULTON. I certainly think that you should be clear.

Mr. PERKINS. We have been making every effort to get them to do these things; whether you call it pressure or not is a question.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Javits.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, do you not agree that the American people ought to understand very clearly what we are doing in view of the fact that this is the first time that we are helping a Communist dictator?

Mr. PERKINS. Completely; absolutely.

Mr. JAVITS. Do you agree that the words "economic warfare" have a very understandable connotation? We used them throughout World War II and the people had a pretty good idea of what that meant.

Mr. PERKINS. I think that is right.

Mr. JAVITS. Is this economic warfare?

Mr. PERKINS. That is my understanding of it.

Mr. JAVITS. Hence, the reason why you ask that this be made a grant instead of a loan is that you cannot get all your conditions accepted; is that right?

Mr. PERKINS. That is right.

Mr. JAVITS. Because on balance you feel this is the thing to do in the fight against the aggressive Communist power that we are waging.

Is it not a fact that one of the things that our policy has been the most criticized for is that we have not gotten behind the iron curtain enough in our struggle against communism and this is the first time we are doing it?

Mr. PERKINS. I would not say that it is the first time we are doing it. It is the first time that we have had a chance to do it effectively.

Mr. JAVITS. Effectively?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes.

Mr. JAVITS. Is it not a fact that we do not by this program intend to give Tito even a small part of the economic aid that he needs? He needs much more; does he not?

Mr. PERKINS. Far more than we are talking about.

Mr. JAVITS. This is a relief for starvation program?

Mr. PERKINS. That is right.

Mr. JAVITS. This is neither the complete bill for aid, nor the bill of conditions we would set to aid?

Mr. PERKINS. That is about right.

Mr. JAVITS. It is just the beginning, and it is the beginning in economic warfare of the kind some people felt, including myself, we ought to have; is that correct?

Mr. PERKINS. That is correct.

Mr. JAVITS. That is why, Mr. Secretary, I am for this program.

Now, would the State Department see any reason why there should not be an amendment to its draft bill in section 3 (d)?

Section 3 (d) says:

To make equitable distribution to its people at reasonable prices consistent with economic conditions—

and I propose to offer an amendment to it which will make it read:

To make equitable distribution to its people—

and then these words I want inserted:

without discrimination on grounds of race, creed, color, or political opinion.

Can the State Department see any objection to that?

Mr. PERKINS. Offhand, I have no objection to it. I would like to consider it, if I may.

Mr. JAVITS. It is a legislative mandate that we want to distribute the aid to the people of Yugoslavia, not only the Communists.

Do you agree, Mr. Secretary, that although we may not be able to get many agreements out of the Yugoslav Government, we can impose conditions on how our own aid is distributed?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes. There is no question about that.

Mr. JAVITS. Is it a fact, too, that if we do impose conditions, there will be a very essential difference between what we impose and the kind of business that Tito had been doing with the Kremlin before he broke away from the Kremlin in 1948, and that is if we impose conditions they will be public conditions. Everybody in the United States will know about them. They will be openly discussed and they will be demanded openly in public, whereas the Kremlin's conditions are likely to be clandestine. Is that correct?

Mr. PERKINS. I think that is correct. I am not sure what that leads to, however.

Mr. JAVITS. I am only pointing out when we do condition aid, it will be upon conditions which are publicly announced and publicly discussed. There is a very great difference between those conditions and the conditions imposed by the Kremlin.

Mr. PERKINS. But how will that help the recipients of the conditions?

Mr. JAVITS. It helps the recipient of the conditions in that the conditions are much more likely to be fair than if they are clandestine and conspiratorial.

Yugoslavia is indebted to other countries—Switzerland, France, Great Britain—and I understand that there are negotiators for Yugoslavia in France with respect to the copper mines which are owned by the French in Yugoslavia and expropriated.

Is it your purpose to see that none of the moneys we devote to relief in Yugoslavia are directly or indirectly diverted for the purpose of paying Yugoslavia's debts to anybody?

Mr. PERKINS. Certainly; that is correct, but there would be no money going to Yugoslavia and they would have no chance. It would simply be foodstuffs donated.

Mr. JAVITS. Or that the aid itself in some fashion may be misused, will we be vigilant on that score?

Mr. PERKINS. We certainly will.

Mr. JAVITS. It is a fact that Yugoslavia is now negotiating trade treaties with various countries—Switzerland and France.

Mr. PERKINS. Right.

Mr. JAVITS. I raise that point to serve notice that we are aware of that, and that we should see that in no way is our aid diverted and that it is used only for its essential purposes.

Mr. PERKINS. You are absolutely right.

Mr. JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Secretary, is it your considered opinion that Tito is beyond the pale permanently insofar as Stalin is concerned?

Mr. PERKINS. I think there is no question of that whatsoever. He has said so and Stalin has said so, and there seems to be no possible way in which that breach can be mended. They have just gone too far for either of them to be able to withdraw what they have said.

Mr. RICHARDS. Someone said yesterday that Hitler and Stalin said the same thing about each other, but they got together. I think the main thing the American people are concerned about in there is whether we are going to help some nation that may make a trade later on and go back home.

Mr. PERKINS. The difference in this instance is that Tito has hit the basic concept of the Stalin theory, which is that everyone has to be subservient to the Kremlin. He has revolted from the Kremlin. There is no way on earth they can take him back into the fold without destroying their whole theory of the management of the economy of the world.

Mr. RICHARDS. Other Communists have been taken back.

Mr. PERKINS. I cannot think of any.

Mr. RICHARDS. What about Dimitrov, who proposed the federation of the Balkan States?

Mr. PERKINS. He did not break with the Kremlin. He just made a mistake.

Mr. RICHARDS. He made a mistake, and he came back home perhaps before it was too late. Maybe Tito is so far out on the limb he cannot get back.

Mrs. BOLTON. I would like to suggest the original Communist doctrine was that there should not be a union of autonomous states not a centrally controlled Communist country, and part of Tito's claim in this whole thing is that he is upholding the original Communist theory and that Stalin is the one who has violated it.

Mr. RICHARDS. Suppose he repudiates that concept. That is what I am talking about, and he goes back home and says, "I am wrong."

Mrs. BOLTON. He would be dead, and he knows it.

Mr. RICHARDS. He may be dead, and he may be more alive than he ever was before.

Mr. PERKINS. There is no question about it. The thing has been very thoroughly canvassed with all our Russian experts who know as much as anybody can about the mentality of these people, and they are perfectly certain there is just no chance.

Mrs. BOLTON. As you know, I was responsible for a Communist report gotten out by the subcommittee.

Mr. RICHARDS. And a very fine report.

Mrs. BOLTON. We were in Moscow in 1945, and in discussing the whole situation with Mr. Vishinsky we asked a good many questions about the principles of communism. Mr. Mundt, our spokesman, said, "They were so different from what we supposed they were; our knowledge probably came from the original Communist ideas." Vishinsky replied, "One of the things you must understand about communism is that Marx gave us the ideology; Lenin interpreted it, Stalin is making of it a Russian phenomenon." That is certainly the case. Tito has made it very clear that he does not go along with the phenomenon.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we are at a point ourselves where we are faced very definitely with survival—and we had better remember it—we had better think of it every day of our lives and every minute of our days. We should do whatever we can to pry loose from Kremlin domination somebody and some state. Regardless of the fact that Tito's ideology is Communist and does not agree with ours by this action we shall be doing something to make possible an eventual overthrow of the forces that are waging this war.

At the moment, with the situation as it is in the Far East, the one essential thing is time. Whatever we can do in Europe or Asia or anywhere else to get time is the thing that we should do. What are we prepared to do in this country against this force of destruction? Certainly this emergency help to Yugoslavia whatever be her government will give hope to the people in Europe and so will help the eventual goal we all seek.

Yes, I would like to see Tito made responsible for the carrying out of the Subositch agreement through which we originally recognized the Government of Yugoslavia. But have we held anyone responsible for anything? We have let everybody do as they pleased. This is hardly the moment to bear down when through this help we may be able to drive a wedge between the Kremlin and Yugoslavia.

May I repeat that nothing resembling communism as originally intended exists today. That ended with the military purge of 20 years ago. It is now a state monopoly of the cruelest and most ruthless kind.

Mr. RICHARDS. I hope you are right about that. You make a good argument anyway.

Mr. Carnahan, did I pass you over; do you have any questions?

Mr. CARNAHAN. No; I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chipperfield.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I just make a personal request? I want to ask the witness just one thing and that is whether or not the State Department will take a very forceful stand on the Archbishop Stepinac case and the restoration of church property and the other grave disabilities that the Tito government has inflicted upon the church in Yugoslavia?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; we certainly will.

Mr. JAVITS. Thank you.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chipperfield.

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, we had before us last fall, I think it was, Mr. Armstrong of the Intelligence Department.

The CLERK. Mr. Armstrong was here two times, Mr. Chairman, in August before one of the subcommittees.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I would like myself to have him testify again in executive session. He talked about this matter, but I do not want to talk about it in public.

Mr. PERKINS. Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. Mudd here this morning from Mr. Armstrong's office, who is his expert on Yugoslavia, and if you would like to call on him later he will be available.

Mr. RICHARDS. We want to hear him later on this.

Mr. Ribicoff.

Mr. RIBICOFF. I have no questions, thank you.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. What is the calorie diet now, and what will it be for the next 4 months over there, and for the next 6 months? We were quite familiar with calorie considerations during UNRRA and the first phases of the Marshall plan.

Mr. PERKINS. I have figures here on that. I will get them for you. The normal diet in the past has been about 2,800 calories in Yugoslavia. The estimate is that with the foodstuffs that they have on hand that will drop to about 2,300 calories, and with the aid which is proposed it would rise to 2,500 or about 2,600 calories, 2,550 to 2,600 calories. About 4,000 calories per man per day are required for the Yugoslav Army numbering some 350,000 men. A population made up of a large proportion of soldiers, farmers, laborers, and other heavy workers requires a relatively high daily average per capita intake to carry on in the manner required to maintain itself in the present situation.

Mr. VORYS. That is, this contemplates practically no tightening of their own belts?

Mr. PERKINS. About 10 percent of their food ration.

Mr. VORYS. What I mean is that this is away above the kind of figures we were attempting to shoot at in feeding Europe under the Marshall plan; it goes away beyond them.

Mr. PERKINS. They are away beyond the initial figures, but they are not beyond the objectives of the Marshall plan, and these figures are lower than the present diets in Austria and Germany where the diet is still being supported by the Marshall plan.

Mr. VORYS. But there has yet been no starvation nor any real hunger, has there?

Mr. PERKINS. No; not up to this moment, if that is what you mean.

Mrs. BOLTON. Do you mean in Yugoslavia?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. PERKINS. Mrs. Bolton, I mean they have quite enough food to live on at the moment. They have cut back about 10 percent in their food intake now. Difficulty may come a little later on.

Mrs. BOLTON. Well, there are some hungry people there.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes, of course; I imagine that there are almost always some hungry people in Yugoslavia in certain areas.

Mr. VORYS. Well, it is perfectly obvious that there is no famine there now, and there is no starvation there now.

Mr. PERKINS. No; there is no starvation there now.

Mr. VORYS. And there is not going to be any certainty till the end of January.

Mr. PERKINS. That depends upon how they distribute their food, and what they do with the food that they have and get.

Mr. VORYS. Yes; but with the supplies that we unilaterally furnish, that is, what is already under way, there is just not any starvation or any famine in sight in Yugoslavia till the end of January.

Mr. PERKINS. That is right, they have enough food to feed their people, presumably, until the end of January.

Mr. HIGGS. Mr. Secretary, the agricultural attaché has just arrived from Yugoslavia, and he will be here tomorrow, and he can probably give you more detail on that.

Mr. PERKINS. That is right, but I think, based on the figures we have, there is enough food in Yugoslavia, with what is on the way, to take care of the situation until the end of January.

Mr. VORYS. Now, there has been a lot of talk before our committee here this morning about attaching conditions to our aid so as to make it in line with the things that we have been doing for the last 3 or 4 years, wherever we have extended aid. Now, suppose we offer an alternative here. You have said that you do not want that and the Yugoslavs do not want it. Suppose we offer credit such as the British have, so that they can borrow the money and pay it back with lead, zinc, and so forth, over a period of years; or, if they want a grant, they can take it with our terms attached. How would that be? They can take their pick. If they do not want to have any strings tied to the aid, why, they can borrow the money and we will take a little time to get it back in these critical materials they have and which we want. We do not need them next year or the year after, but they can pay off this loan and take their time about it; or, if they want a grant, they can take it on the terms that are simply standard when we make a grant. What would you think about that?

Mr. PERKINS. Well, in the first place, if we do it on the credit basis, as indicated earlier, we simply cut down the total credit which is available to them. They have still some credit there, and they need that credit for putting the country on its feet where it will continue to survive and not be calling for outside help all of the time. So, that is really not a good alternative. I do not know that we are making conditions on other people where we have been making grants to them.

Mr. VORYS. Well, just to refresh your recollection we have right from the post-UNRRA law on through. We did not under UNRRA, and then we learned our lesson, and from post-UNRRA relief, from the spring of 1947 clear through the Marshall plan in the aid that we have extended, even in Asia, there are a whole series of strings attached to our aid that are standard; there are provisions made for counterpart funds and all of the rest of it.

Mr. PERKINS. That kind of condition relates to the conditions economically and—

Mr. FULTON. No; there were political conditions in the last ECA, if you recall.

Mr. VORYS. Yes, this committee has been going through that, recently.

Mr. PERKINS. Well, I am confused about that.

Mr. FULTON. And that condition was that we want the Marshall-plan countries to join together and take steps toward European union and unification.

Mr. PERKINS. That was not a condition, but the expression of a desire.

Mr. FULTON. That certainly was the condition upon which the aid was accepted, that they would take those steps, and that if that was not done there would not be further aid forthcoming. That is one of the points that will be examined on extension of Marshall-plan aid to determine whether Marshall-plan countries have gone far enough in unification and in joining together in cooperation.

Mr. VORYS. I do not care to have you give your final answer on that now. I wish you would consider the possibility of an alternative plan.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; we shall be very glad to do that.

Mr. VORYS. Rather than embark at this time upon a brand new sort of give-away, such as we have never done in our whole history, we should consider that plan.

That is all. I have no further questions.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one thing further at this time?

Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. The committee will remember I was one of the ones who sat here at the time when the State Department and the Army were up here, when they talked of removing troops from Korea, and I said, "I do not believe South Korea can then defend itself and can sustain itself against attack from North Korea, say it again." So, you now have said at least twice that Tito will not join up with the other Communists, but that he will remain separate from them and that it is worth the chance in order to get these 32 divisions of his over on our side or neutral. Will you please say again that the Department and that this administration feels that there is no chance that Tito will go over to the other side; because I do not believe it.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; I am glad to say that again. We feel that there is no chance that Tito will go over.

Mr. FULTON. And you do not feel that there is any chance that those 32 divisions will be used against us, or to our detriment?

Mr. PERKINS. By Tito?

Mr. FULTON. By Tito or anybody.

Mr. PERKINS. Well, I cannot say by anybody, I do not know, but by Tito I think the answer is "Yes," that they will not be used against us.

Mr. FULTON. And you can assure this committee that that is your reasoned and full judgment, and is not a hasty judgment?

Mr. PERKINS. That is correct.

Mr. JAVITS. I have just one more question, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to ask.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Javits.

Mr. JAVITS. Is it not a fact, Mr. Secretary, that this aid is, in the view of the Department, essential to maintain the Tito government? In other words, you are only talking about the Tito government now in the answers that you have given; is that correct?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; only the Tito government. I do not think we can say that this aid is essential to maintain the Tito government. The Tito government might or might not survive without this aid. The probability is I think it would survive. Being a Communist dictatorship, they have a pretty tight hold on the situation, but they might be so weakened in their surviving that their troops would be incapable of satisfactory resistance, or later on it might eventually destroy their hold on the situation and allow the Stalin Communists to take hold of the situation.

Mr. JAVITS. And our policy is to do everything we can to keep Tito from coming back into the Cominform and the Stalinist Communists from coming back in and taking control of the situation like they did in Hungary, Rumania, China, and so forth.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDS. Do you consider that the only alternative is in the Tito government itself?

Mr. PERKINS. We see no other alternative.

Mr. RICHARDS. You do not think it would swing to the right?

Mr. PERKINS. We do not see any leadership that would bring it back to the right.

Mr. FULTON. If it is a straight business deal what are the strategic or vital materials that we might get from Yugoslavia in exchange for a loan? Can you outline some of those elements like copper, zinc, and manganese?

Mr. PERKINS. Copper, zinc, and lead, I think, are the principal exports we are getting from them.

Mr. FULTON. What are the materials, to follow up this line of questioning, that we might get in return for what we give them as a business deal?

Mr. PERKINS. I think the provision which is in the draft act, which says that they will make accessible to us those materials, is what we should expect.

Mr. FULTON. Give us some of the details of it; how much and where are they.

Mr. PERKINS. In 1949, which is, of course, the last full year that we have, we got 13,361 metric tons of copper, and 21,267 metric tons of lead, 246 tons of antimony, and 109 tons of quick silver. These are Department of Commerce figures.

Mr. FULTON. Is there any manganese there?

Mr. PERKINS. No. There may be small quantities, but it is not significant.

(The following table has been submitted for the record:)

Yugoslavia: Export of strategic materials, 1947-49 and January to September 1950

[In metric tons]

Country of destination	Copper, blister, and electrolytic				Lead, refined			Zinc, concentrates			
	1947	1948	1949	January-September 1950	1947	1948	1949	January-September 1950	1947	1948	1949
Soviet bloc.....	6,522	11,844	1,114	(1)	19,452	22,413	5,558	(1)	11,166	12,033	7,148
Czechoslovakia.....	2,009	2,532	1,000	-----	1,726	4,700	5,208	-----	-----	-----	-----
Hungary.....	1,611	3,039	114	-----	1,571	3,332	350	-----	-----	-----	-----
Poland.....	1,140	3,328	-----	-----	-----	726	-----	-----	11,166	12,033	7,148
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.....	1,762	2,885	-----	-----	16,155	13,655	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Western world.....	10,759	10,722	13,978	11,323	20,888	19,033	46,495	36,313	29,886	24,045	21,983
Austria.....	212	256	324	-----	1,014	735	1,395	630	-----	-----	-----
Belgium.....	-----	1,000	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	20	-----	15,355	16,443
France.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	1,397	997	-----	-----	-----
Germany (west).....	-----	-----	1,995	4,403	-----	-----	1,523	0	-----	-----	-----
Italy.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	805	2,421	2,258	-----	-----	-----	-----
Netherlands.....	6,007	749	1,045	-----	3,105	3,665	2,559	500	9,556	2,990	1,630
Sweden.....	-----	250	-----	-----	830	1,970	3,000	-----	-----	-----	-----
Switzerland.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	835	2,265	590	945	-----	-----	-----
United Kingdom.....	-----	-----	-----	-----	1,700	250	-----	22,000	-----	-----	-----
United States.....	-----	-----	9,977	6,420	-----	-----	27,659	28,425	-----	-----	2,9,450
Others.....	4,540	8,467	637	500	12,599	7,727	7,114	2,796	8,975	5,700	3,910
Total.....	17,281	22,566	15,092	11,323	40,340	41,446	52,053	36,313	41,052	36,078	29,131
											23,052

1 Negligible.

2 Sterling area.

Country of destination	Pulpwood				Antimony			Mercury	
	1947	1948	1949	January-September 1950	1947	1948	1949	1949	January-September 1950
Soviet bloc.....	18, 120	17, 437	(1)	(1)	377	375	(1)	(1)	(1)
Western world.....	272, 252	509, 858	636, 233	466, 700	1, 117	923	1, 526	351	326
Austria.....			36, 325	71, 814					14
Belgium.....									27
France.....									12
Germany (west).....								21	20
Italy.....				53, 057					31
Netherlands.....				332, 402					
Sweden.....									
Switzerland.....			470, 380						
United Kingdom.....			54, 694						
United States.....			804	2, 898					
Others.....				26, 580				124	176
				79				206	32
Total.....	290, 372	527, 245	636, 233	466, 780	1, 494	1, 293	1, 526	351	326

1 Negligible.

2 Sterling area.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Secretary, you are not contending that this program would in any way encourage those free people, or those who want liberty and freedom in Yugoslavia, that it will in any way encourage them under this operation?

Mr. PERKINS. I do not think you can say that at all. The purpose of this is to see to it that people who are on our side are taken care of.

Mr. SMITH. Do you maintain that Tito is on our side?

Mr. PERKINS. Perhaps I should say not on the other side.

Mr. SMITH. That is a distinction without a difference.

Mrs. BOLTON. No; not quite.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Merrow.

Mr. MERROW. Mr. Secretary, I realize that you are going to discuss this matter of conditions in executive session, but I have this observation to make; it seems to me that, if the break is as irrevocable as you think, there should be no hesitancy on the part of the Tito government to agree to conditions which we might formulate, and that there should be no hesitancy on our part in laying down certain conditions that we would like to see fulfilled.

Mr. PERKINS. I think that there is a great deal of difficulty in it because of what I have said: that one of the basic factors in the break with the Stalinists came about as the result of the fact that they laid down conditions on Yugoslavia. That is a public reason, not a private reason. It has been broadcast all through Yugoslavia, and if we come in and start making conditions it seems to me that would be a misconception of the situation.

Mr. MERROW. But the type of conditions laid down by a free country would be different, certainly, from those imposed by the Communists in Russia.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; that is true, but they are still conditions.

Mr. MERROWS. But they ought to do something in return for what they are going to get from us. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Battle, would you like to ask any questions?

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Secretary, I was wondering about this aid bill that we are considering. Is it anticipated that we will use our surplus food, or is this to be a grant to purchase new food?

Mr. PERKINS. This will be a grant which will use surplus food, in so far as possible, of course.

Mr. BATTLE. Does this mean that we are being asked to appropriate money to buy surplus food from our own agricultural agencies, or how will that work?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; we would buy food here in the United States.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Richards, you talked yesterday about making use of this surplus food that is already available.

Mr. RICHARDS. We got into that awhile before you came in, but go ahead, Mr. Battle.

Mr. BATTLE. I will catch up on that later.

Mr. VORYS. We were told that all of our surpluses are a strategic reserve. I presume that includes eggs, and so forth. We will get a little more information on that from the agricultural people.

Mr. FULTON. What proportion of this program is to be given from surplus, whether strategic surplus or just plain surplus of the United States?

Mr. PERKINS. As I said earlier, I think you can get a more satisfactory answer on that from the agricultural witnesses than from myself.

Mr. FULTON. I am not asking for details. I am simply saying what portion of it will have to be new money. Now, the State Department ought to be able to give that.

Mr. PERKINS. What do you mean by new money?

Mr. FULTON. Well, you are going to have to buy some of it if it is not taken from United States surplus. So, I am asking you what part of it is money that must actually be spent as against the part of the program obtained from surplus.

Mr. PERKINS. I think, if we may, we better get that for you and not try to do it up here.

Mr. FULTON. Can you give it to us approximately? Is it 10 or 20 percent purchases and the rest of it in surplus?

Mr. TRUESDELL. You will see the items listed here [indicating]. You will find that we are meeting the Yugoslav request for 4,500 metric tons of dried eggs. The prices shown in the first column are the market values which we would have to pay under law and precedent if appropriated funds are used. If they are purchased by the Yugoslavs with their own funds, they would be allowed special prices.

Mr. FULTON. On what page is that?

Mr. PERKINS. It is in exhibit 1, table 1.

Mr. FULTON. Looking at table 1, ocean transportation is shown as 3.6 million dollars. Is that "Canned meat" item surplus?

Mr. TRUESDELL. That is Mexican canned meat.

Mr. FULTON. What proportion out of the 34.4 million dollars is going to be paid for with the taxpayers' money?

Mr. TRUESDELL. That would be analyzed by the Department of Agriculture and a determination made, depending on what comes out of the price-support program and that sort of thing.

Mr. FULTON. I do not mean just that. I am looking for what you must buy from sources outside of United States Government stocks.

Mr. PERKINS. I think if we may we better get that for you.

Mr. RIBICOFF. I think the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Vorys, could tell you about the experience he had in that connection on the floor. I think under the present law you have to buy it.

Mr. VORYS. The answer to the question as to how much is coming out of the taxpayers would be all of it. The answer would be that it is all going to be brand-new money coming out of the taxpayers.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Vorys' whole intention on that was misinterpreted.

Mr. FULTON. May I say this: That the question there was not the same as the question here. That became a fight to set aside a certain amount of the money under the Marshall-plan program for surpluses, and to the industrial people it looked as though they were setting it aside or freezing part of the funds by prior legislative allocation, to the derogation of industrial products. I was one of the ones who opposed it too.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Well, I do not think that was Mr. Vorys' intention at all.

Mr. FULTON. But it happened that way.

Now, on the new money that will have to be spent other than for current Government stocks, will you come up with a statement of that to us to show us the source and the purpose of the funds and whatever there might be going into this program, tracing the source down? Then I will yield to Mrs. Bolton.

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; we will get that together for you.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

COMMODITIES IN STOCK AND OPEN-MARKET PURCHASES IN THE YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY PROGRAM

The total program is comprised of foodstuffs with a market value of \$75,000,000, of which \$53,000,000, or 71 percent, are held in the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation; and \$22,000,000, or 29 percent, chiefly flour, lard, and seeds, must be purchased in the open market.

The program before the Congress has an estimated market value of 34.4 million dollars, of which 24.6 million dollars, or 72 percent, are in CCC stocks, while 9.8 million dollars, or 28 percent, must be purchased on the open market.

Dried beans, dried eggs, and dried milk are sold by the CCC at "nominal" prices to member countries of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for use in special feeding projects. Included in the total program are 35,000 metric tons of dried beans, 4,500 tons of dried eggs, and 6,000 tons of dried milk, but only those foods purchased with Yugoslav funds, provided under the Export-Import Bank credit, were obtained at special prices. The remainder, procured with appropriated funds, are included in the program at regular market prices in keeping with the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.

Under section 416, Public Law 439, Eighty-first Congress, "perishable" items are made available to private welfare organizations in the United States for the assistance of needy persons at points of storage in the United States without charge. It is expected that modest amounts of dried eggs, dried milk, and possibly some cheese may be obtained by United States welfare organizations for Yugoslav relief purposes. Potatoes and butter, the only other "perishable" items offered by the CCC without charge under section 416, are not expected to be shipped in view of the high handling costs, excessive ocean transportation charges, and the probabilities of spoilage.

A table prepared by the Department of Agriculture indicating the items in the total and congressional portions of the program which must be purchased in the open market is presented herewith for insertion in the record:

Breakdown of Yugoslav-aid program in terms of commodities in stock with Department of Agriculture and those requiring purchase in the open market

Commodity	Total Yugoslav-aid program								Congressional program			
	Amount		In stock (Commodity Credit Corporation)		(Perishables)		Open-market purchases		In stock (Commodity Credit Corporation)		Open-market purchases	
	1,000 metric tons	Million dollars	1,000 metric tons	Million dollars	1,000 metric tons	Million dollars	1,000 metric tons	Million dollars	1,000 metric tons	Million dollars	1,000 metric tons	Million dollars
Wheat.....	140	12.2	¹ 140	12.2								
Flour.....	58	6.5					58	6.5			26	2.9
Corn meal.....	9	.9					9	.9				
Corn.....	137.5	9.8	137.5	9.8					125	8.9		
Barley.....	40	2.7	40	2.7					15	1.0		
Oats.....	60	4.8	60	4.8					60	4.8		
Milo.....	50	2.6	50	2.6					50	2.6		
Rice.....	5	1.1					5	1.1			5	1.1
Peas.....	30	3.0	30	3.0					30	3.0		
Sugar.....	20	2.4					20	2.4				
Edible fats: Lard.....	20	7.1					20	7.1			5	1.8
Beans.....	35	5.8	35	5.8					15	2.5		
Dried eggs.....	4.5	9.9	4.5	9.9	(4.5)	(9.9)						
Dried milk ²	6	1.8	6	1.8	(6.0)	(1.8)			6	² 1.8		
Canned meat.....	.9	.4	.9	.4								
Seeds.....	18.0	4					18	4.0			18	4.0
Total.....	633.9	75.0	503.9	53.0	(10.5)	(11.7)	130	22.0	301	24.6	54	9.8

¹ Represents replacement for 110,000 tons of flour being delivered direct to Yugoslavia from Italy and Germany under ECA arrangements. Some portion may be procured by recipient countries on open market.

² Only perishable item in congressional portion of total program.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Lodge, do you have any questions?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Perkins, this question may have been asked before: Is it proposed to reimburse the Mutual Defense Assistance program and any other program's funds contemplated for use until this program gets under way?

Mr. PERKINS. No.

Mr. LODGE. Then, actually, you will diminish the amounts which are available under the Mutual Defense Assistance program?

Mr. PERKINS. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. LODGE. Does it not seem to you, in view of the current international situation, that the full amount in the Mutual Defense Assistance program should be available for the purpose for which it was intended by the Congress?

Mr. PERKINS. This thing was very carefully canvassed, Mr. Lodge, and it was concluded that reimbursement should not be asked now.

Mr. LODGE. What was the reason for that?

Mr. HIGGS. If the appropriation runs short, we would just have to ask for a supplemental appropriation later, and in this short session it was felt that it would be more convenient for the Congress and simpler to handle it in this way.

Mr. LODGE. The decision was made then as a matter of tactics in dealing with the Congress, not as a matter of dealing with the situation in the world?

Mr. PERKINS. Insofar as a military angle is concerned—

Mr. LODGE (interposing). I am not saying that it was not proper to use it for that purpose, I am simply inquiring whether it would not be a good idea to reimburse the MDA appropriation. It does not seem to me that the needs of Europe have diminished since the Mutual Defense Assistance program was passed, but, rather, that they have increased. Of course, this is a relatively small amount by comparison with the 4 billion dollars that we added to it at the end of the last session of Congress. It may be that it can be taken care of by the Eighty-second Congress, but I think it is important for us to confront that possibility and not turn our backs on it.

Mr. PERKINS. Let me look into that, because I was not in on that part of it.

(The information is as follows:)

REASONS FOR NOT REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO REIMBURSE MDAP APPROPRIATIONS

Reimbursement of the MDAP appropriation for the funds withdrawn to meet the emergency food crisis in Yugoslavia will be encompassed in the next request made to the Congress for funds to support MDAP in general. This request may not, of course, be in the form of a specific request related to the particular funds withdrawn for the purpose of aiding Yugoslavia. The funds which have been appropriated for MDAP have been programed to the point where the reduction of those programs by \$16,000,000 has a specific effect on the program. However, since the total program involves funds in the neighborhood of \$5,000,000,000, and because of the long lead times involved in carrying out parts of the program, it does not become necessary immediately to replace the \$16,000,000 withdrawn for the purpose of aiding Yugoslavia. It was felt, therefore, that consideration of the question of reimbursement to the MDAP appropriations for the benefit of other countries should not be injected into consideration of the bill which has the single objective of aid to Yugoslavia.

Mr. LODGE. Now, this proposal does not limit the cost to \$38,000,000. What is it going to cost?

Mr. PERKINS. About \$69,000,000.

Mr. LODGE. It is important to get that figure in mind so that we will have some idea of the total cost.

Mr. PERKINS. In table 1 at the back of the book it gives the appropriation request of the stopgap program, and following it in table 2 you come to 69.4 million dollars as the total amount involved in the program from the United States Government. The market value of the total prepared program is \$81,000,000 including ocean transportation costs of \$6,000,000. The actual program expenditure including the Export-Import Bank credit totals 69.4 million dollars including the \$6,000,000 transportation costs. The difference between \$81,000,000 and \$69,000,000 is explained by the special prices allowed by the Commodity Credit Corporation for beans and dried eggs, purchased with funds from the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. FULTON. How about the figure we were given yesterday for the current need plus \$35,000,000 or \$72,000,000?

Mr. PERKINS. No, it is 31.4 million dollars in the stopgap program and \$38,000,000 we are now asking for.

Mr. LODGE. I have one more question that I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, Mr. Lodge.

Mr. LODGE. I gather, then, that there is no intention whatsoever to ask for any kind of quid pro quo in connection with this matter?

Mr. PERKINS. Other than connected with the distribution of the aid itself there is no quid pro quo. It is just the conditions in connection with the distribution of the aid.

Mr. LODGE. As a quid pro quo.

Mr. PERKINS. No, except as contained in the MDAP agreement.

Mr. LODGE. There is no intention to ask for strategic materials then?

Mr. PERKINS. There is a provision in the draft bill that they would continue to make accessible strategic materials.

Mr. LODGE. I do not believe, Mr. Secretary, that the program can be justified on a humanitarian basis.

Mr. PERKINS. No, neither do we.

Mr. LODGE. No. I notice that you say that in your statement. Of course, we are a generous people and a humanitarian people but the object of this surely would be to stem communism. It seems to me the only way we can look at it is in terms of the strategic necessities of the hour. I think if you tried to justify it on the basis of humanitarianism because of conditions in all the rest of the world today it would be a very ineffective thing to do.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mrs. Bolton, I believe you had a question.

Mrs. BOLTON. The time is past, thank you.

Mr. RICHARDS. That will terminate the hearings this morning.

I would like to say to the committee that General Bradley will be here at 2:30 this afternoon first at a public session and then in executive session, and I hope that all of the members will be here.

(Thereupon, at 12:20 p. m., the committee adjourned until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee resumed at 2:30 p. m., Hon. James P. Richards presiding.)

Mr. RICHARDS. The committee will please be in order. We have the pleasure of having with us General Bradley, but at this point in the hearings I am going to ask, before General Bradley testifies, that the clerk read a letter that we have received from General Marshall on the subject of Yugoslavian aid.

(The clerk read the letter which is as follows:)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, November 29, 1950.

HON. JOHN KEE,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President has asked the Congress to take action to provide funds for emergency food aid for Yugoslavia. Because of the effect of the current food shortage on the Yugoslav armed forces regarding their ability to maintain internal security, and ability to resist external attack, the Department of Defense fully endorses the granting of such assistance as will alleviate this situation.

The economic crisis in Yugoslavia will lower the morale of the armed forces, due to the shortage of rations for the troops and their families.

Continued shortage of rations will limit the ability to conduct the necessary training.

From the standpoint of United States security, the strategic importance of the effects referred to in the preceding paragraphs are as follows:

It appears desirable that the largest armed force on the continent of Europe (over 30 divisions) outside of the U. S. S. R. should remain militarily effective

and friendly to the western powers. Communist guerrilla activity in Greece immediately decreased after the Yugoslav break with Moscow.

The Yugoslav-Cominform rift has quite evidently had the effect of slowing down the drive for the close control which Moscow desires over the Communist parties in other countries.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Department of Defense strongly supports the enactment of the emergency food legislation.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. OMAR N. BRADLEY, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

MR. RICHARDS. We are fortunate in having with us General Bradley. I believe, General, your title is now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir.

MR. RICHARDS. You have been informed that we are holding this hearing on the question of aid to Yugoslavia?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. I believe all I can say, Mr. Chairman, is something of an elaboration on the statement of General Marshall. We think—and I am speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Chairman—that this economic crisis in Yugoslavia has provided an opportunity for the United States to seek further gains in exploiting the Yugoslav-Soviet break in behalf and in the interest of the west. We believe it is in the military interest of the United States that this break be exploited as much as possible.

The emergency food aid which the Congress is now considering might provide a lever for exploiting this break. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully concur that it is important and that it is in the important interest of the west that Tito maintain his resistance to dominance from Moscow. We believe that there are significant security advantages to the United States if this rift between Tito and the Kremlin continues, and especially if Tito's example gives impetus to defections by other satellite states. The Yugoslav success in opposing Soviet domination could, in fact, present opportunities which the United States might capitalize on to attain certain of its national objectives.

So, because of the advantages which we might obtain through this rift we believe that from the military point of view the United States economic aid to Tito is sound. I believe that states, Mr. Chairman, the military point of view. In other words, we consider this an opportunity to further this rift to the military advantage of the west.

MR. RICHARDS. Thank you, General. I am sure you would not mind the committee asking you some questions. I just want to say that if there are any questions which you feel should not be answered or that you would prefer to answer in executive session, do not hesitate to say so.

Mr. Battle—

MR. BATTLE. General Bradley, it is a pleasure to see you again, sir. I appreciate your appearance here. I am just wondering what your idea is about whether or not we should tie any strings to this economic aid, such as requiring the return of strategic materials to the United States that might be of use to us. Or do you think it should be just an outright gift with no strings attached?

General BRADLEY. I think that is a question that could probably be better answered by representatives of the State Department who make

our foreign policy. I do not know just what all of the implications of strings would be politically. It is always nice to get something for something. On the other hand, sometimes when you furnish certain aid with the idea that you gain good will now, it pays off materially later on.

Mr. BATTLE. They have certain strategic materials that could be valuable to us, do they not?

General BRADLEY. Probably, but I am afraid I am not in a position to answer just what those are or in what quantity.

Mr. BATTLE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Vorys, have you any questions? The members of the committee understand that we are proceeding under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, the questions I have in mind would take more than 5 minutes to answer and I surmise that you could not answer them in open session, because what I would like to know is your military judgment, not on the question of some Communist country in the Balkans, but on other parts of the world. Right at the moment, since I imagine that you would not care to go into that in an open session, I shall pass, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Mansfield——

Mr. MANSFIELD. No questions.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mrs. Bolton——

Mrs. BOLTON. At the moment, no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Carnahan——

Mr. CARNAHAN. No questions.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Smith——

Mr. SMITH. I am sorry I did not hear the general's statement, and so I shall pass at this time.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Burleson——

Mr. BURLESON. Nothing at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Merrow——

Mr. MERROW. General Bradley, I am glad to have you with us. You may not want to answer this, but the Yugoslav Army would be very valuable in helping in the defense of the Atlantic community if we got into difficulty, would it not?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir; any force of that size on our side would be of material assistance.

Mr. MERROW. Has some thought been given to what help this army might give, or the possibility of integrating it into the defense of western Europe? Of course, the idea of an integrated defense of western Europe has been discussed a great deal, but I am thinking about the integration of this force with it.

General BRADLEY. I believe that is primarily a political question. I assume that you are implying the taking in of Yugoslavia into the North Atlantic Treaty organization, because that is where we do have an integrated defense. I think the inclusion of Yugoslavia into the North Atlantic Treaty organization is primarily a political question, which I believe the State Department would be in a much better position to answer than I am.

Mr. MERROW. I do not know that I was thinking so much of including it, as I was thinking of some commitment in regard to helping the Atlantic Community if we get into a great deal of trouble in stopping the movement of international communism.

General BRADLEY. Whether or not they took an active part, or were committed to take an active part ahead of time, or whether or not they are of great value as a threat on the flank of any movement, is something you would have to weigh. They would be of assistance in either case. In the first place, if we could even take them out of the hostile camp and make them a neutral, that is one step. If you can get them to act as a threat, that is a second step. If you can get them actively to participate on your side, that is even a further step and then, of course, if you had a commitment, where their efforts were integrated with those of ours on the defense, that would still be a further step. But I do not think I am in a position to discuss those various phases. You can see the advantages to all of them.

Mr. MERROW. It would seem to me we ought to get some commitments before aid is extended. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Ribicoff—

Mr. RIBICOFF. No questions.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Fulton—

Mr. FULTON. General, I am glad to see you here. It is always a pleasure to have you with us and we always learn a lot from you. As a former Navy lieutenant I do not know whether those five stars represent too much rank to be asked any question by me or not.

General BRADLEY. I assure you, they do not, whether you are Navy or anybody else.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you. Could we have an estimate of how much of an adverse force Tito's 30 to 32 divisions could tie down, if you want to do that publicly?

General BRADLEY. There are so many "ifs" in that question, Mr. Fulton, it would be hard to give a concrete answer. But to take a force of that size either in active opposition or as a threat on your flank, you would actually tie down or tie down in reserve positions, quite a considerable force. How much they would tie down, of course, would depend upon how the war was going and how the equipment stood up, and what the status of their reserves were, their mobility, and so forth.

Mr. FULTON. Is it not an army rule of thumb that a force that is in a fixed position with ample material is able to tie down about twice the number of the offensive or attacking force?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir. But, of course, that works both ways. If they were attacking Yugoslavia it would probably take twice that many divisions. On the other hand, if they were just holding as against a threat from the flank on the part of Yugoslavia, they might hold with a lesser number, using the same rule of thumb.

Mr. FULTON. Generally they would be able to hold about twice the number of divisions of the attacking force. I am not sure that I clearly understood your answer.

General BRADLEY. I mean, if they were holding altogether defensively against those 30 divisions, using your rule, they might in a defensive position watch them with 15 divisions, using the rule of one-half, to prevent an offensive movement on the part of the 30 divisions. On the other hand, if they are moving to overrun the 30 divisions of Yugoslavia, your figures would probably be correct. It would probably take a good many more to overrun them and conquer them.

Mr. FULTON. Actually it would take more than 32 divisions to overrun a stationary force very well equipped?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. So that you do not say actually in maneuvering that it takes 32 attacking divisions to override 32 divisions?

General BRADLEY. Of course, that is only a general rule, because there are so many intangibles and other tangibles, too, for that matter; the question of morale, equipment, willingness to fight, the amount of air support that you can get to back them up, which is a really tangible thing. So that while that is a general rule, it has many modifications both ways.

Mr. FULTON. According to your estimate, in reference to the other satellite countries surrounding Yugoslavia, such as Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, this force of Tito's would pretty well be able to take care of itself, would it not?

General BRADLEY. If it were attacked we think it would and we think defensively, when they are defending their own country, that they would be quite effective.

Mr. FULTON. So that really, then, the point of decision is as to the size of Tito's force in relation to Soviet Russia. Would you say that would be the deciding factor here?

General BRADLEY. It is pretty hard just to make a numerical proposition out of this. I think the most you can say is that a force of this size, of some 30 or more divisions, on our side in that particular position, could not help but be very effective, whether they are used as a deterrent or as a flanking threat, or in participation. The actual numerical effect on somebody else in terms of divisions is something that is almost impossible to give you. But certainly from a military point of view we would like to have those divisions on our side, and, as General Marshall pointed out in his letter, the trouble in Greece became very materially less when Yugoslavia broke with Russia because they were no longer supporting them across the border. That in itself saved us an awful lot, and for all military reasons in that area we would like to have them on our side, either actively on our side or at least not against us.

Mr. FULTON. In any Russian threat to western Europe, a threatened sweep toward the Atlantic coast, do you think that Tito's force would be a substantial deterrent, a substantial obstacle to their passage?

General BRADLEY. Yes; I think it would act as a deterrent in that area, just as the existence of all defensive forces actually acts as a deterrent to war.

Mr. FULTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Smathers—

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. Chairman, are we going to be permitted the opportunity of hearing General Bradley in executive session?

Mr. RICHARDS. That is correct. General, you are willing to stay with us in executive session?

General BRADLEY. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDS. That is the plan.

Mr. SMATHERS. Then I have no questions at this time.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Lodge—

Mr. LODGE. General, I am very glad to see you here, sir. I think it is probably safe to assume that Tito's regime is at least as anxious to preserve itself as we are to preserve it. I bring that up only because I think there was a tendency during World War II to think that the Russians were less anxious to preserve themselves than we were to

preserve them as a fighting force. I think it important to establish that in our minds because we are in the danger of falling into the same error right now as we were during World War II.

On the assumption that the Yugoslavs are anxious to preserve their own independence, it would seem to me that we ought to obtain some definite quid pro quos, not in the form of strategic materials but in the form of a commitment to fight. I would like to return, therefore, to Mr. Merrow's question, if I may, General, and if it embarrasses you please do not hesitate not to answer it. That is that if we establish a supreme command over there, with an American supreme commander, what will the relations be with the Yugoslavs? Will there be a liaison established between Tito and this supreme commander? What is contemplated along that line, assuming that Yugoslavia will not become part of the Atlantic Treaty nations?

General BRADLEY. I can answer that very briefly.

Mr. LODGE. If you would rather not answer it, please do not hesitate to say so.

General BRADLEY. Well, if you could save that until the executive session, I think I should prefer it.

Mr. LODGE. All right, sir. We will save that until the executive session. Perhaps you would rather save this one for the executive session, too. If you will look at the map on the wall behind our distinguished chairman, I would be interested to have your opinion as to how significant it would be in terms of our own national security and our own capacity for the defense of western Europe if Albania were somehow to become part of our team rather than to be part of the Communist team? Would that be of any significance to us?

General BRADLEY. Oh, I think that is apparent to anyone, and I can answer that in open session, because a country down that far, that is stuck out into the Mediterranean, around which we have a lot of friends, would create a considerable threat in case of an emergency or war if in the hands of the opponent.

Mr. LODGE. That was the answer I expected, General. And, therefore, it occurs to me, in view of the situation in Greece and the part that we played in bringing about a successful solution of that problem, and in view of the situation in Yugoslavia and the part that we have been playing and propose to play in helping them, that we are now in a very strong position to bring about what we might on our part refer to as the liberation of Albania. I think it would have a very salutary effect on a great many other countries if, for once, the tables were turned and liberation were to come about in a real sense instead of in the usual upside-down-language sense. Albania is a nation of about 1,000,000 people, and it would seem to me that would be a very interesting field for the propagation of freedom. Obviously, that would be difficult for you to comment on in open session, but I would assume that it is something to which you were giving a great deal of attention.

General BRADLEY. I do not think that is something on which I should comment on in open session. Of course, we do not have the same opportunity in Albania that we have right now in Yugoslavia to do something to get these people on our side.

Mr. LODGE. I understand that Hodja, the dictator of Albania, is a disciple of the Politburo, is currently anti-Tito, and that there is very bad feeling between the two. Certainly the liberation of Albania would relieve a great deal of pressure on Tito and thereby help us.

We are interested, obviously, by this legislation, in relieving pressure on Tito, and therefore it becomes extremely relevant to the whole problem that we are considering in the committee, it would seem to me. Would you not say that it was relevant to the proposed legislation before us?

Mr. RICHARDS. I understood the witness to say, Mr. Lodge, that he would rather not comment directly on that in open session.

Mr. LODGE. All right; thank you very much, General.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Jackson—

Mr. JACKSON. General Bradley, it is my understanding that the Yugoslav Army at this time comprises about 32 division; is that correct?

General BRADLEY. The only figure I believe I used was around 30 divisions; approximately 30 divisions. I did not say specifically.

Mr. JACKSON. What is the origin and nature of their equipment and armament?

General BRADLEY. I do not know technically what the details are, just what they lack, or what they are strong in, but, taking them as a whole, we have always considered them a pretty well-equipped army.

Mr. JACKSON. My understanding from previous testimony was that the equipment is largely of German and Russian design and manufacture and, if that is the case, and without ample means of replenishment, replacement and supply, could a force, irrespective of its size in numbers, be expected over any considerable period of time to be an effective force in the field in case of any possible aggression?

General BRADLEY. I do not believe I know enough about the details of the status of their equipment really to answer your question because apparently you want expert testimony on it. I am not prepared to give it. I think we could furnish it to you, but I do not have the G-2 reports here on the status of their equipment at this time. The only thing I can say in general is that we have considered them as a rather effective Balkan Army. How long they could fight, what the status of their supply and production is, I am sorry but I do not have that available at this time.

Mr. JACKSON. My disposition at the moment is to support the legislation, but I am in thorough accord with those members who have expressed the opinion that there should be a very definite quid pro quo established and agreed upon prior to the passage of aid legislation. There are a great many matters of mutual concern to the United States and Yugoslavia that might well be discussed for settlement at this time; Trieste, the return of the Greek children, and several other important points. I should be very hesitant to support the legislation unless some definite understandings were reached on these points. I realize that that is outside the realm of your preoccupation, but do you believe, General—and this question again might better be reserved for the executive session, if there is any hesitancy in your mind about answering it now—from the military standpoint is there any reason to believe that we are proceeding on anything more than a wishful hope in this legislation, a hope that if the bill is passed and implemented, the Yugoslav Army would be on the side of the west in case of any possible aggression? Is there anything more than just that desire on our part, that wish, that should hostilities come, we might expect Yugoslavia to be on the side of the west?

General BRADLEY. I should think it is more than just wishful thinking. There has been a tendency on the part of Tito and his government to lean toward the west ever since his break with the Russians. Just how far that has gone, and how far he would go in case of an emergency I do not believe anybody could vouch for. This has all been an attempt to encourage him and see that he does not suffer too much for having broken with the Cominform and thereby not discourage anybody else from ever doing it. So, from a military point of view, as I say, we think we ought to do anything we can to encourage him, to help him, in his breaking away and thereby not discourage anyone else, but rather to encourage other countries to break away, if they see fit.

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, General.

Mr. RICHARDS. The committee at this time will go into executive session.)

(Whereupon at 3 p. m. the committee went into executive session.)

YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1950

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, at 10:30 a. m., pursuant to adjournment, Hon. James P. Richards, acting chairman, presiding.

Mr. RICHARDS. The committee will please come to order. We are still holding hearings on the so-called Yugoslav relief bill. Is Mr. Andrews here?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes, sir.

STATEMENT OF STANLEY ANDREWS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. RICHARDS. The first witness is Mr. Stanley Andrews, Director of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations of the Department of Agriculture. We are glad to have you here, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I am not here as an advocate or an expert on any of the phases of this Yugoslav problem relating to the politics or the military end of it at all.

My office in the Department of Agriculture is the office in the Government here which gathers statistics and information throughout the world on food conditions, crop conditions, and food problems.

We assemble that information in our office and it comes to us through the agricultural attachés who are attached to our various embassies. So I am going to confine my remarks to two points, to establish that there has been a drought in Yugoslavia which has materially cut their production, and that with the present food supply as a result of that drought there would probably be serious hunger and, possibly, unrest in the country.

I have here with me, and who will testify in a few moments, Mr. John J. Haggerty, who is agricultural attaché in Yugoslavia, who landed here last night by plane from Yugoslavia and who has been all over that country and knows its conditions.

I might say that as early as last July, Mr. Haggerty, and other sources which we have in Yugoslavia, were reporting that there was a serious drought developing down there. As a matter of fact he had been looking at the low moisture and the general conditions preceding that, and there had been some warnings that drought was in the offing down there.

At that particular time the Yugoslavs were not letting out much of anything officially, and most of the information that came in to us

was picked up by Mr. Haggerty through his own observation and things of that kind. The drought did strike and it has materially cut down the production of that country, ranging from a reduction of 15 percent in the northern areas up to 40, 50, 60 percent or higher in the mountain areas.

Yugoslavia normally, is a food exporting country. They export a considerable amount of grain to Egypt, and also sometimes to Germany, and sometimes, of course, to Italy. But this year even if they cut off all exports they will still have a considerable deficit there in food.

Now, the thing about this business is that we can all sit down, and we can all make figures that count up all of the total amount of the food in the country and divide it up among the people and come out with some reasonable amount of food per capita, assuming that everybody gets his share of the food. But I want to point out to you that Yugoslavia, like all of the Danube Basin countries, is in a rather exceptional situation in that the normal distribution at the normal caloric level calculations and all of those things which we use to measure the intake of food of the population hardly hold for the simple fact that it is a very rugged country.

The farmers there are very small farmers, mostly self-subsisting with the exception of some of the area in the northern part of the country. The drought hit down in this mountain area, and along the coast. Those people are small farmers living in villages and usually have a food deficit anyhow. Furthermore there are actual cases where, because of the mountainous terrain of the country, the usual location of roads, railroads and distribution facilities you can have a virtual famine in one valley, and you can have a great abundance in the other.

So, when we go to figuring in terms of all of the materials that they need, in terms of equal distribution, it simply does not hold because you simply cannot distribute it equally among all of them.

The other point is that the people here in this area mostly hit by the drought are the little farmers, and they are the fellows who have resisted in the past, and who continue to resist the so-called collectivization program in Yugoslavia.

I do not want to talk in conjectures here on something that maybe does not have too much basis in fact, but it is certainly generally assumed that one of the things that stopped Tito or, rather, caused Tito to swing against the Russians was the fact that he could not go through with his collectivization program, primarily because of these little farmers. They are a tough bunch of cookies. They are people who control their land, and because of things of that kind he ran up against almost a solid phalanx there of these peasants. Even assuming that they did have enough grain, and that they did have the stuff, in fact that you could get all of the stuff in from the peasants sufficient to feed the population, Tito would have a real job to put on the stiff collection program you would have to have in order to get what food they have out of those peasants and get it to the places where it is needed. So, you have a kind of tough situation there. I do not think you are going to have a situation where you are going to have starvation sweeping the country or anything of that kind. But unless there is aid sent in there, unless there are some efforts made to help, you are going to have a lot, an awful lot, of people who are

hungry people, and the hungry people are the ones who raise the dickens.

A literally starving population cannot raise the dickens too much, because they wander around in a weakened condition, take pneumonia, and die, and that is all you hear about them. But people who are hungry can cause some very serious propositions, and that is about what the situation is down there now.

The only other thing I want to say is that there is need and will be need for the aid proposed. There has been a drought and Tito will probably have considerable trouble. I do not know whether it will slow up the economic end of the thing or not, but I do know from my experience in Germany that a country just slides down into nothing when the people are hungry and you do not get production out of them.

Mr. Haggerty has just arrived, as I said before, from Yugoslavia. He is from Montana. I might call him a farmer. He is a Montana farm boy. He knows drought when he sees it. His experience in this country has been primarily in the dry land area through some of the drought years which we experienced in this country.

He has traveled personally 25,000 or 30,000 miles in Yugoslavia in the past 2 years. He has been all over that country in the past month, and I am going to let him take up from here and make any report to you he desires to make and answer any questions that any of you have to ask.

If you have any questions to ask me I shall be glad to answer them.

Mr. CARNAHAN (presiding). Before we hear the next witness we will give the members a chance to ask any questions they desire to ask.

Mr. VORYS. As I understand it, Mr. Andrews, you will be available and will be standing by here, and Mr. Haggerty is going to tell us about this thing from the Yugoslav side. Then you will be available for any questions on where this proposed stuff might come from our own agriculture.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Trigg, here, of the Department, who is the real boss of our surpluses and things of that kind, will be here to testify.

We are merely taking the Yugoslav side of it. Now, as to the estimates which are before you, they are the Yugoslav estimates. Mr. Haggerty will tell you that our own estimates are probably just a little bit higher than theirs. We feel probably that they have been a little modest in their requests. In some categories we cut them. We cut the sugar and the lard that they have asked for, but in the other categories Yugoslavia's requests, according to our figures, and according to our best information, have been modest requests.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I will not call on each member at this time, but if there are any questions that any of the members desire to ask they may do so.

Mrs. BOLTON. I have just an incidental question to ask there. Why did you cut the estimate on sugar and lard?

Mr. ANDREWS. There are two reasons for that. One is that Yugoslavia normally is a pretty heavy sugar-producing area. They normally export a little sugar. Secondly, most of the people in Yugoslavia do not use much sugar because they cannot afford it, to be perfectly honest about it. And they have a fair crop of sugar there normally.

The other thing is that the sugar beet is just now being milled in Yugoslavia at this time of the year, and the variation of the sugar content in the sugar beet can be anywhere from 6 to 13 percent. In a dry year the sugar content of a sugar beet is considerably higher. We do not know what the crop is. We can estimate, but you cannot always tell by looking at a sugar beet what is in it.

On the lard end of it this is the basis for it: Yugoslavia is a large producer of pigs, and in the normal operation of things in the Balkan Basin when a farmer meets the situation where he has not any food for his hogs, when he has not any forage any place, he does not wait for Uncle Sam, God Almighty, or anybody else to bring in food for his hogs; he kills them. Of course, they are slaughtering their hogs in large numbers, and there is a certain amount of lard going to come out of them, and we estimated that maybe their lard estimate was a little high.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you.

Mr. CARNAHAN. Then the committee will hear Mr. John J. Haggerty, United States agricultural attaché of the United States Embassy in Belgrade. You may proceed as you wish, Mr. Haggerty.

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. HAGGERTY, UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL ATTACHÉ, UNITED STATES EMBASSY, BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. HAGGERTY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as Mr. Andrews has said, I have just come back from Yugoslavia, and I expect to return there in just a few days, as soon as our business here is over.

I have felt that the committee will have enough statistics from other sources. It might be most helpful to the committee if I just described from my own observations my experience as an agricultural man in Yugoslavia, and give you a summary first-hand as to how things look to me.

I might say, by way of background, that I did live in Montana on a dry-land farm from 1919 to 1923, which was about as long as my father could afford to farm with nine children. After that he had to go back to his regular profession as a carpenter. We were droughted out, grasshoppered out, and hailed out.

For the next 4 years I was in high school but worked during the summers on farms and lived on farms. In 1927 and the summers of 1928 and 1929 I was employed in charge of dry-land rotation experiments at Moccasin, Mont. In 1932 I traveled over the State in connection with a farm tax survey which took me into 25 of the 56 county seats.

From 1934 to 1941 I worked here in the Department of Agriculture on questions of farm taxes, traveling in the 17 Western States, so that I might say that I have seen something of drought, I have seen a good deal of the type of agriculture—that is, grain, corn, and livestock—which predominates in Yugoslavia.

During the past 2 years by car and jeep I traveled whenever I could tear myself away from my desk in the Embassy by my own estimate about 25,000 miles during a 2-year period in Yugoslavia; and, while my knowledge of Serbo-Croatian is limited and I would never be

mistaken for a Yugoslav, I can ask a question and understand an answer, and I have talked with hundreds of peasants in Yugoslavia.

The present drought really begins with the month of February. Yugoslavia had adequate rainfall for the planting season last fall. Their bread grains are almost 99 percent fall-planted.

During the fall planting season and the early part of the winter they had abundant rainfall and snow, but the deficit began in February. I have since obtained some statistics from the Yugoslav Government which bear this out.

From February through May the accumulated deficit of rainfall was roughly 50 percent of normal, so that by the 1st of June the situation was one that could be described as no material damage to crops up to that time, but all crops had reached the stage of extreme vulnerability if there was an onset of hot, dry weather.

That weather began to hit about the middle of June. The result was that the bread grains were pushed into accelerated ripening; and, where the harvest would normally be the 1st of August, they began cutting wheat, barley, and rye in the first week of July, so that some of the heads of the grain did not completely fill. Much of the grain was of less than the normal weights per bushel with dry, shriveled-up kernels. Due to those factors the reduction in the bread-grain crop was not disastrous; it was in the range of 20 to 25 percent reduction in the major grain-producing areas.

However, as to the spring-planted crops—and corn occupies about three-eighths of all of the cropland area of Yugoslavia—the production of corn was caught, just as it would be here in Iowa or southern Wisconsin, in the lush growing stage, and for a 5-day period in the first week of July they had killing daytime temperatures of from 105° to 108° Fahrenheit. I went into a cornfield a short distance from Belgrade over a period of 10 days, and you could see where the tassels and the top leaves as they developed were just burned white in the course of 1 day. Many of those plants stopped growing the first week of July, and they did not do anything more than stand there until September.

I walked up corn rows and counted as many as 20 or 30 stalks in a row in which the tassel was burned dead and the silk never emerged, so that you would have the formation of what was to be the ear on the stalk, but no silk emerged, and the ear never developed. Those were, fortunately, extreme conditions, and they are not uniform.

Throughout the corn-producing areas, scattered thundershowers from about the 5th of July on through the latter part of July and August hit here and missed there. Where they missed, there is disaster; and where they hit there is some crop production, up to 60 or 70 percent of the normal crop; but for the corn-producing area as a whole my own estimate is that the corn crop and other spring-planted crops are somewhere between 60 and 65 percent of normal.

Down through the mountain districts there is a more serious deficit, and if I may I will just refer to the map.

This area [indicating on map] around Slavonia and Vojvodina are part of the Old Pannonian Sea, an ancient lake bed, and the conditions in there are almost comparable to those in our own Corn Belt—Iowa, southern Wisconsin, and eastern Missouri—with deep, fertile soil. Some of it is heavy and badly drained, but where the drainage is good it is very productive land. The main area is the plains.

The mountain areas—Old Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro, and what is called Kosmet, with a large Albanian population, Old Serbia, and Macedonia—this mountain area contains about one-third of the population of Yugoslavia, and in a normal year they produce perhaps one-fifth or one-sixth of the crops. It is not the main crop region. In fact, they are referred to always in the Yugoslav literature as deficit producing areas in terms of food. There is a certain amount of forest production and some mining and other economic activity carried on, but they depend for their food supply, in a large part, on the surplus moving down from the grain country.

Fortunately, this year, in Slovenia, this area [indicating on map], crop conditions are about 85 to 90 percent of normal. In fact, they had more damage from hail than from drought, except for up here [indicating on map] where they produce hops; that crop is about 50 percent of normal.

Over-all, in Slovenia, Slavonia, and Vojvodina, they have had 80 to 85 percent of normal crops, but as you get down into the mountain areas, all through the Lika and Kordun, they are perhaps 30 percent. Then in Bosnia anywhere from 10 to 50 percent, and similarly in Montenegro and South Serbia crop conditions are no better than half of normal, and the same with Macedonia, except that there is one small area here [indicating on map] where they must have gotten one shower that the other regions did not get where the crops are probably 75 percent of normal.

The result is that Yugoslavia has had to intensify its customary practice of moving food into these areas, and they are doing it with less than the normal amount of supplies, and they have been doing that to beat the winter to these high-mountain passes and valleys where what they get in there by the middle of December is what people are likely to have to eat up to the middle of March. They have moved their livestock off state farms and the larger collective farms out of this area [indicating on map] up to Slovenia where there is a pretty fair forage crop with which to winter the stock.

They have cut bread rations; they have cut out their exports, and they have virtually abolished special privilege.

I had the pleasure the other evening of hearing a woman who is a Communist and the wife of a Communist in the Foreign Office practically cry about the fact that they did not think they were going to be able to stand it because for 3 weeks she has had to stand in line for her food like the other people.

Yugoslavia is anticipating moving substantial quantities of food down the railways and highways into these mountain districts [indicating on map].

From the first announcement that America might send in some aid, they have been basing their plans on that aid. They are depending on us to get food into these areas from the Adriatic seaboard through the various ports that have rail connections to the interior. At least one load of 600 tons of flour milled in Germany has come in, down on the Yugoslav side at Jesenice.

The vice consul from Belgrade was sent out Monday morning to Ljublanja to observe the arrival of that flour. It is destined to get into these mountain areas before winter shuts off the operation.

There will also be other flour moving in from Italy by rail into Ljublanja. This may amount to 35 or 40 thousand tons from Ger-

many and 35 to 40 thousand from Italy by rail, and another 35 or 40 thousand from the ports below, possibly Bari and Venice, which does not show on the map. That will be picked up by Yugoslav vessels and moved to these seaports and then by rail communication into the interior, and that movement is one which we hope can be completed by the end of December.

There is one thing which I think is very significant; and that is that, at our suggestion in the Embassy, the Yugoslavs set up a special emergency food-planning group. As a matter of fact, I told the Minister of Agriculture who we would like to have in that group, and it was set up accordingly. The chairman of the special group is the vice president of the federal planning commission. We have the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, and the Deputy Minister of Internal Trade, and among those individuals they can pull all strings in the Yugoslav Ministry of Railways, Maritime, Ports, Harbors, and Works.

We have been working out a food-distribution plan on the stopgap aid program and on the assumption that some aid will be extended out of the bill which is before this committee, and in that program we are dividing the country into contiguous areas based on the various ports of arrival and the rail facilities into the interior.

We are very hopeful that the railway from Salonika will be opened within the next few days. The railroad is finished; there is no question about it; one rail remains to be put under the fence, and the fence removed at the border. Otherwise trains can roll from Salonika up to Belgrade. The port facilities are adequate to handle all of the traffic we would need to put in by that route.

I am told that the economic breaking point for rail freight, as between Salonika and Rijeka, is just outside the outskirts of Belgrade. In other words, the economic way to put traffic into this entire area, including south and central Serbia is through Salonika.

We are hopeful that the Yugoslav need for this food will be of material help in improving the political relations between Greece and Yugoslavia.

I might add one more thing, while I am at the map. The Yugoslavs have agreed to permit any American observers that may be desired to go into the country to see who gets this food, how it is distributed, and what is done with it. Our current thinking is to base the observers in the ports with railroads running into the interior. One or two narrow-gages run through these mountain valleys, and we will try to base our observers so as to give them a territory to observe in accordance with the food distribution plan itself. They will be given directions to see the food arrive, get on the trains and see where the cars are spotted, where they go, and also occasionally to dip in a random way into individual communities to see who is eating and who is not, and why not.

MR. CARNAHAN. Mr. Haggerty, about what percentage of the farms are collectivized?

MR. HAGGERTY. I am afraid I cannot answer it in those terms.

MR. VORYS. This book says 73 percent in private hands while 21 percent is collectivized. Did they get those figures from you?

MR. HAGGERTY. That is on the basis of rural population. We have figures on acreage and on numbers of households.

Mr. CARNAHAN. I would like to have it on the basis of acreage.

Mr. HAGGERTY. About 21 percent on acreage.

Mr. CARNAHAN. How are these observers to be recruited? Who will they be?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Because the food that is going in there now is under ECA auspices we have recommended that the Special Representative's office in Paris send a couple of these men in to be based at Ljubljana to cover rail shipments.

If the rest of the program goes through, observers will be recruited by the Embassy.

I believe that there is a provision in the agreement which Yugoslavia has signed that Yugoslavia will supply Yugoslav currency in dinars to cover the administrative expenses of the program. It may be that out of the dinars supplied by Yugoslavia we will pay the internal expenses of the American observers and also, I might say, the interpreters who will have to travel with them.

Mr. CARNAHAN. We will proceed now under the 5-minute rule. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Haggerty, I am aware of the fact, of course, that you are giving a factual report in reference to physical conditions in Yugoslavia, but it seems to me you should also be very well qualified to give us an appraisal of the consciousness on the part of the rural people toward political aspects, and whether or not they have any competent leadership or concerted action and influence toward the Government.

Mr. HAGGERTY. Mr. Burleson, I would say that the vast majority of the Yugoslav people are pro-American. As I have traveled around the country I have very frequently taken my wife with me, and sometimes my two children as well. The longest trip we took was 17 days, where we lived off the country—camped out, and what not. I have yet to get into a corner of Yugoslavia where the statement that "I am an American" does not open all doors to me.

That has not been true of the Government, as you know.

During the honeymoon with the Cominform they followed the typical Communist line of American imperialism and all of that rot, but since their break with the Cominform, and particularly the economic blockade, as they have had to look at their hole cards, they have realized that, after all, America was the only country to which they could turn for economic aid and, on a sound basis, I might say, to help accomplish their economic development.

As the effects of this truth then became apparent they have had to swallow quite a bit of their propaganda. They have had to get down to cases, and I would say that they have turned to America as a dying man will turn back to the God of his childhood. It gets down to what they really do believe. I do not believe it is possible to exaggerate the political significance of the fact that the Yugoslav Government has turned to America in its time of crisis.

Mr. BURLESON. Do you feel that any part of that stems from an ideology of which they are conscious?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I think as far as the people in control in the Government are concerned they have had to set their ideology aside and look at the facts of life, and I must say that the people of Yugoslavia, the ones I have had an opportunity to contact, have welcomed with a vast relief first, the fact that Yugoslavia has appealed to the United

States, and second, based on the press releases some weeks ago, the fact that the American Government was sympathetically disposed, and my own feeling is that those facts—the knowledge or the assumption that aid will come from America—have already had a very material effect in reducing the psychological and political tension which could blow the country all apart, and every shipload of food we deliver will contribute further to that effect.

Mr. BURLESON. Inferentially, then, I gather that you feel the Government is aware of the plight of the people and that the people in the rural areas who actually produce food do have some influence with the Government?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Very much so. The attempt at socialization of the peasants has already slowed down substantially more than a year ago. On the basis of the record and statistics they have leveled off at about the beginning of the calendar year 1950.

We are not prepared to believe, as yet, that that means any reduction in their attempt to socialize, but they have had to stop and take stock and perhaps consolidate their position. The fact that they have stopped is going to create a very great obstacle toward getting the thing under way again. My own feeling is that with this aid program and by the degree it is implemented—if it is successful, if we pull this country through the winter without an upheaval, disorder, and anarchy, which could benefit only the Cominform countries, if we pull them through to the next harvest—all Yugoslavia will be thinking very much closer to the West and, particularly, the United States; that we will have established a very real basis for meeting them on some common ground through which they can achieve their basic purpose of economic advancement and at the same time change their social and political system to a point where we can tolerate it.

I think we have an unprecedented opportunity to influence the country and the people and its government. I think there is room in the world for our country to live as a capitalistic country and help Yugoslavia as a Socialist or, perhaps, a semi-Socialist country to achieve its economic objectives without destroying the human values that go with civil rights and individual liberties.

Mr. BURLESON. Would you say, Mr. Haggerty, that there is an element of democracy present even though it is within a dictatorship?

Mr. HAGGERTY. It is latent. The Yugoslav people have never subdued themselves. They have never bowed, really, to this thing. They bowed with the wind, you might say, but they still have the will to resist; just as they resisted the Turks for 500 years and they resisted the Germans during the recent occupation, they are now resisting the Communists. That is why I say they have accepted with great relief the fact that there has been this turn to America; they expect a great deal from it.

Mr. BURLESON. There exists also, I take it from that, a national spirit, even with the sectionalism which exists in the country?

Mr. HAGGERTY. That is true.

Mr. BURLESON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS (presiding). Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. I can give you these figures you asked about. There is what they call a peasant work cooperative which might be a collective farm or it might be just a cooperative of some kind. Eighteen percent of the rural households are in that, and 21 percent of the

arable land area has various forms of cooperative enterprises and I guess they are collective. But as to state farms there are 1,446,000 acres of land in state farms. That is one of the arrangements where the state owns it and it is run more or less like the Russian system.

Mrs. BOLTON. Would you give that figure again?

Mr. ANDREWS. 1,446,000. That represents 5.8 percent of the total area of arable land in Yugoslavia.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I have that figure again?

Mr. ANDREWS. Five point eight percent.

Mr. RICHARDS. We will proceed again with the questioning.

Mr. Chipperfield?

Mr. CHIPPERFIELD. No questions.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Vorys?

Mr. VORYS. How much grain did Yugoslavia export this summer after they knew of the possibility of drought conditions?

Mr. HAGGERTY. What information we have on that up to date indicates that on the basis of their trade agreements with Switzerland and other countries, they were exporting grain up to June. I have found no evidence that they have exported any grain, certainly no material quantities, since that time.

Mr. VORYS. For instance, I have heard that, under those trade agreements Egypt is expecting to have deliveries this year. What is the arrangement about exporting for the next year?

Mr. HAGGERTY. The latest on that, and I might say by way of background that Yugoslavia normally grows yellow corn like our Iowa types, but on the basis of trade agreements with Egypt, for each of the past 2 years they have undertaken to produce 100,000 tons of white corn, which seems to be in demand in Egypt. Why, I do not know. Last year they produced some seventy thousand against one hundred thousand target. This year they only produced about thirty thousand on the same acreage and I think that is very substantial evidence of the intensity of the drought.

Egypt has attempted to put on the squeeze a bit, because, first off, Yugoslavia has been receiving Egyptian cotton in advance to be paid for by corn as the harvest came in. They have sold themselves short. We have word from the Embassy that Yugoslavia is not going to undertake to export corn to Egypt. It may jeopardize receipts of cotton from Egypt this next year; that is another problem that will have to be worked out.

Mr. VORYS. As I understand it, looking at the table on page 17 of this book, Yugoslav Emergency Food Assistance Program, according to that they have got all the wheat they need. Is that not right? This is, under the stopgap program.

Mr. HAGGERTY. That takes into account the American aid program.

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. Well, they asked for 160,000 tons of wheat and 40,000 tons of wheat flour and we are going to give them 168,000 tons of wheat flour; is that correct? The second column is headed, "Yugoslav request."

Mr. HAGGERTY. What page are you reading from?

Mr. VORYS. Page 17, table V: at the top it says "Yugoslavia emergency food program." The second line is "Yugoslavia request," 40,000 tons of wheat flour; "total proposed program," 168,000 tons, of which 142,000 is to be in the stopgap program.

Mr. HAGGERTY. I think the answer to that, Mr. Chairman, is that they requested wheat and flour, primarily wheat. We are meeting it with, primarily, flour.

Mr. TRUESDELL. There should be a bracket in there, the 160,000 and 40,000 put together. We are meeting it all in flour.

Mr. HAGGERTY. The total would be 200,000 tons.

Mr. VORYS. Why do we not meet it with wheat?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Because the deficit areas for the most part do not have mills. They are chronically deficit and they customarily receive their flour in the form of flour from the producing regions. If we sent them wheat, it would have to go into the country by rail up into the northern regions and be milled and go back down and there just is not time for that operation. We are putting this in in the form of flour from stocks already existing in Germany and Italy. They will come in here and be fed by rail to these deficit areas. About one-third of the total will come in the form of flour milled in Italy by Yugoslav boats to these ports and go directly into the areas where it is needed.

Mr. VORYS. In any case, about 142,000 tons of flour have already been arranged for under the stopgap program; that is correct, is it not?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I believe that is true. I am personally not too familiar with the statistics which have been worked out in Washington.

Mr. TRUESDELL. That is correct.

Mr. VORYS. Now, for corn; what are they going to do with their corn? Do they eat it in the form of meal themselves or is it for stock?

Mr. HAGGERTY. It is both. The peasants by and large eat corn and the city working population eat bread. Corn is extremely important to put their foundation herds, hogs and cattle and poultry, through the winter. What the proportions would be, I am not prepared to say, but it is both for human consumption and livestock.

Mr. VORYS. Now, how much of the things they asked for, or that are in the proposed program, are in surplus in this country?

STATEMENT OF RALPH S. TRIGG, PRESIDENT, COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION

Mr. TRIGG. Mr. Vorys, most all the commodities that they are requesting here in the proposed program are not in surplus in this country in a strict sense of the word. We have offered the so-called surplus commodities to these people on this program at no cost price. Freight is paid, picked up at the point of storage in the Commodity Credit Corporation stock. Such commodities as dried eggs, dried milk, butter, cheese, potatoes, things of that nature.

The commodities that you were just talking about; wheat and flour and corn, those are not in surplus. They are not in surplus in this country. We have stocks of them on hand. We have stocks of them in the inventory of the Commodity Credit Corporation, but we do not consider them as being surplus.

Mrs. BOLTON. Who decides that?

Mr. TRIGG. It is a matter of policy decision on the part of the Department of Agriculture.

Mr. VORYS. How much corn have we got on hand?

Mr. TRIGG. At the present time, this year's carry-over will be about between 800 and 900 million bushels.

Mr. VORYS. You say 900,000,000? And what did we have on hand before that?

Mr. TRIGG. Of course, we figure that in normal years the carry-over in this country runs from between 750 million and 1 billion bushels of corn. That is a normal carry-over.

Mr. VORYS. Do we have any corn left over from last year?

Mr. TRIGG. Oh, yes.

Mr. VORYS. How much it that?

Mr. TRIGG. I do not know what the figure would run, but it is a matter of a continuing figure. It probably ran in the neighborhood of 700,000,000 bushels carry-over last year.

Mr. VORYS. Would you add 7 and 9 to find out what we have on hand?

Mr. TRIGG. No, no; 900,000,000 is what we have on hand. The rest of it is being fed and used in this country; but you carry it from one crop year to the next, such figures as the 700,000,000.

Mr. VORYS. Yes, but what I am trying to figure is—I am green on agricultural economy—I am trying to find out whether the 900,000,000 bushels carry-over includes unused corn from last year or the year before.

Mr. TRIGG. Yes, sir; there would be unused corn; it might be 2 years old as far as that is concerned.

Mr. VORYS. Does that include the carry-over, the corn at the Commodity Credit Corporation that the Government owns now?

Mr. TRIGG. No, that is the total carry-over in the country as a matter of fact. We might say, stocks on hand.

Mr. VORYS. Stocks on hand. How much wheat?

Mr. TRIGG. There is probably in the neighborhood of 450 million bushels. I expect that is high. I should say from 350 to 400, in that neighborhood. There again that is stocks on hand in the country. It is considered in our carry-over. Some of it is in the hands of the Commodity Credit Corporation and some of it is not.

Mr. VORYS. How much does the Commodity Credit Corporation have of corn?

Mr. TRIGG. Corn, we have got as of November 27, we have an inventory of 347 million bushels.

Mr. VORYS. How much wheat?

Mr. TRIGG. Sixty-nine million bushels.

Mr. VORYS. And in this program I note "dried eggs, United States market price, per metric ton, \$22.05 a ton," and their request for four and a half thousand tons at the market value of 9.9 million dollars. The reason there is no appropriation request is that that is just charged off; is that not right?

Mr. TRIGG. No——

Mr. VORYS. Well, the actual cost is half a million dollars?

Mr. TRIGG. Let me explain it this way, Mr. Vorys: The stopgap program contemplates the use of 4,500 metric tons of dried eggs. The acquisition cost of those eggs to the Government was 13½ million dollars under the price support program. Against this there is half a million dollars of stopgap aid that came from the various sources, which means that there is a loss to the Commodity Credit Corporation of 13 million dollars on that many eggs, or of that contribution in this program.

Mr. VORYS. What would be the actual cost figure? Shipping would be down below? So what would be half a million dollars actual cost, the estimated actual cost?

Mr. TRIGG. I do not know; but as I understand your question, half a million dollars applies against the 13½ million dollars. Actually, the cost of those eggs to the Government is 13½ million dollars, and coming back to the Commodity Credit Corporation in the way of reimbursement is only half a million dollars. The shipping is in addition thereto.

Mr. VORYS. That is what I wondered.

My question is simply based on the figures we have been given here, "estimated actual cost" of this 4,500 tons of eggs is \$500,000. I wondered what that comes from.

Mr. TRIGG. I am sorry. I see the heading on that table there, "estimated actual cost." I do not know who made this table up; it probably came from some other agency, but I think what they are saying is "estimated actual cost," is that the estimated actual cost of 4,500 tons of eggs under the stopgap program would cost half a million dollars. In other words, the half a million dollars of the stopgap aid fund that has been accumulated would be applied against 13½ million dollars' worth of eggs; the actual cost of the eggs or 13½ million dollars. I think all this is a matter of applying the half of a million dollars, of applying stopgap aid fund to the 13½ million dollars.

I might explain this, that the Department of Agriculture offered eggs, cheese, milk, potatoes, and one other commodity, butter, free of cost to this program at the point of storage where they are in inventory of the Commodity Credit Corporation. These would have had to have been given to private relief agencies. That was made possible under section 416 program of the Agricultural Act of 1949. We have that authority to give them to relief agencies that are properly constituted and approved by the State Department as relief agencies. We offered to give those commodities in this case at no cost. All it would have taken would have been shipping cost at that time but because of some difficulties in getting the proper relief agencies set up, it was decided to buy these commodities from the Commodity Credit Corporation at a price that we had offered them to other countries, members of the FAO. That was the price shown here. It was applied against that. In other words, a very low purchase price is what it amounted to.

Mr. VORYS. I just wanted you to clear it up. Would that also apply on any of these other items, milk, cheese, and the others you mentioned?

Mr. TRIGG. The only other item it applies to there is beans. I believe it is dried beans. I believe there is a million and a half, \$3,400,000 acquisition cost against \$1,100,000 of these funds to be applied.

To clarify this point further—

Mr. VORYS. My time has expired.

Mr. TRIGG. I know it has, but if the chairman would permit—if I understand you correctly now, there is only one-half million dollars charged to this program in this one item, whereas actually to the taxpayers, insofar as they are concerned, it is costing 13½ million dollars; is that your point?

Mr. VORYS. That is the fact, whether it is a point or not.

Mr. BURLESON. If it is included in other items. In other words, the total of 38 million is on paper. Actually, the program, as it is contemplated, cost this 38 million plus 13 million and plus other sums similarly included.

Mr. VORYS. The total is not 38. We are talking about 80.9 million program and with the eggs in it at 9.9 instead of 13½. I do not understand those figures, but the cost to the American taxpayer, if carried out, will be in excess of 80 million dollars. But whether that should be charged to the local agricultural program or to relief is another matter.

Mr. BURLESON. That is the point I wish to make; this carries out your idea in the amendment you had to ECA insofar as it goes here. The Commodity Credit Corporation is absorbing the shock for another program which does not appear to be fair insofar as the Commodity Credit Corporation is concerned. I think that should certainly be a matter of record.

Mr. JAVITS. Will the gentleman yield a minute on that point? Five hundred thousand dollars is not the market value of what you are delivering today under this program, is it?

Mr. TRIGG. No, sir; not exactly: \$500,000 is what was put against this \$13,500,000. We are selling those eggs for more than that right now on the open market.

Mr. JAVITS. What is the market value? I think that is the answer to Mr. Burleson's question.

Mr. TRIGG. The market value is \$22.05 per metric ton. We have offered eggs and are selling some for export for 30 cents a pound. The 1950 eggs we are selling at 60 cents a pound.

Mr. JAVITS. What does that mean with relation to this 13½ million dollars, that is what I want to know.

Mr. TRIGG. It is in the neighborhood of 5 cents a pound, is what this amounts to because of the fact that we offered these on special feeding programs to FAO countries at this reduced price.

Mr. JAVITS. I do not think you are still answering the question. What is the market value of the eggs you are delivering under this program? How much in dollars?

Mr. TRIGG. The market value of the 13½ million dollars of eggs today would be in the neighborhood of 5 to 7 million dollars.

Mr. JAVITS. That is the exact figure, then.

Mr. TRIGG. May I point out, though, that these eggs could—I was a little low on that; the market value is estimated at 9.9 million. I was low. But may I point out that these eggs have already cost the Commodity Credit Corporation 13½ million dollars? Now we would get, we anticipate that if we sold them, we would get 9.9 million dollars out of it. If we go this way, which we offered to do, we will get half a million dollars back out of it.

Mr. BURLESON. It shows 13 million dollars that the Commodity Credit Corporation is sacrificing into this program. Insofar as the record is concerned, when the argument comes up on the floor, and later when the farm program is presented, that is what the result will be regardless of what the market value may be or what they get out of it. You have 13 million dollars sunk in the program and unless the record is made clear, the CCC is charged with the deficit.

Mr. VORYS. Let me see if I got this fact correct as to what this is; what it proves is something else.

The reason the "estimated actual cost" is not zero and the reason that it is \$500,000 is because for some reason or other this could not qualify as a foreign-relief program under the statute; is that not correct? So that a nominal selling price had to be fixed.

Mr. TRIGG. That is correct. It was for some reason impossible to set up a relief agency to receive these for nothing.

Mr. VORYS. Will you find out why that was?

Mr. TRIGG. Maybe someone from the State Department could answer that now or Mr. Stoops can, who is from my office working with the State Department on it.

Mr. STOOPS. Some months ago the Yugoslavs under this announcement to the FAO countries came to the Department of Agriculture and asked to buy the quantity of beans, eggs, and Mexican canned meat listed there. After due consideration there on the thing and taking into consideration the needs over there in Yugoslavia, the Department agreed to sell this quantity of eggs and beans to the Yugoslav Government. The Department of Agriculture was paid the nominal price that it was required to ask for those eggs from funds made available to the Yugoslav Government from the Export-Import Bank. That is where the funds came from to pay for the eggs in the amount of \$500,000.

Mr. VORYS. Yes, but you have not explained why the Yugoslav Government could not apply and get this for nothing under the relief provisions of the law which would have saved Yugoslavia \$500,000 on the eggs, from their export-import loan. It would have left the Department of Agriculture \$500,000 worse off, but it would have benefited Yugoslavia. Certainly one of the things you must have explored was why we do not consider this a relief program under the law?

Mr. STOOPS. At that time there was only one small relief agency operating in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs did not ask at that time for this aid under that type of program.

Mr. FULTON. You said, a small agency. What agency?

Mr. TRUESDELL. It is a large agency but they were just getting started. I believe it was CARE.

Mr. STOOPS. Not at that time, was it, George?

Mr. TRUESDELL. Yes.

Mr. FULTON. At what time? Let us be definite, specific.

Mr. STOOPS. In what months?

Mr. FULTON. Could we have the time and the agency?

Mr. STOOPS. The sale was made in October.

Mr. FULTON. Of what year?

Mr. STOOPS. This year.

Mr. FULTON. And the agency?

Mrs. BOLTON. CARE, he said.

Mr. FULTON. Do you agree that it was CARE?

Mr. STOOPS. There is no agency involved; that is the thing I was explaining, sir. It was made from the Department of Agriculture to the Yugoslav Government and the price received by the Department of Agriculture for those eggs was one-half million dollars.

Mr. VORYS. You have answered my question by saying that there was a small agency there that was not equipped to receive it or some-

thing like that, and Mr. Fulton said, what agency? And one gentleman said CARE and you said you did not know. Now, if this was or is a famine relief program, I am curious, and possibly other members of the committee are, to know why it was not handled and is not being handled as a famine relief proposition under the existing law.

Mr. TRIGG. Mr. Vorys, in connection with that, it is not the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture to say what foreign relief agency is eligible for receipt or recipient of these commodities. All of those are cleared through the State Department.

Mr. VORYS. That is why we were talking to the man behind you from the State Department to find out, and we have not done it.

Mr. TRIGG. All I know is that we made them available under section 416 of the Agriculture Act of 1949.

Mr. FULTON. How do you arrive at this \$500,000 price? What were the elements in reaching your decision?

Mr. TRIGG. That came about as a result of this being, No. 1, a deal between the Yugoslav Government and this Government resulting out of their borrowing funds from the Export-Import Bank. That price was arrived at because it was a price that was made to some 50 member nations of the FAO for special feeding purposes some months back. That same price was offered to them for dried eggs and other commodities, and the same price was made to Yugoslavia. They accepted it, and after they got their loan from the Export-Import Bank and the \$500,000—that is where that comes from.

Mr. FULTON. So that as far as the Department of Agriculture is concerned, it is in accordance with your usual practice that you had nothing to do with the determining of what agency should take or whether it should be through a Government, nor did you handle the financing of the transaction.

Mr. TRIGG. That is something insofar as the approval of these private welfare organizations or any organization in a foreign country that would receive these commodities if they are given; that is up to the State Department to approve those agencies for us.

Mr. FULTON. But I am trying to get your departmental responsibility in these transactions. The Department of Agriculture has no responsibility when you say the State Department does?

Mr. TRIGG. If I understand your question correctly, sir, we have no responsibility beyond disposition of the commodities and they would be disposed of in accordance with a plan that was agreed to by the State Department.

Mr. FULTON. You have no part in making that plan, then, in the Department of Agriculture?

Mr. TRIGG. The Commodity Credit Corporation has no responsibility except in working with the State Department people and others in setting prices and shipping schedules, making commodities available and that sort of thing; but the disposition of them is something beyond our scope.

Mr. FULTON. That is what I was trying to get.

Mr. RICHARDS. You referred to a general agreement you had with others on prices. Am I correct in understanding that you said to them, "We can let you have it on such and such a price basis", and that basis is the general agreement?

Mr. TRIGG. That is correct. That is when the Government funds are used, when those funds became Yugoslav funds as a result of the loan from the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. RICHARDS. In this calculation, this half a million dollars, I believe it is? There is no departure from similar transactions between other governments?

Mr. TRIGG. That is right, as long as these other transactions are food that would have been received under those transactions which would be used for special purposes, feeding purposes.

Mr. RICHARDS. Was that the category you were talking about a while ago?

Mr. TRIGG. That is a criterion we established and set up against selling these commodities at a much reduced price below what we might set for them on the open market.

Mr. RICHARDS. That is normally far removed from any other formula of value you have there? In other words, it is \$13,000,000 and you get half a million dollars out of it. That is what you have been getting?

Mr. TRIGG. That is right, for other countries for the same type of program, if we sold that at the market price. I think I explained this before you came in. We estimate we get \$9,900,000.

Mr. RICHARDS. I do not want to take up the time of the committee. Who was next? Mrs. Bolton?

Mr. BATTLE. Could I make one comment? I want to personally welcome Mr. Haggerty before this committee and tell him that I appreciate his appearance here. A few weeks ago I had the privilege of seeing him in Yugoslavia and he escorted us around the countryside and spent a lot of time in helping us to understand the economic and cultural conditions over there; and we learned a lot. I am deeply grateful for your assistance and it is good to see you here today, sir.

Mr. HAGGERTY. It is a pleasure to be here.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Haggerty, in the matter of these observers who are being invited to see what is going on, do they exercise any kind of veto power as to the method of distribution?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I should say not. We have insisted and ECA has agreed that these observers will be under very close control of the Embassy. If they see some things, some situation that is not what they think it should be, they are to report it by the most expeditious way to the Embassy; the Embassy will make representations to the Yugoslav Government. That is the only way, with the situation being as delicate as it is, that observers could work without jeopardizing all of the good that we have been able to develop there during the past couple of years.

Mr. SMITH. It is a long shot at best?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Yes. They are going to have to play by ear a bit. We have tried to explain to them what they are going in there for, but we cannot quite tell them how they should do it.

Mr. SMITH. They are going to do it, are they not?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Yes; I am satisfied that these are going to be men who have had considerable experience on food distribution in connection with the programs in other European countries and they have been briefed already to some extent on the situation they will find

themselves in in Yugoslavia. I personally do not expect there will be any incidents.

Mr. SMITH. Is it the same crowd that handled the UNRRA program a few years or so ago?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I doubt it. These are men who are currently employed in ECA in Europe. We do not know yet how many there will be. The two men who are going in there this week—I stopped in Paris on the way here—and had two conferences with ECA people in Paris on the matter—they are sending two men immediately in from the Paris office with jeeps that they are going to pick up in Trieste. If this number is increased, they will have to borrow men from the ECA establishments elsewhere in Europe, perhaps Germany. On the flour coming in from Germany, there would be an advantage in having a man there who knows the German end of it. They might borrow a man from ECA office in Rome or Trieste or even Greece.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to interpose and say there, I do not know whether Mr. Haggerty knows about it, but we are sending up through the State Department our attaché from Vienna up to work with the Embassy and the point I want to make with him, he is an old hand at this sort of thing and rode herd on the distribution problems and collection problems under the military government in Germany and he is a pretty hard-boiled and a pretty crusty guy and he is going to be one fellow who will more or less be a roving Joe to observe and check. He was used extensively during the military occupation. As far as we are concerned, we know that he will give a realistic view on the thing.

Mr. SMITH. But once the material is there and they are handling it, it is going to be a very delicate situation to step in and say, we do not like this; and then the cry will go up, well, the Americans are interfering with the program.

Mr. ANDREWS. Sometimes you have to interfere.

Mr. SMITH. I say amen to that, but that has not been the history of this kind of a job in the past.

Mr. ANDREWS. It was in some places, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Can you give us a list of overlapping with the UNRRA personnel?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I have no information on that whatever, sir. UNRRA has not been in operation now close to 3 years. I was not personally acquainted and I do not know who the personnel were.

Mr. FULTON. We are asking if you would get it. I think Mr. Smith is correct in that. I would like to see the source of personnel you are going to use.

Mr. HAGGERTY. We can get that.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Burleson.

Mr. BURLESON. Nothing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. I would like to have an explanation about CARE. What has been or what is the history of CARE in Yugoslavia? Are they operating now? It has been mentioned here that they started. How much of an operation do they have?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I believe I can answer that, sir. The CARE agreement was signed in June of the present year. An attempt had been made to introduce the program into Yugoslavia about a year previously, but for whatever reasons they have or may have had, the

Yugoslav Government did not sign the agreement. They did sign in June. Shortly after that time, the present director arrived in Belgrade and as you will realize, the program of CARE depends on donations largely in this country. He told me about a week ago that his package volume up to the present time had reached about 1,000 packages.

Mr. FULTON. What is his organization there? How do they make distribution? I am more interested in that than I am in the volume of transactions.

Mr. HAGGERTY. At the present time, he has a very small organization to receive shipments, a warehouse in Rijeka, and he has two Yugoslav employees in Belgrade. Really, they have just made a beginning.

Mr. FULTON. On the United Nations agencies we have had programs, for example the FAO, and we have also had the program of the UNICEF. Would you first comment on the FAO programs in other countries and how they have succeeded, and then why that FAO organization could not be used here, if such is the case. Secondly, if you would comment on the United Nations Children's Fund and the success of their program and then why, if not, their program could not be used here.

Mr. HAGGERTY. You want me to do that?

Mr. FULTON. I would like it submitted, maybe later. I would like those two fields covered, definitely. It may take too long here for the remaining 5 minutes. You can do it later if you want to.

(The information referred to is as follows:)

DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Thorough consideration was given to the possibility of using existing international organizations for the distribution and administration of the United States Emergency Relief Assistance to Yugoslavia. The available organizations were narrowed down to two United Nations agencies: The Food and Agriculture Organization, and the International Children's Emergency Fund.

The Food and Agriculture Organization was ruled out since it had no program in Yugoslavia (or anywhere else) of a relief character involving distribution of food and supplies. FAO activities in Yugoslavia consist of limited technical assistance which to date has been confined to a visit to Yugoslavia by an FAO statistical expert who advised the Yugoslav Government on statistical methods and sampling procedures. An agreement under the expended United Nations program of technical assistance has just been signed under which the FAO will provide Yugoslavia with four additional experts in various fields. The preliminary estimate of the cost to the FAO is \$33,500.

UNICEF was also ruled out as a possible international agency for handling the United States Emergency Relief Assistance Program. The UNICEF staff in Yugoslavia consists of five persons who are scheduled to remain only for the first 6 months of 1951 at which time the UNICEF mission is to be closed. In addition there are nine local staffs—all Yugoslav.

Because of the lack of existing facilities and staff in Yugoslavia and the time which would have been necessary to set up an entire new non-Yugoslav distribution system it was considered impractical that the program should be handled by UNICEF.

Moreover, there were other serious drawbacks. UNICEF is set up and authorized to provide relief to children. The United States Emergency Relief Assistance Program is of much broader scope and purpose. It would be neither desirable nor, in all probability, possible to mix strategic considerations with the purposes of the Children's Fund and would only do damage to the latter. In this connection, if the United States Emergency Relief Assistance Program were brought before UNICEF, it would presumably be opposed by the eastern European members of the executive board.

In short, there does not seem to be any practical way of channeling United States assistance to Yugoslavia through existing international organizations.

Mr. FULTON. Is there any intention to use Yugoslav funds, any funds of Yugoslav currency for furthering the program?

John, do you recall what we called that?

Mr. VORYS. Counterpart funds.

Mr. FULTON. Counterpart funds other than just for the expenses of administration of the program.

Mr. HAGGERTY. That was just being worked out at the time I left Belgrade; I do not know what volume it will reach. I believe that the agreement mentions specifically Dinar funds for the administration of the program. Beyond that, I do not know what might be involved.

Mr. FULTON. Has the State Department gone over any possibility of possibly using those funds for a children's or a mother's aid program later if such counterpart provision were put into this bill and as we have done in many other countries on relief problems? Thus you would get another step in the use of the aid.

Mr. HAGGERTY. Is somebody from the State Department here? I am just a farm boy working in Yugoslavia. [Laughter.]

Mr. TRUESDELL. May I ask, would this be some kind of a relief after this program in Yugoslavia with Dinars?

Mr. FULTON. Suppose that we made this as a loan to Yugoslavia; they would then have to repay us, possibly, in critical materials. That is one alternative. Or suppose we actually sold the products to Yugoslavia and they paid for them in their currency. Then Yugoslavia has what we have called counterpart funds in an account available only in Yugoslavia, subject to further uses for relief and work relief by mutual consent. Then possibly through the United Nations Children's Fund or FAO or some agency, or even through the Government itself by agreement, we could embark on another program where we spend those funds in Yugoslavia, or supervise the spending of them for the purpose of aiding the underprivileged of that country. In many cases this relief has been for the children, who have been given extra supplementary aids, extra milk, a hot lunch, testing for tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and things of that type.

Now, that is the addition I am trying to bring up here for this program. This is an alternative. Instead of financing Tito, for further dictatorial purposes, with just a grant because we are easing his budget for him. Possibly the credit that we are actually giving, if it has to be a grant might actually well be supervised in its use in Yugoslavia for the right purposes and that is helping the next generation. Remember that Tito will sell through the government rationing system, a large part of the United States aid.

Now, has anything, has any consideration been given to that possibility because it is right in line with this committee practice.

Mr. VORYS. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. FULTON. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. VORYS. The gentleman has described what is the typical counterpart transaction which is that the counterpart was deposited not subject entirely to our control but subject to our veto—

Mr. FULTON. That is correct.

Mr. VORYS. Which would be used for further relief or rehabilitation or any other purpose agreed upon between the two governments.

Then that has become simply SOP, Standard Operating Procedure, all over the world except that now it is proposed that we depart from it in Yugoslavia.

Mr. FULTON. What happens is that it is put into an account right in the country; that joint account is subject to the mutual decision by agreement of the United States Government and the local government and the expenditure is entirely within the country for purposes agreed upon for the benefit of the country's population. That is the usual method of operation by this committee, but it is peculiarly left out of this bill on grant-in-aid to Yugoslavia.

Mr. TRUESDELL. May I answer and say that we have considered counterparts of the nature you have in the European recovery program and have not favored it. We have not considered the use of a small amount of counterpart for the relief type of operation that you mention. It is a new idea as far as I know.

Mr. FULTON. There are two customary uses of counterpart besides reducing indebtedness. One is for reconstruction programs that go to make the country stronger on public works—that it could not do otherwise, for instance, draining the Pontine marshes in Italy. The other is for the purpose of relief, for example, aiding the children and mothers. The latter is charitable, and the other is public works, has a public works aspect.

Mr. TRUESDELL. We can give you an answer on the public works aspect of it right now. On the other part, to my knowledge it has not been considered and I think we should delay an answer and give it to you later.

Mr. FULTON. Will you answer on the public works aspect because, as I remember, Mr. Vorys and Mr. Richards will bear me out, the State Department objected previously to that on the ECA program when we put it in and I hope they are still not currently objecting.

Mr. RICHARDS. I do not recall any precedent for using counterpart funds other than for administration in a straight-out relief program.

Mr. VORYS. It started in 1947.

Mr. RICHARDS. I am talking about use outside of administration.

Mr. VORYS. I am talking about 1947 when it was put on; this committee refused to do it. It was put into the bill on the floor.

Mr. RICHARDS. What bill?

Mr. VORYS. The post-NRRA relief bill. It was put in on the floor after a battle and it stayed in in the Senate and has since that time, up to this moment. We had a terrible fight to get the State Department to accept it but since then it has become standard for the Marshall plan and all of our ECA programs in China or any place.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Vorys is correct because I remember it thoroughly. I was part of the fight to put it in. The only thing that surprises me is that the State Department now comes along with the same old objection to the counterpart funds and the use of them in this bill.

Mr. VORYS. There has not been a single reason stated by the gentleman there who is apparently in charge of the Yugoslavia program except "we disapprove of it." That is what they said in 1947.

Mr. TRUESDELL. I said I would be very willing to give you reasons for that.

Mr. RICHARDS. I know what ECA did.

Mr. VORYS. In 1947.

Mr. RICHARDS. I am talking about any program identical with this program that was straight-out relief and I still contend there is no precedent for using counterpart funds in it. They might be advised to put it in here. I am not arguing about that point, but there is no precedent for putting counterpart funds in there for anything but administration. The UNRRA program you have been talking about has something else in it.

Mr. VORYS. Post-UNRRA relief; a little item of \$350,000,000.

Mr. RICHARDS. It went beyond simple relief as this bill does. You will accept that, will you not?

Mr. VORYS. That is exactly what this bill is; exactly.

Mrs. BOLTON. This is just a relief bill.

Mr. FULTON. Have you forgotten that the Pontine marshes in Italy were drained by counterpart funds?

Mr. RICHARDS. I do not dispute that.

Mr. FULTON. That is certainly beyond administrative costs.

Mr. RICHARDS. You are not draining the Pontine marshes in this bill or doing anything like it. I am not arguing about that point.

Mr. FULTON. Under ECA it was my amendment that put the \$60,000,000 authorization in for the United Nations children's fund, under ECA direction as a new title, if you recall.

Mr. RICHARDS. I am not antagonistic to the use of counterpart funds. Perhaps it ought to be in this bill, but I was arguing solely to the point that there was no direct precedent for it under similar circumstances. I may be mistaken about it.

Mr. FULTON. I understood you were arguing to say that counterpart funds were restricted only to administrative expenses, to which Mr. Vorys and I object to strongly.

Mrs. BOLTON. Is this purely a relief bill? We were so told two or three times yesterday?

Mr. VORYS. We were told it was not purely relief because there are greater relief needs all over the world. This is an economic welfare bill.

Mrs. BOLTON. But with the formula of a relief program.

Mr. RICHARDS. I was not contending at all that counterpart funds had not been used for something else besides administration purposes. The question I have raised is whether or not there is a precedent for using counterpart for anything beyond administration in a bill of this type.

Mr. FULTON. On a bill of this relief type, I do not think you can change it over to have it go into a public works program so that actually we are in agreement with your original thought, but not with your example. Therefore, I am suggesting that counterpart funds be used for furthering the particular purposes of the bill.

Mr. RICHARDS. Maybe that will go in here.

Mr. FULTON. In a limited way.

Mr. RICHARDS. We will take it up when we get to writing the bill.

Mr. FULTON. A counterpart fund provision will give us a further say over assistance to some of the down-under people in Yugoslavia as Mrs. Bolton has pointed out. It is likely that this relief and the money will go down just so far through the Communist groupings and then many people will be left out, so that will still give us—

Mrs. BOLTON. No; I asked that.

Mr. FULTON. As I say, anywhere these funds go. .

Mr. RICHARDS. There is this difference, as I see it. I thought the basis of the thinking for putting this counterpart fund system in ECA was because there would be individual projects upon which the United States would like to exercise a deciding voice. The primary reason for having counterpart funds was to insure that projects would have to be approved by the United States.

Mr. FULTON. That is right.

Mr. RICHARDS. I do not see how you are going to get a large number of different categories of projects in a bill of this kind. It is a question of whether you were going to give it to the Government or dribble it out.

Mr. VORYS. Merely to refresh our recollections, because this is merely a matter of testing memories, in Public Law 84, Eightieth Congress, the title was: "Providing For Relief Assistance To People of Countries Devastated By War."

Section 6 provides:

To the extent that relief supplies procured with funds authorized under this general resolution are not furnished on terms of repayment in dollars, they shall be furnished only upon conditions that the government of the receiving country agree that when it sells such relief supplies for local currency, (a) the amounts of such local currency will be deposited by it in a special account; (b) such account will be used within such country as a revolving fund until June 30, 1948, only upon the approval of the duly authorized representative of the United States for relief and work relief purposes, including local currency expenses of the United States incident to the furnishing of relief, and (c) any unencumbered balance remaining in such account on June 30, 1948, will be disposed of within such country for such purposes as the United States Government pursuant to act or joint resolution of the Congress may determine.

That was the origin that became law May 31, 1947, of counterpart, which Mr. Hoffman has testified before this committee is the key to the success of ECA; a similar formula was in the interim aid bill passed in December 1947; a similar formula was in the Marshall plan or Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, and since then, that counterpart formula, I believe, has been included in everything, including, I believe, aid to Korea.

Mr. FULTON. It has been a precedent, under Public Law 84, for the use of counterpart in relief as well as on public works projects. I must say to you in all fairness that under the ECA that the counterpart funds have been mostly used for public works projects plus the expenses of the particular local ECA administrations; is that not right?

Mr. VORYS. Well, no; there was a provision written in by the Appropriations Committee and now included in our legislation that 5 percent must be used for strategic materials.

Mr. FULTON. Of course, for debt reduction, too.

Mr. RICHARDS. Well, I would like to hear from the witness. You gentlemen were talking about why he does not think counterpart would do at all in this bill. I would like to hear what he has to say on the subject.

Mr. TRUESDELL. I believe Mr. Fulton mentioned that he agreed that counterpart for industrial development in this program was not in order.

Mr. FULTON. It is hardly feasible.

Mr. TRUESDELL. We agree with that position. What the relief aspect of it is is something new to me; as far as I know, it had not been considered and we should consider it.

Mr. FULTON. If you would consider it, I am sure this committee would be interested in some type of a program that might not even be in the nature of a revolving fund as in Public Law 84. Because then it would continue when we might have need for a quicker termination. If you would bring that particular point up, I am sure it will make the bill a lot more palatable to many people.

Mr. ANDREWS. And Mr. Chairman, if I might break in here, the Yugoslav Army plays a pretty big role in this whole scheme. The present army and the security police number about 350,000 people. Their army ration runs from 3,500 to 4,000 calories per soldier per day. I would like to mention for the record that this requires an expenditure of about \$4,000,000 per month to take care of that army. That sum is being provided for the first 4 months under the MDAP portion of the stopgap aid program, 21 percent of the total program of 47 percent of the stopgap program. Extending this requirement to cover the full 7 months of the program results in the food requirements of the Yugoslav Army amounting to \$28,000,000, or 44 percent of the total program.

In addition to these needs lumber workers, strategic metals, and other miners, and various other heavy laborers require 4,000 calories a day.

Thus, the daily caloric intake to be provided the average Yugoslav will be well below 2,300 calories a day.

Mr. RICHARDS. I just wanted to know whether you had a document you wanted to put in the record.

Mr. FULTON. Could I make a comment there to you, that your statement as to the primary use of either the supplies or this money originally put up is not in any way interfered with by the later use of counterpart funds for another purpose.

Mr. ANDREWS. I can agree with you, but that is not my place to determine that policy. I have got a lot of ideas about that question.

Mr. FULTON. If you were meaning that the feeding of the army would be cut by the use of counterpart funds—

Mr. ANDREWS. No, no, no.

Mr. FULTON. I am pointing out to you it would have no relation whatever.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wanted to bring in the record here that I am sure the military is an important item in this whole business; it takes 4,000 calories per person a day in food to keep that 350,000 army in force.

Mr. RICHARDS. The hearing is about to come to an end. Are there any further questions?

Mrs. BOLTON. I did not ask a question and I would like to ask Mr. Haggerty something.

You have been all over Yugoslavia and you must know the sense of the people and the Government. I would like to ask you whether it would be your feeling that attaching any conditions at all to this gift of ours would make difficulties and would interfere in any way with the purpose which, as Mr. Vorys has reminded me, was economic warfare rather than just humanitarian?

Mr. HAGGERTY. It would depend very much on what the conditions were whether or not it would create any difficulties.

Mrs. BOLTON. Conditions like the archbishop being released and left inside the country, insisting upon action on the basis of the agreement upon which we recognized the Government; freedom of press

and religion and some of those salient points, to say nothing of the Greek children.

Mr. HAGGERTY. Those issues, I am confident, are best handled in a more informal way than to spell them out as conditions. I am sure that we will accomplish a great deal more along those lines by putting our trust in our Ambassador there who is an extremely competent man and understands the situation and is handling it very well, than to try to write them in as conditions in the program. I think it would be self-defeating because in recent weeks the Yugoslav Government has shown that they are willing to go along with us as rapidly as they can. I would like to point out that this is a program which will extend over a period of possibly 5 or 6 months, from now until April or May. Yugoslavia is not an occupied country. The total aid which is contemplated, including the stopgap program which is already being implemented, will not represent more than 10 or perhaps 15 percent of the Yugoslav food supply, what they are actually going to have to eat from now until the next harvest, after taking account of the belt tightening which they are undergoing, and it is not a situation in which the tail can wag the dog. I think we have stretched as far as we dare this very thin and delicate membrane of our relationship and if we try to impose conditions, they are a proud people; they are proud of the struggle they went through in the liberation war. We have to, I think, have some regard for that fact. If we deal with them more on an informal basis we will accomplish a good deal more.

Mr. FULTON. How can Congress then say to Marshall-plan countries, either you get together and cooperate or we are going to look over the program again?

Mrs. BOLTON. I do not accept that, Mr. Fulton, as my point at all. My point is that, and I said something of this yesterday, this is a moment when this country and all the countries of the world are facing a survival proposition. It seems to me of extreme importance that we take each state that we can deal with practically, as a separate entity. The one thing we need to do for getting ourselves a little bit of help here and there is to pry loose from the Kremlin as many of these individual states as can be. Yugoslavia is the first one that offers us any such chance. To me, what we are up against is so infinitely greater than any comparison that could be made between Yugoslavia and the Marshall states, Yugoslavia and Spain, any comparison of the small entities, the over-all is of such terrible importance to the survival of men on earth that I think we have got to broaden our point of view very much in this and not haggle over the little things.

Mr. FULTON. May I say then for myself, how can we rationalize putting conditions on the Marshall-plan countries?

Mrs. BOLTON. Because we are not prying them loose.

Mr. FULTON. When we are not putting conditions on Tito. Would you answer that?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I think in the very nature of the Marshall plan, in George Marshall's original speech which launched it, he said if European countries will do thus and so, if they will get together and they will, to the maximum possible extent meet one another's own needs economically, that the United States will be prepared to step in and help.

Mr. FULTON. That plan worked so well for the Marshall-plan countries, will you tell us then from your great experience in Yugoslavia why it should not work in a further extension to Yugoslavia?

Mr. HAGGERTY. For this reason: The Marshall-plan countries from the outset were basically friendly to us, in reaching out to us. Yugoslavia only a year ago was stacked up in the enemy camp. They have moved.

Mr. FULTON. How about next year?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Yugoslavia has moved, in my judgment, a very great distance in asking America for aid. The imposition of conditions at this point would destroy that. Next year is in the lap of the gods. I think it depends very much upon how we handle ourselves during the next 6 months.

Mr. FULTON. In closing, could I ask, did you see any of the so-called reeducation camps for Yugoslav people, to reorient them toward Tito's so-called Leninist communism in Yugoslavia?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I have not seen any such camps. I know that that sort of thing has been going on in the public schools and in the children's movement and in practically every walk of life. It perhaps still is.

Mrs. BOLTON. Going on? It is going on here, is it not?

Mr. HAGGERTY. You mean political propaganda?

Mr. FULTON. But the camps themselves, have you seen them?

Mr. HAGGERTY. No; and I have not been aware of their existence.

Mr. FULTON. Then you have not seen enough of Yugoslavia for me.

Mr. HAGGERTY. I have seen summer camps; I know that they are not compulsory because I know that—

Mr. FULTON. I have a young DP I am sending through the University of Pittsburgh now from Yugoslavia. Within the last 18 months to 2 years, there was an attempt to kidnap him on a ship and get him back. That was Tito's government.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask a question, something that I would like to have in the record of today?

There has been written in the papers and in letters to us the suggestion that I will quote from this paper:

The hunger in Yugoslavia, once the granary of Europe, has its true cause in the foolish and unnatural Communist economic plan which has been imposed by a minority on the masses of the Yugoslav people against their will.

Now, this particular situation, does that, in your opinion, cover the real reason and the fundamental reason for this drought?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I would classify that as a half-truth. It is true that during the three-odd years of the Communist administration in Yugoslavia there has been economic deterioration in every phase of the economy, agricultural as well as others. It is still true this year. There has been a degree of apathy on the part of the peasants to produce, those who are in the collective farms, a great many of them having been coerced into joining. They have no great enthusiasm for it. They would just as soon see the collectives fail. Their attitude is, Let Henry do it. As a result, the record of production on collective farms, despite official propaganda to the contrary, is that they are not producing up to par set by private peasants. On the roughly three-quarters of the farms that are still private holdings there has been a deteriorating influence because they are constantly under the

threat of socialization; what they do produce is taken by the Government at low prices set by the Government and much of the economic inducement to work is gone. There has been this downward spiral, to put a statistical handle on that—I would not state it as a final judgment—but just to illustrate it, I would say that the fallen production between 1949 and 1950 might be due to the extent of 10 or 15 percent to general economic deterioration and apathy and the rest of it is due to the drought.

Mr. RICHARDS. You would not say, as Mrs. Bolton has suggested, that these internal policies brought on the drought?

Mr. HAGGERTY. No; as a matter of fact, I do not think they have.

Mrs. BOLTON. May I ask this in addition? I think it was Mr. Andrews who gave us figures on the collectivization. It made a difference in the collectivism of the state and the cooperatives, the farm co-ops. Is there a real difference between those two and do the farm cooperatives which the farm peasants as a rule voluntarily set up, have they any relation to our co-ops?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I use that word "voluntarily" in quotes in referring to Yugoslavia. State farms in Yugoslavia are factory farms. They are run as commercial enterprises under a manager and with hired labor force.

Mrs. BOLTON. Could you compare them very vaguely with the large farm industry of the Middle West or far West, farms of 5,000,000 acres?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I would say following the depression we had and we may have still some very large holdings of insurance companies which they found more or less unwillingly in their laps and they had to operate them to come out. They consolidated farms into large operating units, put a college-trained manager in charge and ran it as a business proposition until the real estate market would pick up to the time when they could sell.

The state farms are somewhat comparable. Their first function is to produce economically. Secondly, they are demonstration farms to prove to Yugoslav people that the socialist way is the better way. For that purpose they get machinery, fertilizer, seed, and what technical know-how is available in Yugoslavia; that is poured first into the state farm so they can show up to advantage.

Mrs. BOLTON. But in spite of that fact, they have not done as well as the private peasant?

Mr. HAGGERTY. When I made that statement, I was referring to collectives which I was just about getting to. In the collective farms like the Russian kolkhoz, the land is not nationalized. It is collectivized. The peasant signs a contract or an agreement to join with the collective for an initial period of 3 years. He pledges his land, his capital, his work stock, his machinery and his own labor for a 3-year period. The collective farms are of four categories, from the bottom up: First, the man puts his land in and obtains rent. In all four groups they receive payment on the basis of their day's work performed, but in the lowest group, he gets rent on his land and retains title.

Mrs. BOLTON. Just like Russia.

Mr. HAGGERTY. In the second group, he receives instead of rent, an interest on its estimated capital value. He also retains title.

In the third group, he retains title but receives no land income. He gets his payment in kind and in cash on the basis of his day's work performed.

The fourth group which the Yugoslavs call the highest group or highest type, full-scale collective, he donates his land, signs it away inviolably and his land becomes collective property, presumably in perpetuity, and the only income he gets is on the basis of the day's work performed. There is a quirk in the law regarding collectives by which the assembly of the collective can change the thing from a lower to a higher type so if the man goes into a lower type collective he may in the course of 2 or 3 years find that his collective has become one of the higher type and he has lost the right to withdraw the land.

Mr. RICHARDS. Are there any other questions?

Mr. VORYS. I have one question, probably a foolish question. I notice that there are substantial shortages of potatoes and I just wonder why we can't send potatoes.

Mr. TRIGG. Mr. Vorys, I might answer that by saying we can send them. There are plenty here. But they would have to go under such conditions that it would not at all be economical or profitable to send them.

No. 1 is they would have to be shipped in refrigerated conditions to keep them from freezing. We can send them other commodities that on a calorie content basis they can get more calories per dollar spent for it either in transportation or in acquisition costs.

Mrs. BOLTON. They eat those other commodities?

Mr. TRIGG. Presumably wheat or something of that nature. They can get much more for the dollar spent.

Mr. VORYS. In this connection, the millers of the United States have always wanted to get a guaranteed minimum of flour in the ECA plan and at the suggestion of the Administrator, we have resisted that on the grounds that they needed the millings over there as much as the flour and that, while flour was cheaper to ship, being less bulky than wheat, they needed the milling over there.

Now, in this case, the Yugoslavs have requested wheat and we send them flour and also fodder and stuff which I, as a nonfarmer, would think would be taking the place of the millings. Why is it a good thing to turn down a Yugoslav request for wheat but insist that we want to send wheat to the rest of the European countries?

Mr. TRIGG. I think Mr. Haggerty explained it a minute ago. Why don't you repeat it?

Mr. HAGGERTY. It is partly a matter of geography and partly a matter of time. We are assuming a normal winter there. We have at the latest December, to get in flour to the areas where it is to be eaten.

There is a factor of geography in that this chronic deficit area, the islands along the Dalmatian coasts have considerable population, and the mountain valleys running up from the coast are not grain-producing areas, consequently they don't have mills and if we shipped in wheat as I mentioned earlier, it would have to go to the wheat-producing regions to be milled. Of course, they would have the shorts and the bran there but it would be too late getting flour into the areas where it is needed.

Mr. VORYS. I don't quite understand that because we have been told that the stopgap program will take care of their situation until January and you have told us that whatever these valleys are getting,

for use up to March, they will have to have before January, so I am assuming that the one-third of the population or so that are in the mountains are going to be taken care of out of the stopgap program or they are not going to be taken care of at all. Am I wrong about that?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I think that is largely true. I am sure that this flour that is going in from Germany and Italy will go for the most important part into these interior areas that get snowed in. The later shipments, their actual distribution will have to be worked out between now and the time they arrive with the Yugoslav authorities as to what their food situation is, what distribution they have made of their own food supply, and fill out where the shortages exist. I have been told that Yugoslavia anticipating the winter has already moved so much food from the grain-producing regions that if the full program goes through some of the American food is going to have to go back to grain-producing areas to take place of the requisitioning done to take care of mountain areas.

Mr. VORYS. If wheat were shipped to the grain-producing regions there would be flour mills and transportation?

Mrs. BOLTON. Is all of it flour?

Mr. HAGGERTY. The bulk of the program is flour.

Mrs. BOLTON. Some of it is wheat?

Mr. TRIGG. Yes; 110,000 is flour, 58,000 tons is to be wheat.

Mr. VORYS. I am looking at this report in front of me. They asked for 160,000 tons of wheat and 40,000 tons of flour. They are getting 168,000 tons of flour, of which 142,000 are in the stopgap program and 26,000 in the appropriation request. All I know is what I see here in front of me on paper.

Mr. TRIGG. I think my answer was incorrect. I was answering on the basis of the original authority or request of this program, but as I understand it, now it is all to be flour.

Mr. RICHARDS. Is white flour referred to when we talk about flour?

Mr. TRIGG. Eighty percent.

Mr. RICHARDS. When we had this question up before, the millers wanted to send white flour.

However, in this particular case there is a need of byproducts for feed, because you have items here for feed.

Mr. VORYS. Milo, wouldn't that be comparable with millings in food value for stock?

Mr. TRIGG. Milo is pure and simple stock feed.

Mr. VORYS. Byproducts of wheat are stock feed, aren't they?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDS. Is milo from milling?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; milo includes millet and certain related grains. Only in one area is milo used as food for direct human consumption. It isn't Yugoslavia, it is India.

Mr. VORYS. This \$2,600,000 that is in here for milo, fodder. Is it just for exactly the same purpose that you could use millings? Am I right? I am no farmer.

Mr. RICHARDS. The rough wheat you are talking about, the rough stuff out of wheat.

Mr. TRIGG. I don't think you can say it is exactly the same. Milo has a different food value. Milo compares more with corn and it

has a different feeding value for livestock use than you would get from leavings of milled wheat.

Mr. VORYS. But it is the same sort of thing, to feed stock with.

Mr. TRIGG. It is for livestock feed; yes.

Mr. VORYS. Our purpose, I would think, is to keep this stock alive until their next harvest rather than to attempt to please their taste. The people there could be choosy about the food but if we can keep their cattle going and pigs, I imagine we would not need to be fussy about their diet.

Mr. TRIGG. I am sure that the necessity for livestock feed exists there but as has been pointed out, you have got to ship this inland and get it milled and then redistributed where the milo can go one way and the flour can go another, if it needs to be over there, when it hits the shore.

Mr. VORYS. The people you are going to have to feed out of this program are going to be people who live right where you have got mills and transportation, right in the dead of winter.

Mrs. BOLTON. It isn't.

Mr. VORYS. Then I can't see the difference between that and the arguments presented every time on ECA.

Mrs. BOLTON. The people we are trying to feed in the mountains—

Mr. VORYS. He has just explained that they have already got the supplies.

Mrs. BOLTON. Not enough until the snow breaks.

Mr. HAGGERTY. I could clarify two points I think in the recent discussion. One, on the extraction. The Yugoslavs have indicated a preference for dark flour, 85 or 90 percent which is what we would call a whole wheat flour but they have agreed to accept for the immediate deliveries which are already coming from Germany and Italy, flour already milled which may run as low as 73 percent, which is a white flour.

The bulk of it, however, if milled for Yugoslavia's account would be higher, a darker wheat. On the milo and other grains, it is important to bear in mind that the Yugoslav economy is horsepowered. Almost all transportation is horsepower, horses and oxen. It isn't only a matter of keeping them alive but their internal transportation throughout the winter requires feed. They have a forest economy and they depend to a large extent on exports of forest products. Their work in the forests uses horses and oxen. Don't forget, for spring farming they have got to feed the stock. I have seen farmers in Montana try to plow with underfed horses and it did not work.

Mr. RICHARDS. You might add that the military is on wheels.

Mr. HAGGERTY. Drawn by horses.

Mr. RICHARDS. That causes an abnormally great demand on the normal civilian supply.

Mr. FULTON. You have been in Yugoslavia and you know the situation. Now, I would like to find what the basis of this program is. First, this is not a relief program because there are many areas of the world in equal or worse distress than Yugoslavia. For example, India would be one; and in the last year or so we did nothing for India. That was turned down by the United States when they requested food relief. Second, it is not a humanitarian purpose because if it is a humanitarian purpose, we can look just as well for other places and within this country for people who are having a hard time.

Next, the program is not made on a direct alliance; there is no intention of making an alliance with the Tito government and the United States Government.

Next, it is not joining Tito's government with the Marshall plan. So there is no intention of making this a Marshall-plan program.

Next, it is not Tito's government joining the Atlantic Treaty nations. So it does not or is not integrating them into the common defense of the Atlantic basin area.

Next, it is not Tito's government joining the Western Union. So it is not his joining the other countries of Europe for the common defense of Europe.

Nor is there any statement by him that he will remain neutral for any length of time, nor that he will not join the Soviets, nor on the other side, the converse, that he will join us or any one of us in fighting any imperialist menace.

Now, then, if we put this program through Tito's governmental organization, it first eases the budget pressures upon that Government and, in effect, it fills up the supply lines of a government that controls all industry and agricultural and all economic life. So, in effect, it means that we would be insuring for a certain time a continuation of a Communist government of a certain type.

Mrs. BOLTON. A Communist government that does not accept the domination of the Kremlin. Over 85 percent of the Yugoslav people who do not want it, and let it be said, too, an inefficient government.

Mr. FULTON. Now, then, as I said before, it is not all just bread and arms in this world. You yourself have no choice of Communist ideologies do you? Do you think this is a better dictatorship and a better type communism in and of itself than the Soviet Government type? Do you think it is better?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I think it is in the sense that it is an independent government and because it is so overwhelmingly dependent on the Western World now. It is therefore amenable to suggestion and pressure and change if judiciously managed.

Mr. FULTON. You do not think the difference between this type of government and the Soviet Government is enough to induce you to enter this program, do you? Simply a theoretical idealistic difference between the two systems of government is not enough to you, is it?

Mr. HAGGERTY. No; I agree with you on that.

Mr. FULTON. So, then, if we come to that, it just comes down to opportunism without plan, or is it economic warfare, and deal with whom you must? Which did you think it is?

Mr. HAGGERTY. Mr. Congressman, I do not like to have you putting words in my mouth.

Mr. FULTON. I am not. I do not want you to agree with me. I am trying to keep you from agreeing with me.

Mr. BURLESON. Will the gentleman yield? You have ably answered your own questions in the observations you make.

Mr. RICHARDS. Let me answer that question for you.

Mr. FULTON. I would like to hear it from the witness. You are too good. I would like the witness from Yugoslavia, if you will.

Mr. HAGERTY. I will be very happy to answer you in my own way, Mr. Congressman.

As you say, I have been in Yugoslavia 2 years and whatever facilities I have—

Mr. FULTON. That is why I am simply asking, and putting no words in your mouth.

Mr. HAGGERTY. In making observations there, you have enumerated there a number of things which you said this loan is not. I think more properly you would say it is not exclusively any one of those things.

Mr. FULTON. I gave you an alternative and asked you what it was.

Mr. HAGGERTY. In some degree it is a little bit of all of them. It is partly humanitarian, partly political, partly strategic, but in my own opinion, and I have given a good deal of thought to it, there are several reasons why we should help Yugoslavia in this crisis. I understand that there are in the range of 80,000 of Yugoslav nationality in the city of Detroit alone. I do not know any statistics beyond that, but I know that there are very large elements of people of Yugoslav origin in the area from Chicago to Pittsburgh, all of our industrial cities.

Mr. FULTON. I represent South Pittsburgh and there is a large group in the Pittsburgh district so I know, and they don't favor the present dictatorship in my estimation.

Mr. HAGGERTY. To use the figure you used, 85 percent of the people of Yugoslavia do not want a Communist government; I think that is substantially true. And those people are basically friendly to America. They look to us for their salvation and in the situation in which they find themselves. I do not believe that as many as the remaining 15 percent are Communists. But even if they were, there are strata in Communists. You could probably count on both hands the Communists in Yugoslavia who have committed themselves to a point where there is no backing up. The great majority, particularly the younger people, have not been educated in Moscow. What they know of communism they have learned in Yugoslavia. I personally believe that education is a process that goes on all a man's life. Many of these people have sincere doubts as to whether or not the system they are living under is right. They are subject to change. Their education is not yet complete.

Mr. FULTON. Why do we not encourage that group instead of trying to shore up dictatorial regimes and maintaining inefficient regimes?

Mr. HAGGERTY. I say that we are encouraging those groups by feeding them. Every morsel of food that goes into Yugoslavia from America, every kernel of hybrid corn seed is a golden yellow diplomat. We, if you please, will use their own government as a funnel through which we will feed not only food to the Yugoslav people but with every bit of food will go some element of the western way of life. We are not going to get anyplace if we try to overthrow this government. We are not going to get anyplace if we try to impose conditions on the loan. While I think it is not the best government in the world, it is the only government the Yugoslavs have. The alternative, if it falls, is no government whatever, which is the kind of set-up the Cominform is looking for.

Mr. FULTON. Why don't you use the United Nations? And I disagree with you that if the Yugoslav Government falls there is no government whatever, and no possibility otherwise.

Mr. RICHARDS. The committee stands adjourned, and we will meet in executive session at 2:30 this afternoon.

(At 12:45 p. m., the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIX

[From the New York Times, October 25, 1950]

YUGOSLAVS SLASH AT SOVIET POLICY—SHARPNESS OF RECENT ATTACKS SURPRISES OBSERVERS—VISHINSKY A TARGET

BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA, October 24, 1950.—Yugoslav propagandists have surprised foreign observers with the vehemence of their defense of the United Nations and the extreme violence of their attack on the Soviet Government.

The attacks that have been appearing in recent days on the Soviet foreign policy surpass in violence anything published in this country on this subject since the rupture with Moscow. Yesterday's issue of the newspaper Omladina, for example, described Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Y. Vishinsky and the Soviet Government in such terms as to leave no doubt that they were considered little more than the archenemies of mankind.

The newspaper asserted that even the "blackest reactionaries" in the West had shown a sense of decency compared with Mr. Vishinsky, because they at least had made no effort to conceal their aggressive ambitions.

"Mr. Vishinsky is more dangerous than they," the newspaper said.

"He is a symbol of hypocrisy. He sits on two chairs. He advocates Russian hegemony, the right to command other nations, the right to create Soviet provinces out of free nations, the right to produce Soviet marshals for export, and the right to shape the destiny of civilization.

"He considers Moscow as the center of the universe. His scientists, who recently turned successfully to inventing everything, will in all probability reveal soon that Jesus Christ was born in Moscow, and that Eve tricked Adam in the Moscow parks, which God picked for Paradise.

"Where Moscow's domination is concerned, Vishinsky is the flaming defender of slavery and Christian piety. Whoever dares to oppose Moscow is an heretic and mystic and must be burned at the stake.

So far as the Yugo-Soviet struggle is concerned, Omladina said that in the terms of Mr. Vishinsky, "we are the blackest warmongering Fascists and criminals who threaten the existence of the people's democracies and the great Soviet Union."

"And we must be eradicated from the face of the earth.

"Eradicate us because of peace. Eradicate us because of the progress of the human race. Eradicate us for the triumph of the inhuman policy defended by Mr. Vishinsky."

Omladina declared that the Soviet Government was showing its love for peace by concentrating troops against other countries. In substance, the newspaper said, Soviet policy was to shout for peace and use force against small countries because force was its "brightest argument."

[From the New York Herald Tribune, November 21, 1950]

TITO AID CALLS MOSCOW BREAK "UNBRIDGEABLE"—ASSERTION BY PROPAGANDA CHIEF IS NEW DEPARTURE IN ATTACK AGAINST RUSSIA

BELGRADE, November 20—One of the four top men of Premier Marshal Tito's entourage declared today that the schism between Belgrade and Moscow is "unbridgeable." It is believed to be the first time a Yugoslav Communist leader has made this statement since Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform.

In a diatribe of exceptional violence against the Soviet Union, Milovan Djilas, 39, Marshal Tito's propaganda chief, accused the Russian Communists of spreading abroad a despotism without precedent in human history and of preparing for aggressive war.

A few paragraphs must be quoted to give the flavor of a two-installment attack on the Russians by Mr. Djilas, entitled "The Essence of the Soviet Union" and published by the Communist party paper Borba.

"Not only every Marxist but every bourgeois politician and every common man can see what the Soviet Union is.

"Instead of internationalism and brotherhood and equality, nationalistic darkness, the occupation and suppression of six civilized European states, expropriation of their property, preparation for aggressive war, allegedly against capitalism but in fact to assure the Soviet Union of plunder and new land.

"Instead of a happy life for working people, a gray mentality; furious, inhuman and alcoholic outbursts of phony happiness; violent and total pressure on the iron heel: espionage that has infiltrated into the tiniest cells of society—into the relations between husband and wife, parents and children, artists and their inspirations—in a way that human history has not known until now.

"Shallow and trivial lies and demagoguery and staged trials like those in the past against heretics and witches, planned to deceive simple, common people; lies and slander elsewhere and in everything."

The fight between Belgrade and Moscow, Mr. Djilas said, is more irreconcilable than the fight between the "despotism" of capitalism and proletarian democracy.

Until now the Yugoslav Communist party, which says it is a follower of the principles of Marx and Lenin, has generally assailed Soviet leaders as "revisionists" of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Mr. Djilas today called them outright "enemies" of communism. He said the Soviet Union "is monstrous even compared to bourgeois democracy."

COMMISSION ON WORLD PEACE OF THE METHODIST CHURCH,

Chicago 11, Ill., December 1, 1950.

Hon. JOHN KEE,

*Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. KEE: Enclosed is my copy of testimony in support of adequate food relief measures for Yugoslavia. I regret that I cannot appear in person to give this testimony.

I will appreciate it if the committee will enter this testimony in the record.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES F. BOSS, JR.,
Executive Secretary.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF FOOD RELIEF PROPOSALS FOR YUGOSLAVIA BY CHARLES F. BOSS, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON WORLD PEACE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is Charles F. Boss, Jr., and I am executive secretary of the Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church. I am making this statement in support of adequate food relief measures for Yugoslavia, since our commission on world peace took action November 17, 1950, in support of the sending of surplus foods to countries now in need. In any case, our Methodist Church will participate in a food relief program by sending packages to needy families in Yugoslavia.

Principally, however, I am making this statement on the basis of personal experiences and observations in Yugoslavia. It was my privilege to visit Yugoslavia in August of 1948 and again in September and early October of 1950. While in Yugoslavia I spoke to Methodist Churches and held conferences with the district superintendent, pastors, and women workers of the churches. This enabled me to receive first-hand reports on the food situation directly from persons in Yugoslav homes. I may say that it made me humble and also thankful to hear people in homes where I ate say, "Most of the food you are eating came from friends in the United States." There was no hesitancy in giving credit to the United States for what it is doing for Yugoslavia.

The district superintendent of Methodist Churches in Yugoslavia gave evidence of the food crisis facing his people this winter in eastern Yugoslavia (Methodist Churches are located in eastern Yugoslavia from the Hungarian border on the north to the Greek-Bulgarian border on the southeast).

In addition to the contacts reported above I had the privilege of long conferences with bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church and an hour and a half with the new patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The religious affairs committee of Yugoslavia of which Smiljanic "second president" of the Serbian Parliament, is chairman, invited me to a dinner which

lasted for 3 hours, during which time we discussed the food relief and other matters of mutual interest to the churches.

More than 2 hours were given to a conference on food relief and other matters of mutual concern, with a member of the Yugoslavia Cabinet.

Before leaving Yugoslavia I conferred for more than an hour with Ambassador George V. Allen on conditions in Yugoslavia.

In all of the foregoing conferences judgments were unanimous that a genuine need and very imperative need for immediate help exists.

Upon request I am writing articles for our church papers in support of the plan to send food packages to needy families in Yugoslavia. My personal observations and conferences, therefore, all add up in support of my testimony in favor of immediate and adequate food help for Yugoslavia.

[H. R. 9853, 81st Cong., 2d sess.]

A BILL To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950."

SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for additional emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia a sum not to exceed \$38,000,000 to remain available for obligation through June 30, 1951.

SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this Act.

(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States.

(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe without restriction the distribution of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this Act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

(d) To make equitable distribution to the people of Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this Act without discrimination as to race, color, or political or religious belief.

SEC. 4. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this Act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

SEC. 5. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this Act without charge against appropriated funds.

SEC. 6. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this Act, or is diverting from the purpose of this Act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution of both Houses, finds termination is desirable.

Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered.

81ST CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. R. 9853

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 5, 1950

MR. RICHARDS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

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2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
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4 Relief Assistance Act of 1950".

5 SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated
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4 determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

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6 States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its
7 local currency administrative and operating expenses in
8 Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this
9 Act.

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11 press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to
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5 Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this sec-
6 tion shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies
7 scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered.

81ST CONGRESS
2d Session

H. R. 9853

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and provide for
the defense and general welfare of the
United States by furnishing emergency re-
lief assistance to Yugoslavia.

By Mr. RICHARDS

DECEMBER 5, 1950

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE
ACT OF 1950

REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ON

H. R. 9853

A BILL TO PROMOTE THE FOREIGN POLICY
AND PROVIDE FOR THE DEFENSE AND GEN-
ERAL WELFARE OF THE UNITED STATES BY
FURNISHING EMERGENCY RELIEF
ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA



SUBMITTED BY MR. RICHARDS

DECEMBER 7, 1950.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE





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Union Calendar No. 1097

81ST CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
2d Session } { No. 3179

YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950

DECEMBER 7, 1950.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. RICHARDS, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 9853]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 9853) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendments are as follows:

On page 2, line 12, after the word "States", strike out the period, insert a semicolon and the following: "and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose."

On page 2, line 14, after the word "observe", insert "and supervise".

On page 2, line 15, after the word "distribution", insert "by Yugoslavia".

On page 2, line 20, strike out the word "of" and insert in lieu thereof the word "in"; and on line 22, strike out "color,".

On page 2, line 22, after the word "Aet", insert the following: "as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources,".

On page 4, line 4, strike out the words "of both Houses".

I. COMMITTEE ACTION

The Yugoslav relief question was first presented to the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in a meeting held on November 27, 1950, by the Honorable George Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. A message from the President, dated November 29, 1950 (H. Doc. No. 723), recommending enactment of legislation for this purpose was referred to the

committee on November 30. On November 28, 1950, the Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, appeared before the full committee and gave a résumé of the world situation, including a discussion of the relationship of the present critical position of Yugoslavia to this situation and the urgent need for assistance from the United States. Formal hearings were held in open and executive sessions on November 29 and 30. The following witnesses were heard: Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Stanley Andrews, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture; Mr. John J. Haggerty, agricultural attaché, United States Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Mr. Ralph S. Trigg, President, Commodity Credit Corporation; Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., special assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence; Mr. Robert Mudd, intelligence adviser on the Balkan area, Department of State; the Honorable Henry F. Grady, United States Ambassador to Iran; and Mr. George E. Truesdell, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State.

The committee also heard a report by two of its members, the Honorable Laurie C. Battle and the Honorable Thurmond Chatham, on their recent visit to Yugoslavia.

H. R. 9853 was introduced on December 5, 1950, by the Honorable James P. Richards, acting chairman of the committee. It embodied certain initial provisions developed from the committee's consideration. On December 5 and 6, the committee met in executive session to consider the bill. On December 6, the committee voted to report the bill favorably with amendments.

II. PURPOSE OF THE BILL

The purpose of this bill is to relieve the threat of distress from hunger in Yugoslavia as a consequence of the severe drought in that country during the spring and summer of 1950, and thus to help Yugoslavia maintain its political and economic independence, the loss of which could seriously endanger the peace and stability of Europe and the world.

The bill authorizes the appropriation of \$38,000,000 for additional emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, to remain available through June 30, 1951, under the terms of an agreement to be entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States. The bill sets forth in some detail the conditions of aid and the necessary arrangements for administration.

III. THE BACKGROUND OF EVENTS

Postwar emergence of Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia emerged from World War II as a leading member of the Soviet-oriented countries of eastern Europe. Having fought the Axis successfully, Yugoslav leaders enthusiastically set forth to develop the country into a thoroughgoing Communist state. Marshal Tito consolidated his political power in all directions and embarked upon an ambitious collectivist economic program. Politically, Tito consolidated his power by familiar police-state methods and appealed to the hard core of dynamic nationalism of his people, offering his own leadership as the key to Socialist success.

Economically, Yugoslavia relied on exports of food and raw materials to purchase chemicals, textiles, machinery, metals, and metal manufactures. Prior to the war, Germany had been its largest trading partner; but with the disappearance of Germany as a trading area, Yugoslavia turned to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the other satellites. The shift in the trade pattern was a definite plan designed to promote close economic relations with the other countries of the Soviet bloc.

Internationally, Yugoslavia joined in the chorus of the Soviet satellites in condemning the west and in furthering the aims of the satellite group of states as well as its own. It maintained a belligerent attitude toward Italy on the subject of Trieste. It participated actively with the Soviet states in supporting the guerrilla warfare in Greece. In nearly every respect Yugoslavia truculently played its part as a Communist state. This was, however, not all done for the benefit of the Soviet Union. Yugoslav national aims were perhaps clearer than they had been for some time. Tito was anxious to establish Yugoslavia as the leader in eastern Europe.

The break with the Soviet Union and its consequences

In accordance with the prime objective of monolithic control, the Soviet Union set out to organize the satellite states for its own purposes. This involved close collaboration and often Soviet dictation on military matters, and a kind of colonial economic organization designed to strengthen the Soviet economy at the expense of the satellites, who, in turn, would rely almost completely on the Soviet and satellite economies to supply their major needs. The Kremlin set out to mold Yugoslavia on this pattern.

Contrary to the familiar pattern in the other satellite states, Yugoslavia did not accept these two premises of Soviet policy. In an exchange of letters in the summer of 1948 between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Tito declared his independence. The circumstances and the involved argument over the immediate causes for the break are unimportant. What happened was that Tito elected to defy the Kremlin on the basic issue of who should control Yugoslavia. Despite the fog of verbiage over who embraced the true religion and who was the heretic, the basic proposition was that Tito insisted upon his continued control of the Yugoslav regime, especially the army and the security forces, rather than permitting control to be exercised by Moscow as in the case of the other European satellites.

In the beginning, the Western World was inclined to regard the break as a devious and carefully staged action designed to accomplish a purpose yet to become evident. For some time, Tito avoided direct attacks on Stalin. Yugoslavia continued to follow the Soviet line in international conferences. As time went on, however, it became evident that the break was genuine; it had not been staged. What the world was witnessing was a struggle for power within the tightly controlled Soviet empire. The political and economic consequences of this event have assumed a tremendous importance; in fact, they are in one sense the real roots of the problems of principle involved in the legislation.

Politically, the break represented the first significant crack in the iron curtain. To the non-Communist world, the spectacle of David standing up to Goliath was viewed with increasing interest and a

guarded optimism. To the Communist world, the break was a matter of the highest importance, and the liquidation of Tito became an urgent objective. There is no question but what the Kremlin was deeply shaken, for Tito's performance could serve as a model for other satellite leaders. Steps were taken subsequently in nearly all of the other satellite countries to weed out those who showed any signs of questioning Soviet leadership. Almost frantically the Soviet Union began to strengthen its control over the satellites. At the same time, it used every means short of armed force to overthrow Tito, but with a notable lack of success. The Yugoslav Government has reported that up to September 1, 1950, a total of 219 border incidents had occurred. In the summer of 1949, the Soviet Army itself held military maneuvers along Yugoslavia's borders with the obvious purpose of creating additional tensions in Yugoslavia. Subsequently, during the summer of 1950, all of the iron-curtain countries launched an intensive campaign charging that Yugoslavia, in connivance with Greece and at the instigation of the "American warmongers of Wall Street," was plotting to attack Bulgaria and Albania, and that Yugoslavia was rapidly becoming a "fortified outpost for use in the aggressive war plans of the United States." Carefully selected Soviet puppets in Yugoslavia were groomed to take over, but Tito ferreted them out and disposed of them. Soviet spies were sent into Yugoslavia in droves, but they too met with little success. As time went on and Tito's defiance went unpunished, the Soviet Union reached the point where only a brazen aggression could accomplish its purpose.

Tito began to move cautiously toward the west, not because of any love for the democratic ideal, but because he realized there was no other direction to move. In order to continue his defiance of Moscow, he had to tighten his control over Yugoslavia and at the same time build up its economy in accordance with earlier Communist plans. Relations with the west began to improve. Tito ceased giving aid to Greek guerrillas and contributed materially to the liquidation of the Greek war. He relaxed restrictions against western observers, seeking to have favorable first-hand impressions spread throughout the Western World. Among other things, the United States-Yugoslav claims settlement agreement, involving \$17,000,000 was effected.

Economically, the break with the Soviet Union was as sharp as the political break. Yugoslav trade moved toward the west. In particular the United States has become a principal purchaser of Yugoslav nonferrous metals.

Throughout 1949, the various satellite countries began to reduce trade with Yugoslavia and finally one after another broke off economic relations. By the end of the year trade between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its satellites was at a complete standstill.

As a result of these events, Yugoslavia now stands in a unique and perilous position. It must either look to the west or be reabsorbed into the Soviet bloc, a constant objective of the Kremlin. As a Communist country and a thoroughgoing dictatorship, it is not accepted as an ally in the Western World. Yet it remains a prime anti-Soviet country right at the doorstep of the Soviet world.

How definite is the break?

One of the prime questions now is whether the break with the Soviet Union is complete and irreparable.

The witnesses who testified before the committee, in both open and executive session, unanimously emphasizing the completeness of the rift, stated that Tito is beyond the pale permanently insofar as Stalin is concerned. Tito has said so, and so has Stalin, and there seems to be no possible way in which that breach can be mended. They have gone too far for either of them to retract what they have said.

IV. YUGOSLAVIA TODAY

Basic policies

Yugoslavia today is a Communist dictatorship, and Tito's policy is clearly to maintain it with equal ruthlessness against all groups in Yugoslavia—non-Communists and Cominformists alike. This requires stamping out organized opposition to the regime, exploiting Yugoslav patriotism, and resisting Soviet and Cominform pressures.

Political strength and weaknesses

The Tito regime is reasonably well established in Yugoslavia. Its elements of political strength are nationalism and a strong desire for independence. Its weaknesses lie in its lack of economic development, the latent opposition of the peasants to any interference in their traditional independence, particularly with respect to collectivization, a Cominform fifth column, and its precarious foreign exchange position. It would be a mistake to assume that because the Yugoslavs are pro-Yugoslavia, they are also pro-Tito. There are a great many who are anti-Tito but their opposition is either latent or swallowed up in a greater opposition to Moscow. The existence of an efficient secret police is evidence that strong measures are necessary to maintain the stability of the regime, as well as to hunt out and destroy Cominformists.

The morale of the people must be taken into account. Serbian and Croatian nationalism, peasant discontent, and the desire of many for freedom of speech can be kept down by force, but they cannot be removed from people's minds. They are a negative factor, tending to lower morale and they hamper unified support for the Government in its present situation.

The opposition

There is little known about the Cominform fifth column. It would be surprising, however, if within the Yugoslav Communist Party there were not some who sympathize with the Cominform, and others who desire a reconciliation with Moscow and still think one is possible. There is no reason to suppose that Tito's regime is now in danger. However, that he has declared and is maintaining his independence of Moscow should not be interpreted as a lack of any defections at home.

Titoism

It should be emphasized that Tito is devoted to communism and is as contemptuous of the "bourgeois imperialist west" as are the Soviets. He merely believes that he and his group are better qualified than the Kremlin to apply the science of Marxism-Leninism to Yugoslav conditions. There is no evidence that the Yugoslav Government is leaning toward democracy or that it will do so in the foreseeable future. The important point to Tito—and to the west as well—is his continued ability to stand up to the Soviet Union.

The 5-year plan

Economically, the Yugoslav Communist program is designed to industrialize the country as soon as possible. In accordance with the 1946 constitution, the Government has taken over all enterprises in transportation, industry, banking and finance, wholesale and foreign trade, and practically all retail stores. Even before the war, however, the railroads, a large portion of the shipping, mining concerns, and forests were state-owned.

In the spring of 1947, Yugoslavia introduced its first full-fledged 5-year plan along Soviet lines. This plan emphasized heavy investment for rapid industrialization at the expense of consumers. It is an ambitious plan, and one which many observers feel is unlikely to be achieved. In fact, the Yugoslav Government itself has been forced to make substantial modifications in it and even extend it to 6 years. Up to the summer of 1950, the industrial, trade, and banking enterprises were managed by state-employed directors who in turn were supervised by the central authorities in Belgrade. Since that time, the organization has been somewhat decentralized. The "federal republics" have been given administrative responsibility for enterprises within their boundaries, although the over-all plan is binding upon them. So-called workers' councils have been set up in every enterprise for the purpose of "assisting" the Government-appointed manager in his functions. However, the responsibility for operating the plants rests with the managers, who are subservient to the state. As in the Soviet Union, the trade unions are instruments for increasing the productivity of the workers. Wage rates and working conditions are determined by the Government and are not subject to collective bargaining.

Collectivization

In the ambitious economic plan, the collectivization of agriculture is an important element. In order to conform with the plan, a systematic centralized control over the scattered peasantry has been felt necessary to insure regular and increased supplies of food for the rapidly growing cities and regular and increased supplies of recruits for industry. Cheap, unskilled labor is plentiful in Yugoslavia, and control of the rural population through collectivization permits the Government to utilize the surplus manpower of the villages. Under the collective farm system, where the managing committees for the farms are controlled by the local Communist representatives, systematic recruitment of industrial labor becomes possible.

Ever since Tito came to power, control of the peasantry has been an important objective. The old prewar political parties were destroyed, and the social classes which provided their leadership were made powerless by Government control of all industrial enterprises. The peasantry remained the sole source of non-Communist opposition to Tito. The leaders of the Croatian and Serbian peasant parties have been disposed of. The only nongovernmental organizations still having some access to the peasantry are the churches. Leaders of the Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in Serbia who showed some signs of opposition to Tito have been removed, and although the churches operate on a limited basis, the Government is constantly watchful of the clergy.

In spite of the threat from the outside, the Government has not been disposed to make concessions to the peasantry. Collectivization of agriculture is the means for bringing the peasants under the complete control of the state. During 1949, there was a sustained drive for mass collectivization. Whereas at the end of 1948, there were 1,300 "peasant labor cooperatives" in Yugoslavia, by mid-1949 there were more than 4,500. At that time, half the agricultural land of Voivodina—the richest grain-producing province in Yugoslavia—was collectivized. In Macedonia about 37 percent was held in collectives. As of June 1950, about 21 percent of all the arable land in Yugoslavia was contained in several types of collective farms; 73 percent of the land was in private hands; and the remaining 6 percent belonged to state farms.

Collectivization has gone on vigorously, but without many of the harsher elements that characterized the system in the Soviet Union. Individual householders may own small allotments on which they may raise crops and cattle and poultry within certain legally defined limits.

The collective farms are of four types. In the first, a farmer contributes the use of his land, obtains rent and keeps title, receiving payment on the basis of a day's work performed. In the second, the farmer also retains title but receives instead of rent an interest on its estimated capital value. In the third, the farmer retains title but receives no rent income. He gets his payment in kind and in cash on the basis of the day's work performed. In the fourth, which the Yugoslavs call the highest group, the full-scale collective, the farmer donates land, signs it away, and the only income he receives is on the basis of the day's work performed. His land becomes collective property, presumably in perpetuity. Under the law, the governing group can change a farm from a lower type to a higher type. One result of this is that if a farmer joins a collective of the first type, retaining title to his land, he may find over a period of years that his collective has become one of the higher types and he has lost the title to his land.

The state farms are slightly different. They employ hired labor and are operated as business concerns and as demonstration farms to prove to the Yugoslav people that the Socialist way is the better way. For that purpose they receive a priority in farm equipment, fertilizer, seed, and technical assistance.

Although only about a fourth of the land in Yugoslavia is collectivized, the threat of collectivization hangs over the remainder. The produce of the noncollective farms is taken by the Government at low prices fixed by the Government. The farmers show no demonstrable enthusiasm for collectivization, and in many of the collectives members have been coerced into joining. Consequently, a degree of apathy is evident both in the collective farms and in those still in private hands. Production on the collective farms is not as high as that on the private farms.

Collectivization and the Government purchase of crops from the noncollective farms has reduced agricultural production throughout Yugoslavia generally. There is little incentive to produce in a collective farm where the farmer receives only wages and the prospect that he may lose title to his land. Since the collective farm is the very

antithesis of the traditional individually owned agricultural enterprise, the farmers not only have no incentive to produce; in many instances, they deliberately slow down their effort.

Production on privately owned farms is not as low as that on the collective farms. However, the threat of collectivization and the Government purchase program leave the private farmer with little incentive to produce to the fullest, and encourage hoarding.

During the past year, however, collectivization has not been pushed. The drive was relaxed in 1950 even before the effects of the drought had become known. While there is no assurance that the drive of collectivization may not be stepped up in the future, the available evidence indicates that Tito may allow that program to remain dormant.

Geographic factors

Yugoslavia offers ready access geographically to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. It is literally the land bridge between the free world and the Communist world in southern Europe. On the side of the free world, Yugoslavia is an important link in a chain that begins in Iran and ends in northern Europe. It occupies a position that could control the Adriatic, and continue to isolate Albania, rendering that small country virtually useless to the Soviet Union. In Soviet hands, Yugoslavia is a threat to Greece and the Near East, as well as being a wedge into the northern Mediterranean coast. As long as a Yugoslav Government, unfriendly to the Kremlin, remains, the Soviet Union will not have complete freedom of political and military action against western Europe. If Yugoslavia aligns with the free world, it denies the satellite states the control of an area that is strategically vital to them. From the strategic point of view the west cannot easily afford to yield Yugoslavia.

Military factors

The military stake in Yugoslavia is one that must not be overlooked. Tito's Army is approximately 30 divisions, comprising about 350,000 troops. It is the largest standing army in non-Soviet Europe. It is well trained, and although equipped mostly with World War II equipment, it is capable of giving a good account of itself. Unlike other Balkan military forces, the Yugoslavs have fought with distinction in the kind of mountain warfare that is their specialty. The Yugoslav Army cannot be expected to withstand a full-scale onslaught of the Soviet Army. It probably could not, without outside assistance, withstand the combined assault of its satellite neighbors. Nevertheless, as an active, well-trained force in being, the Yugoslav Army is a deterrent to aggression in the area and could undoubtedly tie down considerable numbers of enemy forces in the event of full-scale war.


Yugoslavia is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty organization and hence its forces are not integrated into the defense force of western Europe. So far as the general area is concerned, the Yugoslav Army is an important element in the military forces of southern Europe and the Near East that are resisting communism. The Turkish and the Greek Armies are well-trained, capable forces. With the Yugoslav Army, there are available perhaps the three best military forces in that part of the free world.

YUGOSLAVIA

SIZE 95,983 SQ. MILES

POPULATION 15,751,953 (MAR. 1943)

Major Albanian
Romanian, Czech,
German
Slovene
Croat



Density: 163 per sq. mile.


1914



1919



HISTORY



- MONARCHY - Directorate King Alexander
- MONARCHY - Directorate Prince Paul Regency
- OCCUPATION (German, Italian, Zorab, Hungarian, Bulgarian)
- SATELLITE Tito
- NATIONAL ANTI COMMUNISM Tito

Political factors

The Yugoslav defection from the Kremlin created a power situation somewhat unique in Europe. As long as Tito defies the Soviet Union, there is a power center—an anti-Soviet buffer state—that favors the West. The symbol of Titoism continues to threaten the Soviet hold on the satellites in Europe. It also weakens the position of the communists in Italy and France. If Tito should be crushed by his Soviet enemies, any further deviations within the Soviet empire are not likely to occur for some time. Eradication of the anti-Soviet buffer state would leave Soviet power ruling unswayed from the Baltic to the Mediterranean and the effectiveness of the Communist Parties in Western Europe would be strengthened considerably. As long as Tito remains independent, the Soviet Union cannot move freely in western Europe, and as long as this situation obtains, Soviet power is limited to that extent.

Economic factors

One of Yugoslavia's major economic assets is a plentiful supply of nonferrous metals—copper, lead, antimony, and quicksilver. All of these are vital to the United States and to its allies in western Europe, both in peace and war.

The greatest material blow to the Soviet bloc and gain to the west was the shifting of Yugoslav nonferrous ore exports, particularly copper and lead, from east to west. Since 1949 the bulk of these strategic metals has been shipped to the United States, and contracts now exist with United States private firms under which these shipments will continue through 1951. Yugoslavia's intention to continue these imports was reaffirmed under the MDAP agreement which provides that Yugoslavia will continue to facilitate the production to the United States of raw and semiprocessed materials. These exports are Yugoslavia's main source of dollars. In 1949, the United States purchased 66 percent of the Yugoslav copper export, 54 percent of its lead export, 35 percent of its quicksilver, and 30 percent of the antimony.

The United States benefits indirectly from increased Yugoslav stability and continued independence. As long as Yugoslavia stands firm, Greece has a sense of security necessary to its continued recovery and reconstruction. This tends to lessen the burden of the United States in Greece and to permit a more orderly resolution of Greek problems. As long as there is no military threat to Greece from Yugoslavia, the economic drain on United States resources to protect Greece militarily is lessened.

The tensions

The period before Tito's break with Moscow has left a legacy of tensions still evident in his relations with the Western World. In addition, the very nature of Titoism means the continuance of political practices contrary to principles fundamentally accepted in the Western World. The pressure against the churches in Yugoslavia resulting in the imprisonment of church leaders and the closing of churches and religious institutions has created an atmosphere of hostility. In its support of the Greek war, Tito countenanced the removal by the Greek guerrillas of Greek children. Some of these were transported to the Cominform countries. Many still remain in Yugo-

slavia. This action quite naturally shocked public opinion in the United States and elsewhere.

Another of the tensions arose from the treatment of persons with dual nationality—that is, persons in Yugoslavia who were nationals of both Yugoslavia and the United States. The Yugoslav Government looked upon these persons as Yugoslav nationals only and refused to permit them to return to the United States.

As a result of Tito's move toward the west, there has been some relaxation of these tensions. Pressure against the churches has been eased somewhat. Some church funds hereto frozen have been released. Permission has been given for the consecration of some Roman Catholic bishops, and there appears to be some relaxation of the efforts to prevent religious instruction. However, a number of the clergy are still in prison.

In contrast to the Cominform countries, where the position of the churches has steadily deteriorated, some progress has been made in Yugoslavia. But there is still much room for improvement. The committee is concerned that progress continue to be made. No opportunity should be lost by our Government to urge upon Tito a continued improvement in church-state relations, particularly when the aid program in this bill offers a means to impress this upon him.

Very recently the Yugoslav Government has completed arrangements with the International Red Cross for the return to Greece of a portion of the Greek children still remaining in Yugoslavia. The committee believes that now is the time to urge a complete resolution on an equitable basis of this tragic situation.

In the spring of 1950 an agreement was reached with Yugoslav authorities on the question of dual nationals. However, this related to all dual nationals who came into Yugoslavia after the date of the agreement. In recent weeks arrangements have been worked out with the Yugoslav authorities to permit almost all of the dual nationals to leave Yugoslavia. This problem has almost been resolved. Efforts should be continued to complete it.

V. THE BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE

The United States has maintained diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia since its emergence as an independent state. The United States has not approved the practices of the Tito regime; it does not approve them now. However, at various times during and since World War II this country has given economic assistance to Yugoslavia, direct and indirect, in various forms. None of this assistance has carried with it any approval of the regime. The aid has been based on the exigencies of war and humanitarian motives, and since the Yugoslav break with the Soviet Union, assistance has been designed to strengthen the ability of Yugoslavia to maintain its independence and resist the Kremlin.

Direct assistance

Excluding the stopgap aid program, discussed below, the United States has given a total of \$377,706,000 of direct assistance to Yugoslavia during and since the war. Wartime assistance, including lend-lease totaled \$38,625,000; the United States share of postwar UNRRA assistance from 1945 to 1947 totaled \$299,081,000. Up to the time of

Tito's break with Moscow, United States assistance to Yugoslavia totaled \$337,706,000.

Since the break with Moscow, the United States, through the Export-Import Bank, has extended three credits to Yugoslavia in the gross amount of \$55,000,000. Excluding the last credit of \$15,000,000, which has so far been unutilized, except to the extent used in the stop-gap program in the last few weeks, the net total of loans made to date is \$40,000,000.

Indirect assistance

In addition to direct assistance the United States had indirectly assisted Yugoslavia in various ways. In September and October 1949 this country supported Yugoslav drawings of some \$9,000,000 from the International Monetary Fund. In October 1949 the United States supported the Yugoslav application to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for a loan for \$2,700,000 for timber development. A few months earlier, in August 1949, this country approved export licenses for a steel mill to be purchased by Yugoslavia. In December 1949 ECA authorized offshore purchases to be made in Yugoslavia.

VI. THE DROUGHT

Emergence and effects

The first evidence of the drought appeared as early as February 1950. Prior to that time, rainfall and snow conditions had been favorable to crop production. Beginning in February and throughout ensuing months it was more and more apparent that reserves of soil moisture were below normal. By early June the condition, although not serious or critical, was one in which crops were not hit, but were becoming increasingly dependent upon the timeliness of showers, and therefore increasingly vulnerable to the intense summer heat without rain. The weather became serious about the middle of June. As a result, the bread grains, which are planted in the autumn, escaped more serious effects, but were pushed into accelerated ripening. Many of the heads did not completely fill, and a substantial part of the crop was light and shriveled. This caused a reduction of 20 to 25 percent of the total output of bread grains—wheat, rye, and fall-planted barley.

The spring-planted crop, of which the most important one is corn, was caught in late June and early July in a period of lush vegetative growth. During the first days of July, Yugoslavia went through a period of intense summer heat with temperatures of 110° F. In the scorching, dry, hot weather of that period many cornfields were literally blasted. The tops of the plants curled before the emergence of silks. Some of these fields made no further growth throughout the balance of the season. Others fortunate enough to receive occasional summer showers came on to make half a crop or 60 to 70 percent in some cases. During the latter half of the summer, the hit-and-miss pattern of late summer showers made the difference between absolute disaster or a partial drought.

Geographical pattern of the drought

Yugoslavia may be roughly divided into two segments: The northern half consisting of fertile, flat plains, generally similar to the American Corn Belt; while the southern half is extremely rugged and mountainous. Approximately two-thirds of the people of Yugoslavia, in-

cluding the major cities, are in the northern half. About one-third of the population are in the southern mountainous half, which, even in normal years, produces no more than perhaps one-sixth of the nation's agriculture. Even under normal conditions, the southern mountainous half is a food-deficit region; in other words, it normally depends for an important part of its food supply upon the northern grain-producing region.

While the drought occurred throughout the entire territory of Yugoslavia, its effects have been most intensive in the southern half of the country. Throughout the northern plains, in terms of all crop production, the drought has resulted in a reduction of 20 to 30 percent. In the extreme western part of the country, comprising the Republic of Slovenia, the drought damage was also relatively moderate, with crop production about 85 to 90 percent of normal. However, Slovenia, because of mountainous topography and altitude, is not an important grain-producing region.

The southern mountainous half includes the area known as the Kordun and Lika, where 1950 production of all crops is estimated at 20 to 30 percent of normal; the entire Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of many mountain ranges and enfolded valleys, where 1950 crop production ranges from 10 to 50 percent of normal. In Montenegro, likewise, the drought was very severe with crop production ranging from 50 percent of normal downward. This is also true of the entire southern half of Serbia, including the region called Kosmet, and the entire Republic of Macedonia, except for one relatively small area which apparently received a late summer rain that produced a crop perhaps 75 percent of normal.

Yugoslavia has had to intensify its customary practice of moving food into these areas, but now with less than the normal amount of supplies. Moreover, this has to be done before the high mountain passes and valleys become impassable. Food must be brought in by the middle of December to last up to the middle of March. The Yugoslavs have moved their stock off state farms and the larger collectives out of this area up to Slovenia where there is a fair forage crop to winter the stock.

According to estimates of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, total grain production this year was approximately 5,600,000 metric tons, or 71 percent of the 1947-49 average. In a country such as Yugoslavia, where bread is the staple diet, damage to the grain crop is particularly serious.

While all crops suffered from the drought, it affected most adversely corn and other late crops such as potatoes, sugar beets, and beans. The Department of Agriculture has placed the 1950 corn crop at 2,800,000 metric tons or 59 percent of the 1947-49 average. The reduction in corn production is an especially heavy blow because of the important place which corn occupies both in the human diet and in the feed supply of Yugoslavia.

The short corn crop has brought about heavy slaughter of hogs, most of which were well below normal weight. The result will be a cumulative shortage of lard. Lard is one of the primary foods of the peasants during the winter months and must be shipped into the less accessible non-lard-producing regions before winter sets in.

The drastic decline in production of vegetables and legumes also has contributed to the gravity of the food-supply situation while a poor hay crop is aggravating the already difficult feed problem.

Yugoslav self-help

The committee was concerned whether the Yugoslav Government has taken steps to alleviate the effects of the drought. It is obvious that no relief the United States may send can be effective unless the Yugoslavs themselves are willing to tighten their belts. The committee was told that the Yugoslav Government has taken several drastic measures in this direction, the more important of which are—

- (1) The abolition of all special privileges in rations and other services for high Communist Party and Government officials, army officers and other privileged members of the state hierarchy;
- (2) A 10-percent slash in the bread ration;
- (3) A ban on the export of all food, live animals, and feed;
- (4) Material reduction in deliveries required by the Government from the farmers of corn, one of the crops most seriously affected. For example, in Montenegro, Bosnia, and Croatia, these deliveries have been cut to 10, 12.4, and 36.1 percent, respectively, of the original planned figure.

United States action—the stopgap program

Development of the food shortage, resulting from the drought, was not a surprise to United States officials in Yugoslavia. They observed what was developing and reported this to Washington. About mid-July, the United States Embassy in Yugoslavia first intimated clearly the likelihood that Yugoslavia faced the prospect of a famine winter. As the forecasts became hard facts, the United States was aware that a critical situation was developing.

The seriousness of the drought could not be fully determined until the results of the fall harvest were known. Had it rained sufficiently as late as early September (the end of the ripening period), losses would have been much less severe. Thus, no accurate estimate of the damage done by the drought could be arrived at before October, and it was not until October 20 that the Yugoslav Government formally requested aid of the United States.

On November 1, the United States Government formally advised Yugoslavia that it was prepared to take measures immediately available to provide assistance. This is the so-called stopgap program.

The immediate problem was to get foodstuffs into the more inaccessible areas before the onset of winter conditions. Knowledge that the United States was planning to extend assistance justified Yugoslavia in moving available stocks to the outlying sections of the country. The purpose of the stopgap program was to replace these commodities and to cushion the impact of growing food shortages in these areas. Since the Congress was not in session, the only steps that could be taken were those available to the President under authority of existing statutes. Had action been postponed until the reconvening of the Congress, foodstuffs would probably not have arrived before February. By that time winter transport conditions would be at their worst, and hunger and civil unrest might have been widespread. Under the stopgap program, commodities have already

arrived and will continue to become available through the end of the year.

Yugoslavia requested assistance totaling about \$85,900,000. The stopgap program provided commodities having an actual cost (including transportation) of \$31,400,000 and a market value of \$40,600,000. This consisted of wheat flour, cornmeal, corn, barley, lard, sugar, dried beans, dried eggs, dried milk, and canned meat.

This assistance was made available under three different authorities: the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, the Economic Cooperation Act, and a third of a \$15,000,000 Export-Import Bank credit that had been made available earlier to Yugoslavia. Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, commodities with a value of \$13,600,000 were furnished for the Yugoslav armed forces. Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, authorized the President under certain circumstances to utilize up to 10 percent of the funds—

in the event of a development seriously affecting the security of the North Atlantic area for the purpose of providing military assistance to any other European nation whose strategic location makes it of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area and whose immediately increased ability to defend itself, the President, after consultation with the governments of the other nations which are members of the North Atlantic Treaty, finds contributes to the preservation of the peace and security of the North Atlantic area and is vital to the security of the United States.

The Yugoslav situation comes under this category.

On November 22, 1950, the President notified the Committee on Foreign Affairs of his decision to utilize the provisions of section 408 (c) to give aid to Yugoslavia. The committee was informed that the amount to be used would not exceed \$16,000,000. The funds were to be used to provide food for the Yugoslav armed forces. There is nothing specific in the MDAP Act about the question of food, nor is there any specific prohibition on the use of funds for this purpose. The act certainly implies that funds may be used to provide arms and logistic support, which would include food in this instance.

Under the Economic Cooperation Act, wheat having a value of \$12,200,000, including transportation cost, is being furnished to Italy and Germany from United States stocks to replace flour shipped by these countries to Yugoslavia. ECA aid was made available under sections 111 and 115 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

On August 30, 1950, the Export-Import Bank made available a third credit to Yugoslavia of \$15,000,000. About \$5,600,000 of this credit was used to procure and ship foodstuffs from the United States Government. The stopgap program is already in operation; the purchases have been made and the food is on the way. This, however, resolves only half of the problem.

VII. THE PROGRAM

Nature

The objective of this legislation is to augment the relief already on the way. The program in this bill begins where the stopgap program ends. It is the other half of a total program of United States assistance. The stopgap program will not be sufficient to carry Yugoslavia through the drought crisis. Without prompt approval of this bill,

the objective of the whole program might well be nullified. In the view of the committee, the United States should complete the total emergency program. To leave the program where it is now would not make sense.

The program is designed for emergency purposes only through the end of fiscal 1951. It is not in any sense long-range. Yugoslavia's request for assistance was not couched in long-range terms. The Congress is not being asked to authorize any more than the minimum necessary to carry Yugoslavia over its emergency.

It should be emphasized that Yugoslavia will not receive dollars under this bill. This is a relief program to furnish on a grant basis necessary foodstuffs having a dollar value.

Further, the bill has been so drafted by the committee as to contain assurances that our assistance will be used to achieve maximum effectiveness.

Content

The initial request of Yugoslavia was for commodities valued at \$85,900,000. This represented 684,000 metric tons of foodstuffs, consisting of bread grains, stock feed, edible fats, sugar, legumes, dried eggs, dried milk, canned meat, and seeds. The components of the program were developed by the Yugoslavs themselves and were included in the formal request made to the United States. In requesting the assistance, the Yugoslav Government outlined a program of food imports constituting the minimum amounts of food required. In order to evaluate the validity of the Yugoslav request for food assistance and arrive at an appropriate aid program, it was necessary to compare the consumption deficits in various commodities with the amounts requested by the Yugoslavs.

Estimates of the Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture, show a consumption deficit, using 1948-49 as a base year, of 1,531,000 metric tons of grains. The Yugoslavs asked for 516,000 tons, while the United States aid program calls for slightly more than 500,000 tons. Therefore, even with the total United States aid program, there will still be an uncovered consumption deficit of over 1,000,000 tons of grain.

The consumption deficit in vegetables is estimated at 364,000 tons while the Yugoslav request, which is not being fully met, calls for only 50,000 tons. Thus, there will be an uncovered deficit, after the program, of over 300,000 tons of vegetables.

The other items and amounts in the Yugoslav request were fully justified by the Department of Agriculture estimates with the exception of sugar and lard. Lard was cut 50 percent in the United States program.

Although the Department of Agriculture figures showed no deficit in sugar, somewhat less than two-thirds of the Yugoslav request was included in the program, since sugar is food of high energy content and it was felt that it would prove valuable in meeting the large deficit in other foods, particularly grains, not being met under the United States program which covers only the amounts requested by the Yugoslavs. It will be especially useful for consumption by the military and by workers in important industries. The sugar is being supplied only under the stopgap program.

The cut in lard, \$7,200,000, and the cut in sugar, \$1,900,000, resulted in a reduction of the estimated cost of the total program of \$9,100,000. In addition, a further allowance of \$1,900,000 was made for foodstuffs which may be made available from sources other than the United States Government. This leaves a total proposed program valued at \$75,000,000, exclusive of ocean-transportation costs. Of this total, commodities valued at \$40,600,000 have already been placed in procurement under the stopgap program, leaving a balance of \$34,400,000 in foodstuffs to be made available under the remainder of the program to be authorized by this bill. Including ocean-transportation costs of \$3,600,000, the program under this bill requires funds totaling \$38,000,000.

Use of surplus commodities

Of the total program valued at \$75,000,000, \$53,000,000, or 71 percent, represents the value of the program items held in stock by the Commodity Credit Corporation. Items valued at \$22,000,000, or 29 percent, chiefly flour, lard, and seed, must be purchased in the open market. Of the program now before the House, which has an estimated market value of \$34,400,000, items valued at \$24,600,000, or 72 percent, are in Commodity Credit Corporation stocks, while items valued at \$9,800,000, or 28 percent, must be purchased in the open market.

Dried beans, dried eggs, and dried milk are sold by the CCC at "nominal" prices to member countries of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations for use in special feeding projects. Included in the total program are 35,000 metric tons of dried beans, 4,500 tons of dried eggs, and 6,000 tons of dried milk, but only those foods purchased with Yugoslav funds, provided under the Export-Import Bank credit, were obtained at special prices. The purchase of dried beans and dried eggs at the special prices accounts for the difference of \$11,600,000 between the total market value of the stopgap program of \$40,600,000 and the "estimated program expenditure" under the stopgap program of \$29,000,000. The remainder, procured with appropriated funds, are included in the program at regular market prices in keeping with the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948.

Under section 416, Public Law 439, Eighty-first Congress, "perishable" items are made available to private welfare organizations in the United States for the assistance of needy persons at points of storage in the United States without charge. It is expected that modest amounts of dried eggs, dried milk, and possibly some butter may be obtained by United States welfare organizations for Yugoslav relief purposes. Potatoes, the only other "perishable" item offered by the CCC without charge under section 416, is not expected to be shipped in view of the high handling costs, excessive ocean transportation charges, and the probabilities of spoilage.

Emergency aid to Yugoslavia

Commodity	Yugoslav request		Total proposed program			Stop-gap program ¹				Appropriation request	
	United States market price (free along ship) per metric ton (dollars)	Market value (millions of dollars)	1,000 metric tons	Market value (millions of dollars)	Estimated program expenditures (millions of dollars)	1,000 metric tons	USDA acquisition cost (millions of dollars)	Market value (millions of dollars)	Estimated program expenditures (millions of dollars)	1,000 metric tons	Market value and estimated program expenditure (millions of dollars)
Wheat	88.25	14.1	168.0	18.7	18.7	142.0	19.1	15.8	15.8	26	2.9
Wheat flour	2 111.33	4.5	9.0	9.0	9.0	12.5	.9	.9	.9	125	8.9
Corn meal	2 100.20		137.5	9.8	9.8	25.0	1.7	1.7	1.7	15	1.0
Corn	70.92	10.6	40.0	2.7	2.7					60	4.8
Barley	66.58	2.7	60.0	4.8	4.8					50	2.6
Oats	79.24	2.6	50.0	2.6	2.6						
Milo (fodder)	2 52.11										
Vegetables:											
Rice	2 225.00		5.0	1.1	1.1					5	1.1
Dried peas	100.00	10 6.9	30.0	3.0	3.0					30	3.0
Edible fats (lard)	2 356.57	14.3	20.0	7.1	7.1	15.0	5.3	5.3	5.3	5	1.8
Sugar	2 122.33	4.3	20.0	2.4	2.4	20.0	2.4	2.4	2.4		
Beans (dried)	165.00	5.0	35.0	5.8	3.6	20.0	3.4	3.3	1.1	15	2.5
Dried eggs	2,205.00	4 4.5	4.5	9 9.9	5.5	4.5	13.5	9.9	.5		
Dried milk	297.62	1.8	6.0	1.8	1.8					6	1.8
Canned meat	500.00	4.4	9.9	4.4	4.4	.9	.4	.4	.4	7 18	4.0
Seeds	222.00	4.0	7 18.0	4.0	4.0						
Subtotal		85.9	603.9	75.0 9 6.0	63.4 6.0	248.9	8 47.6	40.6 2.4	29.0 2.4	355	34.4 3.6
Ocean transportation											
Total			603.9	81.0	69.4	248.9		43.0	31.4	355	38.0

¹ For details see discussion under "United States action—the stopgap program."² Includes 1 percent administrative expense of USDA under Public Law 151.³ Includes 5,000 tons of dried beans to meet vegetable requirement.⁴ Formal Yugoslav request 3,000 tons. Request and purchase with funds from Export-Import credit, 4,500 tons.⁵ Nominal market value.⁶ Not in formal Yugoslav request. Request and purchase with funds from Export-Import credit, 1,000 short tons.⁷ Estimated.⁸ Includes 18.6 million dollars representing difference between USDA, CCC, investment or acquisition cost and charge to program.⁹ Includes 1 percent administrative expense of USDA. Estimated on basis of one-third carried in Yugoslav vessels, excluding ECA flour.¹⁰ Assuming supply of 10,000 tons of rice, 30,000 tons of dried peas, and 10,000 tons of dried beans to meet this request.

A table prepared by the Department of Agriculture indicating the items in the program follows:

Breakdown of Yugoslav aid program in terms of commodities in stock with Department of Agriculture and those requiring purchase in the open market

Commodity	Total Yugoslav aid program								Congressional program			
	Amount		In stock (CCC)		Perishables		Open-market purchase		In stock (CCC)		Open-market purchase	
	Thou-sands of metric tons	Mil-lions of dol-lars	Thou-sands of metric tons	Mil-lions of dol-lars	Thou-sands of metric tons	Mil-lions of dol-lars	Thou-sands of metric tons	Mil-lions of dol-lars	Thou-sands of metric tons	Mil-lions of dol-lars	Thou-sands of metric tons	Mil-lions of dol-lars
Wheat.....	140.0	12.2	140.0	12.2								
Flour.....	58.0	6.5					58	6.5			26	2.9
Corn meal.....	9.0	.9					9	.9				
Corn.....	137.5	9.8	137.5	9.8					125	8.9		
Barley.....	40.0	2.7	40.0	2.7					15	1.0		
Oats.....	60.0	4.8	60.0	4.8					60	4.8		
Milo.....	50.0	2.6	50.0	2.6					50	2.6		
Rice.....	5.0	1.1					5	1.1			5	1.1
Peas.....	30.0	3.0	30.0	3.0					30	3.0		
Sugar.....	20.0	2.4					20	2.4				
Edible fats:												
Lard.....	20.0	7.1					20	7.1			5	1.8
Beans.....	35.0	5.8	35.0	5.8					15	2.5		
Dried eggs.....	4.5	9.9	4.5	9.9	4.5	9.9						
Dried milk ²	6.0	1.8	6.0	1.8	6.0	1.8			6	² 1.8		
Canned meat.....	.9	.4	.9	.4								
Seeds.....	18.0	4.0					18	4.0			18	4.0
Total.....	633.9	75.0	503.9	53.0	10.5	11.7	130	22.0	301	24.6	54	9.8

¹ Represents replacement for 110,000 tons of flour being delivered direct to Yugoslavia from Italy and Germany under ECA arrangements. Some portion may be procured by recipient countries on open market.

² Only perishable item in Congressional portion of total program.

VIII. MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE BILL

Administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia—section 3 (a)

None of the funds authorized by this bill will be used for administrative and operating expenses incurred by the United States in Yugoslavia. The purpose of section 3 (a) is to require Yugoslavia to foot those expenses with Yugoslav currency.

Publicity—Section 3 (b)

The Yugoslav Government has given wide publicity in Yugoslavia to the United States assistance already rendered to Yugoslavia to combat the present food shortages. For instance, Radio Belgrade on the evening of November 18 broadcast the speech made that day by the American Ambassador on the occasion of the arrival at a Yugoslav port of the first shipment of United States emergency assistance. On November 19 Borba, the principal Yugoslav Government newspaper, featured on its front page the story of the arrival of this first food consignment from the United States, and quoted the American Ambassador's speech in full.

In a formal exchange of notes between the United States and Yugoslavia concluded on November 21, 1950, the Yugoslav Government acknowledged that the source and character of United States assistance should become known to the Yugoslav people. It agreed to

give full publicity to the matter itself and to afford this Government the opportunity of giving similar publicity in Yugoslavia and using special labels or other designations on the food packages.

Several United States officers with public affairs experience will be detailed to the American Embassy at Belgrade to observe the extent of the publicity promised by the Yugoslav Government. In addition, a press assistant to the United States Ambassador will gather all the details of the United States program and disseminate them to representatives of the United States press. He also will report to this Government on the publicity disseminated in Yugoslavia by Yugoslav information organs.

Section 3 (b) of the bill requires, among the undertakings by Yugoslavia, that it give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to United States assistance. It further provides that Yugoslavia agree to allow the United States the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this. This is in keeping, not only with the requirements which the Congress has laid down in past programs, but also conforms to the policy of the Yugoslav Government described above, with respect to the total program of United States emergency assistance.

Observing and supervising the distribution—section 3 (c)

One of the fundamentals of this program is that it is to be operated by the Yugoslavs. The United States will not distribute the food in Yugoslavia. However, common prudence would require that where we give our assistance, we have some means of determining the effectiveness of its use. This has always been the case in past programs. The purpose of section 3 (c) is to provide that means. In its original form, the bill required Yugoslavia to agree to permit the United States to observe the distribution. The committee has amended this provision to add the word "supervise." This word is deliberately chosen. It means the power to inspect with authority the distribution made by Yugoslavia of the American assistance. In order that this be effective, Yugoslavia must undertake to permit full freedom of movement and access to communication and information facilities.

In a formal exchange of notes between the United States and Yugoslavia concluded on November 21, 1950 the following understandings were reached: Yugoslavia would permit United States officials to observe the receipt and distribution of food and to have access to the appropriate Yugoslav officials for the purpose of presenting their views on and discussing supply and transportation arrangements within Yugoslavia which will assure that the food is equitably distributed among the Yugoslav people. Yugoslavia also undertook to provide reports to this Government on the use made of the assistance, and to permit representatives of the United States press freely to observe the receipt and distribution of the assistance.

Comment was made on this by Mr. John J. Haggerty, agricultural attaché, United States Embassy, Belgrade, Yugoslavia, during his testimony, as follows:

The Yugoslavs have agreed to permit any American observers that may be desired to go into the country to see who gets this food, how it is distributed, and what is done with it. Our current thinking is to base it on the ports with railroads running up through Gevgelia and Skaplje, cutting back through the interior. One or two narrow gages run through these mountain valleys, and we will try to base

our observers so as to give them a territory to observe in accordance with the food-distribution plan itself. They will be given directions to see the food train, get on the trains and see where the cars are spotted, where they go, and also occasionally to dip in a random way into individual communities to see who is eating and who is not, and why not.

In the testimony before the committee, it was indicated that the observers would number 10 to 12. In the committee's judgment, this hardly seems adequate to insure proper observation; it is certainly not adequate for reasonable supervision. The committee expects that suitable arrangements will be made to provide enough observers so that this provision of the agreement can be carried out. This is an important matter; the provision of the law could be rendered ineffective by a number insufficient to perform the task adequately.

It may be argued that this provision, even if carried out fully by an adequate staff, is not a sufficient control over the assistance provided by the people of the United States. The alternatives in this instance are to have the United States distribute the food or to use a system such as this bill provides. The committee does not feel that distribution by United States personnel is desirable in this instance. If it is argued that there is an insufficient control, it should be pointed out that section 6, the termination section, offers the United States an adequate basis to stop the assistance if it is not being made available in compliance with the terms of the agreement.

Distribution—section 3 (d)

According to information received by the committee from the Honorable George V. Allen, United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, foodstuffs supplied under this bill will be distributed within normal channels. The food will be distributed by each "federal republic" of Yugoslavia to regular consumer outlets where it will be sold for fixed dinar prices. Other individuals, chiefly in rural areas, will require dinars, but no ration cards. Needy persons, lacking sufficient dinars, will receive food free of charge. The Yugoslav Government plans to rush food to the stricken areas first.

But if the distribution is to be effective, it must be distributed equitably. Accordingly, section 3 (d) of the bill requires that Yugoslavia undertake to make an equitable distribution to its people of the commodities made available under this act. There are two important ideas in this subsection: One is that the distribution be made without discrimination as to race or political or religious belief. The other is the amendment adopted by the committee. The sense of this amendment is that the equitable distribution applies not only to the commodities made available by the United States in this bill, but also to similar commodities in Yugoslavia either produced locally or imported from other sources. The intent of the committee is that all supplies from all sources be distributed equitably.

The words "equitable distribution" have been deliberately chosen. They mean that the food must be sold at reasonable prices, in view of the economic situation in Yugoslavia, and also that, where necessary, a fair share of the food should be distributed without cost to those who are unable to pay for it.

Administration of the program

In the United States, the administration of the program will rest in the Department of State. The bill authorizes the appropriation of funds to the President, but it also authorizes him to transfer all or any

portion of the funds to the appropriate departments or agencies of the executive branch. This means that actual procurement and shipment of the commodities will be done by those agencies now engaged in that activity. The Department of State will be responsible for implementing the policies governing the content and method of aid, the negotiation of the agreement required by section 3 of the bill, and the direction of the provision of aid.

The Department of State, through the United States Embassy in Yugoslavia, will be responsible for such control of the program in Yugoslavia as the bill provides.

Termination—section 6

In a program of this character, it is particularly important to give careful attention to the ultimate sanction of the program at any stage in its existence. The committee has given careful thought to the termination provisions of this bill. Where the program is not being operated by the United States, and where it is being undertaken from motives other than those strictly humanitarian, the United States should have all available means to end the program when and if conditions require. Section 6 of the bill is written with this in mind. It provides for termination by the President under certain conditions, and it leaves in the Congress the power to require the President to end the program.

Yugoslavia will receive United States assistance in accordance with an agreement. The essence of this program lies in the complete fulfillment by Yugoslavia of the conditions laid down in the agreement. Whenever the undertakings of the agreement are not being complied with, the President must terminate the aid. The whole purpose of this program can be nullified if the assistance is used for any other purpose than that provided in the act. Section 6 provides for this contingency.

The basis for this program is a condition of crisis in Yugoslavia arising from a drought. There is no quarrel with the estimates that the problem can be met by the end of fiscal 1951. However, should conditions change, it is entirely proper that the United States have the unquestioned right to end the program.

One of the justifications of emergency-relief assistance is that it serves the national interest of the United States and is consistent with its foreign policy. It is obvious that the United States should be under no obligation to continue such a program if these conditions cannot be met.

This program is one in which the Congress has an important voice. That voice should not cease to be heard with the granting of the assistance. Section 6 assures the Congress a proper share of control by providing for termination by the President whenever the Congress by concurrent resolution finds this desirable.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

Yugoslavia is a Communist state. It is a dictatorship. Our Government has repeatedly made it clear that its maintenance of normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Yugoslavia and its extension of financial assistance does not in any way imply approval of the internal policies of Tito. The committee emphasizes very strongly

that the legislation now before the House in no way implies such approval. The committee and this House, however, must consider any foreign affairs legislation in the context of the national interest and security of the people of the United States. The national interest and security of the United States are threatened by Soviet imperialism and by militant and aggressive Soviet international communism. Indeed, the whole fabric of independent sovereign states, as exemplified by the United Nations, is threatened. Our national interest and security require that our foreign policy meet that threat. In order to discharge our responsibilities, we must seize every opportunity that may help us face up to the challenge of Soviet communism.

The committee has borne in mind that, next to Russia, Yugoslavia has the strongest standing army in Europe. The committee believes that there are political, military, and strategic reasons that make this program worth the price. So do General Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, and General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Yugoslavia, partially surrounded by four satellites of the Kremlin, and having common borders with Austria, Italy, and Greece, occupies a highly strategic position in Europe. Yugoslavia's assertion of independence has made possible the easing of Italy's position, the relaxation of tension in Trieste, and the strengthening of Austria. Further, the committee believes that a strong Yugoslav Army, with the will to fight if attacked—and a hungry army seldom has the will—may act as a deterrent to aggression in the Balkans and a force for peace and security.

The committee, in considering H. R. 9853, has tried to balance the interests, the chances, the opportunities, and the risks involved in this measure. This the committee has done.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

Record of votes by United States, U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia on certain political items in the Fifth General Assembly

ACTION ON PLENARY ITEMS

[In most instances the General Assembly votes by a show of hands and no record is made of the way individual members voted. In the table below Y signifies affirmative vote, N signifies negative, and A signifies abstention]

Subject	United States	U. S. S. R.	Yugo- slavia
CHINESE CREDENTIALS			
1. Indian resolution recognizing representatives of Communist China as accredited representative.....	N	Y	Y
2. Canadian resolution establishing special committee and seating Nationalists in meantime.....	Y	N	N
3. U. S. S. R. resolution that Kuomintang representatives can't take part in General Assembly.....	N	Y	Y
4. U. S. S. R. resolution inviting Chinese Communists to General Assembly.....	N	Y	Y
REPORT OF CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE			
1. Report approved.....	Y	N	Y or A
2. U. S. S. R. proposal re credentials of Nationalists—not valid.....	N	Y	Y
20-YEAR PEACE PLAN			
1. Requests organs UN to give consideration to Secretary General Lie's program and to inform General Assembly at sixth session through SYG of any progress achieved.....	Y	N	Y ¹
APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY GENERAL			
1. Resolution extending term for 3 years.....	Y	N	Y

¹ Was one of sponsors but could not accept one amendment; may account for one abstention in vote; 50-5, 1.

Record of votes by United States, U. S. S. R., and Yugoslavia on certain political items in the Fifth General Assembly—Continued

ACTION ON COMMITTEE 1 ITEMS

Subject	Committee action only	Plenary	United States	U. S. S. R.	Yugoslavia.
KOREA					
1. Resolution establishing UNCURK.....		X	Y	N	A
2. Soviet resolution to invite North and South Korean representatives to participate in General Assembly discussion.....		X	N	Y	Y
3. U. S. S. R., Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Polish, Czechoslovakian resolution providing measures to establish a unified independent democratic Korea.....		X	N	Y	(2)
4. U. S. S. R. resolution on the cessation of bombing of peaceful inhabitants, towns, and inhabited centers by United States Armed Forces in Korea.....		X	N	Y	A
5. U. S. S. R. resolution disbanding the UN Commission in Korea.....		X	N	Y	N
UNITED ACTION FOR PEACE					
1. United States resolution providing for emergency General Assembly sessions, establishing the POC and the Collective Measures Committee.....		X	Y	N	Y
2. Resolution recommending application of Charter arts. 43, 45, 46, and 47.....		X	Y	A	Y
3. Resolution recommending permanent power consultation toward resolving differences and reaching agreement.....		X	Y	Y	Y
4. U. S. S. R. resolution calling for consultations under art. 106 to take necessary joint action on behalf of UN prior to Armed Forces being placed at Security Council disposal under art. 43.....		X ³	N	Y	(4)
DECLARATION ON THE REMOVAL OF THE THREAT OF A NEW WAR AND THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY AMONG THE NATIONS					
1. Peace through deeds—accepts international control of atomic energy, regulations, and reduction of armaments.....		X	Y	N	A
2. Condemnation of propaganda against peace.....		X	Y	A	A
3. Soviet resolution condemning war propaganda and use of atomic weapons for weapons of aggression; conclusion of peace pact among Big Five.....		X ⁵	N	Y	A
THREATS TO POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GREECE					
1. Soviet resolution asking repeal of death sentences imposed by military courts in Athens.....	X		N	Y	Y
2. Joint resolution continuing UNSCOB.....	X		Y	N	N
3. U. S. S. R. resolution recommending amnesty in Greece, new elections, cessation of United States-United Kingdom intervention, dissolution of UNSCOB, etc.....	X		N	Y	A
4. Greek resolution calling for repatriation of Greek soldiers still detained by Greece's northern neighbors.....	X		Y	N	A
5. Joint resolution concerning the repatriation of Greek children.....	X		Y	N	Y
THREATS TO THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CHINA AND TO THE PEACE OF THE FAR EAST, RESULTING FROM SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SINO-SOVIET TREATY					
1. Syrian draft resolution referring case to the IC.....	X		Y	N	N
2. Salvadoran resolution reaffirming General Assembly resolution 291 (IV) on stability of international relations in Far East.....	X		Y	N	N

² Resolution rejected by roll-call vote paragraph by paragraph. Yugoslavia either voted yes or abstained. No vote was taken on resolution as a whole. (Yugoslavia abstained on the resolution in the Committee.)

³ 5-39-11.

⁴ Probably abstained.

⁵ Voted on paragraph by paragraph, no final vote.

Record of votes by United States, U. S. S. R., and Yugoslavia on certain political items in the Fifth General Assembly—Continued

ACTION ON COMMITTEE 1 ITEMS—Continued

Subject	Committee action only	Plenary	United States	U. S. S. R.	Yugoslavia
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT COMMISSION OF GOOD OFFICES					
1. Uruguayan-Lebanese resolution referring question to IC-----		X	Y	N	Y
DUTIES OF STATES IN THE EVENT OF THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES					
1. Resolution recommending procedures to be followed by state becoming engaged in conflict-----		X	Y	N	Y
2. Resolution referring U. S. S. R. proposal on definition of aggression to ILC-----		X	Y	N	Y
COMPLAINT BY THE U. S. S. R. REGARDING AGGRESSION AGAINST CHINA BY THE UNITED STATES					
1. U. S. S. R. proposal to invite Chinese Communists to participate in debate-----	X		A	Y	Y

ACTION ON AD HOC POLITICAL ITEMS

ITALIAN COLONIES					
U. S. S. R. resolution recommending that Libya be united and foreign troops withdrawn-----		X	N	Y	A
Resolution calling for implementation of Resolution 239 (IV) and convening of the National Assembly (Libya)-----		X	Y	A	Y
Resolution providing for Federation of Eritrea-----	X		Y	N	Y
RELATIONS OF STATES MEMBERS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES WITH SPAIN					
1. Resolution recommending that General Assembly Resolution 39 (I) of Dec. 12, 1946, dealing with withdrawal of Ambassadors and barring membership in specialized agencies be revoked-----		X	Y	N	N
TREATMENT OF PEOPLE OF INDIAN ORIGIN IN THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA					
1. Resolution calling on India and South Africa and Pakistan to hold round-table conference and failing that that a commission of three be appointed-----	X		A	A	Y
OBSERVANCE IN BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND RUMANIA OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS					
1. Resolution condemning action on part of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and inviting members to submit evidence to SYG and inviting SYG notify states of information received-----		X	Y	N	Y ⁶

⁶ Probably voted Y in committee.

30 YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950

Record of votes in Security Council by United States, U. S. S. R., Yugoslavia since June 25, 1950

	United States	U. S. S. R.	Yugoslavia
Korea: Resolution concerning complaint of aggression on the Republic of Korea adopted at the 473d meeting of the Security Council on June 25 (called for immediate cessation of hostilities and called on authorities of North Korea to withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel; requested UNCOK to communicate recommendations and observe the withdrawal of North Koreans to the 38th parallel; called on members of UN to render all assistance to the UN in the execution of the resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Koreans. (S/1501; <i>adopted</i> SPV/473.)	Yes-----	(1)-----	Abstained.
Korea: Resolution concerning the complaint of aggression on the Republic of Korea adopted at the 474th meeting of the Security Council on June 27, 1950. (Recommended that members of the UN furnish assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.) (<i>Adopted</i> SPV/474;S/1511.)	Yes-----	(1)-----	No.
Korea: Resolution concerning the complaint of aggression on the Republic of Korea adopted at the 476th meeting of the Security Council on July 7, 1950. (Recommended to all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to the unified command under the United States; requested the United States to designate commander of such forces; authorize the unified command at its discretion to use the UN flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with flags of various nations participating; requested United States to provide Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the Unified Command.) (<i>Adopted</i> in SPV/476, S/1588.)	Yes-----	(1)-----	Abstained.
Korean relief: Resolution concerning Korean relief adopted at the 479th meeting of the Security Council on July 31, 1950 (requested Unified Command to exercise responsibility for determining requirements for relief and support of civilian population of Korea and for establishing in the field the procedures for providing such relief and support; requested SYG to transmit all offers of assistance for relief and support to the Unified Command; requested the Unified Command to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on its relief activities; requested SYG, ECOSOC, and other appropriate UN principal and subsidiary organs, specialized agencies and appropriate nongovernmental organizations to provide such assistance as Unified Command may request for relief and support of the civilian population of Korea. (<i>Adopted</i> in SPV/479; S/1657.)	Yes-----	(1)-----	Abstained.
Chinese representation: Vote in connection with ruling of President of Security Council (Malik, U. S. S. R.) on Aug. 1 that Kuomintang group seated in the Security Council did not represent China and could not therefore take part in meetings of the Security Council. (<i>Rejected</i> SPV/480/rev. 1.)	No-----	Yes-----	Yes.
Korea: U. S. S. R. resolution concerning complaint of aggression on Republic of Korea re inhuman, barbarous bombing by American Air Force of peaceful population, towns, and populated areas in Korea; called on United States to cease. (<i>Rejected</i> SPV/497; S/1679.)	No-----	Yes-----	Abstained.
Ruling of President of Security Council for September (Austin, United States) to invite representative of Republic of Korea to take seat at Council table. (<i>Approved</i> SPV/494.)	Yes-----	No-----	Yes.
Vote on U. S. S. R. resolution to invite representatives of North Korea to participate in Security Council discussion. (<i>Rejected</i> proposal; SPV/494.)	No-----	Yes-----	Yes.
Korea: United States resolution to localize conflict. Draft resolution submitted at 479th meeting of Security Council, July 31, 1950, concerning the complaint of aggression on the Republic of Korea (condemned North Korean authorities for their continued defiance of the UN; called on all states to use their influence to prevail upon the authorities of North Korea to cease this defiance; called on all states to refrain from assisting or encouraging the North Korean authorities and to refrain from action which might lead to spread of Korean conflict to other areas and thereby further endanger international peace and security). (<i>Rejected</i> SPV/496, S/1653 due to Russian veto.)	Yes-----	No-----	Abstained.
U. S. S. R. draft resolution concerning the complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea—on peaceful settlement of the Korean question (Security Council should decide to invite representatives of the Central Peoples Republic of China and to hear representatives of Korean people; should put end to hostilities in Korea and withdraw foreign troops from Korea.) (<i>Rejected</i> S/1668 in SPV/496.)	No-----	Yes-----	Abstained

¹ U. S. S. R. boycotted Security Council until August.

Record of votes in Security Council by United States, U. S. S. R., Yugoslavia since June 25, 1950—Continued

	United States	U. S. S. R.	Yugoslavia
U. S. S. R. draft resolution submitted at the 495th meeting of the Security Council on Sept. 5 on complaint of bombing by Air Forces on the territory of China. Decided to invite representatives of Chinese People's Republic to meetings of Security Council to discuss this. (<i>Rejected</i> SPV/499, S/1759.)	No-----	Yes-----	Yes.
Vote on draft resolution submitted by representative of United States on complaint of bombing by Air Forces of territory of China. Decided to establish commission to investigate on spot and report as soon as possible with regard to allegations contained in S/1722 and S/1743. (<i>Rejected</i> due to veto, SPV/501; S/1752.)	Yes-----	No-----	Abstained.
Vote on U. S. S. R. draft resolution submitted at 493d meeting of Security Council Aug. 31 concerning the statements of Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China relating to the violation of the Chinese frontiers by U. S. Air Forces and their bombing and strafing of buildings, railway stations, and an aerodrome resulting in loss of life and property damage; condemns acts of United States and decides to call on Government of United States to prohibit such illegal acts which violate Chinese sovereignty and cause damage to the People's Republic of China and to the peaceful Chinese populations. (<i>Rejected</i> SPV 501; S/1745/rev. 1.)	No-----	Yes-----	Abstained.
Resolution inviting representatives of CPR to provide it with information concerning complaint of armed invasion of Taiwan (Formosa). (<i>Adopted</i> SPV/506 S/1823 and corr. 1; S/1836.)	No-----	Yes-----	Yes.
Vote on S/1812: U. S. S. R. resolution condemning American Air Force for inhuman barbarous bombing of the peaceful population, towns, and inhabited centers in Korea by American Air Force. (<i>Rejected</i> SPV/508.)	No-----	Yes-----	Abstained.
Vote on United Kingdom amendment submitted at 519th meeting re the complaint of aggression upon the republic of Korea; decided to invite representatives of CPR to be present during discussion by Council of special report of UN command in Korea (S/1884). (<i>Adopted</i> SPV/520; S/1892.)	Yes-----	Yes-----	Yes.
Resolution concerning the Palestine question at the 524th meeting of the Security Council on Nov. 17 calling on parties to consent to handling of complaints according to procedures established in armistice agreements for handling of complaints and settlements of points at issue; requesting Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission to give urgent attention to Egyptian complaint of expulsion of Palestine Arabs, etc. (<i>Adopted</i> SPV/524; S/1907.)	Yes-----	Abstained	Yes.

APPENDIX II

Chronology of moves of Yugoslavia away from Kremlin toward the west

1948

Date	Event
June 28-----	Tito breaks with the Cominform; publication of the Cominform charges against Yugoslavia.
June 30-----	Announcement that United States-Yugoslav claims to be settled.
July 17-----	Yugoslavia bans Cominform publication.
July 25-----	Tito confers with Governor Olsen; Tito says he favors trade with the west.
Oct. 1-----	Five-year trade agreement with Switzerland signed; Swiss claims against Yugoslavia settled.
Dec. 27-----	Yugoslavia signs trade agreement with the United Kingdom.
Dec. 29-----	Yugoslav trade with U. S. S. R. announced by Tass. Reduced to one-eighth of previous figure.

Chronology of moves of Yugoslavia away from Kremlin toward the west—Continued

1949

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
Jan. 23-----	Yugoslavia ships colored metals to the United States.
Mar. 20-----	Yugoslavia closes Polish information center in Belgrade.
June 16-----	Trade negotiations with Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
July 10-----	Tito closes the Greek border, breaking the backs of the Cominform-sponsored Greek guerrilla forces.
Aug. 3-----	Yugoslavia sends a note to the U. S. S. R. protesting the attitude of the Soviet Government on the Austrian treaty question.
Sept. 2-----	The Yugoslav Government announces the dissolution of the Soviet-Yugoslav Danube River Co. and the Soviet-Yugoslav joint civil aviation company.
Sept. 13-----	Mosa Pijade challenged the Soviet Government to make good its threat to throw the Albanian question in the UN for adjudication.
Sept. 13-----	Yugoslavia says the Soviet Union was attempting to interfere in the domestic affairs of Yugoslavia.
Sept. 20-----	Yugoslavia seems to be consistently voting against the Soviet bloc, or abstaining as the Soviet bloc garnered 5 instead of its former 6 votes in the election of officials for the General Assembly.
Sept. 22-----	Politburo member Mosa Pijade accused the U. S. S. R. in an issue of Borba, official organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, of seeking world domination. He characterized the trial of Lazlo Rajk in Hungary as the "penetration into Europe of the dark methods of the Soviet intelligence system."
Sept. 22-----	Yugoslavia split with the U. S. S. R. on the issue of human rights violations in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but voted with the Soviet Union on the Greek-Balkan issue, the extension of the Interim Committee, Korea, and the creation of a UN guard force.
Sept. 27-----	Yugoslavia sent a note to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R. asking them to investigate why Hungary had not paid its reparations to Yugoslavia.
Sept. 30-----	Yugoslavia issues a statement denouncing Soviet abrogation of the friendship and mutual assistance pact with Yugoslavia and states that the U. S. S. R. considers agreements "as a scrap of paper."
Oct. 1-----	Yugoslavia sent a note to the U. S. S. R. accusing it of violating the UN Charter.
Oct. 5-----	Mosa Pijade attacked the U. S. S. R. for not having had elections for 10 years.
Oct. 6-----	Yugoslavia expels eight Poles and five Czechs in retaliation for like measures taken against Yugoslav personnel.
Oct. 7-----	Yugoslav UN delegate gives the General Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee details of Soviet exploitation of underdeveloped areas in the Soviet sphere.
Oct. 18-----	Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet bloc on the issue of a blanket condemnation of the administering authorities in UN trustee areas.
Nov. 3-----	Milovan Djilas in an interview at Lake Success says that Yugoslavia is opposed to any new Communist international.
Nov. 12-----	Yugoslavia denounces its treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Albania.
Nov. 18-----	Yugoslavia expresses dissatisfaction with the first session of the Danube Conference at Galati and attacks the U. S. S. R.'s role.
Nov. 19-----	Yugoslavia demands the recall of the representatives of the Soviet Information Bureau in Belgrade, the U. S. S. R. military attaché and consul in Zagreb on the grounds of hostile activity and espionage.

Chronology of moves of Yugoslavia away from Kremlin toward the west—Continued

1949

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
Dec. 12-----	Foreign Minister Kardelj charges that the fetishism of the state halted the progress of science, particularly social science in the U. S. S. R. and attacks the infallibility of Soviet leaders.
Dec. 24-----	The United States and Yugoslavia sign a civil aviation agreement granting United States planes the right to use Yugoslav civilian airfields and to overfly Yugoslavia.
Dec. 26-----	5-year trade pact signed with United Kingdom providing for an exchange of goods amounting to 110,000,000 pounds annually each way. A compensation agreement was also agreed upon and signed.
Dec. 27-----	Foreign Minister Kardelj says relations with the west have improved; a World Bank loan of \$20,000,000 is agreed upon in principle.
Jan. 2-----	Belgrade announced the CPY has ordered the complete reorganization of the educational system to rid Yugoslavia of Soviet "counter-revolutionary" ideas on socialism and bourgeois ideology.
Jan. 19-----	U. S. Government is advised that Yugoslavia will shortly embargo all overflights of the planes of the Cominform countries.
Jan. 26-----	Marshal Tito in receiving new United States Ambassador Allen indicated that he was willing to liquidate all "past misunderstandings" with the United States.
Mar. 5-----	In a speech at Split Tito denied he was negotiating with the U. S. S. R. and said that talks were impossible until the U. S. S. R. apologized to the Yugoslavs for its actions.
Mar. 10-----	Yugoslavia apologized to Italy for the killing of the master of an Italian fishing vessel.
Mar. 28-----	Yugoslavia and the United States reached an agreement with respect to the problem of dual nationals. Yugoslavia will issue exit visas for all United States citizens of Yugoslav origin visiting Yugoslavia and in return the United States will not invalidate passports for travel to Yugoslavia.
Mar. 30-----	A United States pilot forced down by engine trouble in Yugoslavia is returned to Trieste by Yugoslav authorities.
Apr. 6-----	The Foreign Office advised the United States Embassy that after June 1 certain hotels would be earmarked for foreign tourists.
Apr. 6-----	Yugoslavia joins UNESCO.
Apr. 7-----	Yugoslav-Swiss trade protocol signed.
Apr. 17-----	Yugoslav trade-unions break with the WFTU.

1950


Apr. 23-----	Father Janez Janko, vicar-general of the Catholic Archdiocese of Belgrade, was released from prison.
Apr. 27-----	Tito delivers a state-of-the-union address noteworthy for its friendlier treatment of the west. Tito called for friendlier relations with his western neighbors.
May 7-----	Yugoslav magazine <i>Knjizevne Novine</i> in an attack on art critics of the Soviet type demands that Soviet writers end their dogmatism.
May 20-----	6 Greek children from Yugoslavia arrive in Switzerland en route to Australia to be united with their parents.
July 4-----	First editorial comment on Korea describes the North Koreans as the aggressors and praises the United States intervention.
July 23-----	CARE signs an agreement with the Yugoslav Government opening the country to the delivery of CARE packages.
July 23-----	Yugoslav paper attacks the "Stalin cult," debunks the efforts of Soviet leaders to instill a "feeling of religious love, fear, and respect for Stalin" in all Communists.
July 26-----	Yugoslav-Peruvian trade agreement signed.
Aug. 7-----	Yugoslav-Egyptian trade agreement signed.

Chronology of moves of Yugoslavia away from Kremlin toward the west—Continued

1950

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
August-----	The bimonthly publication <i>Kommunist</i> says in August that one of the main courses in the CPY school, the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would be replaced by the History of the International Working Class Movement which is organized to dispute the U. S. S. R.'s claims to total credit for the progress of world communism.
Aug. 21-----	Announcement is made of the first consecration of a Roman Catholic bishop in 4 years. A UP dispatch says the consecration took place July 25 at Pazin.
Sept. 6-----	Foreign Minister Kardelj assails North Korean aggression and calls the action a blow to world peace.
Oct. 13-----	Phipps Bros., Inc., of New York, announces that it has concluded an agreement with the Yugoslav Government to receive a major share of Yugoslavia's strategic nonferrous metals. This will amount to between 15 and 20 million dollars.
Oct. 21-----	Tito told a congressional committee that Yugoslavia would honor its commitments to the United Nations against any acts of aggression.
Oct. 23-----	Yugoslav paper, <i>Omladina</i> , castigates Vishinsky and Russian hegemony climaxing an upswing in sharp attacks against the U. S. S. R. and its leaders.
Nov. 3-----	Yugoslavia offers aggression curb to the United Nations.
Nov. 3-----	Chile and Yugoslavia end 3-year split and resume diplomatic relations.
Nov. 7-----	Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler appeals for Italy's entry into the UN.
Nov. 7-----	Tito says he will back any UN decision in the event of conflict with Red China.
Nov. 8-----	Yugoslav chief of staff says Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, allies of Hitler in World War II and now satellites of the U. S. S. R., are violating the military clauses of the 1946 Paris peace treaties and that they are building up armies in excess of the limitations specified by those statutes.
Nov. 11-----	Yugoslavia expels the Albanian mission in Belgrade.
Nov. 16-----	Tito told Yugoslavs that no one would starve this winter because the United States was sending food to Yugoslavia.
Nov. 17-----	Politburo member Milovan Djilas says that the gulf between Moscow and Belgrade is now "unbridgeable." Djilas accused Moscow of despotism without precedent and of preparation for aggressive war.
Nov. 21-----	Press (NYHT) announces Tito has agreed to admit United States observers to watch the distribution of food in Yugoslavia.
Nov. 26-----	Yugoslavia returns 21 Greek children to their native land, the first of such a group.
Nov. 27-----	Greek railway into Yugoslavia via Salonika-Florina opened.
Nov. 26-----	After a conference with Interior Minister Rankovic, Yugoslavia agrees to release all registered American citizens in Yugoslavia who have hitherto been denied exit visas. Arrangements are made for most dual nationals to receive exit permits on United States passports and for alien dependents to receive release of Yugoslav citizenship by special simplified process and the issuance of passavants.





81ST CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. R. 9853

[Report No. 3179]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 5, 1950

Mr. RICHARDS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

DECEMBER 7, 1950

Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

[Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That this Act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency
4 Relief Assistance Act of 1950".

5 SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated
6 to the President for additional emergency relief assistance to
7 Yugoslavia a sum not to exceed \$38,000,000 to remain
8 available for obligation through June 30, 1951.

9 SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall
10 be made available nor shall any funds appropriated here-

1 under be expended until an agreement is entered into be-
2 tween Yugoslavia and the United States containing the
3 following undertakings, and any others the President may
4 determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

5 (a) To make available to the Government of the United
6 States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its
7 local currency administrative and operating expenses in
8 Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this
9 Act.

10 (b) To give full and continuous publicity through the
11 press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to
12 the assistance furnished by the United States; *and to allow*
13 *to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use*
14 *of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.*

15 (c) To permit persons designated by the Government
16 of the United States to observe *and supervise* without restric-
17 tion the distribution *by Yugoslavia* of commodities and other
18 assistance made available under the authority of this Act,
19 and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full
20 freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia
21 and full access to communication and information facilities.

22 (d) To make equitable distribution to the people ~~of~~
23 *in* Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this
24 Act, *as well as similar commodities produced locally or im-*

1 *ported from outside sources*, without discrimination as to
2 *race, color, or political or religious belief.*

3 SEC. 4. All or any portion of the funds made available
4 under authority of this Act may be transferred by the Presi-
5 dent to any department or agency of the executive branch
6 of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this
7 Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the au-
8 thority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this
9 Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned,
10 except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled
11 with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall
12 be accounted for separately.

13 SEC. 5. Local currency made available to the United
14 States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement
15 required by section 3 may be used for local currency admin-
16 istrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection
17 with assistance provided by this Act without charge against
18 appropriated funds.

19 SEC. 6. All or any part of the assistance provided here-
20 under shall be promptly terminated by the President—

21 (a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia
22 is not complying fully with the undertakings in the
23 agreement entered into under section 3 of this Act, or is
24 diverting from the purpose of this Act assistance pro-

1 vided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions,
2 continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable,
3 or no longer consistent with the national interest or the
4 foreign policy of the United States;

5 (b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolu-
6 tion of both Houses, finds termination is desirable.

7 Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this sec-
8 tion shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies
9 scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered.

[Report No. 3179]

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

By Mr. RICHARDS

DECEMBER 5, 1950

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

DECEMBER 7 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 27), 1950.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. CONNALLY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 4234]

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under consideration a proposal to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, reports S. 4234, and recommends that it do pass.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE BILL

This bill authorizes the appropriation of not to exceed \$38,000,000, to the President to enable the United States to provide emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia. This assistance, most of which will be in the form of food, is being provided in order to assist the Yugoslav people to avoid economic havoc arising out of unusual drought conditions during 1950 and thereby to maintain their independence from the Soviet Union which can be expected to do its utmost to encourage the disintegration of an independent Yugoslavia.

Although this bill calls for aid to a Communist Yugoslavia which engages in many practices that the free peoples of the world do not approve, the interests of the United States, the free world, and Yugoslavia coincide at this moment in history. Those interests coincide because of a common desire to prevent aggression, to stem the tide of Soviet imperialism wherever it may occur, and in this instance, in Yugoslavia in particular.

2. COMMITTEE ACTION

On December 4, 1950, the Committee on Foreign Relations heard witnesses in support of the recommendation of the President that the Congress enact legislation authorizing further United States assistance to meet the emergency created by the food shortage in Yugoslavia.

The committee heard Mr. George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. John J. Haggerty, United States agricultural attaché in Belgrade; and Mr. Stanley Andrews, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture. These witnesses discussed drought conditions in Yugoslavia and the political implications of the proposed aid.

On December 5, the committee heard Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, testify in executive session in support of this legislation.

On December 6, 1950, the committee voted to report S. 4234 favorably to the Senate.

3. THE NEED FOR AID

The Soviet Yugoslav dispute.—In order to assess the need for aid to Yugoslavia at this time and to see how giving that aid will be in the interest of the United States, one must examine the nature and extent of the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948.

Prior to early 1948 the Yugoslav regime was, as one reporter wrote: "The toast of Moscow as the Soviet Union's lustiest offspring. * * *" It was the biggest and in many respects the most vocal of the Soviet satellites. Its representatives echoed the Soviet line from the Danube to the United Nations. The headquarters of the Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau consisting of the Communist parties of various states), was in Belgrade.

Then came the break. During March, April, and May of 1948, Tito and Stalin in several exchanges of notes revealed fundamental differences between the Communist leaders of the Soviet Union and those of Yugoslavia.

In a note to Tito the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. reminded him of Trotsky and his fate. "When he decided to declare war on the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)," said the note, "Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers." The note added significantly, and perhaps as a warning, "We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive." It will be recalled that Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico City where he was living in enforced exile.

A Cominform communiqué of June 28, 1948, read Tito's Communist Party out of the iron curtain in these words:

The information bureau unanimously concludes that by their antiparty and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the information bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the information bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the united Socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism.

Permanence of split between Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.—Assistant Secretary of State George Perkins in commenting to the committee on this break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia said:

I know of no convincing evidence that the split between the Government of Marshal Tito and the Kremlin is not genuine and is not permanent. Both the marshal and the Kremlin have publicly proclaimed the irrevocability of the split and certainly there is nothing in Communist doctrine nor practice that I know

of which would permit the Kremlin to take Marshal Tito back into the fold on any terms short of the grave.

The voting record of the Yugoslav delegation in the United Nations indicates the seriousness of the break. Prior to 1948 Yugoslavia always voted with the Soviet Union. Since then, Yugoslavia has shown increasing independence of the Soviet Union and on many occasions has taken positions in vigorous opposition. The Soviet imperialist attack on Korea seemed to be the occasion for an unqualified and vigorous stand by Yugoslavia against Soviet imperialism.

In a statement on September 8, 1950, the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kardelj, said:

When considering the situation in Korea, the people of Yugoslavia cannot but do so in the light of the fact that for 3 years the Government of the Cominform, led by the Government of the Soviet Union, have been carrying on a violently aggressive campaign against Socialist Yugoslavia, precisely because the working people of Yugoslavia maintains its right to make its own decisions on its own soil. This aggressive policy, against which Socialist Yugoslavia has reacted very firmly, throws light on the policy pursued by its organizers in other parts of the world. It leaves no doubt that those who are still pursuing an aggressive and anti-Socialist policy toward Yugoslavia—a policy aimed at gaining supremacy for themselves—cannot be pursuing a different policy, a democratic and Socialist policy, a policy of peace and of the equality and brotherhood of all peoples, in other parts of the world. For a long time, the policy of the leaders of the Cominform has not coincided with the interests of the progress of mankind, and it is therefore harmful to all progressive and liberating movements which become its instruments.

All their cries of loyalty to the cause of peace, and their accusations that others are aggressors will not suffice to cloak their share of responsibility for the Korean War and for the way in which they are endangering the peace of the world as a whole.

The attitude of the Yugoslav Government toward the west has changed for the better. Yugoslavia is now returning Greek children abducted during hostilities with Greece. Greece and Yugoslavia are renewing diplomatic relations. Yugoslavia is permitting people with Yugoslav nationality as well as American nationality to return to the United States if they wish. Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia have improved and Trieste is not the tinder box that it was 2 years ago. Relations between Austria and Yugoslavia have likewise been improving.

While the repressive measures of Tito toward the Yugoslav people and religious freedom find no defense in the United States, there have been indications recently that the requirements of support from the west may mean greater freedom for the people of Yugoslavia.

Economic warfare.—Since 1948, the Soviet's war of nerves on Yugoslavia has been unrelenting. It has been implemented by an economic boycott that has effectively interdicted trade between Yugoslavia and the iron curtain countries. In 1947, 49.1 percent of Yugoslavia's exports went to the Soviet bloc; in 1949, only 14.4 percent. The picture is much the same for imports. In 1947, 51.9 percent of Yugoslav imports came from the Soviet Union and the satellites; by 1949 imports from the Soviet States accounted for only 13.4 percent of Yugoslavia's total imports. These figures show the terrific impact of the Soviet break upon the economy of Yugoslavia. Within 2 years it was necessary for Yugoslavia to reorientate her foreign trade from the east to the west. New markets had to be found for Yugoslav products; new sources of raw materials sought and means developed to pay for them.

The economic impact on Yugoslavia of this boycott as well as military moves by her satellite neighbors, and finally the show of Communist imperialist force in far off Korea, all combined to put the Tito regime in a most precarious position—a position where Soviet Communists by subversion, coercion, or even military force might have brought Yugoslavia back into the Soviet fold.

The drought.—Then came the drought. After heavy rains in February 1950, March showed rainfall of 63 percent of a 15-year average; April 84 percent of average; May 46 percent; June 21 percent; July 55 percent; August 12 percent; and September 37 percent. By then, what crops there were, were being harvested. The American agricultural attaché, Mr. John J. Haggerty, who during the past 2 years has traveled some 25,000 miles in Yugoslavia, reported that the drought effects were devastating. Corn failed to mature; wheat harvests were off.

The percentages in 1950 of 1947–49 average of certain commodities produced in Yugoslavia are as follows:

	Percent		Percent
Corn.....	59	Vegetables and melons.....	57
Wheat.....	88	Potatoes.....	67
Rye.....	83	Edible fats.....	88
Barley.....	87	Sugar.....	108
Oats.....	79	Beans.....	72
Rice.....	100	Peas.....	57

These figures do not tell the whole story. Yugoslavia normally has food enough to export and thereby acquire foreign exchange with which to buy needed imports. One of the most telling effects of the drought was to reduce the ability of the Yugoslav people to import needed materials.

4. THE STOPGAP PROGRAM

During the summer months of 1950 it became apparent to American observers in Yugoslavia that that country was going to have great difficulty in avoiding economic collapse because of the drought. Economic collapse could only mean eventual resubjugation to Soviet imperialism. Nothing would have suited the Soviet better. Yugoslavia would then have become the first-class example of what happens to satellite states with nerve enough to break out of the Soviet orbit.

On October 20, 1950, the Yugoslav Government formally requested American assistance to meet the effects of the drought. That Government said it—

has established by a careful examination of the damage incurred, that in spite of all efforts and an extreme limitation of the consumption, there still remains a loss amounting to \$105,000,000 that can be covered solely by extraordinary assistance from abroad.

After a careful examination of reports on conditions in Yugoslavia supplemented by eye-witness information from our agricultural attaché in Belgrade, and confirmed by American newspapermen, businessmen, and congressional visitors, the United States Government told the Yugoslav Government that it was prepared to take immediate steps to provide emergency foodstuffs to the people of that country. Immediate action was necessary so that maximum distribution could be undertaken before winter interfered with an inadequate transportation system. Accordingly, after informing certain congressional

leaders of the conditions in Yugoslavia that made it necessary in our national interest to assist Yugoslavia, the President took steps to send foodstuffs to that country, under existing authority. The following table indicates the source and nature of the commodities being shipped under the stopgap program.

Yugoslav emergency food program—stopgap program

Commodity	ECA (millions of dollars)	MDAP (millions of dollars)	Export-Import Bank (millions of dollars)	Total (millions of dollars)
Flour.....	¹ 12.2 ² (3.3)	3.6		15.8
Corn meal.....		.9		.9
Corn.....		.9		.9
Barley.....		1.7		1.7
Lard.....		2.1	3.2	5.3
Sugar.....		2.4		2.4
Beans.....			³ 1.1 (2.3)	1.1
Dried eggs.....			³ .5 (13.0)	.5
Canned meat.....			.4	.4
Subtotal.....	12.2 (3.3)	11.6	5.2 (15.3)	⁴ 29.0 (18.6)
Ocean transport.....		2.0	⁵ .4	2.4
Total.....	12.2 (3.3)	13.6	5.6 (15.3)	⁴ 31.4 (18.6)

¹ Includes ocean transport costs of replacement wheat to Italy and Germany. In the event that ECA is unable to supply the full 110,000 tons of flour, the deficiency will be made up by a drawing on MDA funds up to the extent of \$16 million.

² Estimated subsidy under wheat agreement on wheat replacement by ECA to Italy and Germany at current prices using 80% extraction rate.

³ Difference between USDA, CCC, investment cost and actual sales price at special, low, FAO price.

⁴ Difference between USDA, CCC, investment or acquisition cost and charge to program.

⁵ Assuming canned meat, dried eggs, some lard, and one-half of the dried beans shipped in Yugoslav vessels.

Authority for stopgap aid.—According to information presented by the Department of State:

The measures taken under this program (the stopgap program) were of a special nature and utilized existing legislative authority on an emergency basis for purposes not specifically contemplated when the laws in question were being considered by Congress.

The Department further described the authority for the stopgap program as follows:

(a) The Export-Import Bank had already approved a \$15,000,000 credit to Yugoslavia for export development programs. It was decided, however, to divert approximately \$6,000,000 of this credit in order to start food shipments immediately. In view of the fact that no appropriations for raw materials are being requested in the present program, it is considered necessary to utilize the remainder of the \$15,000,000 credit for raw materials, as well as spare parts and equipment, essential for the maintenance of the Yugoslav export industries.

(b) The Economic Cooperation Act authorizes shipments of food to the European countries. It also recognizes that permission may be given for transfers of material purchased with ERP funds, or similar materials, from participating countries to third countries. This authority was drawn upon to have flour shipped from Germany and Italy on the understanding that it would be replaced with wheat shipped from the United States to those countries. This unusual measure, which assists in the maintenance of stability of Yugoslavia, contributes to the over-all purposes of the European recovery program and is consistent with the established policy of encouraging exports by participating countries. Its prime purpose, however, is not one of the purposes of the programs contemplated when the ERP was last before Congress, and requires the participation of third countries in a way that makes its continuation undesirable.

(c) Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act permits the transfer of materials to European countries, other than those in the North Atlantic Treaty, under certain specified emergency conditions. These conditions were

clearly present in the case of Yugoslavia, and therefore it was decided to provide foodstuffs to Yugoslavia only, however, in those quantities needed by the Yugoslav military forces.

Yugoslavia is not a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and therefore is not eligible for direct ERP aid. Up to now Yugoslavia has not indicated a willingness to become a member of the OEEC and assume the responsibilities under which it could qualify as a participating country and it is not considered advisable at this time to attempt to persuade it to do so. Similarly, Yugoslavia is not a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, and it is not expected to become a party.

Consequently, it is appropriate and necessary, in view of the above considerations, to furnish such assistance to Yugoslavia, as will contribute to our purposes in the maintenance of peace, by means of special legislation for that end, rather than by means of further emergency use of legislative authority not specifically intended to cover the contingencies which have arisen in connection with Yugoslavia.

5. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM

On November 29, 1950, the President recommended that Congress appropriate \$38,000,000 for the purchase of commodities to give Yugoslavia for emergency relief. The President's message explained that this amount would be in addition to the \$31,400,000 supplied on existing authority during the stopgap program. The total expenditures for commodities which would be supplied from the United States would be \$69,400,000.

The distribution of the proposed \$38,000,000, as well as the stopgap program of \$31,400,000, among commodities is as follows:

Emergency aid to Yugoslavia

Commodity	Yugoslav request, market value (million dollars)	Total proposed program, estimated program expenditures (million dollars)	Stopgap program, estimated program expenditures (million dollars)	Authorization request, market value and estimated program expenditures (million dollars)
Wheat.....	14.1			
Wheat flour.....	4.5	18.7	15.8	2.9
Corn meal.....		.9	.9	
Corn.....	10.6	9.8	.9	8.9
Barley.....	2.7	2.7	1.7	1.0
Oats.....	4.8	4.8		4.8
Milo (fodder).....	2.6	2.6		2.6
Vegetables:				
Rice.....		1.1		1.1
Dried peas.....	6.9	3.0		3.0
Edible fats: Lard.....	14.3	7.1	5.3	1.8
Sugar.....	4.3	2.4	2.4	
Beans (dried).....	5.0	3.6	1.1	2.5
Dried eggs.....	9.9	.5	.5	
Dried milk.....	1.8	1.8		1.8
Canned meat.....	.4	.4	.4	
Seeds.....	4.0	4.0		4.0
Subtotal.....	\$5.9	63.4	29.0	34.4
Ocean transportation.....		6.0	2.4	3.6
Total.....		69.4	31.4	38.0

Use of surplus supplies.—Witnesses before the committee testified that although the funds actually to be spent on this program would total \$69,400,000, the market value of the foodstuffs supplied would be about \$75,000,000. About 71 percent of the foodstuffs in the stopgap and the proposed program are in the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation. The only items that would be purchased in the open market are expected to be flour, lard, and rice and seeds.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ALREADY PROVIDED TO YUGOSLAVIA BY THE UNITED STATES

The following table gives in outline form the major items of United States aid to Yugoslavia starting with wartime lend-lease and continuing up to the present:

Wartime:	
Plan A.....	¹ \$6, 500, 000
Lend-lease.....	² 32, 125, 000
Postwar: 1945-47, UNRRA.....	³ 299, 081, 000
Since Cominform break:	
August 1949: National Security Council decision to approve export of steel mill.	
September 1949: Export-Import Bank.....	20, 000, 000
March 1949: Export-Import Bank.....	20, 000, 000
August 1949: Export-Import Bank.....	15, 000, 000
Other United States economic assistance:	
September 1949: United States support for \$3,000,000 International Monetary Fund drawing.	
October 1949: United States support for International Bank \$2,700,000 loan, for timber equipment.	
October 1949: United States support for \$6,000,000 IMF drawing.	
December 1949: ECA authorizes off-shore purchases in Yugoslavia.	
September 1949: United States support for west German credit to Yugoslavia of \$35,000,000.	

¹ United States portion of a joint United States, United Kingdom, Canadian postwar civilian relief to Yugoslavia from military supplies.

² All but \$75,000 during war.

³ United States share of a total amount of \$430,000,000 provided by UNRRA

6. ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAM

Since this is an emergency relief program that will come to an end with the crop harvest in the spring and summer of 1951, it was not deemed advisable to create a complicated administrative mechanism for operation of the program. The draft bill provides (sec. 4) that the President may transfer aid funds to any Department or agency of the executive branch of the Government for expenditure under the terms of the law. It is the intention of the executive branch to continue to operate the program authorized by this legislation in much the same way as the stopgap program has been administered. That means the principal operating responsibility in the United States will be in the Department of State. The actual procurement and shipment of aid will be carried on by existing procurement agencies, principally the CCC and the Department of Agriculture.

Responsibility at the Belgrade end of the operation will be in the hands of the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He will have, with the assistance of a small staff recruited for this purpose, responsibility for seeing that the conditions of aid set forth in section 3 of the bill, and such other conditions as the President finds desirable and appropriate, are met by the Yugoslav Government.

Since the stopgap program has been quickly and efficiently administered by existing agencies with existing personnel, the committee saw no reason to change that set-up.

7. CONDITIONS OF AID

As indicated earlier, the motivation for aid to Yugoslavia, while partly humanitarian, is dictated largely by the coincidence in the national interests of the United States and Yugoslavia in maintaining the independence of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the legislation sets forth certain minimum conditions which are to be satisfied before any aid authorized is made available to Yugoslavia. Those conditions are set forth in section 3 of the bill. They follow in a general way the pattern of other aid legislation passed by the Congress during recent years.

Publicity.—Provision is made that “full and continuous publicity” is to be given by Yugoslavia to the aid furnished by the United States and that the Yugoslav Government must permit observers to see and report on the distribution of aid made available under the act. The arrival of the first shipment in the stopgap program received extensive press and radio coverage in Yugoslavia.

Equitable distribution.—Yugoslavia is required to agree to make “equitable distribution” of the commodities supplied “without discrimination as to race, color, or political or religious belief.”

Local currency.—The legislation also requires Yugoslavia to make local currency available in amounts sufficient to meet the local expenses incurred by the United States in connection with the aid furnished. At the suggestion of the committee, provision was also made that, to the extent the Government of Yugoslavia sells commodities furnished by the United States, it is to provide an equivalent amount of local currency to be available for such purposes as the United States and Yugoslavia may agree upon. Mention is made of the possibility of using such sums for relief to needy persons and children and for charitable or medical purposes.

Finally, the President is authorized to require from Yugoslavia such other undertakings as he finds desirable and appropriate as conditions of aid.

8. OTHER AID FOR YUGOSLAVIA

The Yugoslav Government has tightened its belt. It is not relying solely on what other governments can do to help it. Orders have been issued limiting domestic use of scarce foodstuffs and imported items. Severe criminal penalties are provided for persons who disobey those orders. On September 27, 1950, an order was issued with a preamble as follows:

On account of the reduction in the yield of agricultural products, caused by drought, and in order to ensure food for the population, preserve the livestock, find and successfully carry out the economic and other plans in the coming year, all competent government agencies are obligated to undertake special measures for the realization of these tasks, etc.

The Italian and German Governments assisted the stopgap program by sending food grains and sugar to Yugoslavia. The United Kingdom has offered a credit of 3,000,000 pounds for Yugoslavia to purchase food and consumer goods. Other countries in the North Atlantic area which are vitally concerned with the continued independence of Yugoslavia are considering what steps they can take to give assistance.

9. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROGRAM

The President in his message to Congress set forth the policy of this Government with respect to Yugoslavia in these words:

Since the break between the Kremlin and Yugoslavia, it has been the policy of this Government to assist Yugoslavia to maintain its independence. The continued independence of Yugoslavia is of great importance to the security of the United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Organization, and to all nations associated with them in their common defense against the threat of Soviet aggression.

The United States Government is unalterably opposed to international communism wherever it exists and therefore would like to see the people of Yugoslavia free to choose their own political institutions. While it may seem then that the United States should not give assistance to the Communist government of Yugoslavia, the fact is that help is being given Yugoslavia because Yugoslavia puts independence from Communist imperialism ahead of subservience to international communism. Tito espouses nationalist communism rather than imperialist communism which seeks to bind all communists to the Kremlin. Soviet imperialist communism seeks to rob all states of their independence. Titoism seeks the independence of Communist states from Soviet dictatorship.

The Yugoslav break with the Soviet bloc was a decided set-back to Soviet expansionism. The Western Powers must exploit this break, not because they want to help communism in Yugoslavia, but because they want to encourage other Communist states to throw off the yoke of the Kremlin and to choose a free government. Yugoslavia may not be a recruit for democracy, but it is a recruit for the principle of independence.

10. THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROGRAM

On November 20, 1950, a United States note to the Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs set forth the agreed basis whereby certain funds from the Mutual Defense Assistance Act were to be made available as a part of the stopgap program for assistance to the military forces of Yugoslavia. That note reads in part as follows:

Our two Governments are both desirous of fostering international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles.

Accordingly, I am pleased to inform you that my Government is prepared, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress, as amended, to supply assistance in aid of food requirements of the armed forces of your Government on the following mutually agreed basis that:

(1) Your Government will use the assistance exclusively for the purpose for which it is furnished, namely, in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, to prevent the weakening of the defenses of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

(2) That your Government agrees not to transfer to any other nation the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement without the prior consent of this Government.

(3) That your Government will provide the United States with reciprocal assistance by continuing to facilitate the production and transfer to the United States, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, of raw and semiprocessed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources and which may be

available in Yugoslavia. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Yugoslavia.

(4) That your Government is prepared to make available to the Government of the United States of America dinars for the use of the United States of America for any administrative expenditures within Yugoslavia in connection with assistance furnished by the United States of America to Yugoslavia arising out of this agreement. Our two Governments will at the appropriate time initiate discussion with a view to determining the amount of such dinars and to agree upon arrangements for the furnishing of such dinars.

YUGOSLAV MILITARY STRENGTH

The Yugoslav Army of more than 30 divisions at this time is the largest army in western Europe outside of the Soviet Union. Its troops established their fighting ability during the war with Germany. Their forces plus those of other independent states of southeast Europe would, if the Soviet Union should use force to wreak its will on western Europe, constitute a bastion of strength. To fail at this time to help any one of these states to retain its independence would be to overlook a source of strength for the defense of the free world which western Europe and the United States could ill afford to lose.

II. SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR AIDING YUGOSLAVIA

1. The Government of Yugoslavia has successfully broken away from the domination of the Kremlin. The rift between the Communist regimes of Moscow and Belgrade seems to be deep and unbridgable.

2. Drought conditions in Yugoslavia during the past year in combination with economic difficulties arising from the break with the Soviet bloc, have threatened the economic collapse of Yugoslavia.

3. The economic collapse of Yugoslavia would presage overthrow of the Tito government and the enforced return of that country to the Soviet fold.

4. It is in the interests of the United States and the free nations of the world to assist any state in maintaining its independence, particularly from the domination of Moscow.

5. The strength of the Yugoslav Army is such that it might well be a crucial factor in the defense of western Europe in the event of Soviet aggression.

6. The United States has always maintained that nations should be free to determine their own form of government even though the United States may not like that form of government. Soviet imperialism has always sought to impose its form of government and its direction on independent states whenever possible. Assistance to Yugoslavia will assist her in maintaining that independence.

It is the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Relations that the United States Government should provide emergency aid to Yugoslavia to enable that country to meet food shortages arising out of the 1950 drought and thereby stave off the threat of Soviet imperialism.

Calendar No. 2589

81ST CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

S. 4234

[Report No. 2588]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 7 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 27), 1950

MR. CONNALLY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, reported the following bill; which was read twice and ordered to be placed on the calendar

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 That this Act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency
4 Relief Assistance Act of 1950".

5 SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated
6 to the President for continuation of emergency relief assist-
7 ance to Yugoslavia a sum not to exceed \$38,000,000 to
8 remain available for obligation through June 30, 1951.

9 SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall
10 be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder

1 be expended until an agreement is entered into between
2 Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following
3 undertakings by Yugoslavia and any other undertakings the
4 President may find desirable and appropriate:

5 (a) To give full and continuous publicity through the
6 press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia
7 to the assistance furnished by the United States.

8 (b) To permit persons designated by the Government
9 of the United States to observe without restriction the dis-
10 tribution of commodities and other assistance made available
11 under the authority of this Act, and to the extent necessary
12 for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such
13 persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication
14 facilities.

15 (c) To make equitable distribution to the people of
16 Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this
17 Act without discrimination as to race, color, or political or
18 religious belief.

19 (d) To make available to the Government of the United
20 States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its
21 local currency administrative and operating expenses in
22 Yugoslavia in connection with assistance to Yugoslavia.

23 (e) Whenever relief supplies furnished under this Act
24 are sold for local currency by the Government of Yugo-
25 slavia, to use an equivalent amount of such currency to

1 provide relief to needy persons and to children, and for
2 charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be
3 mutually agreed upon.

4 SEC. 4. All or any portion of the funds made available
5 under authority of this Act may be transferred by the Presi-
6 dent to any Department or agency of the executive branch
7 of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this
8 Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the
9 authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this
10 Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned.

11 SEC. 5. Local currency made available to the United
12 States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement
13 required by section 3 of this Act may be used for local
14 currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugo-
15 slavia in connection with assistance provided by this Act
16 without charge against appropriated funds.

17 SEC. 6. All or any part of the assistance provided under
18 this Act shall be promptly terminated by the President—

19 (a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is
20 not complying fully with the undertakings in the agree-
21 ment entered into under section 3 of this Act, or is
22 diverting from the purpose of this Act assistance pro-
23 vided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions,
24 continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable,

1 or no longer consistent with the national interest or the
2 foreign policy of the United States;

3 (b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolu-
4 tion of both Houses, finds termination is desirable.

5 Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this sec-
6 tion shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies
7 scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered.

Calendar No. 2589

81ST CONGRESS
2d Session

S. 4234

[Report No. 2588]

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and provide for
the defense and general welfare of the
United States by furnishing emergency re-
lief assistance to Yugoslavia.

By Mr. CONNALLY

DECEMBER 7 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 27), 1950

Read twice and ordered to be placed on the calendar

H. RES. 878

[Report No. 3181]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DECEMBER 8, 1950

Mr. SMITH of Virginia, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following resolution; which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

1 *Resolved*, That immediately upon the adoption of this
2 resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve
3 itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State
4 of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9853)
5 to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense
6 and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emer-
7 gency relief assistance to Yugoslavia. That after general
8 debate which shall be confined to the bill and continue not
9 to exceed three hours, to be equally divided and controlled
10 by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Com-
11 mittee on Foreign Affairs, the bill shall be read for amend-
12 ment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the

1 consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall
2 rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments
3 as may have been adopted and the previous question shall
4 be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto
5 to final passage without intervening motion except one mo-
6 tion to recommit.

House Calendar No. 295

81ST CONGRESS
2^D SESSION

H. RES. 878

[Report No. 3181]

RESOLUTION

Providing for the consideration of H. R. 9853,
a bill to promote the foreign policy and pro-
vide for the defense and general welfare of
the United States by furnishing emergency
relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

By Mr. SMITH of Virginia

DECEMBER 8, 1950

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed

unions, the marine division has been bitterly opposed to the SIU.

The 4-year fight actually involved only 470-odd seamen. The first of the 4 years was consumed mainly in resolving an argument between the SIU and the CIO maritime workers as to which was the appropriate challenger. In October 1947 the NLRB threw out the latter, and ordered an election between the SIU and no union. At that time the SIU claimed 55 percent of the unlicensed seamen on the Cities Service fleet.

Cities Service made it plain from the beginning that it was in no hurry to get the issue settled. It asked and received a 60-day extension of the voting time; later, another 10 days was granted. After the voting had begun, the company asked for still another extension period, this time 75 days, to allow one of its ships in the Pacific to participate. Since the ship might be gone for months, the NLRB denied the request, and also denied a variety of company requests for alterations in the eligibility requirements. Finally, on February 9, 1948, the votes were counted. They showed that the SIU had won 83 percent of the ballots.

From February to May of 1948, Cities Service belabored the NLRB with protests against the balloting, all of which were overruled. On May 24, 1948, the SIU was certified as the appropriate bargaining agent for 7 ships that had been voted. There were still 9 tankers to be accounted for—the one that had been in the Pacific during the original balloting, and 8 new ships acquired just previously. The NLRB announced that on January 5, 1949, it would hold a meeting to arrange for votes on these 9 ships. Cities Service declined to participate, however, asserting that it had not been formally notified. The meeting was then postponed until February 16, at which time the company threatened not to cooperate unless the board rescinded a 10-year-old order permitting CIO organizers on its ships.

When the voting finally began, on February 20, several tankers refused to allow the NLRB representatives on board to conduct the election. It was then necessary, in some cases, to use launches, which could approach the tankers as they docked and advertise the time and place of the election with loudspeakers. On February 22, after 6 ships had managed to vote, Cities Service went into court and got a temporary injunction that stopped the balloting and impounded the votes already cast. Shortly afterward, however, the injunction was dismissed and the voting was resumed.

On April 15 a court appearance was made by representatives of the Citco Tanker Men's Association, which had been quickly organized a few months before and which the SIU repeatedly denounced as company-dominated. The CTMA asked for an injunction to prevent the counting of ballots; it claimed the election was unfair since it did not have a place on the ballot. The injunction was denied, the votes were counted, and the SIU was found to have won 89 percent of the votes. Cities Service immediately filed 19 objections to the conduct of the election, all of which, 4 months later, were denied by the NLRB in Washington. Not unexpectedly, the company came right back with a list of "exceptions to the objection." These were taken under consideration, then finally denied on December 2, 1949.

It was now 38 months since the union had first asked for a contract. As yet, no collective bargaining had taken place and, as it turned out, Cities Service was not quite ready to begin. On December 15, CTMA put in another appearance, demanding this time that the NLRB certify it as the representative of the seamen who had voted in the first (seven-ship) election. The board de-

nied the request and CTMA inevitably, asked for a review of the decision. This was forthcoming on January 19, 1950, when the NLRB again ruled that the SIU was bargaining agent on the tankers. On February 8, bargaining began.

An interim contract was signed on March 10, stipulating that the company pay the SIU tanker scale on its ships. But just when it began to look as if the long, excruciating battle might be ending, the question of labor espionage came into the open.

The trouble was, the union complained at the Senate hearings, that while Cities Service was sitting down to the bargaining table with the SIU, it was firing SIU men. The union claimed that SIU men had been kept off the company's tankers, so far as was possible, ever since 1946. The SIU said that one of the chief reasons for the organization of CTMA in 1948 was to enable Cities Service to smoke out SIU men on the ships—by noting those who refused to go along with the new union. Whatever the truth about this, there was no dispute over the fact that Cities Service and the CTMA were hiring private detectives on a large scale. Caesar L. Scotti, a New York operative, told the Senate committee that he had been hired by a company attorney to get to know SIU men so that he could "finger" them when they entered the Cities Service hiring office. Two seamen, Anthony Hennessey and John Basciano, were hired to ship out on Cities Service tankers and inform on SIU activity at closer range. A licensed investigator in New York, Daniel J. Griffin, was hired to dig up what he could on the SIU leaders. The SIU complained at the hearings that several other men were more or less constantly engaged in shadowing their officials.

To round out the portrait of Cities Service labor relations during 1949 and early 1950 it might be added that these operatives were also up to their ears in shadowing one another. Scotti was instructed to keep an eye on James Hanaway, the company shipping master, whose office, in addition, was said to be wire-tapped. (The tap was denied by Cities Service.) The company's suspicion of Hanaway appears to have been justified; he admitted at the hearings that he had been paid at least \$700 by the SIU and was busily working for both sides. Scotti was also shadowing Hennessey, whom the company apparently never trusted, but the suspicions proved unfounded. Hennessey, meanwhile, was shadowing a CTMA lawyer named Albert Strasburger. Strasburger was the man who had hired Griffin to get some dirt on the SIU.

On June 5 of this year the NLRB took up the unfair-labor practice cases arising from the espionage. After 3 days of hearings the company interrupted the proceedings with an announcement that it was willing to settle all the disputed points. It agreed to comply with all the NLRB demands, to rehire 151 men allegedly discharged for SIU activity, to pay \$150,000 in back wages, and to bargain in good faith from that point on. The settlement stipulation, which was enforced by the second circuit court, also dissolved the CTMA.

The contract was finally signed on September 22. It was negotiated, incidentally, not by the marine-division officials of Cities Service, but by lawyers on the corporation level. Since the signing, relations have been excellent.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, as a member of that committee, I wish to join in the tribute which has just been paid to the senior Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY] for the splendid manner in which he, as chairman of the

subcommittee, has conducted the investigation. He has shown fairness, objectivity and intense, keen interest in the subject; and I think he has served well the Senate and the entire country as chairman of the subcommittee in connection with the inquiry.

AMENDMENT OF RAILWAY LABOR ACT

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 3295) to amend the Railway Labor Act and to authorize agreements providing for union membership and agreements for deductions from the wages of carriers' employees for certain purposes and under certain conditions.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Florida yield to me, to permit me to propound a unanimous-consent agreement, if it is understood that by doing so the Senator will not prejudice his rights to the floor?

Mr. PEPPER. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, perhaps we should have a quorum call at this time.

Mr. WHERRY. This proposal does not relate to the final vote on the bill, of course.

Mr. HILL. It does not relate to the final vote on the bill.

Mr. LUCAS. That is correct.

Mr. President, a number of Senators who are interested in Senate bill 3295, the pending measure, and also are interested in the amendment which now is being debated, known as the Holland amendment, have practically agreed upon the time for the vote, through a unanimous-consent agreement.

I am going to place the proposed unanimous-consent agreement before the Senate to see whether we can make some progress on it. I ask unanimous consent that the so-called Holland amendment to Senate bill 3295, Calendar 2263—

Mr. HILL. The amendment as presented.

Mr. LUCAS. Yes, the Holland amendment, as presented—be voted upon at the hour of 1 o'clock on Monday next; that the time on the amendment be divided equally between the opponents and the proponents, to be controlled by the Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND] and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], after the quorum call is had upon the convening of the Senate on that day; following that, the amendment of the Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER], which is the amendment dealing with the FEPC bill, will be offered to Senate bill 3295; and on that amendment the Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER] shall have 15 minutes and the opponents of the amendment shall have 15 minutes.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, let us make it clear that after the Senator from Indiana has had his opportunity to speak for 15 minutes and after the opponents have had an opportunity to speak, if they see fit to do so, or if they think they should do so, in answer to the Senator from Indiana, then a motion to lay on the table will come.

Mr. LUCAS. Yes. I have not yet reached that point of the unanimous-consent proposal.

Mr. HILL. But I wish to make it clear that the 30 minutes of debate on the amendment must not preclude further debate on the amendment in the event the motion to table fails.

Mr. LUCAS. I think that is understood, and I was going to include that in the proposed agreement.

Mr. President, my thoughts have been considerably disturbed by the interruptions on the part of the Senator from Alabama, but I shall not repeat what I have already stated in regard to the proposal.

I think I was about to say that it is proposed that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER] shall have 15 minutes on his amendment and the opponents shall have 15 minutes; following that a motion to table shall be in order; and if the motion to table fails, the so-called Jenner amendment will still be before the Senate for debate.

Mr. HILL. For debate that is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I shall not object—I should like to propound a parliamentary inquiry first: Has the so-called Jenner amendment been submitted?

Mr. LUCAS. I do not think it has. It has been lying around for several weeks, I believe.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of North Carolina in the chair). The Chair is advised by the Parliamentarian that the amendment has not yet been submitted.

Mr. WHERRY. I think it should be submitted, so there will be no question as to what it is; or at least in the proposed unanimous-consent agreement the Jenner amendment should be identified. I think that should be done.

Mr. LUCAS. I have already said that it is the so-called Jenner amendment, known as the FEPC amendment.

Mr. WHERRY. I beg the Senator's pardon; that is fine. I have no objection, then.

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] wished to speak at this time, I believe.

Mr. CAPEHART. No, thank you; the Senator from Nebraska has covered what I had in mind.

Mr. WHERRY. Very well.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object—and I do not wish to have to object—

Mr. LUCAS. Please do not.

Mr. MORSE. I will object unless the unanimous-consent request is presented after a quorum call.

Mr. LUCAS. I shall suggest the absence of a quorum at this time, if the Senator from Florida will yield for that purpose.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, probably there is more unanimity at the present time than there might be later on, so I shall not stand in the way of increasing the unanimity. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. The Senator from Florida is always in favor of unanimity, and I thank him for yielding.

Mr. President, I now suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Holland	Myers
Anderson	Hunt	Neely
Brewster	Ives	Nixon
Bricker	Johnson, Tex.	O'Connor
Bridges	Johnston, S. C.	O'Mahoney
Butler	Kefauver	Pepper
Byrd	Kem	Robertson
Cain	Kerr	Russell
Capehart	Kilgore	Saltonstall
Carlson	Knowland	Schoeppel
Chapman	Langer	Smith, Maine
Chavez	Leahy	Smith, N. J.
Clements	Lehman	Smith, N. C.
Connally	Long	Stennis
Cordon	Lucas	Taft
Donnell	McCarran	Taylor
Douglas	McCarthy	Thomas, Okla.
Dworschak	McClellan	Thomas, Utah
Eaton	McFarland	Thye
Ellender	McKellar	Tobey
Fulbright	McMahon	Tydings
George	Malone	Watkins
Gillette	Martin	Wherry
Gurney	Maybank	Wiley
Hayden	Millikin	Williams
Hendrickson	Morse	Young
Hickenlooper	Mundt	
Hill	Murray	

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. A quorum is present.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Florida had the floor. I think he felt that a unanimous-consent agreement might be entered into, and that therefore he would not continue his speech this afternoon. The majority leader was going to propound a unanimous-consent request at this time, I understood.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, the majority leader has conferred with the minority leader, and I feel that all the terms of the unanimous-consent agreement have been reduced to the point where they meet the objections of all those who had anything to say about them.

Mr. LUCAS entered the Chamber.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I may say for the RECORD that my colleague, who had the floor, had a long-standing engagement at the Senate Restaurant. He went to the restaurant to keep the engagement, and requested that he be notified in the event of a failure to enter into the unanimous-consent agreement. I, of course, shall protect him in that matter by holding the floor, in the event it becomes necessary to do so. But I hope, with him, that the agreement will be entered into.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request propounded by the Senator from Illinois previous to the quorum call? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The unanimous-consent agreement, as reduced to writing, is as follows:

Ordered, That on the calendar day of Monday, December 11, 1950, at the hour of 1 p. m., the Senate proceed to vote, without further debate, upon the amendment of Mr. HOLLAND, as proposed on December 7, 1950, to the bill (S. 3295) to amend the Railway Labor Act and to authorize agreements providing for union membership and agreements for deductions from the wages of carriers' employees for certain purposes and under certain conditions; and that the time intervening between a quorum call, to be had upon the convening of the Senate on said day, and said hour of 1 o'clock shall be equally divided between those favoring and those opposing said amendment and con-

trolled, respectively, by Mr. HOLLAND and Mr. HILL.

Ordered further, That following the vote on the so-called Holland amendment, the Senate immediately proceed to consider the amendment, lettered A, submitted by Mr. JENNER on September 1, 1950, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed; that debate thereon be limited to 30 minutes and equally divided and controlled by Mr. JENNER and Mr. HILL; that following the expiration of the time for debate it shall be in order to move to lay said amendment on the table, and if such motion to lay on the table is rejected, the further consideration of said amendment shall proceed under the rules of the Senate.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I want the RECORD to show that the interest of many Senators in seeking the unanimous-consent agreement was in order to permit the majority leader to take up the announced legislation to grant aid to Yugoslavia. I think the RECORD ought to show that the agreement has come about through cooperation on the part of Members of the Senate from both sides of the aisle.

Mr. LUCAS. I am very glad the Senator from Nebraska has made that statement. It is only 3 o'clock, and in view of the Senator's statement, it seems to me that we can probably pass this bill yet this afternoon.

EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business, the bill (S. 3295) to amend the Railway Labor Act and to authorize agreements providing for union membership and agreements for deduction from the wages of carriers' employees for certain purposes, be temporarily laid aside, and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will state the bill by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Illinois?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

Mr. WHERRY. As I understand, the request of the majority leader was to lay aside temporarily the unfinished business?

Mr. LUCAS. The request was to lay aside temporarily the unfinished business and to proceed to the consideration of the Yugoslavia relief bill.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, the bill under consideration would authorize relief to Yugoslavia because of the terrible drought which that country has suffered during the past year. Under the emergency powers which the Presi-

dent possesses \$31,000,000 has already been provided for that purpose. Senate bill 4234 would authorize \$38,000,000 more. Those who are familiar with the facts involved are strongly in favor of the passage of the measure. I shall read a brief statement dealing with the bill, after which I shall make some additional comments.

If any Senator 2 years ago had suggested that I would today be standing on the floor of the United States Senator advocating \$38,000,000 for aid to Communist Yugoslavia, I should have called him to order. Yet today I support and urge the earliest possible enactment of S. 4234 because I believe, as do other members of the Foreign Relations Committee, that the security of the United States requires this action.

Woodrow Wilson in an address to the United States Senate in 1937 said:

I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealment.

That is what I shall try to do in telling my colleagues as briefly as possible, why we must at this moment in history, give assistance to Yugoslavia—a country whose people we admire but whose government leaves much to be desired.

We must help Yugoslavia because it is the only state that once, under the domination of the Kremlin, has successfully defied the Kremlin. Since before the war, the Soviet Union has expanded its territories by every means conceivable. The roster of once free states, now captive, is long and depressing: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and now China. Not one of these states is independent. Not one official of these states would dare make a decision different than that dictated by Moscow. Not a single one of these states that is a member of the United Nations would dare vote differently from the Soviet Union.

Yugoslavia was once a member of this extinguished list of independent states. While I have never had a good thing to say for a Communist or for communism, Marshal Tito is one Communist who knows when he has had enough. He had enough from the Kremlin when he found Yugoslavia invaded from the Soviet Union by military advisers, economic experts, and political henchmen, all of them ready to act for the good of the Soviet Union no matter what the consequences to Yugoslavia. He had enough when he realized that the Soviet brand of communism was but a shield for the Machiavellian imperialism of a Politburo seeking world domination no matter what the cost.

Now that the break between Tito and Stalin has come, it is in the interests of the United States to see that Marshal Tito is able to maintain his independence. If the economic blockade that Stalin imposed upon Yugoslavia, if satellite military moves on the borders of Yugoslavia, if the drought of last summer, if any of these things should endanger Yugoslav independence from the Soviet Union, it would hurt the cause of the free world.

We should never lose sight of the fact that Yugoslavia has the largest standing army in Europe, outside the Soviet Union. More than 30 divisions stand ready to defend that country from attack. The threat to Yugoslav independence comes not from the west, but from the east. The Yugoslavs know that. That is why they must maintain a large army ever ready to defend them from the Soviet bloc. We need to maintain that strength on the side of freedom.

The Foreign Relations Committee heard witnesses who told of the severity of the drought last summer in Yugoslavia. Other nations of the west, including Great Britain, are helping Yugoslavia meet the effects of that drought. I believe we must continue the help which the President began this fall while the Congress was in recess.

I want to make it crystal clear that my support of this legislation is because it will help to preserve an independent country from Soviet imperialism. I condemn what Tito has done to religion and to human freedoms in Yugoslavia, but in times like these we cannot demand perfection as a price for our assistance.

In that connection we wish to offer an amendment. I shall read the amendment before I conclude my remarks.

The legislation before the Senate sets forth certain conditions that must be met before we will give aid under this bill. Many of these conditions have already been met. Yugoslavia has agreed to give publicity to our aid. She is already performing on that promise. She must agree to make local funds available to us for use in administering the program, and, to the extent that Yugoslavia sells the goods we supply, she must make equivalent local currency available for such uses as we agree to, such as medical aid, relief for children, and similar projects.

Under the terms of this bill money will not be given to Yugoslavia. The dollars will be spent here in the United States for commodities most of which are surplus to our needs. Some 71 percent of the money will be used for buying commodities already in the hands of the Commodity Credit Corporation. There will be only a few items, such as seeds and rice, that will be purchased on the open market.

In conclusion, let me say that sometimes the best way to fight fire is with fire. We now have a Communist backfire burning in Yugoslavia. I want to keep that fire burning. I do not want to let it be quenched. I want Yugoslavia's insistence on independence from Moscow to stiffen the backbone of people throughout the world who see the terrible dangers of Soviet imperialism cloaked in the robes of international communism.

I hope very much that the Senate will give its overwhelming approval to this bill, and demonstrate once again our profound determination to meet the threat of communism in the world.

The amendment to which I have referred has not been acted upon by the committee, but it will be offered before the bill is voted on. It is proposed to

add at the end of the bill a section which would provide:

Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, or economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

That language has been approved by the Department of State, and I feel sure there can be no objection to it.

I very much hope that the Senate will pass the bill promptly, because it is extremely urgent that we act quickly. The President is deeply concerned, and those who are in responsible positions dealing with the subject urge its passage.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. McKELLAR. Is it not true that should Russia decide to invade the western nations of Europe her natural, probable course would be through Yugoslavia?

Mr. CONNALLY. I cannot say that it would necessarily be the best course. It is one of the probable courses.

Mr. McKELLAR. It is one of the likely courses, at any rate?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes; because she would supposedly have the aid of her satellites in the areas which border Yugoslavia. She already has masses of troops stationed in Hungary and in other satellite countries on the borders of Yugoslavia, as a threat against Yugoslavia to make it comply with the wishes of the Cominform.

Mr. McKELLAR. I wish to say to the Senator from Texas that, as he has announced, if anyone had told me a few months ago that I would be in favor of giving aid to Yugoslavia—

Mr. CONNALLY. Or to any Communist country.

Mr. McKELLAR. If anyone had told me that I would do it with respect to Yugoslavia or any other Communist country I am sure I would have objected very strenuously. I am utterly opposed to communism. I shall continue to oppose it. But under the conditions which now surround us, with threats of war all over the world, it seems to me that we must look to whatever other steps may be taken, and use every means to prevent the spread of war. I agree with the Senator's statement almost totally, if not quite totally.

I hope the Senate will pass this bill. So far as I am concerned, when the request comes before the Committee on Appropriations for an appropriation to carry out the purposes of the bill, I shall do everything I can to see that the appropriation is approved by that committee, and afterward by the Senate.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. Did the Senator say that some other fund had already been provided for this purpose?

Mr. CONNALLY. There is what is called an ad interim fund of only

\$31,000,000. It is explained in the report of the committee.

Mr. STENNIS. Has that all been spent?

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not know that it has all been spent, but it has been provided.

Mr. STENNIS. It is in process of being spent?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes. It is estimated that this additional sum will be required to carry out the full program. The report of the committee gives the details as to the \$31,000,000.

Mr. STENNIS. Does the Senator think that the additional sum of \$38,000,000 will be sufficient to meet the present emergency?

Mr. CONNALLY. We think it will be sufficient until the next harvest. When the next harvest comes it will not be necessary to appropriate nearly so much, if anything. One of the most terrible droughts ever to visit Yugoslavia in all its history has devastated the food supplies of the country. There is great suffering in Yugoslavia even now.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. What is the attitude of Tito, or what is the attitude of the people of Yugoslavia, toward this aid?

Mr. CONNALLY. They want it because they are hungry. They want it because they want to eat. Tito and his people have shown an increasing leaning toward the west. There has been an increasing expression of their interest in the west rather than in the east. But if we let some of them starve, they will fall into the lap of Russia and break away from the west.

Mr. STENNIS. Were there any expressions before the committee from the people?

Mr. CONNALLY. We had nothing direct. In the Washington Post of this morning there is something which is pretty close to the people. Reference is made to a message from one of our diplomatic attachés who has been in Belgrade. It is on the front page of the Washington Post of this morning. Let me read from the front page of the Post:

THIRTY-TWO YUGOSLAV ARMY DIVISIONS HELD READY

NEW YORK, December 7.—R. Borden Reams, counselor at the United States Embassy in Belgrade, said today that anti-Cominform Yugoslavia had 32 army divisions available for immediate service.

Commenting on American aid to Marshal Tito's regime, Reams said:

"There isn't a better investment for us in the world today—dollar for dollar."

That answers the Senator's question. That is the view of Mr. Reams. He has been among the people. He states that there is not a better investment for us in the world today.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I notice that it is provided in the bill that there shall be continuous publicity through the press,

radio, and other available media in Yugoslavia, for the assistance given by the United States. That raises in my mind the question of just what the people there are being told now.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not know what they are being told now, but it is being made clear to them what we are doing. I mentioned earlier in my remarks that they had already agreed to give full publicity to what we were doing. On November 16 Tito told Yugoslavia that no one would starve this winter because the United States was sending food to Yugoslavia. They have agreed to carry on a program of information to their people as to where the relief is coming from.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I think that is the important point in the whole program.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. MURRAY. After listening to the very persuasive statement of the Senator from Texas, it seems to me that we cannot fail to vote for this measure. However, I have been reading in the press of the very serious persecution and oppression of religion in Yugoslavia. I am wondering what the future attitude of that government is likely to be in reference to the religions which were or are being persecuted.

Mr. CONNALLY. I will say to the Senator that the testimony before the committee revealed that there is a swinging around on that question. This is the amendment which we propose to add to the bill:

Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

That is an approach to the subject.

Mr. MURRAY. I thank the Senator.

Mr. McKELLAR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. McKELLAR. I invite the Senator's attention to the fact that in subsection (b) of section 6 it is also provided that the aid will be terminated "whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution of both Houses, finds termination is desirable."

Mr. CONNALLY. I invite the attention of the Senator from Montana to the fact that the Senator from Tennessee has just pointed out that the aid is terminable by means of a concurrent resolution of both Houses. So if there should be any abuse by Yugoslavia in regard to religious or civil liberties, we could immediately terminate the entire program.

Mr. MURRAY. That is a very wise provision.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. ELLENDER. I notice that this appropriation is for the continuation of emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator is correct.

Mr. ELLENDER. Will the Senator tell us how much aid has already been given to Yugoslavia, and in what form?

Mr. CONNALLY. I cannot tell the Senator how much of it has been spent, but a certain sum was made available. The Senator can obtain the information from the report.

Mr. ELLENDER. I should like to have the information in the RECORD. If the report is not going into the RECORD, I should like to have the information stated for the RECORD.

Mr. CONNALLY. On page 6 of the report are set forth the items already made available. I ask unanimous consent to have that statement printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Yugoslav emergency food program—stopgap program

Commodity	ECA (millions of dollars)	MDAP (millions of dollars)	Export-Import Bank (millions of dollars)	Total (millions of dollars)
Flour.....	¹ 12.2 ² (3.3)	3.6		15.8
Corn meal.....		.9		.9
Corn.....		.9		.9
Barley.....		1.7		1.7
Lard.....		2.1	3.2	5.3
Sugar.....		2.4		2.4
Beans.....			³ 1.1 (2.3)	1.1
Dried eggs.....			⁴ .5 (13.0)	.5
Canned meat.....			.4	.4
Subtotal.....	12.2 (3.3)	11.6	5.2 (15.3)	⁴ 29.0 (18.6)
Ocean transport.....		2.0	.4	2.4
Total.....	12.2 (3.3)	13.6	5.6 (15.3)	⁴ 31.4 (18.6)

¹ Includes ocean transport costs of replacement wheat to Italy and Germany. In the event that ECA is unable to supply the full 110,000 tons of flour, the deficiency will be made up by a drawing on MDA funds up to the extent of \$16,000,000.

² Estimated subsidy under wheat agreement on wheat replacement by ECA to Italy and Germany at current prices using 80 percent extraction rate.

³ Difference between USDA, CCC, investment cost and actual sales price at special, low, FAO price.

⁴ Difference between USDA, CCC, investment or acquisition cost and charge to program.

⁵ Assuming canned meat, dried eggs, some lard, and one-half of the dried beans shipped in Yugoslav vessels.

Mr. CONNALLY. Does that meet the wishes of the Senator from Louisiana?

Mr. ELLENDER. I notice that according to the table, it seems to relate to the \$31,400,000 already appropriated.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the \$31,400,000 is being provided as stopgap aid. It is largely transferred from the Export-Import Bank loan, and from ERP. The additional \$38,000,000 makes a total of \$69,400,000.

Mr. ELLENDER. I notice that. Will the Senator tell us about the \$31,400,000? How much of that is borrowed from the Export-Import Bank?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe that \$6,000,000 of a \$15,000,000 credit has been transferred for this purpose.

Mr. CONNALLY. The details are set forth on page 5 of the report.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is a transfer from the authority under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. Part of the money is transferred from that authority.

Mr. ELLENDER. I was not present to listen to the entire discussion by the distinguished Senator from Texas. I am wondering if there would be any objection to placing the entire report in the RECORD.

Mr. CONNALLY. None at all.

Mr. ELLENDER. I ask unanimous consent that the entire report accompanying the bill be printed in the RECORD.

Mr. CONNALLY. Does the Senator wish the entire report printed?

Mr. ELLENDER. I think it would be advisable.

Mr. CONNALLY. I have no objection.

There being no objection, the report, No. 2588, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, having had under consideration a proposal to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, reports S. 4234, and recommends that it do pass.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE BILL

This bill authorizes the appropriation of not to exceed \$38,000,000, to the President to enable the United States to provide emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia. This assistance, most of which will be in the form of food, is being provided in order to assist the Yugoslav people to avoid economic havoc arising out of unusual drought conditions during 1950 and thereby to maintain their independence from the Soviet Union which can be expected to do its utmost to encourage the disintegration of an independent Yugoslavia.

Although this bill calls for aid to a Communist Yugoslavia which engages in many practices that the free peoples of the world do not approve, the interests of the United States, the free world, and Yugoslavia coincide at this moment in history. Those interests coincide because of a common desire to prevent aggression, to stem the tide of Soviet imperialism wherever it may occur, and in this instance, in Yugoslavia in particular.

2. COMMITTEE ACTION

On December 4, 1950, the Committee on Foreign Relations heard witnesses in support of the recommendation of the President that the Congress enact legislation authorizing further United States assistance to meet the emergency created by the food shortage in Yugoslavia. The committee heard Mr.

George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. John J. Haggerty, United States agricultural attaché in Belgrade; and Mr. Stanley Andrews, Director, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture. These witnesses discussed drought conditions in Yugoslavia and the political implications of the proposed aid.

On December 5, the committee heard Gen. Omar N. Bradley, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, testify in executive session in support of this legislation.

On December 6, 1950, the committee voted to report S. 4234 favorably to the Senate.

3. THE NEED FOR AID

The Soviet Yugoslav dispute: In order to assess the need for aid to Yugoslavia at this time and to see how giving that aid will be in the interest of the United States, one must examine the nature and extent of the break between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in 1948.

Prior to early 1948 the Yugoslav regime was, as one reporter wrote: "The toast of Moscow as the Soviet Union's lustiest offspring. * * * It was the biggest and in many respects the most vocal of the Soviet satellites. Its representatives echoed the Soviet line from the Danube to the United Nations. The headquarters of the Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau consisting of the Communist parties of various states), was in Belgrade.

Then came the break. During March, April, and May of 1948, Tito and Stalin in several exchanges of notes revealed fundamental differences between the Communist leaders of the Soviet Union and those of Yugoslavia.

In a note to Tito the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. reminded him of Trotsky and his fate. "When he decided to declare war on the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)," said the note, "Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers." The note added significantly, and perhaps as a warning, "We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive." It will be recalled that Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico City where he was living in enforced exile.

A Cominform communiqué of June 28, 1948, read Tito's Communist Party out of the iron curtain in these words:

"The information bureau unanimously concludes that by their antiparty and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the information bureau, the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia have placed themselves in opposition to the Communist Parties affiliated to the information bureau, have taken the path of seceding from the united Socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people, and have taken up a position of nationalism."

Permanence of split between Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.—Assistant Secretary of State George Perkins in commenting to the committee on this break between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia said:

"I know of no convincing evidence that the split between the government of Marshal Tito and the Kremlin is not genuine and is not permanent. Both the Marshal and the Kremlin have publicly proclaimed the irrevocability of the split and certainly there is nothing in Communist doctrine nor practice that I know of which would permit the Kremlin to take Marshal Tito back into the fold on any terms short of the grave."

The voting record of the Yugoslav delegation in the United Nations indicates the seriousness of the break. Prior to 1948 Yugoslavia always voted with the Soviet Union. Since then, Yugoslavia has shown increas-

ing independence of the Soviet Union and on many occasions has taken positions in vigorous opposition. The Soviet imperialist attack on Korea seemed to be the occasion for an unqualified and vigorous stand by Yugoslavia against Soviet imperialism.

In a statement on September 8, 1950, the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kardelj, said:

"When considering the situation in Korea, the people of Yugoslavia cannot but do so in the light of the fact that for 3 years the Government of the Cominform, led by the Government of the Soviet Union, have been carrying on a violently aggressive campaign against Socialist Yugoslavia, precisely because the working people of Yugoslavia maintains its right to make its own decisions on its own soil. This aggressive policy, against which Socialist Yugoslavia has reacted very firmly, throws light on the policy pursued by its organizers in other parts of the world. It leaves no doubt that those who are still pursuing an aggressive and anti-Socialist policy toward Yugoslavia—a policy aimed at gaining supremacy for themselves—cannot be pursuing a different policy, a democratic and Socialist policy, a policy of peace and of the equality and brotherhood of all peoples, in other parts of the world. For a long time, the policy of the leaders of the Cominform has not coincided with the interests of the progress of mankind, and it is therefore harmful to all progressive and liberating movements which become its instruments.

"All their cries of loyalty to the cause of peace, and their accusations that others are aggressors will not suffice to cloak their share of responsibility for the Korean War and for the way in which they are endangering the peace of the world as a whole."

The attitude of the Yugoslav Government toward the west has changed for the better. Yugoslavia is now returning Greek children abducted during hostilities with Greece. Greece and Yugoslavia are renewing diplomatic relations. Yugoslavia is permitting people with Yugoslav nationality as well as American nationality to return to the United States if they wish. Relations between Italy and Yugoslavia have improved and Trieste is not the tinder box that it was 2 years ago. Relations between Austria and Yugoslavia have likewise been improving.

While the repressive measures of Tito toward the Yugoslav people and religious freedom find no defense in the United States, there have been indications recently that the requirements of support from the west may mean greater freedom for the people of Yugoslavia.

Economic warfare: Since 1948, the Soviet's war of nerves on Yugoslavia has been unremitting. It has been implemented by an economic boycott that has effectively interdicted trade between Yugoslavia and the iron curtain countries. In 1947, 49.1 percent of Yugoslavia's exports went to the Soviet bloc; in 1949, only 14.4 percent. The picture is much the same for imports. In 1947, 51.9 percent of Yugoslav imports came from the Soviet Union and the satellites; by 1949 imports from the Soviet states accounted for only 13.4 percent of Yugoslavia's total imports. These figures show the terrific impact of the Soviet break upon the economy of Yugoslavia. Within 2 years it was necessary for Yugoslavia to reorientate her foreign trade from the east to the west. New markets had to be found for Yugoslav products; new sources of raw materials sought and means developed to pay for them.

The economic impact on Yugoslavia of this boycott as well as military moves by her satellite neighbors, and finally the show of Communist imperialist force in far-off Korea, all combined to put the Tito regime in a most precarious position—a position where Soviet Communists by subversion, coercion,

or even military force might have brought Yugoslavia back into the Soviet fold.

The drought: Then came the drought. After heavy rains in February 1950, March showed rainfall of 63 percent of a 15-year average; April 84 percent of average; May 46 percent; June 21 percent; July 55 percent; August 12 percent; and September 37 percent. By then, what crops there were, were being harvested. The American agricultural attaché, Mr. John J. Haggerty, who during the past 2 years has traveled some 25,000 miles in Yugoslavia, reported that the drought effects were devastating. Corn failed to mature; wheat harvests were off.

The percentages in 1950 of 1947-49 average of certain commodities produced in Yugoslavia are as follows:

	Percent
Corn.....	59
Wheat.....	88
Rye.....	83
Barley.....	87
Oats.....	79
Rice.....	100
Vegetables and melons.....	57
Potatoes.....	67
Edible fats.....	88
Sugar.....	108
Beans.....	72
Peas.....	57

These figures do not tell the whole story, Yugoslavia normally has food enough to export and thereby acquire foreign exchange with which to buy needed imports. One of the most telling effects of the drought was to reduce the ability of the Yugoslav people to import needed materials.

4. THE STOPGAP PROGRAM

During the summer months of 1950 it became apparent to American observers in

Yugoslavia that that country was going to have great difficulty in avoiding economic collapse because of the drought. Economic collapse could only mean eventual resubjugation to Soviet imperialism. Nothing would have suited the Soviet better. Yugoslavia would then have become the first-class example of what happens to satellite states with nerve enough to break out of the Soviet orbit.

On October 20, 1950, the Yugoslav Government formally requested American assistance to meet the effects of the drought. That Government said it "has established by a careful examination of the damage incurred, that in spite of all efforts and an extreme limitation of the consumption, there still remains a loss amounting to \$105,000,000 that can be covered solely by extraordinary assistance from abroad."

After a careful examination of reports on conditions in Yugoslavia supplemented by eye-witness information from our agricultural attaché in Belgrade, and confirmed by American newspapermen, businessmen, and congressional visitors, the United States Government told the Yugoslav Government that it was prepared to take immediate steps to provide emergency foodstuffs to the people of that country. Immediate action was necessary so that maximum distribution could be undertaken before winter interfered with an inadequate transportation system. Accordingly, after informing certain congressional leaders of the conditions in Yugoslavia that made it necessary in our national interest to assist Yugoslavia, the President took steps to send foodstuffs to that country under existing authority. The following table indicates the source and nature of the commodities being shipped under the stopgap program:

Yugoslav emergency food program—stopgap program

Commodity	ECA (millions of dollars)	MDAP (millions of dollars)	Export-Import Bank (millions of dollars)	Total (millions of dollars)
Flour.....	12.2 (3.3)	3.6		15.8
Corn meal.....		.9		.9
Corn.....		.9		.9
Barley.....		1.7		1.7
Lard.....		2.1	3.2	5.3
Sugar.....		2.4		2.4
Beans.....			1.1 (2.3)	1.1
Dried eggs.....			1.5 (13.0)	.5
Canned meat.....			.4	.4
Subtotal.....	12.2 (3.3)	11.6	5.2 (15.3)	29.0 (18.6)
Ocean transport.....		2.0	1.4	2.4
Total.....	12.2 (3.3)	13.6	5.6 (15.3)	31.4 (18.6)

¹ Includes ocean transport costs of replacement wheat to Italy and Germany. In the event that ECA is unable to supply the full 110,000 tons of flour, the deficiency will be made up by a drawing on MDA funds up to the extent of \$16 million.

² Estimated subsidy under wheat agreement on wheat replacement by ECA to Italy and Germany at current prices using 80% extraction rate.

³ Difference between USDA, CCC, investment cost and actual sales price at special, low, FAO price.

⁴ Difference between USDA, CCC, investment or acquisition cost and charge to program.

⁵ Assuming canned meat, dried eggs, some lard, and one-half of the dried beans shipped in Yugoslav vessels.

Authority for stopgap aid: According to information presented by the Department of State:

"The measures taken under this program (the stopgap program) were of a special nature and utilized existing legislative authority on an emergency basis for purposes not specifically contemplated when the laws in question were being considered by Congress."

The Department further described the authority for the stopgap program as follows:

"(a) The Export-Import Bank had already approved a \$15,000,000 credit to Yugoslavia for export development programs. It was decided, however, to divert approximately \$6,000,000 of this credit in order to start food shipments immediately. In view of the fact that no appropriations for raw materials are being requested in the present program, it is considered necessary to utilize the remainder of the \$15,000,000 credit for raw ma-

terials, as well as spare parts and equipment, essential for the maintenance of the Yugoslav export industries.

"(b) The Economic Cooperation Act authorizes shipments of food to the European countries. It also recognizes that permission may be given for transfers of material purchased with ERP funds, or similar materials, from participating countries to third countries. This authority was drawn upon to have flour shipped from Germany and Italy on the understanding that it would be replaced with wheat shipped from the United States to those countries. This unusual measure, which assists in the maintenance of stability of Yugoslavia, contributes to the over-all purposes of the European recovery program and is consistent with the established policy of encouraging exports by participating countries. Its prime purpose, however, is not one of the purposes of the programs contemplated when the ERP was last before

Congress, and requires the participation of third countries in a way that makes its continuation undesirable.

"(c) Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act permits the transfer of materials to European countries, other than those in the North Atlantic Treaty, under certain specified emergency conditions. These conditions were clearly present in the case of Yugoslavia, and therefore it was decided to provide foodstuffs to Yugoslavia only, however, in those quantities needed by the Yugoslav military forces.

"Yugoslavia is not a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and therefore is not eligible for direct ERP aid. Up to now Yugoslavia has not indicated a willingness to become a member of the OEEC and assume the responsibilities under which it could qualify as a participating country and it is not considered advisable at this time to attempt to persuade it to do so. Similarly, Yugoslavia is not a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, and it is not expected to become a party.

"Consequently, it is appropriate and necessary, in view of the above considerations, to furnish such assistance to Yugoslavia, as will contribute to our purposes in the maintenance of peace, by means of special legislation for that end rather than by means of further emergency use of legislative authority not specifically intended to cover the contingencies which have arisen in connection with Yugoslavia."

5. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM

On November 29, 1950, the President recommended that Congress appropriate \$38,000,000 for the purchase of commodities to give Yugoslavia for emergency relief. The President's message explained that this amount would be in addition to the \$31,400,000 supplied on existing authority during the stopgap program. The total expenditures for commodities which would be supplied from the United States would be \$69,400,000.

The distribution of the proposed \$38,000,000, as well as the stopgap program of \$31,400,000, among commodities, is as follows:

Emergency aid to Yugoslavia

Commodity	Yugoslav request, market value (million dollars)	Total proposed program, estimated program expenditures (million dollars)	Stopgap program, estimated program expenditures (million dollars)	Authorization request, market value and estimated program expenditures (million dollars)
Wheat.....	14.1			
Wheat flour.....	4.5	18.7	15.8	2.9
Corn meal.....		.9	.9	
Corn.....	10.6	9.8	.9	8.9
Barley.....	2.7	2.7	1.7	1.0
Oats.....	4.8	4.8		4.8
Milo (fodder).....	2.6	2.6		2.6
Vegetables:				
Rice.....	6.9	1.1		1.1
Dried peas.....		3.0		3.0
Edible fats: Lard.....	14.3	7.1	5.3	1.8
Sugar.....	4.3	2.4	2.4	
Beans (dried).....	5.0	3.6	1.1	2.5
Dried eggs.....	9.9	.5	.5	
Dried milk.....	1.8	1.8		1.8
Canned meat.....	.4	.4	.4	
Seeds.....	4.0	4.0		4.0
Subtotal.....	85.9	63.4	29.0	34.4
Ocean transportation.....		6.0	2.4	3.6
Total.....		69.4	31.4	38.0

Use of surplus supplies: Witnesses before the committee testified that although the funds actually to be spent on this program would total \$69,400,000, the market value of the foodstuffs supplied would be about \$75,000,000. About 71 percent of the foodstuffs in the stopgap and the proposed program are in the stocks of the Commodity Credit

Corporation. The only items that would be purchased in the open market are expected to be flour, lard, and rice and seeds.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE ALREADY PROVIDED TO YUGOSLAVIA BY THE UNITED STATES

The following table gives in outline form the major items of United States aid to Yugoslavia starting with wartime lend-lease and continuing up to the present:

Wartime:

Plan A-----	¹ \$6,500,000
Lend-lease-----	² 32,125,000
Postwar: 1945-47, UNRRA-----	³ 299,081,000
Since Cominform break:	
August 1949: National Security Council decision to approve export of steel mill.	
September 1949: Export-Import Bank-----	20,000,000
March 1949: Export-Import Bank-----	20,000,000
August 1949: Export-Import Bank-----	15,000,000

Other United States economic assistance:

September 1949: United States support for \$3,000,000 International Monetary Fund drawing.

October 1949: United States support for International Bank \$2,700,000 loan, for timber equipment.

October 1949: United States support for \$6,000,000 IMF drawing.

December 1949: ECA authorizes off-shore purchases in Yugoslavia.

September 1949: United States support for West German credit to Yugoslavia of \$35,000,000.

¹United States portion of a joint United States, United Kingdom, Canadian postwar civilian relief to Yugoslavia from military supplies.

²All but \$75,000 during war.

³United States share of a total amount of \$430,000,000 provided by UNRRA.

6. ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRAM

Since this is an emergency relief program that will come to an end with the crop harvest in the spring and summer of 1951, it was not deemed advisable to create a complicated administrative mechanism for operation of the program. The draft bill provides (sec. 4) that the President may transfer aid funds to any Department or agency of the executive branch of the Government for expenditure under the terms of the law. It is the intention of the executive branch to continue to operate the program authorized by this legislation in much the same way as the stopgap program has been administered. That means the principal operating responsibility in the United States will be in the Department of State. The actual procurement and shipment of aid will be carried on by existing procurement agencies, principally the CCC and the Department of Agriculture.

Responsibility at the Belgrade end of the operation will be in the hands of the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He will have, with the assistance of a small staff recruited for this purpose, responsibility for seeing that the conditions of aid set forth in section 3 of the bill, and such other conditions as the President finds desirable and appropriate, are met by the Yugoslav Government.

Since the stopgap program has been quickly and efficiently administered by existing agencies with existing personnel, the committee saw no reason to change that set-up.

7. CONDITIONS OF AID

As indicated earlier, the motivation for aid to Yugoslavia, while partly humanitarian, is dictated largely by the coincidence in the national interests of the United States and Yugoslavia in maintaining the independence of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the legislation sets forth certain minimum conditions which are to be satisfied before any aid authorized

is made available to Yugoslavia. Those conditions are set forth in section 3 of the bill. They follow in a general way the pattern of other aid legislation passed by the Congress during recent years.

Publicity: Provision is made that "full and continuous publicity" is to be given by Yugoslavia to the aid furnished by the United States and that the Yugoslav Government must permit observers to see and report on the distribution of aid made available under the act. The arrival of the first shipment in the stopgap program received extensive press and radio coverage in Yugoslavia.

Equitable distribution: Yugoslavia is required to agree to make equitable distribution of the commodities supplied without discrimination as to race, color, or political or religious belief."

Local currency: The legislation also requires Yugoslavia to make local currency available in amounts sufficient to meet the local expenses incurred by the United States in connection with the aid furnished. At the suggestion of the committee, provision was also made that, to the extent the Government of Yugoslavia sells commodities furnished by the United States, it is to provide an equivalent amount of local currency to be available for such purposes as the United States and Yugoslavia may agree upon. Mention is made of the possibility of using such sums for relief to needy persons and children and for charitable or medical purposes.

Finally, the President is authorized to require from Yugoslavia such other undertakings as he finds desirable and appropriate as conditions of aid.

8. OTHER AID FOR YUGOSLAVIA

The Yugoslav Government has tightened its belt. It is not relying solely on what other governments can do to help it. Orders have been issued limiting domestic use of scarce foodstuffs and imported items. Severe criminal penalties are provided for persons who disobey those orders. On September 27, 1950, an order was issued with a preamble as follows:

"On account of the reduction in the yield of agricultural products, caused by drought, and in order to insure food for the population, preserve the livestock, find and successfully carry out the economic and other plans in the coming year, all competent government agencies are obligated to undertake special measures for the realization of these tasks, etc."

The Italian and German Governments assisted the stopgap program by sending food grains and sugar to Yugoslavia. The United Kingdom has offered a credit of £3,000,000 for Yugoslavia to purchase food and consumer goods. Other countries in the North Atlantic area which are vitally concerned with the continued independence of Yugoslavia are considering what steps they can take to give assistance.

9. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The President in his message to Congress set forth the policy of this Government with respect to Yugoslavia in these words:

"Since the break between the Kremlin and Yugoslavia, it has been the policy of this Government to assist Yugoslavia to maintain its independence. The continued independence of Yugoslavia is of great importance to the security of the United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Organization, and to all nations associated with them in their common defense against the threat of Soviet aggression."

The United States Government is unalterably opposed to international communism wherever it exists and therefore would like to see the people of Yugoslavia free to choose their own political institutions. While it may seem then that the United States should not give assistance to the Communist Government of Yugoslavia, the fact is that help

is being given Yugoslavia because Yugoslavia puts independence from Communist imperialism ahead of subservience to international communism. Tito espouses nationalist communism rather than Imperialist communism which seeks to bind all Communists to the Kremlin. Soviet Imperialist communism seeks to rob all states of their independence. Titoism seeks the independence of Communist states from Soviet dictatorship.

The Yugoslav break with the Soviet bloc was a decided set-back to Soviet expansionism. The western powers must exploit this break, not because they want to help communism in Yugoslavia, but because they want to encourage other Communist states to throw off the yoke of the Kremlin and to choose a free government. Yugoslavia may not be a recruit for democracy, but it is a recruit for the principle of independence.

10. THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROGRAM

On November 20, 1950, a United States note to the Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs set forth the agreed basis whereby certain funds from the Mutual Defense Assistance Act were to be made available as a part of the stopgap program for assistance to the military forces of Yugoslavia. That note reads in part as follows:

"Our two Governments are both desirous of fostering international peace and security within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles.

"Accordingly, I am pleased to inform you that my Government is prepared, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress, as amended, to supply assistance in aid of food requirements of the armed forces of your Government on the following mutually agreed basis that:

"(1) Your Government will use the assistance exclusively for the purpose for which it is furnished, namely, in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, to prevent the weakening of the defenses of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

"(2) That your Government agrees not to transfer to any other nation the assistance furnished pursuant to this agreement without the prior consent of this Government.

"(3) That your Government will provide the United States with reciprocal assistance by continuing to facilitate the production and transfer to the United States, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, of raw and semiprocessed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources and which may be available in Yugoslavia. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Yugoslavia.

"(4) That your Government is prepared to make available to the Government of the United States of America dinars for the use of the United States of America for any administrative expenditures within Yugoslavia in connection with assistance furnished by the United States of America to Yugoslavia arising out of this agreement. Our two Governments will at the appropriate time initiate discussion with a view to determining the amount of such dinars and to agree upon arrangements for the furnishing of such dinars."

Yugoslav military strength

The Yugoslav Army of more than 30 divisions at this time is the largest army in western Europe outside of the Soviet Union. Its troops established their fighting ability during the war with Germany. Their forces

plus those of other independent states of southeast Europe would, if the Soviet Union should use force to wreak its will on western Europe, constitute a bastion of strength. To fail at this time to help any one of these states to retain its independence would be to overlook a source of strength for the defense of the free world which western Europe and the United States could ill afford to lose.

11. SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR AIDING YUGOSLAVIA

1. The Government of Yugoslavia has successfully broken away from the domination of the Kremlin. The rift between the Communist regimes of Moscow and Belgrade seems to be deep and unbridgeable.

2. Drought conditions in Yugoslavia during the past year in combination with economic difficulties arising from the break with the Soviet bloc, have threatened the economic collapse of Yugoslavia.

3. The economic collapse of Yugoslavia would presage overthrow of the Tito government and the enforced return of that country to the Soviet fold.

4. It is in the interests of the United States and the free nations of the world to assist any state in maintaining its independence, particularly from the domination of Moscow.

5. The strength of the Yugoslav Army is such that it might well be a crucial factor in the defense of western Europe in the event of Soviet aggression.

6. The United States has always maintained that nations should be free to determine their own form of government even though the United States may not like that form of government. Soviet imperialism has always sought to impose its form of government and its direction on independent states whenever possible. Assistance to Yugoslavia will assist her in maintaining that independence.

It is the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Relations that the United States Government should provide emergency aid to Yugoslavia to enable that country to meet food shortages arising out of the 1950 drought and thereby stave off the threat of Soviet imperialism.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Texas yield for a question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. There seems to be rather a strain in the authority, in taking this form of action in connection with the Export-Import Bank. Did the committee go into that question?

Mr. CONNALLY. A strain in the authority?

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes; that it was somewhat beyond the contemplated scope of the Export-Import Bank's authority. Has there been any precedent for giving aid of this character by the Export-Import Bank?

Mr. CONNALLY. It is a loan, is it not?

Mr. BREWSTER. I do not understand it is.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Export-Import Bank makes loans.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The committee took testimony as to that. It was a transaction between the Export-Import Bank and Yugoslavia. The bank had already approved a \$15,000,000 credit to Yugoslavia, and agreed that \$6,000,000 could be diverted to the purchase of food rather than some kind of raw material.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is there any precedent for that precise type of loan by the Export-Import Bank?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We had nothing to do with that. We had no testimony as to that point, to my knowledge.

Mr. BREWSTER. In cases of mutual-defense aid to other countries funds have been diverted, but it is true, is it not, that Yugoslavia is not a member of any of the groups contemplated?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is true. But there was a reservation in the act for a certain percentage of the aid granted to be used in emergency conditions, which was not allocated for Yugoslavia. It was my understanding that when we passed the act we certainly anticipated it could be used, for example, in Austria, which was not a party to the treaty.

Mr. BREWSTER. Has Yugoslavia undertaken any of the obligations associated with any of the countries that are parties to either the mutual-defense agreement or the North Atlantic Pact?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. BREWSTER. If we are relying upon this military aid, why do we not have some kind of obligation on their part that they will come to our aid if we need aid? I think it is about time we should find whether we can secure any help from these people.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Personally I would say it was premature to make that a matter of any public negotiation.

Mr. BREWSTER. We have with respect to all the other countries, have we not?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is a great difference.

Mr. BREWSTER. And even they are slow in coming to our aid when we need it now. But in this case we have not even an obligation on the part of Yugoslavia.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I will have to reclaim the floor. We could not afford, in granting aid to feed hungry people, to provide that the price of our aid is that the recipients must fight with us. That will follow. If we were to make such a provision we would be branded throughout the world as having bribed Yugoslavia.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is it not about time that we obtain a little something in return for our "bribes?" I think the American people are coming to wonder when some of these countries are going to begin to pay off when we need them.

Mr. CONNALLY. That is very difficult.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is it not true that the first installment of this aid of food was to go to feed the army, not the hungry people? Is that not true?

Mr. CONNALLY. The army is hungry just like everybody else.

Mr. BREWSTER. Does the Senator think the army is as hungry as the poor peasants?

Mr. CONNALLY. I have not been in Yugoslavia recently. I was there some years ago. If the Senator will read the committee report I believe he will be satisfied. And he can read the debate as it will be printed in the Record in the morning.

Mr. BREWSTER. I have read the report. I have not seen the printed testimony before the committee. I understand it is not available.

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall read from the report what the State Department says. The report says:

Authority for stopgap aid: According to information presented by the Department of State:

"The measures taken under this program (the stopgap program) were of a special nature and utilized existing legislative authority on an emergency basis for purposes not specifically contemplated when the laws in question were being considered by Congress."

Mr. BREWSTER. Does that mean that it was outside the contemplation of the act?

Mr. CONNALLY. Well, it was not in view. It may have been outside. I read further from the report:

The Department further described the authority for the stopgap program as follows: "(a) The Export-Import Bank had already approved"—

Now if the Senator from Maine will pay heed—

"The Export-Import Bank had already approved a \$15,000,000 credit to Yugoslavia for export development programs."

That is what the Senator from Arkansas was referring to. He referred to the fact that the Export-Import Bank had already approved the credit of \$15,000,000.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. BREWSTER. For development purposes, which is the contemplation of the Export-Import Bank. What I asked was if there was any precedent for aid of this character being extended by the Export-Import Bank?

Mr. CONNALLY. There is often no precedents for anything that happens.

Mr. BREWSTER. We are establishing a precedent now for the Export-Import Bank to start a program of this character which is certainly utterly outside of anything that was contemplated.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator talks about precedent. Everything has got to happen once. It has got to happen once before it is a precedent.

Mr. BREWSTER. That does not prove it is good.

Mr. CONNALLY. We may be making a precedent. I do not have to have a precedent for everything I do. I should like to make some more precedents.

Mr. BREWSTER. Let us have a precedent which gets us a little help from somewhere. Would not such a precedent be a good one?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes, of course, it would. We will get it in due time.

Mr. BREWSTER. The time is pretty late.

Mr. CONNALLY. The question is, Are they able to do it? Does the Senator want a crippled man to lift him over the fence?

Let me read further:

"It was decided, however, to divert approximately \$6,000,000 of this credit in order to start food shipments immediately."

The bank has already approved a credit of \$15,000,000.

Mr. BREWSTER. They are going to divert a part of it.

Mr. CONNALLY. Let me read this sentence.

"It was decided, however, to divert approximately \$6,000,000 of this credit in order to start food shipments immediately."

The concern was with starvation. Food was needed. The bank saw an opportunity temporarily to divert a part of the credit which had already been approved, to be used for food to save starving people. A brief moment ago the Senator from Maine was appealing for the poor peasants who were hungry and starving, yet he does not want to give them anything except to set aside \$6,000,000.

Mr. BREWSTER. If the Senator from Texas will permit me, there is nothing to indicate that anybody in Yugoslavia will do any starving in the next few months. If the Senator will read his own records and his own reports showing the production of Yugoslavia he will find that it is perfectly evident that there is no occasion whatsoever for starvation now or for the next 3 or 4 months.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SMITH of North Carolina in the chair). Does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Arkansas?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I should like to say that the last statement by the Senator from Maine is entirely without any foundation whatever. The evidence before the committee was that Yugoslavia has suffered the most serious drought in her history. We had our own agricultural attaché there, who impressed the committee as being an extremely able gentleman. Everyone had that impression. He had gone out and personally talked to the people. He happens to be one who can talk to the people. He went all over Yugoslavia. He said the present food shortage situation is the most serious they have ever faced. The Senator is entirely mistaken if he believes Yugoslavia is not faced with a serious food shortage immediately.

I should like to draw the Senator's attention to two facts. The Senator said that nothing is agreed to by the Yugoslavs. I draw his attention to page 9 of the report, at the bottom thereof. There he will find several agreements.

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes. Everything except—

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, may we have the regular order?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator thinks that in all agreements of this kind every factor we expect to come about must be set down in black and white, I think he is simply unrealistic about the ways of international relations, because here is a country which is struggling for its existence, separate from Russia, and the fact that they have already made the break, that they have already broken away from Russia, that they have 30 military divisions, and that they exist separate from Russian domination, is sufficient to warrant the statement that was made here a moment ago

that this would be the best investment of our money that we could make. They do not have to fight to be worth every bit of this.

General Bradley and others advised us that the mere existence of 30 divisions on the flank of Russia is worth a great deal to us, whether they ever fight anybody or not. But they are there, ready and able to fight if they are disturbed. It is not a part of this agreement that they agree to attack anybody. But what is important to us is that they be maintained in an independent posture and be able to fight. That is sufficient justification. I certainly do not think we ought to even request that they agree to attack anybody. We do not know whom we are going to attack. Nobody knows what the future will bring. But it is extremely important that they be maintained as an independent country— independent I mean of Russia.

Before I conclude, I should like to say that the authority under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 is set forth on page 15 of the hearings. If the Senator from Maine is interested in it, he will find that there is specific authority for the use of 10 percent of the fund appropriated for aid there for just such an emergency.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, allow me in conclusion to make a statement in reply to the interrogatory of the Senator from Maine, "What are we going to get out of this? How much shall be placed on the barrel head? What are we going to get?" and so on. General Bradley was before our committee and he testified strongly in favor of the bill on the very grounds pointed out by the Senator from Arkansas. There is not involved any direct promise by Yugoslavia to fight when we fight. But the mere existence of 32 divisions, armed and equipped, in that area which would no doubt be a vulnerable area otherwise, is a great guaranty, it is a great assurance, it is a great security against invasions by Communist forces from Russia or elsewhere.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. To what extent did the committee take evidence from General Bradley and others as to the equipment of these divisions?

Mr. CONNALLY. We had evidence on the subject, and it ought to be available to the Senator from Maine, because somebody in the committee gave out something about it, and it is published in the newspapers in extenso. General Bradley had to complain that he could not testify freely before a committee, because what he said would be placarded on the highways and byways on the following day.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is the information available to the Senate, on which this was predicated?

Mr. CONNALLY. On which what was predicated?

Mr. BREWSTER. The equipment of these divisions.

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes; we had testimony on that.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is the printed evidence available to the Senate?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; it was in executive session.

Mr. BREWSTER. It is not available, then.

Mr. CONNALLY. We have it in the committee. If the Senator is interested he can read it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is not for publication.

Mr. CONNALLY. No; it is not for publication.

Mr. BREWSTER. Am I to understand that the committee was satisfied that these divisions were something more than skeletons?

Mr. CONNALLY. Absolutely.

Mr. BREWSTER. Something more than inadequately equipped?

Mr. CONNALLY. Absolutely they are not inadequately equipped.

The committee was satisfied and reported the bill to the Senate. It is up to the Senate to decide whether it wishes to pass the bill or to reject it. I have done all I could along these lines.

I submit that the bill is a wise and courageous measure, not only for humanitarian purposes, but for our own defense and security, and to encourage those in that area who disagree with communism to stand up and take a position alongside the western nations who stand for liberty and freedom.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. What is the total amount of appropriations that will be forthcoming if this measure is passed?

Mr. CONNALLY. Does the Senator mean the \$31,000,000 which has already been authorized?

Mr. WHERRY. The measure now before us in an authorization, I take it, for a further sum.

Mr. CONNALLY. This measure carries an authorization of \$38,000,000; in addition to \$31,000,000 which has been authorized or directed or diverted from other funds. However, the authorization provided in the pending measure is \$38,000,000.

Mr. WHERRY. In order that I may understand the amount of the authorization proposed, let me say that I understand that the amount, which already has been spent is authorized under the 10-percent clause of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. I refer to the provision of that act with respect to emergencies.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; a part of it is diverted from an Export-Import Bank loan which already has been granted. Ten percent of the amount is authorized under section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Does the Senator wish me to read that section?

Mr. WHERRY. No; I simply wish to have the authority clearly in the minds of those of us who will have to vote on this matter, in order to justify the making of the remainder of the appropriation. I know that approximately \$6,000,000 which has been used has been taken from the Export-Import Bank loan for which authority already has been provided.

A short time ago, in the course of the colloquy between the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Maine, the Senator from Texas referred to the authorization under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. How much money was used in that connection?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Thirteen million six hundred thousand dollars and twelve million two hundred thousand dollars under the ECA Act. Wheat is one commodity which has been provided. For example, I believe that Germany and Italy have agreed that the wheat they already have can be used for this purpose.

Mr. CONNALLY. I understand that the Administrator of ECA has authority to allocate those funds.

Mr. WHERRY. The purpose was to get food to Yugoslavia expeditiously, as I understand. Under the ECA Act, Germany and Italy were entitled to certain funds, and I understand that the necessary funds for aid to Yugoslavia have been borrowed from the funds available for Germany and Italy, and have been used for the purchase of flour which has been sent to Yugoslavia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. Does the authority had by the ECA permit the use of that flour for shipment to Yugoslavia?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I understand that it does.

Mr. WHERRY. In what way?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The ECA aid was made available under sections 111 and 115 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

Mr. WHERRY. What is that provision? When we have that information, we shall have a statement of the entire authority for this matter.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Administrator of ECA has the widest authority in respect to allocations and reallocations.

Mr. WHERRY. Yes, I am simply asking about the authority to extend that aid to Yugoslavia. Is that set forth in the report?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yugoslavia is not mentioned in the ECA Act, but that act gives the Administrator wide authority.

Mr. WHERRY. I know that. However, I should like very much to have the RECORD show, if possible, upon what the ECA relied for that authority. When that authority is set forth in the RECORD, that point will be cleared up.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not happen to place that section verbatim in the report, but I do happen to have before me the verbatim section of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

Mr. WHERRY. I hope the Senator will put in the RECORD, first, an explanation of the approximately \$6,000,000 coming from the Export-Import Bank, and will explain, in that connection, that they have operated under authority to use it; second, that under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act they have had so much money, which has been authorized, and under that authorization they have extended aid.

I know that under the ECA Act there have been broad powers to make transfers. However, speaking for myself, let

me say that I did not know that they could extend the aid to any country outside of the 16 countries mentioned. Perhaps that could be done; I simply do not recall it. However, if there is authority for that, I wish the Senator would point it out.

Then we come down to the authorization which it is proposed to make now. I understand that the authorization is proposed to be made in the amount of \$38,000,000; and that authorization, if made by the Senate, will be placed before the Appropriations Committee as a justification for a subsequent appropriation.

Are not those the approximate mechanics of this matter?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

Mr. McKELLAR. I hope the members of the Foreign Relations Committee will give the Appropriations Committee that information, because it will make it very much easier to get the money appropriated if those facts are before us.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Texas yield further? I do not wish to detain him.

Mr. CONNALLY. That is quite all right; I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I wish to ask the Senator from Arkansas some questions. I do not wish to detain the Senator from Texas, if he wishes to be seated.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Among the ECA releases which come to our offices, the last one I have is under date of November 28.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me, let me say that I think the Senator from Nebraska asked a very pointed question, but I did not hear the answer. The question was, By what authority was the \$12,000,000 transferred from ECA funds?

Mr. WHERRY. That is the point the distinguished Senator from Arkansas assured me he would cover. He said that had been authorized under the provisions of the ECA Act, and he is going to supply that authorization for the RECORD, as I understand.

Mr. McCARRAN. I have looked in vain for that authorization, and I should like to have it pointed out.

Mr. WHERRY. I understand that it will be provided for the RECORD.

I understood the Senator to say that the agreements which have been entered into have been published in the report. That may be. However, in the ECA release under date of November 28 of this year the following is stated:

Under the agreement entered into with the Government of Yugoslavia officials of the United States Government and representatives of the United States press will be permitted to observe freely the receipt and the distribution of all assistance made available, with a view to noting that it is equitably distributed among the population of Yugoslavia—

And so forth. I should like to ask either the distinguished Senator from Texas or the distinguished Senator from Arkansas whether the agreements which are mentioned in the report are available to Members of the Senate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That particular agreement is referred to in the bill itself. What I was referring to a moment ago appears on page 9 of the report.

Mr. WHERRY. I find this statement:

Under the agreement entered into with the Government of Yugoslavia—

Of course, that was prior to this time—officials of the United States—

And so forth and so on. Have agreements been entered into between our Government and the Government of Yugoslavia relative to this aid or something upon which the granting of this aid hinges?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe this answers the Senator's question:

On November 20, 1950, a United States note to the Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs set forth the agreed basis whereby certain funds from the Mutual Defense Assistance Act were to be made available as a part of the stopgap program of military assistance to Yugoslavia. That note is the basis of the conditions and agreements for supplying all the aid which heretofore has been given.

It is contemplated that if we pass this measure an executive agreement will be made with the Yugoslav Government incorporating the provisions of this act—in other words, providing for freedom of movement, for observation, for the use of any counterpart funds which may arise, and so forth.

Mr. WHERRY. That is my second point. I should like to see the agreement, if that is possible. I am interested only in the mechanics of this matter.

Under the agreement are counterpart funds being used?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me start over again: As to the money which has been transferred from the funds available under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, there was a note—which constitutes, I think, an executive agreement with Yugoslavia—relating to that aid.

If we pass this measure, authorizing \$38,000,000 more, a new and additional executive agreement will have to be made to cover this aid.

Mr. WHERRY. I understand that. That is the basis of the question I am asking.

In the case of the agreement or the note the Senator mentioned first, is that the agreement which is mentioned in the ECA release to which I have referred?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know about the release. That is the agreement on page 9 of the report.

Mr. WHERRY. That has to do with the relief.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know what release the Senator from Nebraska has.

Mr. WHERRY. It is printed on a page carrying the letterhead of the ECA. This release was issued on November 28. It calls attention to an agreement made between the United States and Yugoslavia. I am asking whether that agreement is available and what it contains, if it is permissible for that information to be published.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All I know is the part which appears on page 9 of the report. On page 9, toward the bottom of the page, we find these words:

That note reads in part as follows—

And at that point there appears in the report most of the note, I assume, at least.

Mr. WHERRY. That is in the report, is it?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, on page 9.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the only agreement in this connection which the Senator from Arkansas knows anything about; is that correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. Very well; I thank the Senator.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at this point?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. I should like to call the attention of the Senator from Nebraska, if I may do so, to a portion of the report appearing near the bottom on page 5, where a part of the statement made by the State Department is set forth. I read from that portion of the report:

(c) Section 408 (c) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act permits the transfer of materials to European countries, other than those in the North Atlantic Treaty, under certain specified emergency conditions. These conditions were clearly present in the case of Yugoslavia, and therefore it was decided to provide foodstuffs to Yugoslavia only, however, in those quantities needed by the Yugoslav military forces.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the majority leader for his statement, but that really does not answer my question. I realize now that there have been exchanges between Yugoslavia and the United States, or some intermediary, relative to the need, and our supplying the need. All I am asking is, Was there any agreement entered into between the United States and Yugoslavia, of which this might be a condition? Let us forget the aid now. If there was such an agreement, I was merely wondering whether it had been introduced in evidence, and whether it was presented to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This part was presented.

Mr. WHERRY. That is the only part the Senator knows about, is it?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. In other words, the Senator feels that possibly that is the agreement which was just mentioned here in this discussion, does he?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do.

Mr. CONNALLY. Let me call attention to the fact that on page 5 of the report, in subparagraph (b), it is stated:

The Economic Cooperation Act authorizes shipments of food to the European countries. It also recognizes that permission may be given for transfers of material purchased with ERP funds, or similar materials, from participating countries to third countries.

That is, they may be transferred to countries which are not participating at all. That is made very clear. I read further from the same paragraph:

This authority was drawn upon to have flour shipped from Germany and Italy on

the understanding that it would be replaced with wheat shipped from the United States to those countries.

In other words, we were going to allocate to those countries certain amounts of wheat, but, in consideration of their releasing the flour, it would be replaced by wheat later on. Reading further from the same paragraph:

This unusual measure, which assists in the maintenance of stability of Yugoslavia, contributes to the over-all purposes of the European recovery program and is consistent with the established policy of encouraging exports by participating countries. Its prime purpose, however, is not one of the purposes of the programs contemplated when the ERP was last before Congress, and requires the participation of third countries in a way that makes its continuation undesirable.

Mr. WHERRY. The Administrator has that authority now, has he not?

Mr. CONNALLY. He has.

Mr. WHERRY. He could transfer funds or materials from any country that he might choose?

Mr. CONNALLY. I think so.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. In the same release, which is available to Members of the Senate, on page 2, in next to the last paragraph, this statement is made to which I should like the Senator from Arkansas particularly to listen, as I know he has been very busy in connection with the bill. I read:

President Truman last week—

And this was issued on November 28—

President Truman last week announced that the United States Government, under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, would also provide \$16,000,000 worth of food to Yugoslavia for use of that country's armed forces.

Is that a part of this appropriation, or is it an additional amount that is to be granted? If so, under what authority will that be granted? It refers here to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What was the amount?

Mr. WHERRY. It says here \$16,000,000. I shall be glad to hand the release to the Senator.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it is the same amount.

Mr. WHERRY. Is that the one we are talking about?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is the amount.

Mr. WHERRY. We do not find in the report the same amounts that are in this release.

Mr. CONNALLY. That refers to the military, does it not?

Mr. WHERRY. Yes; that is for the Armed Forces. That would be a part of the \$31,400,000, would it not?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think so. Let me read from page 15 of the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on House bill 9853, as follows:

On November 22, 1950, the President notified the Committee on Foreign Affairs of his decision to utilize the provisions of section 408 (c) to give aid to Yugoslavia. The committee was informed that the amount to be used would not exceed \$16,000,000.

I think that is the same amount.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator. Before the Senator from Texas yields the floor, I desire to say this. If there is any other agreement with Yugoslavia—and I do not limit it to an agreement to render aid—provided it is not secret, for if it is information which should not be made public I would not want it; but if it is available and can be made public, I should like to have it, because I feel that it might help establish the authority and justification for the remaining \$38,000,000 when it comes before the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. CONNALLY. I may say to the Senator that I cannot give him information which would enable him to dot every "i" and cross every "t." I may say, however, that Yugoslavia was most willing to make these general agreements, and I have no doubt that she will keep them.

Mr. WHERRY. There is no question about that, and I am in no way impugning the motives of the distinguished chairman or of any other member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. CONNALLY. I understand that.

Mr. WHERRY. I am interested only in this agreement. If the agreement is merely the one mentioned by the Senator from Arkansas, which has to do with the transfer of flour, I think we have a pretty good conception of what was in the committee's mind. There was first the \$6,000,000 which was granted by the Export-Import Bank. Second, there was the authority contained in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, to the extent of 10 percent. Then, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas and the distinguished Senator from Texas have pointed out in the report that the ECA may permit the transfer of material purchased with ERP funds, or similar materials, from participating countries to third countries; and, under that program, \$11,500,000,000 has been transferred; is that correct?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Eleven million dollars.

Mr. CONNALLY. Eleven million dollars. The Senator from Nebraska said \$11,000,000,000.

Mr. WHERRY. In these times, I may say to the Senator, billions of dollars do not mean much more than millions; but I shall make the Record correct by saying \$11,000,000. I have just received these figures, but I believe I have them straight in my thinking now. The Appropriations Committee, I understand, will have before it a request for an appropriation in the amount of \$38,000,000, which will complete the entire transaction, totaling about how many million dollars?

Mr. CONNALLY. Seventy million dollars.

Mr. WHERRY. Is it about \$70,000,000?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is \$69,400,000.

Mr. WHERRY. I want to thank the Senator from Arkansas for the computation.

Mr. CONNALLY. I thank the Senator. I yield the floor.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Texas yield to the Senator from Connecticut?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I desire to obtain the floor in my own right.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am yielding to the Senator.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I certainly rise only to speak in support of the bill which is in charge of the distinguished chairman of the committee. I should like to ask the chairman whether he has formally offered the amendment which he read to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. CONNALLY. I did not formally present it, but I read it and stated that we would offer it as an amendment to appear at the end of the bill.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Texas permit me to be associated with him in the offering of the amendment?

Mr. CONNALLY. I am very glad to do so.

Mr. McMAHON. Then, Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] I now submit the amendment.

The amendment submitted by Mr. McMAHON (for himself and Mr. CONNALLY), was ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed, as follows:

At the proper place in the bill insert the following:

"Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, or economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act."

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I withheld my vote of approval in the Foreign Relations Committee when the committee voted approval on this authorization day before yesterday. I did so, not because I was opposed to the authorization, but because, before I registered my formal consent, I wanted an opportunity to review the correspondence which has passed between the State Department and our Ambassador in Yugoslavia concerning the application for aid, and also I wished to review for myself the representations which had been made by our Department of State to our Ambassador regarding the internal conditions of Yugoslavia.

I, of course, find it impossible to forget that it was Tito who shot down American flyers only a few years ago. I do not overlook the fact that he, in the Communist tradition, has persecuted religious persons, has been antichrist and anti-God, has suppressed freedom of speech, has suppressed freedom of assembly, and freedom of worship.

However, Mr. President, we are faced with a condition. A million people are faced with the threat of starvation. I think it is important that the people of Yugoslavia know that we are proferring aid which God in his wisdom has granted to us in abundance, and that we are granting our aid primarily because these people are in distress.

I am particularly impressed by the fact that those who drafted the proposed legislation saw fit to include in it

the provision which makes it mandatory for the administrators of our aid to make the people of Yugoslavia realize the spirit in which we offer it.

I am, of course, not unconscious either, of the effect that giving this aid will have on the future security of the United States. I believe that our security would be enhanced and improved if Tito were to take to heart the provisions of this bill, particularly the provisions of the amendment which the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations has offered to the bill. It is my belief that Tito will secure that kind of unity in Yugoslavia which will enable him more readily to resist foreign domination and aggression, if he grants to his own people the basic freedoms and basic liberties from which must flow a greater unity within that country.

So, Mr. President, I support the authorization and I hope that the Committee on Appropriations, as soon as the bill becomes law, will follow with an appropriation, so that we may proceed to the completion of this business. Then I believe that the administrators of the program on behalf of the United States should make certain that the people of Yugoslavia are under no misapprehension as to our attitude, and that the fact that we come to the aid of people in distress is not to be taken, in the words of this amendment, as any approval of the kind of suppression, the kind of ruthlessness, and the kind of brutality which Tito has evidenced in the past.

I may say in closing that there is some indication, I am happy to see, of a great consciousness in the Yugoslavian Government's mind of the impossibility of the persecution of her own people, and a realization that such persecution is not consonant with the continuation of sovereignty and the exercise thereof in their hands. I am hopeful that the authorization which would give aid to Yugoslavia will be the prelude to a further widening and further liberalization of Yugoslavia's attitude with regard to the rights of individuals, which come not from men but come from God.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I had not anticipated that this bill would be called up for consideration by the Senate this afternoon. I see that the report of the committee is dated December 7. I understand that the record of the hearings held by the committee has not been printed, and therefore is not available to the Members of this body.

If for the moment we indulge in the assumption that the bill should be passed, that support of it is fully justified, and that it is the wise course for our country to pursue, it does not follow that Members of the Senate—and I speak for myself—have yet had an opportunity to become familiar with all the facts and reasons which are being advanced in support of the measure and why funds should be made available to the Government of Yugoslavia.

Mr. President, I can very well preface my remarks by adopting the sentiments expressed by the very able Senator from Texas the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. CONNALLY] and by the able chairman of the Com-

mittee on Appropriations the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. McKELLAR]—and I am a member of the Committee on Appropriations—that if someone had said to me some months ago that I, or any other Member of this body, would be standing on the floor of the Senate this afternoon pleading for aid and assistance to Yugoslavia, I, too, would have called him to order and repudiated any such implications.

Mr. President, the only difference between the able Senator from Texas and the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, on the one hand, and myself, on the other, is that I have not changed my mind. I am of that opinion still. I do not say that I could not be convinced of the wisdom of the suggested course. Perhaps I could be. However, until I am convinced, I shall not vote to authorize an appropriation that I am not prepared to vote for. I cannot, at this moment, according to my best judgment, agree to recommend appropriations to carry out the provisions of this act.

For that reason, Mr. President, if a vote is taken on the measure today, before there has been adequate opportunity to study the testimony which the committee heard, and to weigh all the factors involved, I shall be compelled to cast my vote against the bill.

Mr. President, I have this difficulty. It makes a tremendous humanitarian appeal when it is reported that thousands of people are facing or suffering hunger, and possibly starvation. Regardless of what part of the world such people are in, or of what nationality they may be, the generous spirit of America has prompted us in the past to come to their assistance and we have relieved the distress of humanity in almost every area of the globe during the course of the history of our Nation.

Mr. President, since the end of World War II we have undertaken to rehabilitate the war-devastated countries, and particularly the free nations and the free peoples. We have done so not only for those who were our allies during the war, but even for those who were our enemies in the conflict. To date, Mr. President, we have spent, as I recall, more than \$30,000,000,000 in that great effort of human endeavor and sympathy, because we felt that we were more blessed or more fortunate than other nations, and that since we were all now striving—or we all thought that we were all striving—in this postwar era for the achievement of a lasting and durable peace, we could well afford, not only from an economic standpoint but from a standpoint of human fellowship, to make such expenditures; and to make them even at the cost of burdening our own economy, our own National Treasury, and our taxpayers, in deficit spending. We have done that in order to try to meet a condition which needed our assistance, in the hope and in the belief that those who were the recipients of our assistance would be grateful for our efforts.

Mr. President, the situation has changed. The argument that if we will give assistance to Yugoslavia we may have her help later is speculation and conjecture of the highest order.

Mr. President, a Communist is a Communist. Communist ideology is diametrically opposed to everything that America has stood for from its beginning, and it is opposed to everything that every real red-blooded American stands for today. Not one thing has happened which could possibly recommend to Congress any possible excuse for the proposed authorization other than to try to disburse relief to some people who are in distress. Why we should take this course and expect any benefit to flow to us from it can only be predicated on the hypothesis that at the moment Tito and Stalin are in a quarrel. Yes; someone suggests, "may be." How do we know? Who can vouch for it? We are asked to guess. We are asked to tax the American people more and go further into deficit spending on the doubtful hypothesis that possibly some day we would find Tito's government and his army fighting on our side.

Mr. President, I have no confidence that that will ever happen. It is within the range of possibility, of course, that if Yugoslavia were attacked by the forces of the Kremlin, and if that attack, together with other wars which are now in progress, were to spread into a worldwide war, we might be fighting alongside Yugoslavia. But I can see no reason on earth why Stalin should provoke a war with Yugoslavia, with world conditions as they are today.

But that is not associated with the danger to us. That is a quarrel between Communists. If the war which we are now fighting, and in which our boys are dying in foreign lands, being entrapped by the Red Chinese troops at this hour, is a war inspired from Moscow, if this is the beginning of world war III, if this is the occasion when the blue chips are down again, Mr. President, the Kremlin would be more stupid than it has demonstrated at any time in the past if it were now to start a war with Tito. The natural and likely thing would be simply to bypass Tito and march on through Europe. Then what would we have? We would have Yugoslavia sitting there as a neutral. But I dare say that if the situation ever developed to the point where Tito thought the Kremlin was going to win, he would be found hastening to join the Soviet Union for the kill.

What Senator has any confidence that Tito would risk his life with us? I do not believe it. I should like to help the people over there who are in distress. But I do not want to spend one dollar of American money to aid or bolster any Communist government.

A few minutes ago I came from my office in response to the quorum call. While there I picked up a newspaper from my own State. I believe it is the second largest in circulation in Arkansas. I found therein an editorial of Tuesday, December 5. The editorial is entitled "Tell our 'Friends' To Get in There, Too." This editorial, together with many letters which I am receiving from my constituents, convinces me that the American people know we are now in the position of holding the bag. We are not being treated properly in this conflict by those whom we have so gener-

ously befriended. I invite my colleagues to listen to this editorial. It is not very long. I shall read it:

TELL OUR "FRIENDS" TO GET IN THERE, TOO

The blue chips are down. This fighting in Korea is war, not a "police action." And American boys are doing most of the fighting and dying against an overwhelming horde of Red Chinese.

How much longer is this to go on, while our "friends" in the UN talk, and talk, and talk?

Washington can talk bluntly enough to the American people. It doesn't hesitate to tell them that they must sacrifice for their freedom, must accept hardships, bitter casualty lists, any cost our Red foes may exact.

That is proper and right. But why the tenderness toward the other UN nations, who have just as much at stake as we have? It's their war as much as it is ours. Are we to help support them and fight their battles, too?

Negotiating is all well enough. No chance for a peace settlement by diplomatic means should be passed up.

But words avail nothing with Red China and Russia. They respect only the iron speech of military strength. There will be no basis for negotiation if the Communist horde decimates our little Army in Korea and drives its fragments out.

Why haven't our "friends" got something more than a few token forces in that broken, hard-pressed front? They voted in the UN to stop the aggression in Korea. They've had 5 months of precious time.

If they all, including India, had responded, the story might be very different now. The Red Chinese might not have stormed into Korea. But our "friends" talked, and talked, and still talk.

Washington should talk now, in blunt words. It should tell our allies that either they come across with fighting men or we will look to our own interests. Then if we must fight China, with Russia back of her, call on Chiang Kai-shek's half-million troops. Arm the Japanese. Hunt out Nationalist guerrillas in China and equip them to harass the Reds.

We have resources if we will use them. It is folly for us to fight Russia's stooge-millions alone, while forty-odd other nations prattle and blather on the sidelines.

The Communists will respect no peace that might be patched up if they see that the UN nations have no stomach to resist them. Now, when the blue chips are down, is the time to find out which nations will stand with us to save themselves.

Mr. President, as I stated, letters from my constituents clearly indicate their distress, their alarm, their concern, and their inability to understand why some things have occurred and why others are now happening. They do not understand why more governments of the United Nations are not fighting in this conflict, just as America is. I cannot answer that question, Mr. President.

I have received letters from wives, and from fathers and mothers, inquiring about their husbands and sons. They ask why they must fight under such conditions, and why we are not fighting the Chinese in China, with bombs to destroy their military installations and their arms and ammunition depots. They ask why we are doing nothing but holding our boys in the mountains in freezing weather, while hordes of the Reds pile in from across the border, bringing with them the arms and equipment which they had gathered and stored across the border in preparation for this invasion.

Mr. President, I cannot answer all those questions. I do not have all the answers. However, I say that the American people want to know more than they are being told today about why conditions are as they are.

The question arises about the use of the A-bomb. I do not know if and when and where the A-bomb should be used in this conflict. I am not a military expert. There are many factors which should be considered in that connection. I do not know how many A-bombs we have. I do not know whether we are prepared to start an A-bomb war and carry it through successfully. If I thought we were, before daylight tomorrow morning I would drop an A-bomb anywhere where it would do the most devastation to the enemies of our country and those who are killing our boys, if I knew that that was the wise thing to do under present conditions. I have no hesitancy or qualms about doing whatever is necessary in this conflict and whatever becomes imperative to save our country and prevent more American boys from dying.

Mr. President, there is only \$38,000,000 involved in this particular bill. I have heard it said that it is one of the best investments that we could possibly make with that amount of money.

Mr. President, that is simply a matter of opinion. Those who contend it is may be correct. Subsequent events may prove them to be correct in their opinion. But, Mr. President, based on our past experiences, I do not see how the proposed investment is the best investment we can make at this time.

We are being asked to appropriate billions of dollars to rearm America. I do not know what one A-bomb costs, but I would rather invest some of it in one A-bomb, from the standpoint of strengthening the security of America, than to spend it to aid a Communist government, a government which subscribes to and practices a philosophy that the people who believe in freedom and religious liberty and the fundamentals of Americanism are their mortal enemy and must be destroyed. Until I have some assurance, until I can obtain some information upon which I might place some measure of reliance, I cannot, under those conditions, believe that this breach between Tito and his Communist government and the Kremlin and the Communist government of Moscow is more than a mere scratch on the surface that may quickly heal. I do not think Tito and Stalin disagree upon a single fundamental. It is only a question of leadership—their philosophies are the same.

Mr. President, I may be wrong, but I shall take the chance of refusing, until I have further information, until I know something which convinces me to the contrary, to vote to spend American dollars, money which we have got to borrow, in bolstering a Communist government anywhere in the world.

Mr. McCARRAN obtained the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I wish to ask Senators who have the bill in charge if it is the intention that the Senate vote on the bill tonight, or that it go over until Monday?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is our hope that the bill may be acted upon this afternoon.

Mr. WHERRY. I did not know whether it was the intention of the majority leader that the Senate vote on it tonight, or that it be carried over until Monday.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, there is only one amendment to the bill, I may say, to which no one seems to object. That relates to certain religious conditions existing in Yugoslavia at the present time. After the Senator from Nevada has concluded his speech, and another Senator has spoken, we probably can have a vote on the bill. I should like to have the Senate vote on it today, so it may go to the other House as soon as possible, because the Appropriations Committee must act upon it. It is an emergency measure. I may say the Senator from Texas desires that it be passed, if possible, today.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I offer an amendment to the bill which I ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. O'CONNOR in the chair). The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 1 from line 5, through line 8, it is proposed to strike out all of section 2, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Administration Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, the amendment I have offered is designed primarily to conserve the appropriations this Government is called up to make in this time of emergency. It will not restrict the authority of the President to aid Yugoslavia in accordance with the terms of the bill as it is now before the Senate. It merely provides that the funds for this emergency relief shall be utilized from funds already appropriated for the economic cooperation administration.

In view of our many obligations it is time we began to husband our resources before we find ourselves on the brink of ruin economically.

My subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has followed closely the funds expended by the Economic Cooperation Administration. Through October 31 the ECA procurement authorizations were running at an annual rate of approximately \$1,300,000,000. To this must be added an authorization of \$350,000,000 for the European payments union, making a total of approximately \$1,650,000,000 out of the ECA appropriations. However, there is available for obligation approximately \$2,650,000,000 during the current year. At the present rate of expenditure there

is possible a carry-over by ECA of from \$500,000,000 to \$1,000,000,000. To authorize \$50,000,000 of this sum for the purposes of providing emergency relief to Yugoslavia will not retard or interfere with the ECA program. The gold and dollar reserves of the participating countries have increased almost \$2,000,000,000 since September 1949. This increase has been greatest during the past 4 months when ECA aid to these countries has been at an all-time low. In fact, the greatest improvement in the gold and dollar situation of the participating countries has occurred while ECA procurement authorizations were by far the lowest in the history of the Marshall plan. The ECA's recovery guide for October 1950 points out especially the improved position of the participating countries during the July-September quarter of this year. I quote the following from this guide:

Economic developments affecting the participating countries of Western Europe in the summer of 1950 following the outbreak of the Korean crisis, represented a continuation and intensification of trends already apparent during the earlier months of the year. Western Europe's exports continued to increase, its balance of trade to improve, its dollar gap to narrow, and its hard currency reserves to increase. * * * (Devaluation and continued prosperity in the western world have combined) to bring about a striking improvement in Western Europe's economic position, especially in its balance of payments position. In the year that has elapsed since September 1949: Western Europe's exports to nonparticipating countries have expanded sharply, its imports have held constant. Intra-ERP trade has shown an extraordinary expansion. Production has continued to grow at a rapid rate, thus feeding both higher exports and domestic consumption, and investment. Output in July 1950, was 13 percent above that of July 1949. The hard currency holdings (gold and dollars) of the participating countries have increased almost \$2,000,000,000 since September 1949.

The gold and dollar reserves of the participating countries showed a further sharp increase during the third quarter of 1950.

Let me say at this point, Mr. President, that today our dollars are being banked in England, while we are borrowing the dollars from the people of the United States. The dollars our Government is borrowing from our citizens are going into the banks in England and are being saved there.

I can assure the Senate that if my amendment is adopted, the effectiveness of the ECA will not be interfered with, and we shall be saving \$38,000,000. I realize that is not very much, as money goes these days; but it is something, and it might begin a trend in the right direction.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TAYLOR in the chair). Does the Senator from Nevada yield to the Senator from Maine?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I was interrupted at the moment when the Senator was speaking; but I think he gave the figures as to the British increase in gold reserves.

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes.

Mr. BREWSTER. I understood the Senator to say that that increase approximates the amount we are giving to Britain. Did the Senator say that?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. BREWSTER. Approximately \$1,000,000,000, I believe?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes.

Mr. BREWSTER. Has the Senator's attention also been called to what I think is correct, namely, that during the quarter from July to October the reserves, in dollars, of the European countries participating in the ECA plan were accumulating at the annual rate of approximately \$2,500,000,000, which is approximately the amount we are providing under ECA?

Mr. McCARRAN. I have referred to that, and I am glad to have the Senator emphasize it, because it is an important point.

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes; and it is an indication of how prudently the program is being managed, after we have borrowed the money.

Is it not also true that Britain has had a balanced budget during this period?

Mr. McCARRAN. Britain has had practically a balanced budget; yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did I correctly understand the Senator to say that his proposal is to transfer \$50,000,000 from the ECA appropriations?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes; up to \$50,000,000.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This amendment was not presented to the committee, and I am not quite sure of its full significance. Would the amendment, if adopted, mean that in order to take advantage of these funds, Yugoslavia would have to abide by all the obligations which other ECA countries now have to assume?

Mr. McCARRAN. Not necessarily. If I had my own way, I would say they should, but not necessarily under this amendment. In other words, the amendment will provide an opportunity for the President to utilize up to \$50,000,000 of the ECA funds, to be devoted to the very purpose for which this bill is before the Senate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Would it be fair to say that the only effect of the Senator's amendment, if adopted, will be that instead of appropriating fresh money out of the Treasury, we shall be transferring, free from any other obligation, this amount of money for the President to use?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes; out of the ECA funds.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Out of the ECA funds; yes.

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes.

That is why, Mr. President, I am discussing the situation, for it is my purpose to try to show the Senate that the conditions in Europe at the present time justify the conclusion, without fear of successful contradiction, that there will be anywhere from a \$500,000,000 to a \$1,000,000,000 ECA carry-over.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was the next question I wished to ask specifically.

Mr. McCARRAN. I covered that in the earlier part of my remarks.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I assume that there is no real disagreement between the Senator from Nevada and the ECA officials themselves that there will be a very substantial surplus which ECA will not need.

Mr. McCARRAN. That is correct.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In other words, a surplus of at least more than \$50,000,000. That is all we need to be interested in, insofar as the Senator's amendment goes.

Mr. McCARRAN. In my own judgment, it will exceed \$500,000,000, and will run toward \$1,000,000,000.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, that leads me to observe that that indicates that the Marshall plan has at least been successful in achieving the effect we intended.

Mr. McCARRAN. I think the report coming from the ECA's Recovery Guide—from which I have read only an excerpt—shows how successful the program has been up to date. It shows the gold dollar reserves at the present time—reserves which are practically up to standard. It shows, I repeat, that today Britain is banking American dollars, whereas we are borrowing dollars from our American citizens.

I point that out simply to emphasize the fact that the step proposed to be taken under the amendment can be taken without impairing at all the efficacy of the program under the Marshall plan.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to make sure—because I have not had an opportunity to study the amendment at all—that the basic principle of the Marshall plan is not involved at all.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. Will the Senator explain why the amendment provides for \$50,000,000, when the pending bill calls for only \$38,000,000?

Mr. McCARRAN. They have already used \$12,000,000.

Mr. AIKEN. Was that amount taken out of ECA funds?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes; out of the ECA funds.

Mr. AIKEN. Is that authorized by the ECA Act?

Mr. McCARRAN. I cannot find any authorization for it, Mr. President. If I were to give the Senator from Vermont a blunt answer, I would say it is not authorized, but I would say that with reservations. I say frankly that on the basis of the language used in the ECA Act, I have been unable to justify the use of that money.

Mr. AIKEN. Then, the Senator's amendment contemplates legalizing the expenditure of \$12,000,000, in addition to the authorization proposed by the pending measure; is that correct?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes.

Mr. AIKEN. I think that answers my question.

Mr. CORDON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. CORDON. I should like to know why the Senator by his amendment seeks to be more generous in the use of funds

than the State Department does, although the record of the State Department, as I have observed, is one of great generosity in these matters. In short, I refer to the difference between the \$38,000,000 authorization carried in the pending bill and the \$50,000,000 authorization carried in the Senator's amendment.

Mr. McCARRAN. The \$12,000,000 which already has been utilized will be covered into the \$50,000,000 authorization, and that will leave an authorization of \$38,000,000.

Mr. CORDON. Is there anything in the Senator's amendment which would require that to be done? It would appear to me that when we consider the tenuous authority, if any, that the State Department had for its expenditures in the first place, if we expect it to replace what it already has spent, but which seemingly it had no authority to spend, we had better expressly provide that that be done.

Mr. McCARRAN. I am in general agreement with the Senator from Oregon, in that I have grave doubt as to the authority under the ECA Act for the use of the \$12,000,000. However, be that as it may, that money has already been used. Now they want \$38,000,000 in order to be able to go on with the program for the relief of Yugoslavia.

If we adopt this amendment, thus providing that they may utilize up to \$50,000,000 of ECA funds, that will cover the \$12,000,000 which they may have utilized without authority, and will give them authority to utilize \$38,000,000 in addition.

Mr. CORDON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. CORDON. Would the Senator consider modifying his amendment so as to provide that the \$12,000,000 shall be in lieu of the funds already spent?

Mr. McCARRAN. I would not object to modifying the amendment in that way.

Mr. CORDON. It seems to me that the amendment should be very specific.

Mr. McCARRAN. I would not object to modifying the amendment in that way, except for the fact that I do not like to give positive agreement to something which I do not think was done legally.

Mr. CORDON. Would the Senator consider such a modification over the week end?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes; I certainly would.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator has stated that Great Britain has been taking the borrowed dollars which we have sent to her and has been putting them in banks in England. Will the Senator go into detail in that connection, or will he address a question to the sponsor of the bill, so that we may find what justification he has for such a procedure? After all, that point is a vital one.

Mr. McCARRAN. Today the funds we are affording Great Britain in the way of American dollars, are not being

utilized for the purposes contemplated by the Marshall plan. Britain does not need the money. Great Britain's economy is up to par, and Britain does not need that money. So what are the British doing with our dollars? They are putting them in the bank; that is what they are doing with them.

Mr. STENNIS. Why does the ECA Administrator continue to send those dollars, if they are not needed? Can the Senator from Nevada answer that question?

Mr. McCARRAN. I cannot answer it.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. AIKEN. I assume that the Senator from Nevada is familiar with the ECA's methods of doing business. If the ECA had the right to expend the \$12,000,000 which has been spent for relief of Yugoslavia, and if there is sufficient ECA money on hand, as the Senator from Nevada seems to think there is, what is the reason for this bill at all—if the ECA has authority to spend the additional amount of money?

Mr. McCARRAN. This bill comes to us because Yugoslavia is not an ECA participating country, and never has been.

Mr. AIKEN. But if the ECA had authority to spend the \$12,000,000, it has authority to spend \$50,000,000 for the same purpose.

Mr. McCARRAN. The Senator may argue that way if he wishes to do so.

Mr. AIKEN. I do not wish to do so. I am seeking information.

Mr. McCARRAN. I should like to have information accompanied by a reasonable degree of legality.

Mr. AIKEN. But if it is reasonable for the ECA to spend \$12,000,000 for this purpose, it is reasonable for them to spend \$50,000,000 for the same purpose.

Mr. McCARRAN. I do not wish to do anything to impair the Marshall plan.

Mr. AIKEN. No one does.

Mr. McCARRAN. If I thought I was even on the edge of impairing the Marshall plan, I would not go forward with this amendment. However, I know it is admitted that the ECA has a carry-over. The ECA had a heavy carry-over last year, and this year the ECA will have a larger carry-over because the economies of the participating European countries have improved during that period of time.

Mr. President, in this critical period it behooves us to take every possible step to conserve our assets, inasmuch as we do not know the extent to which we may be called upon to furnish dollars in the near future. Faced, as we are, with unknown obligations, we must use our funds to achieve the greatest returns possible. It does not make sense to make or authorize new appropriations—which is what the pending bill in its present form provides—while we have already appropriated vast sums that could be used.

If more funds are needed before June 30, I am sure the Congress will be in a position to provide them.

Mr. President, I submit the amendment. I submit it without any fear that, if adopted, it will impair the Marshall plan. I submit the amendment because I think the time has come when we should look to the proper use of American dollars, and when we should stop making appropriations if there will be heavy carry-overs from appropriations already made.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I first desire to express my regret that I was unable to be present at the committee hearings on this bill, and to become acquainted with some of the grounds upon which it is based. I also voice my regret that there is no evidence available to support the conclusions of the committee. It is not pleasant to appear here in the role of a devil's advocate, but this subject is of great importance.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Maine yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Maine yield to the Senator from Texas?

Mr. BREWSTER. I yield.

Mr. CONNALLY. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate vote on all amendments to the pending measure on Monday at 4 o'clock.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. BREWSTER. That is agreeable.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I understand that excludes a vote on the bill itself. Am I correct?

Mr. CONNALLY. It does not include a vote on the bill itself. It is a proposal that the Senate vote on all amendments at 4 o'clock, and when that hour arrives and we vote on the amendments, we may then insist upon a vote on the bill; but that is not contained in the request as submitted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, if I may make an inquiry of the distinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], Was it the intention to vote on each amendment at the hour of 4 o'clock, without any further debate?

Mr. CONNALLY. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. And is that what was agreed to?

Mr. CONNALLY. Of course, it would be impossible to vote at 4 o'clock if there were to be any debate. The request I made was that at 4 o'clock Monday the Senate vote on all amendments.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, could there be some agreement as to a discussion, perhaps, for the 2 hours preceding 4 o'clock, so there would be opportunity for Senators to speak who might want to do so at that time?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would point out that there is already an agreement to vote at 1 o'clock on certain amendments to the railroad labor bill.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am aware of that, but that will be out of the way by 4 o'clock.

Mr. BREWSTER. Could we have an agreement that between 2 and 4 o'clock

there would be 10 minutes allocated equally to each side, on the various amendments?

Mr. CONNALLY. Tomorrow?

Mr. BREWSTER. On Monday, between 2 and 4.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not know how the railroad bill would affect that situation.

Mr. WHERRY. We have an agreement on this bill, have we not?

Mr. CONNALLY. We have an agreement to vote at 4 o'clock on all amendments.

Mr. WHERRY. It is already agreed upon; therefore, there is nothing to be done now.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, was there a quorum call, in accordance with the rule, before the unanimous-consent agreement was entered into?

Mr. CONNALLY. A quorum call is not required on an agreement affecting amendments.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The agreement does not include the final passage of the bill.

Mr. KEM. Earlier in the afternoon when a similar request was made in connection with unanimous consent regarding an amendment to the railway labor bill, the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] made the point that no quorum call had been had.

Mr. LUCAS. He merely said he was going to object, unless a quorum call was ordered.

Mr. KEM. And he did object. I feel quite sure that, if the Senator from Oregon had been on the floor when this request was made, he would have objected again.

Mr. CONNALLY. But he was not on the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, in view of the fact that the agreement has already been entered into, I feel that, if the Senator from Texas will agree, we might vote on the first amendment. I do not care about any more debate on the first amendment. Obviously, we cannot vote on all the amendments at one time. I wonder whether it would be agreeable to have an understanding that, after the vote is taken on the first amendment, say 10 minutes on a side on each amendment be allotted until we vote on all of them. Is there any objection to that?

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I think it would be better if, between 2 and 4 o'clock, the time could be divided between the two sides for the discussion of both the amendments and, as far as I am concerned, the bill, in order that we might be sure that both points of view on the matter may be adequately presented.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair would suggest that that, of course, would be contingent upon the ability of the Senate to finish with the railroad labor bill.

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. CONNALLY. I may say there is only one amendment, aside from the one offered by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], on which we are all agreed.

Mr. WHERRY. That is true, I think,

Mr. CONNALLY. There is no danger.

Mr. WHERRY. May we enter into a further unanimous-consent agreement that, after the railroad labor bill has been disposed of finally, the time between then and 4 o'clock shall be divided equally between the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Maine—if the Senator from Maine cares to assume that responsibility—or between the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN]. I suppose the Senator from Nevada should take it.

Mr. BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. CONNALLY. Very well.

Mr. WHERRY. We could then vote on that amendment, and then upon all remaining amendments to the bill, and we might agree that, if any additional amendments were offered, 10 minutes to a side be allotted on each amendment, and then proceed to vote on the amendments. Is that agreeable? Of course, there should be the usual stipulation that all amendments must be germane.

Mr. CONNALLY. That is agreeable to me.

Mr. WHERRY. Very well. If that is agreeable to everyone, I ask that the unanimous consent heretofore entered into be modified accordingly.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Nebraska? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The entire unanimous-consent agreement as reduced to writing is as follows:

Ordered, That on the calendar day of Monday, December 11, 1950, at the hour of 4 o'clock p. m., the Senate proceed to vote, under the limitation of debate hereinafter provided, upon any amendment or motion that may be pending or that may thereafter be proposed to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia: *Provided*, That after the said hour of 4 p. m., debate upon any amendment or motion shall be limited to not exceeding 20 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the mover of any such amendment or motion and Mr. CONNALLY; (2) that no amendment or motion that is not germane to the subject matter of the said bill shall be received; and (3) that no vote on any amendment or motion proposed to the said bill shall be had prior to said hour of 4 o'clock.

Ordered further, That the time intervening between the disposition of the so-called railway labor bill and the said hour of 4 o'clock on said day of Monday, December 11, shall be equally divided between those favoring and those opposing the passage of said bill and controlled, respectively, by Mr. CONNALLY and Mr. McCARRAN.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am sorry the Senator from Nevada is not present at the moment. While he is out of the Senate Chamber, I accept the amendment offered by him.

Mr. BREWSTER. I am sure we are profoundly grateful for that. That is a great step forward.

Mr. CONNALLY. How grateful is the Senator from Maine?

Mr. BREWSTER. I shall be very gentle in my comments.

Mr. CONNALLY. Does the Senator desire to move the adoption of the amendment? It must be passed upon.

Mr. BREWSTER. It is a little premature for that. I think we had better wait until Monday to finally pass upon this matter.

Mr. CONNALLY. I anticipated the Senator from Maine would not agree, if I were willing to accept it.

Mr. BREWSTER. I am hoping I shall persuade the Senator from Texas to agree with me in this instance if he will listen to my suggestions.

Mr. CONNALLY. I shall listen.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, if the Senator from Texas is going to agree to this amendment, we can probably get this bill out of the way tonight, because there are no objections to the other amendments.

Mr. BREWSTER. I think there are other considerations besides the amendment of the Senator from Nevada. It is not the entire subject matter of this discussion.

Mr. CONNALLY. There is nothing else pending.

Mr. LUCAS. There is a bill pending.

Mr. BREWSTER. I should like to speak to that.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator from Maine has the floor.

Mr. BREWSTER. I am quite sure the Senator from Texas is not going to insist that the liberty of discussion be curtailed.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. In order that there may be no misunderstanding, I desire to state my understanding of the parliamentary situation relative to the pending bill giving aid to Yugoslavia. It is this: That when the so-called railway labor bill, on which we have entered into a unanimous-consent agreement, is out of the way and finished, the time between then and 4 o'clock Monday, December 11, will be divided between the proponents and opponents of the bill for Yugoslavia, and any amendments thereto; that at 4 o'clock, whatever amendments are then offered to the bill shall be voted upon; and, on any amendments which are germane, and which may be offered hereafter, debate shall be limited to 10 minutes on a side, until final passage of the bill. Is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the understanding of the Chair.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Chair.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I wish to address myself first to the Senator from Arkansas, who challenged some questions that I raised regarding the extent of the drought in Yugoslavia. I may say that I discussed that question rather fully with Mr. Haggerty, who is the authority the Senator cited, Mr. Haggerty having been the agricultural attaché in Yugoslavia at the time we visited there in September of this year. I think that in the very report which has been filed by the committee it is quite evident that the extent of the drought is definitely determined, so far as Mr. Haggerty was familiar with it. The State Department, when it issued the release on this matter, said there had been a total crop failure, and I took

occasion to comment that that was totally in error.

In the report of the committee, it appears that the corn crop of Yugoslavia for the current year is 59 percent of normal for 1947-49; the wheat crop is 88 percent of normal. Those are the two major crops. The percentages in 1950 of 1947-49 average of other commodities produced in Yugoslavia, as listed in the committee report, are as follows:

	Percent
Rye.....	83
Barley.....	87
Oats.....	79
Rice.....	100
Vegetables and melons.....	57
Potatoes.....	67
Edible fats.....	88
Sugar.....	108
Beans.....	72
Peas.....	57

I may say that corn and wheat are the major crops, as we were told by Mr. Haggerty. I desire to call attention now to the next sentence of the committee report:

These figures do not tell the whole story. Yugoslavia normally has food enough to export and thereby acquire foreign exchange with which to buy needed imports.

Certainly people are not starving when they have the food which is in any such amounts as those indicated; certainly at least not until the last half of the year. I noticed that the Senator from Arkansas referred to this crop year. This crop year runs until the harvest of next August and September, and the point which I wish to make is that there are very considerable reserves of food in Yugoslavia at the present time, unless they are exporting it.

I visited some of the farms with Mr. Haggerty. He pointed out the conditions. I saw some corn, which was equal to the finest corn ever raised in Iowa, which was being fed to the hogs on a cooperative farm which we visited in September of this year—finer corn than I have ever seen raised in most of the States in this country. There were very considerable supplies, as is indicated by the report of the committee.

I had anticipated that this would be a subject for the early consideration of the next Congress when it convened in January, and that there would be ample time then for the Congress elected last November to consider with all reasonable diligence the questions involved. Certainly I would desire that there be no undue delay. However, I regret that there has been the precipitate action which is indicated by what the State Department and the administration have done today.

Mr. President, there are aspects of the matter which lead me to ponder the wisdom of the course suggested. The tremendous haste to get aid to Yugoslavia, in contrast with the extreme reluctance to get Congress-directed aid to Spain has aroused in me questions as to why there should be this almost unseemly haste in the face of the very figures which the committee itself includes in its report.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I did not intend to leave the impression

that there was no corn and no wheat and no rye at all. However, I think 59 percent is what certainly we would call a crop failure in this country.

Mr. BREWSTER. It is a decrease of 41 percent.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I referred to 59 percent of what their normal crop is.

Mr. BREWSTER. They do not say it is normal. They say the average of 2 or 3 years.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I assume that would be normal. I asked Mr. Haggerty how the present drought compared with any other drought which Yugoslavia had experienced, and he said that the present drought was much the worse drought in the country's history. The last drought which was at all comparable to the present one occurred in 1927.

I agree that as of today the people in Yugoslavia are not starving, and that there are some provisions available. However, the Senator from Maine knows as well as I do how slowly Government machinery moves. After an authorization is obtained, the appropriations must be voted. After that the actual getting of the supplies into the pipelines takes additional time. If we were to pass the bill now, it is likely that it would be as late as February or March before much of this material would begin to move to Yugoslavia. That would be true certainly unless we resorted to some strenuous or rigid measures such as the transfer of wheat from Italy. Why that was done, except that there was an emergency, I do not know. I assume the picture is spotty, and that there are places where the situation is really bad today, and that there are other places where it is not so bad.

I should like to make one further comment. Reference was made to aid to Spain. In my view—and I think it is the view of the committee—the reason for passing the pending bill is not altogether humanitarian and not altogether due to our concern for people who need something to eat. There is no question that there are other considerations which are influenced by the state of the world today. The fact has already been commented upon. Certainly the fact is having an effect—and I would say a political effect—upon the attitude of the people of Yugoslavia.

Let us put ourselves in the position where 6 months from today the people of Yugoslavia can see that if they do not get aid they will be starving. Any prudent person must make some decision as to what will happen. The decision must be made whether they will get aid. If they do not know whether they will get some aid 2 or 3 months from now, during the interval I think they would have to do something about it. They would have to do one of two things. They would have to give up their independence and say to Moscow, "You have licked us. Therefore we are coming back to you on our knees. We may starve if we don't." They would have to do that or they would have to overthrow the present government.

Mr. BREWSTER. That might not be an unmitigated evil.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it would be a great loss to the west if Yugoslavia,

with 30 army divisions, were to beg Moscow's pardon and then become an integral part of Soviet Russia.

Mr. BREWSTER. That is not what the Senator from Maine suggests. If the Senator from Arkansas assumes that any change in government in Yugoslavia would necessarily be to the left, it must be on the basis of assumptions which are not warranted by any evidence presented thus far.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the evidence is pretty clear.

Mr. BREWSTER. I should like to finish my statement, please. As a matter of fact, the government which was supplanted by Tito's government was to the right, and not to the left. The Communists are presumably a very small proportion of the population of the country. However, the Tito group is dominant and has control. I believe the Senator is familiar with the situation that in many countries Communists have taken control, although they represent only 5 or 10 percent of the population. However, it does not necessarily follow that any change in government would be to a government which looks in the direction of Moscow.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In that part of the world it is clear to me that it would be toward Moscow. The same situation exists in Czechoslovakia. I agree that the great popular support is not for communism. However, the fact is that Yugoslavia's neighbors—Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, and Poland—are under the complete domination of Moscow. It is not because the people of those countries love Moscow. It is because there is no force in those countries sufficiently strong to overthrow the Communists. The only reason that Yugoslavia can get away with its defiance of Russia and can maintain its independence is because it has an outlet to the West. It has an outlet to the sea, and consequently there is always the possibility of aid from us. Yugoslavia has an approach by sea. We can get to Yugoslavia. They can develop a relationship with the west. We cannot do anything about it so far as Bulgaria or Rumania or any of the other countries are concerned, and will not be likely to be in a position to do anything about it in the near future simply because of that reason. If we do not help the people of Yugoslavia to maintain their independence they have no place to turn.

Mr. BREWSTER. There is no suggestion by the Senator from Maine that we would wish to destroy the independence of Yugoslavia.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe that is the main reason why the bill should be passed.

Mr. BREWSTER. I should like to ask the Senator from Arkansas further whether or not Mr. Haggerty stated to the committee the system under which the Yugoslav Government accumulates its food and why there is difficulty with respect to it in some sections of the country.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. He did. We went into that question to some extent. Mr. Haggerty struck me as being a well-in-

formed man as to the effect of collectivization, and that sort of thing. Collectivization, he told us, and I agreed, has also tended to decrease the production of Yugoslavia, and so on. That is in addition to the drought. However, I do not see how we can do anything about it at the present time.

Mr. BREWSTER. That is not the point to which I was addressing myself, although it is very interesting and somewhat anachronistic that Yugoslavia, which is a disciple of communism and collectivization, should seek aid from the free-enterprise system. The point I wish to make is that the Tito regime had made an assessment of a certain percentage of the crop. Last year that did not work out. Accordingly, they made an assessment on each farmer for so much corn and wheat, which the farmer, according to his normal production, must deliver. The Government did not set up a percentage, but set up the assessment in so many bushels. When the shortage came, the corn crop being only 59 percent of normal, and wheat about 88 percent, it meant that if the peasant did not deliver the assessment he would have nothing left with which to feed his family. The result was that the peasant headed out into the woods. He was not going to see his children starve. The peasant is assessed a certain quota, and if he cannot meet it, he is put in the work gangs that we saw being marched through the streets of Belgrade under the guns of the militia.

There would be no reason for the peasants of Yugoslavia to starve if they were permitted to have the food which they themselves have raised. When the government seizes the food, either for the army or for export, and allows its peasants to starve, it is not demonstrating much concern for its citizens or for its institutions. There is no question that the peasants would be able to get along all right if they could have some food for their families. That is what they are denied under the current policies of the government. My information in that respect came from Mr. Haggerty in person in Belgrade.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am not disputing that aspect. Certainly the Senator from Maine cannot put me in the position of defending the domestic policies of Yugoslavia. That is not my purpose at all. The pending bill has nothing whatever to do with that situation. If we were thinking of Yugoslavia alone, with no relation to the present difficulties in which we find ourselves with regard to Russia, it would be an entirely different matter. I do not approve of those practices. I think they are wrong; they are misguided; they defeat their own purposes. I will go along with the Senator in that respect. I do not think, however, that it has anything to do with the passage of the bill insofar as our interests at this particular time are concerned. That is all I wish to say. I completely dissociate the wisdom of their domestic policies from what is proposed to be done by the bill.

Mr. BREWSTER. To me it is unfortunate that the humanitarian and expedient are so obviously intermingled,

and I believe the Senator from Arkansas will agree with me. There are approximately a billion people in the world who are in dire distress. At Dublin, in September, at the Interparliamentary Union meeting, the representatives of India, Burma, and Ceylon denounced America as imperial colonialists because we were pursuing exactly the same policies which Britain, France, and the Netherlands are pursuing. They denounced us in unmistakable terms, and not one voice was raised in our defense, except as we could raise our own feeble voice.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All I can say to the Senator from Maine in that respect is that we are confronted with a very serious situation which involves our very survival. I am quite willing to ignore the denunciations of India, if that is the way they feel about a situation such as this. I think we in the western countries are in an extremely serious situation, and it is high time that we tried to do some very practical things with respect to the challenge of Russia, regardless of whether it pleases the idealism of India, or any other country. I am not familiar with the denunciations to which the Senator has referred, but I could be critical of India, if it becomes necessary to discuss the subject. However, I do not think it would serve any purpose to do so.

Mr. BREWSTER. What puzzles me is that the Senator should present this subject first as a humanitarian measure.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not do any such thing.

Mr. BREWSTER. The Senator from Connecticut was the one who expressed that though when he said, "We are seeking to assist people in distress."

That was earlier advocated. The Senator from Arkansas is very frank in saying that this is a matter of expediency, and that we need to keep this situation under some kind of control.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will go further and say that that was the predominating motive for ECA, and I said so on this floor. It was not because I was interested primarily in raising the standard of living of the British or French. I can find people in my own State who need help so far as their standard of living is concerned. If the Senator wishes to call it expediency, that is all right. I think it is simply a sensible effort to preserve the integrity of western civilization.

Mr. BREWSTER. Self-interest.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Exactly. It is an effort to survive. It was self-interest in an effort to preserve what we sometimes call western civilization. That is the principal motive for the entire program of ECA.

Mr. BREWSTER. Under ECA and under the North Atlantic Pact, in return for the assistance we have been rendering we have asked very considerable obligations. We have pledged more assistance than we have received thus far, even under the United Nations.

Under the circumstances it is to me a matter of regret that it did not seem appropriate to request some further commitments than are indicated or envisioned here. We hear about the 32 di-

visions of Tito, but there is no suggestion that they will ever be utilized unless his own country shall be invaded. I believe that the Senator from Arkansas or one of the other previous speakers emphasized that the Russians would undoubtedly move, if they decided to move, through Germany or Austria, or in other directions. In that event there is nothing whatever to indicate that Tito will not continue to teeter on the fence, exactly where he has been. Even since his break with Stalin, he has voted half the time with Russia in the United Nations. That is a situation which I find it very difficult to understand when he comes to us hat in hand. He assured us in Belgrade in September that he was still a practicing Communist. He made no bones about it. He did not deny it. He said, "I believe in communism." The very words which he used were:

I look upon myself as the leader of the progressive peoples behind the iron curtain.

In other words, he was to take the place of Stalin as the leader of the Communists in the event, when, as, and if, he should liquidate Mr. Stalin, if Mr. Tito were not liquidated first. I think the American people are entitled to know something of the story of what goes on over there, and whether or not the course of action which is proposed is wise.

I have a very considerable respect for Mr. Reams, counselor of our Embassy, who in my judgment was the best informed man there. If I were to attach final weight to any opinion, it would be to his. That is what impressed me more than any other aspect of this matter. But unfortunately Mr. Reams is not going to be there. He has now left the embassy. He is here. He had been there for a long time. I have great respect for George Allen, our Ambassador, but he has only recently arrived. He is undoubtedly trying to do the best he can, but he faces an exceedingly difficult and delicate situation.

I cannot comprehend how the amendment dealing with religious, economic, and political liberty means anything at all. It simply says that we do not approve certain practices. In other connections, when we have had some other problems, our State Department has been vehement against certain countries. There was denunciation of Spain, where the abuses of religions are utterly insignificant compared with what is going on in Yugoslavia at the present time. Archbishop Stepinac and 400 priests are in jail. Three hundred and eighty have been murdered. There has been no such record of religious persecution in Spain, yet our State Department would never consider assistance to Spain because, forsooth, there had been alleged religious persecution, the circumstances of which were absolutely not supported by our investigations on the ground.

Some 10,000 Greek children were kidnapped by the Yugoslavs and their associates under Moscow domination. They have returned 50 or 60 of them. We took the matter up with Mr. Tito, and he absolutely refused to discuss it. He said,

"That is a matter that we cannot go into at this time." He now talks about the 50 or 60 whom he returned.

We have heard a great deal about civil rights, and habeas corpus. It was announced a little while ago that measures were being formulated in Yugoslavia by which they proposed to lift some of the restrictions of a police state upon their people. Then it was added, "These proposals will be presented to the Yugoslav Assembly next spring when it meets." Next spring is a long way off.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BREWSTER. I yield.

Mr. MAYBANK. I desire to bring up a privileged matter, a conference report—

Mr. BREWSTER. Just a moment. I did not yield for that purpose.

Mr. MAYBANK. It is a privileged matter.

Mr. BREWSTER. Not while I am speaking.

Mr. MAYBANK. I understood—

Mr. BREWSTER. I assumed that the Senator wanted to ask me a question. I did not assume that he was going to take me off the floor.

Mr. MAYBANK. I did not suggest such a thing.

I ask unanimous consent, if it does not require any great amount of time, to present the report—

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I should like to finish my remarks. I shall not unduly detain the Senate. I have been waiting all afternoon.

Mr. MAYBANK. I did not finish the request I was about to make.

Mr. BREWSTER. I do not propose to yield for that purpose. I am sorry, but I have been waiting all afternoon. I have some other obligations as well. I wish to dispose of this matter as quickly as I can.

Mr. President, I question seriously the effectiveness or the wisdom of this proposed grant to Yugoslavia.

What is the purpose of it? It is to bolster the authority of a Communist dictator who appears to have fallen out with Moscow and who now, because of a crop failure, finds himself in deadly peril between Stalin on the one hand and his rebellious and enslaved people on the other.

The State Department contends that the break with Moscow has magically turned the Yugoslav Government into a bulwark against Communism and that the Yugoslav Communist army is of vital importance in holding up the Russian advance.

This line of argument is difficult to accept.

The Yugoslav people already have had one bitter lesson in the operation of American policies. Their Communist dictator, Josip Broz, popularly known as Tito, got his place originally through the insistence of Stalin and an American camarilla of fellow travelers, headed by Louis Adamic, who had access to the White House. The United States Government, in the process of being an echo to Moscow in Tito's support, did nothing to prevent the treacherous betrayal and execution of Mihailovich, the great Yugoslav hero of the war. Mihailovich, the

enemy of the Nazis, whose determined campaign held up the German advance in the Balkans many weeks, was handed over in 1946 to Tito's Communist gang and then judicially murdered.

The American people also have had a bitter illustration of Tito's character. In August 1946 a United States plane, flying its regular run from Vienna to the Udine, was beaten out of its course by a storm and passed over Yugoslav territory. Without a warning of any kind, Tito's gunners shot the plane down and the flyers were killed. Who but Dean Acheson said that this wanton attack was "an outrageous performance" and that "in practically every other part of the world the C-47 would have received help in getting its bearings. Instead it was shot down without warning." Now this same Dean Acheson wants \$38,000,000 to help prevent Tito's police-ridden subjects from rising up and throwing him out. Is this what we call aiding the freedom loving west?

Why should we believe that the Yugoslav army is any protection to us against Moscow? Once the break with Moscow occurred Tito had to conduct a bloody purge of his army. Today he cannot tell who is for and who is against him. Of course, many of his officers are secretly as close to Moscow and the Cominform as they have ever been. When I was in Yugoslavia three of his leaders deserted him and went over, indicating the very difficult time he himself now has.

Do not forget that the ruling clique in Belgrade, whether they have outwardly broken with Moscow or not, are still Communists and that Tito's government is still a Communist government. During the past 5 years our Government has embarked on the strange practice of finding some Communists good Communists and others bad Communists. In China that theory does not seem to have worked out so satisfactorily. There were those who assured us that General Ma and his associates were the good kind of Tito Communists. They are now murdering American boys in the hills of North Korea. I hope we shall not find another experience of serious misjudgment in the case with which we are now concerned. It seems to me that all Communists are alike, and that all are very questionable allies.

I might say at this point that our State Department's passion for Tito and his government has had ghastly results elsewhere. After Tito's break with Moscow some of Mr. Acheson's master minds evolved the theory of Titoism. Titoism is a word used to describe a left wing government that can not get on with Moscow. The State Department loved this theory of Titoism so much that they applied it to China. They said that the Chinese Communists were just agrarian reformers, that they would not go along with Moscow at all and that the Chinese Communist regime was already showing signs of Titoism. Today, as I speak, those Chinese Communists are butchering Americans in cold blood in the snow-bound passes of North Korea. If that is what Titoism means in China, why should we expect it to be something different in Yugoslavia?

I have said that Yugoslavia is a Communist country, and that, despite the purge, Tito cannot tell who is for and who is against him, who are secretly for Moscow and who are not. A year ago one of the members of the central committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia declared that 85 percent of the Communists are against Tito and for the Cominform. How many Communists there are is quite another question.

The common soldiers of the Yugoslav Army are young peasants who have not the slightest sympathy with Tito. Why should they? They have seen with their own eyes the forcible collectivization of thousands of Yugoslav farms. I myself visited one of them. Half a million peasants have been condemned to forced labor because they did not give enough corn to the Communist government. Tito's brutal exactions upon the peasant farmers have been carried out with just as much ruthlessness as Stalin's famous and bloody liquidation of the kulaks.

What is the basis for the argument that the Yugoslav Army can offer effective resistance to the Russians? The Yugoslav Army has an air force of 800 antique planes. What good will they be?

Along the Adriatic coast they have an old-time toy navy consisting of one frigate, three destroyers, eight torpedo boats, and seven lame and halt submarines. What good will they be?

In the event of open war with Russia, the bulk of the officers will go over to Stalin, the common soldiery will melt away to their homes or attempt to get across the frontier, and the remnant, the little Tito gang, will try to find a refuge in the Bosnian Mountains. Just exactly how is all that going to help the freedom-loving nations of the West?

There is no question about the fighting qualities of the Yugoslav soldier. His valor was shown in both the World Wars. But today he has no confidence in his government and no hope for the future. To be effective, the Yugoslav Army would have to be reorganized and equipped with modern weapons and given leaders whom it could trust. Such a reform is utterly beyond the power of the Tito regime.

Tito is literally caught in the middle of a terrible squeeze. In his prison camps are perhaps 10,000 suspected sympathizers of Moscow and double that number of Yugoslav Nationalists, who, of course, are not Communists at all, but are intense patriots and bitter enemies of the regime. These 20,000 are the remnants of the native patriots who openly opposed Tito. It is estimated that since November 1, 1944, when Tito entered Belgrade, no fewer than 60,000 of these Nationalists have been liquidated. In May 1945 the British Government, still pursuing, with the United States, a policy of Moscow appeasement at any price, handed over 14,000 Slovenes to the Yugoslav Communists. All were killed out of hand. What possible reason have we to believe that there is any dependable strength in a government maintained with such blood-thirsty tyranny? Yet the administration asks that we give Tito outright \$38,000,000 worth of foodstuffs.

Yugoslavia has always been a region driven by faction and the longing of native patriots for many years has been for reforms that would help in blotting out the factionalism. The policy of Tito's government has been to inflame these factions wherever possible.

One age-old source of trouble in Yugoslavia has been religious differences. Before Tito, nearly 49 percent of the Yugoslav population were members of the orthodox eastern church, nearly 35 percent were Roman Catholics, and about 11 percent were Moslems. Far from attempting to encourage toleration, the tactics of Tito with the churches has been infamous. More than 380 Roman Catholic priests are dead at the hands of Tito's men and some 400 are in prison today. The most famous of all is Archbishop Stepinac. In October 1946 he was seized and brought to trial, charged with crimes against the state. His defense was that he had raised his voice against massacres and conversions by force, arguing that such things were against canon law. No matter. He was condemned to the loss of his civil rights and sentenced to 16 years in prison.

Recently, when we were in Yugoslavia, we discussed this matter with Marshal Tito. He indicated that he was considering the matter at the time; that he had had discussions with high church dignitaries and hoped the matter would be adjusted. The principal solution was that he would permit Archbishop Stepinac to be freed from jail if he would get out of the country, which involved, by implication, either a conclusion that Archbishop Stepinac was guilty of the crime with which he had been charged or that the Government of Yugoslavia, in accordance with Communist doctrine, should arrogate to itself the right to dominate the activities of the church. If Stepinac were guilty, then by leaving the country he admitted his guilt. On the other hand, if he were not guilty he must admit that Tito was to dominate the activities of the church within that land.

It seems to me that the amendment which is proposed, by which we partially look down our noses, and says we do not approve the religious, political, and economic dictatorship of Tito, is a very poor compensation for the conditions which undoubtedly prevail, not because we are engaged in any crusade to bring freedom and liberty to any country in the world, but because we have very little reason to rely upon the operations of a dictator who conducts the affairs of his own country in so incredible a manner.

The administration maintains that the exports of Yugoslavia to the west are of a critical character, that they are absolutely essential. What exports? The exports of the country have dwindled until they are only a fraction of what they once were. This is not alone due to devastations of the war? It is also due to the crazy, wholesale effort to communize all business and industry. I note that even the House report on this Yugoslav proposal states that the rates for plan fulfillment of the Yugoslav 5-year plan "must have been"—and I am quoting—"the results of statistical legerdemain."

Mr. President, I am convinced that the pending proposal is of very questionable

expedience, if not worse, and will represent no true aid whatsoever to the enslaved Yugoslav people. Moreover, here again we have American foreign policy at work with the same mistakes which have brought us to the sorry mess we see today. We are asked by the State Department to make this grant without gaining any assurances or considerations for the interests of the United States or of the free world. We can be certain that nothing will be done by Tito to rectify the confiscation of American economic interests in Yugoslavia. Even France in her recent aid to Yugoslavia was not so foolish. She demanded adjustments on the claims of her citizens.

The whole adventure bears the same precarious and doubtful character as does so many of our so-called calculated risks which turned out to be all risks and no calculation.

Mr. President, I hope that very careful consideration may be given to the bill before we enter into the arrangement. I hope the State Department and the administration will find it expedient—since this is a measure of expediency and not humanitarianism—to secure much more definite assurances from the present government of Yugoslavia before we commit so much of the money and the resources of this government to help a country which, in the event of any crisis that may occur, we would find of very doubtful aid.

~~EXTENSION OF RENT CONTROL—CHANGE OF CONFEREES—CONFERENCE REPORT~~

~~Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, two days ago, when conferees were appointed on the part of the Senate, the Vice President appointed the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] and the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] as Republican members. The Senator from Vermont could not be present when the matter was considered by the conferees. So there were three Democratic Senators and one Republican Senator present. It has therefore been suggested that the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], who is the next ranking Republican on the committee, serve as conferee.~~

~~Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] may be appointed as a member of the conference, because of the fact that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] cannot serve.~~

~~The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] will be excused from further service and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] is appointed to serve as conferee.~~

~~Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, I now send to the desk a conference report, which has been unanimously approved by the conferees, and ask for its immediate consideration.~~

~~The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. TAYLOR in the chair). The report will be read.~~

~~The Chief Clerk read as follows:~~

~~The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 207) to continue for a temporary period certain provisions of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, having met, after full and free conference,~~

S. 4234

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 8 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 27), 1950

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT

Intended to be proposed by Mr. McCARRAN to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, viz:

1 On page 1, line 5 through line 8, strike out all of sec-
2 tion 2 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

3 “The President is hereby authorized to expend not in
4 excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated
5 for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the
6 Economic Cooperation Administration Act of 1948, as
7 amended (Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress), for the
8 purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugo-
9 slavia under the authority of this Act.”

AMENDMENT

Intended to be proposed by Mr. McCARRAN to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

DECEMBER 8 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 27), 1950

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

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AMENDMENT

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to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and
provide for the defense and general welfare of the United
States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugo-
slavia, viz: At the proper place in the bill, insert the
following:

- 1 SEC. . Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as
- 2 endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government
- 3 of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political,
- 4 and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be
- 5 so notified when aid is furnished under this Act.

81ST CONGRESS
2^D Session

S. 4234

AMENDMENT

Proposed by Mr. McMANON (for himself and Mr. CONNALLY) to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

DECEMBER 8 (legislative day, NOVEMBER 27), 1950

Ordered to be printed

tered into, under which we are now operating, relative to the proposed Yugoslavia relief bill, the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] had an amendment pending when opposition to the proposed legislation developed. There are now other Senators who desire to offer amendments.

Mr. LUCAS. I read from the unanimous-consent agreement:

That the time intervening between the disposition of the so-called railway labor bill and the said hour of 4 o'clock on said day of Monday, December 11, shall be equally divided between those favoring and those opposing the passage of said bill and controlled, respectively, by Mr. CONNALLY and Mr. McCARRAN.

The Senator from Texas accepted the amendment offered by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN], so there should not be too much further debate upon the question.

Mr. WHERRY. Then Senators who would like to offer amendments, if they want to take the time between now and 4 o'clock, could see, I suppose, the Senator from Nevada, in order to have time assigned to them in which to discuss their amendments. Is not that correct?

Mr. LUCAS. That is the way the unanimous-consent agreement reads.

Mr. WHERRY. There was some question on the division of time. I came in late, and I merely wanted to make sure. Of course, if there is an amendment offered after 4 o'clock, there will be 10 minutes allowed on each side.

Mr. LUCAS. That is what the agreement provides.

Mr. WHERRY. Prior to that time, if a Senator wants to offer an amendment it will be necessary for him to have time allotted by the Senator from Nevada; is that correct?

Mr. LUCAS. That is correct.

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator want to make arrangements to take a little time now for that purpose?

Mr. LUCAS. I do not see the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] on the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to have the majority leader make an answer to my request. I think it would be very timely to get some amendments out of the way and charge the time to both sides.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I have the floor. There is no great calamity impending.

Mr. President, in addition to the bills which I noted for the RECORD a moment ago, I also desire to include in the list Calendar No. 2583, the bill (H. R. 9524) to supplement the District of Columbia Teachers' Leave Act of 1949. I do not think very much controversy will develop with respect to that bill.

Mr. President, I now yield to the Senator from New Mexico.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, I wonder whether the distinguished majority leader has in mind calling up Calendar No. 2506, the bill (S. 3135) to amend the peanut-marketing-quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended. I ask the question because a vote on the quotas

will be taken on the 14th of this month.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I will say to my able friend from New Mexico that I have not considered doing so because no Senator who is interested in the bill has talked to me about it.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, both Senators from Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina are interested in the bill.

Mr. ROBERTSON. The distinguished majority leader will recall that I did speak to him as soon as we returned for the present session. I told him that if other pressing matters would permit, I hoped he would give us an opportunity to vote on the peanut bill.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I apologize to the Senator from Virginia. I recall that he did speak to me about the bill. Therefore, I shall include Calendar No. 2506, the bill (S. 3135) to amend the peanut-marketing-quota provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, in the list of bills which may be taken up at any time when a lull should develop in the proceedings of the Senate.

EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN]. Under the unanimous-consent agreement the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] is entitled to the floor.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. Many Senators desire to present routine matters and offer brief insertions for the RECORD. I ask unanimous consent that Senators may be permitted to do so and that the time required be charged equally to both the opponents and the proponents of the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

Mr. McCARRAN. I have no objection to such a request, provided we have sufficient time within which to discuss the pending bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the Senator from Nebraska? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 207) to continue for a temporary period certain provisions of the

Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended.

The message also announced that the House had passed a bill (H. R. 9840) to exempt furlough travel of service personnel from the tax on transportation of persons in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred, as indicated:

REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL

A letter from the Attorney General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report relating to factors which may tend to affect adversely the competitive enterprise system during a period of defense mobilization (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR AERONAUTICS

A letter from the Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the creation of ten professional and scientific positions in the headquarters and research stations of the Committee (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

REPORT OF COMMISSION ON LICENSURE, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A letter from the President of the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of the Commission on Licensure, of the District of Columbia, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

DISPOSITION OF EXECUTIVE PAPERS

A letter from the Archivist of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a list of papers and documents on the files of several departments and agencies of the Government which are not needed in the conduct of business and have no permanent value or historical interest, and requesting action looking to their disposition (with accompanying papers); to a Joint Select Committee on the Disposition of Papers in the Executive Departments.

The VICE PRESIDENT appointed Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina and Mr. LANGER members of the committee on the part of the Senate.

PETITION

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a petition of St. Elizabeth's Post, No. 716, Catholic War Veterans of America, Baltimore, Md., signed by Jane H. O'Connor, adjutant, praying for the enactment of legislation granting statehood to Hawaii and Alaska, which was ordered to lie on the table.

REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

The following reports of a committee were submitted:

By Mr. McCARRAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary, without amendment:

S. 735. A bill for the relief of Leslie A. Connell (Rept. No. 2589);

S. 2460. A bill for the relief of George O. Drucker, Livia Drucker, and their minor daughter, Gloria Elizabeth Drucker (Rept. No. 2590);

S. 3125. A bill for the relief of Dr. Lutfu Lahut Uzman (Rept. No. 2591);

S. 3259. A bill for the relief of Ethelyn Isobel Chenalloy (Rept. No. 2592);

S. 3260. A bill for the relief of Richard H. Bush (Rept. No. 2593);

S. 3261. A bill for the relief of Willard Sidmer Ruttan (Rept. No. 2594);

S. 3378. A bill for the relief of Armando Santini (Rept. No. 2595);

S. 3554. A bill for the relief of Jose Manzano Somera (Rept. No. 2596);

S. 3897. A bill for the relief of Edwin A. Knous (Rept. No. 2619);

S. 4110. A bill for the relief of Howard Lovell (Rept. No. 2597);

S. 4133. A bill for the relief of Dr. Fernand Van Den Branden (Rept. No. 2598);

H. R. 4579. A bill to amend section 333 of title 28 of the United States Code to provide for the attendance at judicial conferences of their respective circuits of the district judges in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, Hawaii, and Alaska (Rept. No. 2599);

H. R. 6228. A bill for the relief of Dr. Chao-Jen Chen, Dr. Janet Wang Chen, and Eleanor Chen (Rept. No. 2600);

H. R. 8834. A bill for the relief of Yamaguchi Michiko (Rept. No. 2601);

H. R. 9284. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," approved July 1, 1898, and acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto (Rept. No. 2602); and

H. R. 9475. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Enid Louise Noble Romick, Jr. (Rept. No. 2603).

By Mr. McCARRAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with an amendment:

S. 2888. A bill for the relief of Frances Ethel Beddington (Rept. No. 2604);

S. 3044. A bill for the relief of Berniece Josephine Lazaga (Rept. No. 2605);

S. 3241. A bill for the relief of George Brander Paloheimo and Eva Leonora Paloheimo (Rept. No. 2606);

S. 3699. A bill for the relief of Linda Leo (Rept. No. 2607);

S. 3725. A bill for the relief of James McGillic and Blossom McGillic (Rept. No. 2608);

H. R. 8759. A bill for the relief of Rev. Andrew Chai Kyung Whang (Rept. No. 2609);

H. R. 8973. A bill for the relief of Archibald Walter Campbell Seymour (Rept. No. 2610);

H. R. 9145. A bill for the relief of Tomoko Yamaya (Rept. No. 2611); and

H. R. 9236. A bill for the relief of H. Halpern & Bro., Inc., of Boston, Mass. (Rept. No. 2612).

By Mr. McCARRAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary, with amendments:

S. 2830. A bill for the relief of E. C. Browder and Charles Kenyon (Rept. No. 2613);

S. 2921. A bill authorizing the naturalization of Stavros S. Niarchos (Rept. No. 2614); and

S. 3513. A bill for the relief of James Shellenger, Jr. (Rept. No. 2615).

By Mr. KILGORE, from the Committee on the Judiciary:

H. R. 5487. A bill to provide for the review of orders of the Federal Communications Commission under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and of certain orders of the Secretary of Agriculture made under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended, and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, as amended, and of orders of the United States Maritime Commission or the Federal Maritime Board under the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, as amended; with amendments (Rept. No. 2618).

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS—REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, from the Committee on the Judiciary, I report an original concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 108) favoring suspension of deportation of certain aliens, and I submit a report (No. 2616) thereon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STENNIS in the chair). The report will be received, and the concurrent resolution will be placed on the calendar.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 108) was placed on the calendar, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation for more than 6 months:

A-5536319, Abraham, Veronika, or Veronica Abraham.

A-4344291, Abreu y Alvarez, Ricardo, or Richard Abreu.

A-6711109, Abstender, Liza, nee Liza Markowicz.

A-2245436, Ali, Asod, or Alli Asod Ullah or Asodeolla Ashruffoolia.

A-5501876, Alinosi, Lottie Bernice, nee Dean.

A-3763210, Alma, Helen, nee Stedman Kinter or Alma S. Kinter or Alma Stedman Kinter.

A-4480223, Altamura, Pasquale.

A-6857826, Alter, Salomon Slolma.

A-5199171, Alvarez, Justina Martin.

A-3059986, Amat, Kasmoin, or Kasmoin Bin Amat.

A-6289628, Arce, Socorro Labrado Ylanan, or Socorro Labrado Rodrigues (maiden name), formerly Socorro Labrado Ylanan alias Mrs. Joe Manila.

A-6439301, Arcellana, nJuan Aquino.

A-5395748, Arnold, Gustavus or Gus Arnold.

A-5987632, Arron, Barbara, or Sydney Barbara Arron or Barbara Lewis.

A-5158808, Ashton, Sarah Ellen, or Sarah Ellen Lewis nee Muskett.

A-3594093, Asrlant, Willy, or Wolka Asrlant or Zev Wolf.

A-5906951, Aurlamno, Elsie.

A-1619827, Avvantaggio, Frank, or Frank Conti.

A-7044374, Bagues, Salvador, or Ruben Marrufo or Salvador Bagues-Villanueva.

A-5134324, Bahler, Karl F., or Karl Friedrich Bahler or Karl Bahler.

A-6030813, Basalo-Sosa, Carmen Teresa.

A-6172610, Bautista, Adalia Marquez de.

A-6702357, Benintende, Francesco, or Frank Benintende.

A-5156017, Berken, Regina Jean Matyas.

A-6719358, Bijjani, George Yousuf.

A-5624281, Birznier, Lina Margareta.

A-6975483, Blount, Richard Keith.

A-5652886, Blumberg, Barney Masei, or Boroch Blumberg.

A-4964138, Boeschling, Henry Frederick Wilhelm.

A-6427944, Bohn, Odette, nee De Rich or Rich.

A-5722987, Bonacasa, Liborio, or Benny Bonacasa or Bonacasa Liborio.

A-4068857, Bongini, Christino, or Christino Bongini.

A-5944282, Boutiller, Verner Trinimon, or Fred Gavin.

A-7049222, Bovoletis, Peter Considine.

A-5110682, Brega, Ernesto.

A-6687726, Brown, Basilette Argendeli, nee Argendeli.

A-5932145, Brown, Percy Flint.

A-6614098, Brown, Vernal Albert.

A-5648521, Bruck, Lila, or Hedwig Drdlik or Hedwig Bruck.

A-6732457, Bulleri, Dora Luigiana.

A-4490134, Burack, Sam.

A-5085609, Cardoza, Joao Ferreira, or John F. Cardoza.

A-7178248, Carlson, Berna Birgit Allrum.

A-4399018, Carroll, Louis Lawrence, or Louis Carroll.

A-5972088, Carty, Peter Silven.

A-2746974, Casais, Domingo, or Domingo Cassis y Costa.

A-6642478, Chaltas, Aristeia Constantinou Katraouzou, or Aristeia Constantinou Katraouzou.

A-6187140, Chan, William Hee, or Gik Hee Chan.

A-6187141, Chan, Linda Siu King, or Chum Shao King.

A-5552575, Charleson, Frank Langelier.

A-7539135, Chiang, Chien Yin, or Chien Chick Yin.

A-6798761, Yink, Chiang Chu Sheng, nee Chu Sheng Ying.

A-3291982, Chikhmatoff, Olga Chirinsky, or Olga Shirinsky Shikhmatoff nee Korff.

A-7273887, Clewis, Raimor Herman, or Raimor Herman Clewis, formerly Raimor Herman Saladin, or Raimor Herman Saladin.

A-6230243, Cohen, Albert Kibrit, or Alberto Cohen Kibrit, or Albert Cohen.

A-1455053, Constantios, Philipos Nikolas, or Philip Constantios.

A-3021828, Costa, Amedeo Giovanni, or Amedeo G. Costa.

A-5811877, Damhus, Ejnar Jensen, or Edward, or Eddy Damhus.

A-4822959, Dapas, Pietro, or Peter Dapas.

A-6690314, De Acosta, Petronila Machuca.

A-6603146, De Barrios, America Cabrera.

A-6603146, Barrios Y Cabrera, Jesus.

A-6787390, De Escobedo, Consuelo Gomez-Alonzo, or Rafaela Lopez.

A-7050144, De Ferrari, Felicina Gallo, nee Felicina Serafina Gallo.

A-6455865, De Grimwood, Laura Antonia Padilla.

A-1101037, Delikat, Lottie Margaret.

A-6323338, Dennis, Edward Victor, or Edward Victor Brown.

A-1412812, Diamantis, Stavros Spyridon.

A-5346801, Di Carlo, Calogero, or Calogero Lelio Di Carlo.

A-4418201, Doorly, Joseph, or Joseph Dorley.

A-7273891, Doring, Uwe Franz.

A-5618814, Dumkolis, Trifo Alexander, or Trifo Alexander Dumkoloff, or Trifo Alex Dumkeles.

A-6897795, Eastman, Elsa Orio, formerly Elsa Orio Garchitorena nee Elsa Erinka Oria.

A-6852394, Elefant, Clara, or Elder nee Lakatos.

A-5151368, Enomoto, Mihacri or Jack.

A-6364325, Entralgo, Luis Estella.

A-4789109, Esop, Edward.

A-6811187, Esposito, Lucian Nicolas.

A-7196657, Essoglou, Panteleimon Elle.

A-6745435, Estaque, Jeanne nee Seitelsohn.

A-6162093, Faustino, Iluminador Flores.

A-6362677, Femino, Marina Domenica Grace, formerly Hislop.

A-6420315, Fieldhouse, Roger Hyde.

A-1842349, Figueiras, Jose Gallardo, or Jose Gallardo.

A-7203232, Flanagan, Johanna Adriana.

A-4570472, Fogel, Morris, or Moische Fogel.

A-6878609, Forcke, Nadine Elwin.

A-6878610, Forcke, Eddie Wallace.

A-3079984, Fournaris, Constantinos Georgios, or Constantinos Fournaris, or Gus Fournaris or Kostas Fournaris.

A-6808868, Franklin, Gudrun, or Gudrun Bruinsma.

A-5456991, Friedman, Fanny or Kalmar.

A-1875873, Fu, Huang, or Wong Fook or Wong Fook Nygoon, or Wong Fook Yuan, or Wong Chun Go.

A-7039621, Galati, Salvatore.

A-5739972, Galati, Maria Antico.

A-7198759, Gampe, Roland Pierre Lucien, or Roland P. Gampe.

A-5854618, Garden, Janet Miller, or Jean Whatling.

A-6353465, Gernaey, Marie Madeline nee Kemmer, or Marie Madeline Jablonski.

A-6872607, Godley, Percival Francis, or Francis Percival Godley.

A-6872603, Godley, Doris nee Eldred.

A-6649919, Goldstein, Rubin, or Riven Goldstein.

tooling up for war, they feel safe as far ahead as they can see. The same thing happened in 1942, he said.

This buying generates higher and higher prices until suddenly the housewife wakes up out of her trance and resists. Prices could turn down fast and it could happen any day.

On the supply side of the picture, production of eggs is running at about the same level as a year ago, produce men here say. But the movement of eggs from the country to terminal markets has been slowed down by snow storms which have blocked a number of country roads. Arrivals of eggs in Chicago, for example, were only 9,312 cases yesterday compared with 12,403 cases a week ago and 12,130 a year ago.

SNOWSTORMS NOT MAJOR FACTOR

Snowstorms, however, are a secondary rather than the major reason for the rise, egg men say. Prices were moving rapidly upward before the storms began.

Cold storage stocks of eggs are the lowest in history. This, too, has accentuated the rise. On December 1, there were only 71,000 cases of eggs in cold storage, a record low for that date. A year earlier, stocks totaled 250,000 cases. Were stocks larger, they would help cushion the effect of the sudden burst of appetite for eggs the public is showing.

Still another factor may be the rise in purchasing of eggs by the Army. Trade sources here say the military services are buying about 100 cars of eggs weekly now.

[From the Wall Street Journal of December 9, 1950]

Wholesale egg prices in Chicago climbed to the highest levels in 30 years. No. 2 Extras jumped 4 cents a dozen to 70 cents. A year ago they sold for 40 cents. Heavy consumer demand has been pushing these prices up since early October when they were around 48 cents. The further rise this week has been spurred by heavy snowstorms which blocked the flow of eggs to market. In Cincinnati, Procter & Gamble Co. raised wholesale prices of shortening and soap powders by 3½ percent.

[From the Washington Post of December 9, 1950]

PRICE OF GRADE A LARGE EGGS NEAR DOLLAR A DOZEN

The retail price of grade A large eggs was expected to push the dollar mark for a dozen in the District today.

A spokesman for the Merchants and Manufacturers' Association explained that a rise to 80 cents a dozen wholesale on the New York Mercantile Exchange yesterday would bring about a retail range here from 96 to 99 cents. Some retailers, however, were reportedly holding prices below 90 cents, at least for today.

The wholesale increase—14 cents a dozen since Monday in New York—was attributed to heavy buying by the armed services, curtailed transportation due to stormy weather, and a shortage of cold storage eggs. The District's present "demic market," with demand outstripping supply, forces wholesalers to pay New York prices for eggs produced in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, a spokesman said.

EXTENSION OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMERGENCY RENT CONTROL

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada yield to me to make a motion, with the understanding that if it leads to debate it will be withdrawn?

Mr. MCCARRAN. Before doing so, let me inquire how the time now stands.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. An hour and 50 minutes remains, divided between

the Senator from Nevada and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY].

Mr. MCCARRAN. Is the Senator from West Virginia willing to agree that if consideration of his motion requires more than 5 minutes he will withdraw it?

Mr. NEELY. I gladly make that agreement with the Senator from Nevada.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia asks unanimous consent to make a motion out of order. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, subject to the agreement just made, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 209, Calendar 2588, to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended. This resolution was unanimously approved by the District of Columbia Committee. Except the brief extension requested, no change whatever is proposed in the existing law.

Mr. President, I know of no opposition to the resolution.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. NEELY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I should like very much to accommodate the distinguished and able Senator from West Virginia, and no doubt will do so. However, I am wondering if the Senator from West Virginia will give us a little time to check the situation. There may be some Senators who are just as enthusiastic about the joint resolution as is the Senator from West Virginia, but who may wish to say something in behalf of the measure. I should like to have the opportunity to make a check. If the Senator will renew his motion immediately after the vote is taken on the pending business, or even before, if the managers will give the Senator the time, I shall be glad to answer "Yes" or "No." At this time I should like to have the Senator withhold the motion until I can make a check.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from West Virginia withhold his motion?

Mr. NEELY. Very gladly, Mr. President.

EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

Mr. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, I should like very much, if possible, to have the Senator from Oregon [Mr. CORDON] in the Chamber. The reason is that some of my remarks are addressed to a colloquy which took place between the Senator from Oregon and myself on last Friday. If it is possible for him to be here, I should like to have him present.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. While the Senator from Oregon is being contacted, I wonder if the Senator from Nevada will yield

to me to permit the clerk to read for the information of the Senate the 6-line amendment which I propose to offer. Since it has not been printed, I should like to give notice to Senators who may support or oppose the amendment, as to what it contains.

Mr. MCCARRAN. I have no objection to its being read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The CHIEF CLERK. At the end of the bill it is proposed to add the following new section:

SEC. 7. This act shall not become effective until at least \$38,000,000 of the \$75,000,000 appropriated for the purpose of carrying out section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, has been expended or obligated for expenditure for assistance to the Republic of China.

Mr. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, in order that Senators who are now present, but who were not present last Friday, may know the text of my amendment, I respectfully request that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The CHIEF CLERK. On page 1, line 5 through line 8, it is proposed to strike out all of section 2 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Administration Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act.

Mr. MCCARRAN. Mr. President, on Friday, when I submitted my amendment to the bill, I made reference to the economic position of the United Kingdom and its relation to Marshall-plan aid.

For the benefit of those interested, I desire to clarify my remarks so that they will not be misinterpreted. First, I want it clearly understood that I used the United Kingdom as the best example for the purpose of demonstrating the recovery that has been had in Europe so that the use of the amount included in my amendment out of funds heretofore appropriated for the ECA will not adversely affect that program. I bring this information to the attention of the Senate, not by way of criticism, but in order that we may all more clearly understand the implication of our action.

During the period September 1949 through September 1950 the gold and dollar assets of the United Kingdom increased by the sum of \$1,331,000,000. During this same period, that is, September 1949 through September 1950, ECA has provided Marshall-plan assistance to the United Kingdom in the amount of \$768,000,000. By comparing these figures, it is a matter of simple arithmetic to see that a considerable portion of the aid that was furnished during this period was not actually required to finance import transactions, but was used to replace and increase the gold and dollar reserve supply of the United Kingdom.

I do not intend to argue that it is not good, or even necessary, that the United Kingdom have a large reserve of gold and dollars, maybe larger than its present gold and dollar reserve. However, the point I wish to make is that while her trade position is such as to balance her gold and dollar expenditures, it is rather foolish for us to provide dollars, which we have to raise by burdensome taxation or through borrowing, for the purpose of building up the gold and dollar reserve of the United Kingdom, it seems to me the pledge of the United States to the United Kingdom of our willingness to provide dollars if the drain on her gold and dollar reserves should become too great would serve to provide the necessary stability for the pound and would cost the American taxpayer considerably less. Certainly under present conditions that would be the case.

I think it should be recalled that the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States have had recent conversations aimed at reexamining the aid requirements of the United Kingdom and designed primarily to arrive at an understanding whereby further aid under the Marshall plan might not be considerably reduced, if not discontinued, during the remainder of this fiscal year.

I wish to repeat, Mr. President, that the object of these remarks has not been necessarily to criticize the United Kingdom, for she has made an excellent record in recovery, but rather they are designed to clarify my position that the diversion of funds heretofore appropriated for the Marshall plan to the purposes of the present legislation will not interfere with the Marshall-plan program.

Mr. President, I desire at this point to place in the RECORD a statement of the United Kingdom gold-and-dollar position.

As of September 1949 there was \$1,425,000,000, gold and dollars, in the British reserve.

As of September 1950 there was in the British reserve, gold and dollars, \$2,750,000,000.

The increase during the period was \$1,331,000,000.

Mr. TAFT. Will the Senator restate those figures please?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes. Gold and dollars as of September 1949, \$1,425,000,000.

Gold and dollars as of September 1950, \$2,756,000,000.

Increase during that period, \$1,331,000,000.

ECA procurement authorization during the same period was \$768,000,000.

Trade deficit during that period was \$235,000,000.

The amount of ECA funds in excess of trade requirements was \$563,000,000.

Mr. President, on Friday there was a colloquy between the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. CORDON] and myself. I regret that the Senator is not present, because I have a high regard for his ability to discuss these subjects. During that colloquy I consented to give consideration over the week end to a modification of the amendment to make specific the understanding that \$12,000,000

of the \$50,000,000 authorized in my amendment was for the purpose of covering commitments already entered into by the Economic Cooperation Administration.

I have given this matter considerable thought and I believe that a clarification for the record is all that is necessary in this instance.

The stopgap program inaugurated by the Government up to the present totaled \$31,400,000. This sum was provided by the utilization of three different sources of funds. The Export-Import Bank loan provided \$5,600,000, the military assistance program provided \$13,600,000, and the ECA provided \$12,200,000. It is this latter fund with which my amendment is concerned.

Mr. President, I hope those present on the Senate floor will follow me closely in this matter because it is of vital importance.

The question has arisen as to the authority to commit ECA funds for this purpose. I must admit, Mr. President, that I am not satisfied as to the authority for this commitment, however, I should like to point out that up to date this is a morale commitment more than a legal one. Although an allotment has been made of ECA funds to Germany in the sum of approximately \$4,000,000, and a tentative allotment to Italy of an equivalent sum, the procurement authorizations which are in the final analysis the legal obligation of funds have not, I am informed, been issued by the ECA. These allotments are generally for information purposes and may be changed at any time prior to the issuance of a procurement authorization.

Therefore, in view of the doubt—and I entertain such doubt—as to the legal authority for such use of ECA funds, I felt that the authorization for further aid to Yugoslavia should include authorization for the use of the approximately \$12,000,000 heretofore morally committed. Since the legal authority for such action is in doubt, the Congress should make clear its intent lest the executive action in this case establish an undesirable precedent for future use of ECA funds.

I make no comment with respect to the authority for the sums obligated from the military-assistance program or the Export-Import Bank loan, although as to that I have some grave doubts. I have been concerned in this matter chiefly with funds appropriated for the Marshall plan. I believe the record is clear, and that if this amendment is adopted as it is presently proposed the intent will be well established that of the total sum of \$50,000,000 authorized to be used out of the ECA appropriation, \$12,000,000 of such authorization is to cover the moral commitment heretofore entered into by our Government.

Mr. President, I do say to the ECA Administrator that while we feel there is a moral obligation which we will cover in this instance, we do not want it to become a precedent, and that he may turn down such a request if it should ever come up again.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NEELY in the chair). Does the Senator from Nevada yield to the Senator from Maine?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. I noted what the Senator had to say about the Export-Import Bank. That action disturbed and disquieted some of us a very great deal because, so far as I was able to learn, it is a precedent in respect to that sort of thing. The Export-Import Bank was created for quite another purpose, and has always operated quite carefully to confine itself to what was certainly the spirit and intent of the law. But if we pass this over now, and it is indicated that our action is being established as a precedent, it might get us very far afield in going into various ventures of this character. Is there any way that we could effectively indicate what seems to be the position of the Senator from Nevada that this is not a precedent for a course to be followed hereafter?

Mr. McCARRAN. As regards the item that came from the Export-Import Bank, I said I had grave doubts as to its legality, because I do not think the Export-Import Bank was established with that object in view.

As to the \$12,000,000 from ECA which was used in this connection, I have even more grave doubts about the legality of the right to use those funds. However, that money was used and now the executive branch is morally committed. It was done in the following manner: Germany and Italy furnished flour to Yugoslavia. Now the executive branch has committed itself to furnish grain to Germany and Italy, to take the place of that flour. So it is a moral commitment which I do not wish to do away with entirely, but I say to the Senate that it should not be established as a precedent. I say we should frown on it and should continue to frown on it. If those in the executive branch wish to do these things, they should first come to the Congress and obtain authority for them.

Mr. BREWSTER. In the case of military assistance, was there not perhaps some greater warrant within the scope of the executive authority?

Mr. McCARRAN. Yes.

Mr. BREWSTER. Is there anything in the measure now before the Senate which, at any rate, would clearly put the Congress on record as not in any way condoning this departure from what we understand to be the spirit and the letter of the law?

Mr. McCARRAN. I had hoped, and I continue to hope, that perhaps my remarks and the remarks of other Senators on this subject, expressed on the floor of the Senate, will be a signboard to those who hereafter will administer it.

Mr. BREWSTER. When the next appropriation for the ECA comes before us, will it be appropriate to consider at that time making some clear indication that further ventures of this character are not to be encouraged?

Mr. McCARRAN. I think it would be, but I do not know whether that would reach the Export-Import Bank.

Mr. BREWSTER. Of course, that is a matter of their loans. The Export-Import Bank does not come to us for appropriations, does it?

Mr. McCARRAN. That is correct; the Export-Import Bank makes loans.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, at the moment I do not know of any other Senator who wishes to speak.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I have an amendment which I have had read at the desk. I should like to call the amendment to the attention of the Senator from Texas, in the hope that he may be able to accept it. If he does accept it, I intend to support the Yugoslavia aid bill.

The amendment is very brief, comprising only six lines, which read as follows:

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

"Sec. 7. This act shall not become effective until at least \$38,000,000 of the \$75,000,000 appropriated for the purpose of carrying out section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, has been expended or obligated for expenditure for assistance to the Republic of China."

Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Texas that I was in the Senate Chamber at the time when the original unanimous-consent agreement was entered into, prior to which there was a quorum call, in accordance with the general understanding. That unanimous-consent agreement dealt with the railway labor bill. When the unanimous-consent agreement was entered into, I left the Senate Chamber, because in the Armed Services Committee we had been holding hearings on the Rosenberg appointment.

Sometime later—and the proceedings appear 14 pages later in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, namely, on page 16508, whereas the original unanimous-consent agreement proceedings appear on page 16494—we find that the original unanimous-consent agreement was amended, without having a quorum call in advance; and as thus amended the agreement takes in an entirely different piece of proposed legislation, namely, the Yugoslavia aid bill.

I would feel that I had been foreclosed from a right in connection with the bill if the question of germaneness is raised against my amendment, because my understanding of the germaneness provision is that the purpose is primarily to prevent FEPC proposed legislation from being tacked on to a bill which has no relationship to FEPC.

This amendment is one with which I have been concerned for some time. If this amendment and the other amendments which have been proposed are adopted, I shall be perfectly willing to support the Yugoslavia aid bill, because I think it is important to break Yugoslavia away from the Soviet bloc, if that can be done.

However, I also feel that some of us who previously have supported proposed

legislation to give aid to the Republic of China, and then found that only an infinitesimal amount of the funds appropriated by the Congress for that purpose had been used for that purpose, have a right to bring up that matter by way of proposed legislation of this kind.

For that reason, I should like to have a few minutes to discuss the amendment.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I shall have to make a point of order against the amendment, on the ground that it is not germane to the original bill.

I do not object to the Senator's having time to debate the amendment, if he desires to do so; but I reserve the right to make the point of order later. I do not wish to make it now if the Senator from California wishes to debate the amendment.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, then, at least, I should like to have some time to discuss the amendment.

If the point I have raised does not receive consideration, namely, that I was foreclosed from offering this amendment by entering into a modification of the unanimous-consent agreement—for which modification a quorum call was not had before the modification, which greatly broadens the scope of the unanimous-consent agreement relative to the railway-labor bill, by including the offering of the Yugoslavia aid bill, was entered into—then, Mr. President, when the next piece of proposed legislation comes before the Senate, I shall be prepared to offer the amendment as a rider to be attached to that measure, and shall accompany that offer with the statement that I was foreclosed from doing so at this time.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I cannot object now to what the Senator from California may do with respect to the next bill, but I can do so with respect to this bill. Therefore, I make the point of order that the amendment is in violation of the unanimous-consent agreement.

It seems to me that the question the Senator from California raises as to whether there was a quorum call is foreclosed by reason of the action of the Senate. Advantage would have to have been taken of that at the moment when the proposed agreement was before the Senate; some Senator would have had to suggest that a quorum was not present.

However, if a unanimous-consent agreement is obtained without having a reservation of that kind, a quorum call is foreclosed; a month later a Senator cannot object to the agreement on the ground that a quorum call was not had at that time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I hope that in the future both the majority and the minority leadership will protect the Members of the Senate who are absent from the floor of the Senate in the discharge of their obligations, by seeing to it that if a unanimous-consent agreement is broadened to include another matter, a quorum call is had first.

In this case, the Senate had entered into a unanimous-consent agreement

relative to the further proceedings in regard to the railway labor bill, an important piece of proposed legislation with which every American is concerned. Then we find, as appears 14 pages later in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—thus indicating that an appreciable amount of time must have elapsed during that period—that a modification of the unanimous-consent agreement was entered into, and as a result some of us have been foreclosed from offering an amendment of this kind, which I think is vital in the field of foreign relations.

The Senator from Texas has made his point of order, and thus has foreclosed me from offering the amendment, if that is the ruling of the Chair.

However, at least I should like to have time to speak on the amendment.

Mr. CONNALLY. I am very glad to give the Senator time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is not the ruling of the Chair, because the point of order has not yet been made; and the Chair cannot rule on a point of order until it is made.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. When the agreement was originally entered into, I was not on the floor of the Senate. When I arrived on the floor, I found that the only issue which had been resolved was that a vote would be taken at 4 o'clock today on the Yugoslavia aid bill. It was then that I suggested to the distinguished Senator from Texas and to other Senators who then were on the floor that if other amendments were to be offered, and I did that to try to modify a request which already had been entered into, additional time should be given—for instance, 20 minutes in total on each amendment, with 10 minutes for each side; and I said that the usual provisions with respect to unanimous-consent agreements should be entered into. By that I meant that in order to accommodate those on the other side of the aisle, the usual provision with respect to germaneness, which in this case has to do with civil-rights measures, and which provision is always included in such agreements, should be written into the agreement.

It was not my intention then, nor is it now, that under that understanding, which was rather a gentlemen's understanding among us, any Senator would be foreclosed from offering an amendment having to do with the proposed Yugoslavia aid legislation or with other measures pertaining thereto.

Because of the fact that a quorum call should have been had at that time—there is no doubt about that, because at that time we were attempting to modify a unanimous-consent agreement already entered into—I hope the distinguished Senator from Texas will permit the Senator from California to offer his amendment, and then let us have a vote on it.

I am satisfied that if the Senator from California had been on the floor of the Senate at the time when the modification of the agreement was proposed, he would have objected unless it was agreed that he could offer this amendment.

Certainly, since it has nothing to do with civil rights, it has a place here for consideration. I shall deeply appreciate it if the distinguished Senator from Texas will permit the Senator from California to offer the amendment, particularly in view of what was said after the unanimous-consent request had been agreed to, in which deliberations I had no part.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator from Nebraska says the Senator from California was not present. That is true. But the Senator from Nebraska was present, and he should have asked the Senate to observe the requirement of a quorum call then, not now.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. If the distinguished Senator will recall, I was not present when the original unanimous-consent agreement was entered into.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator was present on the subsequent occasion.

Mr. WHERRY. Not until I rose, after the agreement had been made, to ask whether we could not have a modification of the agreement to include amendments which might be offered, instead of confining it merely to a vote on the one amendment regarding which there was a unanimous-consent agreement. I feel sure the distinguished Senator remembers that. It was late in the afternoon. I suggested that we could get a vote on additional amendments, if the usual procedure were followed of allowing 20 minutes for debate on each amendment, 10 minutes to a side. I stated it was my feeling that we ought to modify the unanimous-consent agreement which had previously been made, and the distinguished Senator from Texas, because of his thoughtfulness and interest, agreed to that. When that was done, it was my intention that any germane amendment could be offered, unless it had something to do with the civil-rights measure, and a provision as to germaneness is always included in a unanimous-consent request.

Mr. CONNALLY. However, it is necessary that we proceed according to what the record shows, not according to what may be in the mind of the Senator from Nebraska. The Senator from Nebraska is not always present. He has pointed out that he was not present on a previous occasion. If we are to go out in search of the Senator from Nebraska, to learn what is in his mind, that is one thing. If we are to proceed according to the record made in the Senate, that is another thing. I do not wish to be either hostile or contrary. I am perfectly willing that the Senator from California may have such time as he may need in order to discuss the amendment. I do not think the amendment is germane, and, that being so, it becomes my duty to oppose it. I shall therefore make the point of order.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator from California had no desire to delay action by the Senate on the Yugoslavia relief bill. I felt that an amendment of this

kind was germane to the general subject matter with which we were dealing. There is a difference of opinion about that, and perhaps the precedents and the rulings will sustain the technical objection made by the Senator from Texas. However, since the unanimous-consent agreement did not provide a final hour for voting on the bill itself, but merely on the amendments, the Senator from California may find it necessary to move to recommit, with instructions to the committee to report back the amendment which I have offered. Since there is no hour set for a final vote on the bill, that amendment might be in order. I do not want to be compelled to proceed in the way I have indicated if we can get a straight vote on the amendment prior to that time, but in my opinion it is so important that, if I am foreclosed from having a vote on the amendment, I should then feel it necessary at least to exhaust whatever parliamentary rights were still left to me under the unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I want to assure the Senator from California that he will have plenty of opportunity in connection with other measures to offer his amendment. The Yugoslavia relief measure relates to our foreign affairs. If the Senator from California could have heard the discussions in committee I am sure he would not have offered this amendment. It is of vital importance that the pending bill be passed, and that it be passed promptly. It affects, I think, what is usually in the mind of the Senator from California; that is, it is an anti-Communist move. The Senator's proposal, which would tie this up with the Chinese situation, would result in interminable debate not germane to the subject of aid to Yugoslavia. I must, therefore, insist on the point of order, although I shall be glad to withhold it temporarily if the Senator wants to discuss it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I desire to speak on the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. How much time is yielded to the Senator from California, and by whom?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to have 15 minutes, if possible.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is under the control of the Senator from Nevada and the Senator from Texas. Does either Senator yield time to the Senator from California, and if so, how much?

Mr. McCARRAN. I suggest that the Senator from Texas and I each yield 7½ minutes to the Senator from California.

Mr. CONNALLY. That is agreeable.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I desire to discuss briefly the history of the arms implementation legislation, insofar as it provided the appropriation of \$75,000,000. We were then meeting as a joint committee, composed of the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee. I supported the arms implementation legislation for Europe and for the other countries which

were included. We had before the committee testimony relative to the Republic of China, and during those hearings Admiral Badger, who has represented the United States Government in command of the fleet in the Far East, appeared before the committee to testify.

The original amendment which I had submitted for aid to the Republic of China, had provided, according to my recollection, for \$100,000,000 or \$125,000,000. Suggestions had been made that it be cut to \$50,000,000. When Admiral Badger was before the committee, the question was asked him, "What in your judgment is the minimum amount necessary to give some effective aid to the Republic of China?" He answered, "\$75,000,000." That is the legislative background with respect to the origin of the figure of \$75,000,000.

There was still quite a bit of discussion and controversy in committee, however, as to what aid, if any, should be given the Republic of China. As a result of a compromise suggested by the senior Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], the language was used "in the general area of China," and it was pointed out that in the event it was not feasible to give aid to the Republic of China, as such, it might be feasible to have the language so drawn that aid could be given to southeast Asia or other sections, if that were necessary. I had no objection to the compromise proposal. It made sense. No one knew, in this changing world, exactly what the conditions might be.

The fact is, however, that of the original \$75,000,000 allocated to the Republic of China, and which was a clear congressional intent that it should go to the Republic of China, an infinitesimal amount was used, if any. The bill was again amended when it came up this year. In the second arms implementation bill, the \$75,000,000 was again included. There was a slight change in the language, which permitted the President to expend about half of those funds without accounting for them to Congress. But again the general intent was that it should be spent on "the general area of China," and certainly many of us who supported it felt that one of the chief reasons for its being included was in order to aid the Republic of China.

Mr. President, I think I am realistic enough to recognize that there is value in breaking Yugoslavia away from the Communist satellite states, and under proper safeguards I certainly have no objection to, and would like to support, any move which would tend to break down the solid front of the Kremlin. But I should like to call attention to the fact that one of the great difficulties in the foreign policy which we have followed has been the fact that we did not recognize that communism was a global menace, that it was no less menacing in Asia than in Europe.

I have supported the arms implementation program, the North Atlantic Pact, the Greek-Turkish aid program, and ECA, because I felt that they were contributions toward closing the door to communism in Europe. Where I have

differed with the administration has been in the fact that while we were closing the door in Europe, we were leaving it wide open in Asia. The fact of the matter is that on the island of Formosa today there exists a legal government of the Republic of China, a nation with which we have had friendly relations for a period of a hundred years. The Republic of China was our war-time ally in two wars. They are permanent members of the Security Council. They are charter members of the United Nations. I have visited the island of Formosa twice. They have complete religious freedom. They have a fine educational system. The American press is freely admitted. There is no censorship; there is no persecution of anyone because of his religion or color. That is the record of Nationalist China.

In addition to that, they have more than 600,000 non-Communist troops, which is a larger body of non-Communist armed forces than exist in all the rest of Asia together, including the troops of India, Pakistan, the Philippine Republic, the Indonesian Republic, the British in Malaya and Hong Kong, the French in Indo-China, the Korean army, and the United States forces in Korea.

It does not make sense, Mr. President, to begin to aid the Communist Government of Yugoslavia, albeit that government has broken from the Kremlin, when we neglect to give infinitesimal aid to the Government of the Republic of China which is non-Communist in character and which is protecting our far-eastern flank. The fact of the matter is that the Republic of China has never shot down American planes, and Yugoslavia has done so. The Republic of China has voted with the free nations in the United Nations on the question of the Korean invasion, a hundred percent of the time. If Senators will examine the record of Yugoslavia, they will find that it has supported the free nations of the world a very small fraction of the time in the matter of the Korean invasion.

There is complete religious freedom in the Republic of China on the island of Formosa. That does not exist in Yugoslavia.

As I pointed out to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am perfectly willing, if, in the judgment of the administration, it is necessary in the interests of our national defense to give some aid to Communist Yugoslavia, in the general interest of the world-wide situation which exists, to give such aid, but I say, Mr. President, at the same time that we should no longer ignore the mandate of the Congress, both in connection with authorization legislation and appropriations, which indicated that the Congress of the United States at least thought it was equally important to give aid to the non-Communist Republic of China.

If I am foreclosed from offering this amendment, Mr. President, by a technical point of order which forecloses me from exercising in part my duties as a United States Senator, I want to serve notice now that upon the third reading of the bill I intend to move to recommit

it to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions that in the bill which is reported thereafter there be a provision similar to that which I am offering as an amendment. If that is done, I hope the Committee on Foreign Relations will very promptly take up the bill and report it with the amendment which I have offered; and at that time I shall be prepared to support the bill for aid to Communist Yugoslavia which has broken with the Kremlin, but also for aid to Nationalist China which has never been Communist and which has consistently supported the United States and the United Nations in the matter of aggression in Korea.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I wish to say that I join the Senator from California wholeheartedly. I stand behind what he has said and will support his motion if it comes before the Senate. I regret that a point of order should be invoked against the amendment of the Senator from California.

Mr. President, I have no confidence in the present Yugoslav Government. I have no idea that the Government of that nation is serious in its break with its political parent. I have no idea that Mr. Tito has any remorse for what he has done politically and religiously or in any other way. I regret that it may be necessary to do what we are proposing to do here by way of lending aid. But I certainly regret more that we should deny immediate aid to Nationalist China, which is now isolated, in part, on the island of Formosa. If we had given some aid—not very much, but some aid—to Nationalist China when it had a solid foothold on the continent of Asia, in my judgment, American boys would not be dying in Korea today. But we did not do that, although some of us were urging that a few officers be sent over there to guide the military maneuvers of Chiang Kai-shek and to assist the Nationalist Chinese Army in setting itself up against the hordes of communism that were being guided by the Kremlin. But that was not done. It is now water over the wheel, and there is no use in complaining about what has passed. It is the future and the present to which we must look.

In my judgment, there is much merit in the amendment to be offered by the Senator from California, and I shall support him in every way if the amendment comes to a vote on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. President, so far as I am aware, there is no other Senator who cares to be heard with reference to the amendment which I have offered; and I shall be glad to yield the floor.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, under the unanimous-consent agreement, we cannot vote on any amendments until 4 o'clock.

Mr. McCARRAN. I so understand.

Mr. CONNALLY. I say to the Senator from Nevada, who says this amendment should be voted on, that the bill itself was carefully considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations. The committee had testimony from outsiders, from the State Department, and from members of the committee, so that we understand it thoroughly. Why cannot

the amendment of the Senator from California go through the same route? Let him submit it to some committee, let that committee consider it and hold hearings, and then report it. Why do we have to railroad this particular amendment of the Senator from California by recommitting the whole bill, in order that he may try to take a course which is against the standard rules of the Senate? I do not want to be in any wise lacking in consideration. I gladly yielded time to the Senator from California to make his speech. But that does not mean that I care to see the rules of the Senate violated and the unanimous-consent agreement ignored in order to railroad through some proposal which is contrary to the purpose and intent of this particular bill.

As I stated a while ago, we considered this bill thoroughly in the committee. All Senators are aware of the break between Tito and the Cominform. The testimony revealed that the Yugoslav Government and the people are gradually coming more and more around to the viewpoint of the West. The testimony further is that Yugoslavia has suffered the worst drought in the history of any living person in that country. The testimony is that most of the supplies will be from the United States.

So, Mr. President, from all the considerations, in view of the fact that the committee favorably reported the bill, I very much hope that it will be passed without any undue delay. I realize that we cannot vote until 4 o'clock, and I am not adverse to any Senator who wants to discuss the question having the time in which to do so. I shall gladly yield any such time out of my allotment as is desirable and necessary.

It is now 3 o'clock, and we cannot vote until 4 o'clock. I do not know who put that provision into the agreement. I think it is very unwise to provide that the Senate cannot vote until such and such an hour. I think it is important to vote when we conclude the discussion. I should be willing to vote on the amendment of the Senator from Nevada which the committee has indicated it is willing to accept.

Mr. McCARRAN. I am not holding up a vote until 4 o'clock. I am ready to vote now.

Mr. CONNALLY. Under the unanimous-consent agreement we are not able to vote until 4 o'clock.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I am asking the Senator from Nevada to yield some time to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas has the floor.

Mr. WHERRY. I understood that the Senator from Texas would surrender the floor.

Mr. CONNALLY. I think I shall. What does the Senator desire to ask me?

Mr. WHERRY. I should like to ask the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] to yield me 5 minutes.

Mr. McCARRAN. I am permitted to yield time now, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I do not desire to discuss the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND]. Neither do I wish to discuss the merits of the so-called McCarran amendment. I wish to make some observations on unanimous-consent requests.

The distinguished Senator from Texas has stated that it is 3 o'clock, and we cannot vote now because under the unanimous-consent agreement we agreed not to vote until 4 o'clock. He said he did not know why anyone should make such an agreement. Mr. President, to begin with, I was not on the floor when the original agreement was entered into. I was here when some modifications were made. However, I should like to say to the distinguished Senator from Texas that in my opinion the only way it is possible to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement—and I think properly so—is by having a definite time stated in the agreement when a vote is to be taken. The reason for such an understanding as to time for voting is to permit Senators to plan to be in attendance at such time. If such an agreement as to time were not made some Senators would find it impossible to be present when a vote was taken.

I believe the practice we have followed in that respect is good. I believe it has met with the approval of almost all Senators. When a definite time for taking a vote is fixed in a unanimous-consent agreement, Senators can plan in advance to be present when such a vote is taken. Therefore, there can be no complaint on the part of any Senator about not being able to be present. So far as I am concerned, on the basis of the experience I have had with such agreements, I believe it is the only way in which a unanimous-consent agreement can be entered into.

Mr. President, I should like to say also that a unanimous-consent agreement expedites the work of the Senate. Very often such an agreement saves a considerable amount of time. Sometimes debate runs out before we reach the hour fixed for a vote. However, that happens very seldom. In my opinion—and Senators who are my senior will agree with me, I think—ofttimes a unanimous-consent agreement tends to terminate or limit debate to a great extent, thus enabling the Senate to do other constructive work. Therefore, I think it is a good thing to enter into a unanimous-consent agreement on which all Senators are agreed.

The third point I wish to make is that I am satisfied the Senator from California has made a perfect case relative to procedure in connection with the present unanimous-consent agreement, namely, that under the circumstances there should have been a quorum call. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] insists on a quorum call even when a unanimous-consent agreement is proposed on an important amendment—and I think rightly so—because oftentimes a Senator is attending to important com-

mittee work and is not able to be on the floor to protest. Usually, in the judgment of the minority leader, it is good practice to have a quorum call when a unanimous-consent agreement is proposed, even on an amendment. On occasions I have taken pains to call Senators who I thought would be interested in certain amendments and have asked them whether or not it met with their approval to have a unanimous-consent agreement entered into with respect to an amendment.

I was not present the other day when the original unanimous-consent agreement was entered into. If I had been present I would have requested a quorum call, because the agreement includes a provision with respect to a vote on the final passage of the bill. I have tried to follow that procedure since I have been a Member of the Senate. I have always felt that a quorum call should precede that kind of unanimous-consent agreement. It is true that I should have been here, but I will leave it to my colleagues to decide whether or not I have not been present in the Chamber as much as any Senator can be expected to be present and at the same time carry on the other work of the Senate, as well as my duties as minority leader. As I say, I was not here when the original agreement was entered into, but the Senator who sat in my chair—

Mr. CHAVEZ. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WHERRY. I have only 5 minutes allotted to me. However, I am glad to yield to the Senator from New Mexico if he wishes to ask me a question.

Mr. CHAVEZ. I agree with the Senator from Nebraska. At the moment members of the Committee on Appropriations are expected to attend a meeting of the committee. If we are attending such a meeting downstairs, it is impossible to agree to any unanimous-consent agreement that may be offered in our absence. There are approximately only a half-dozen Senators on the floor at the present time. I for one feel we should have a quorum call. I would like to submit an amendment to the pending measure. I believe the Senator from Texas is technically correct. However, in the future I wish such procedure as the Senator from Nebraska suggests could be followed. I know that unanimous consent was given in this instance, and the Senator from Texas is therefore correct. However, in the future under such circumstances we should have a quorum call. I should like to submit an amendment with reference to Spain, inasmuch as we are about to take care of the hungry people of Yugoslavia. There are other places in the world that should be taken care of, too.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Nebraska has expired.

Mr. WHERRY. May I have additional time?

Mr. McCARRAN. I am glad to yield an additional 5 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Senator from New Mexico for his observations. He has had long experience in the Senate. He knows how important it is to expedite the work of the Senate. I know that when we approach the end of a session late in the evening the tendency is not to have a quorum call. However, it is my opinion that before agreements to vote are entered we should have a quorum call on important amendments, and as well as on the passage of a bill.

I have not had lunch, and there is a hearing before the Committee on Appropriations which I should like to attend.

The other day when I came to the Chamber during the discussion of the unanimous-consent agreement I asked that the consent agreement be modified, because I thought additional amendments might be offered. My statement in that respect is found in the colloquy following the unanimous-consent request. I requested that if additional amendments were offered 20 minutes be allowed for a discussion of each amendment, with 10 minutes allotted to each side. I made such request in order to protect Senators who may wish to offer additional amendments. I thought it would protect the rights of Senators who were not present at the time the unanimous-consent agreement was entered into. I made the request in good faith.

I also requested that the question of the germaneness of an amendment be included in the modified agreement. I was merely protecting the rights of those who would have objected if such a modification had not been included. I did not think for a moment that with the insertion of a provision requiring germaneness, thus barring any amendment which dealt with civil rights any Senator would be deprived of the opportunity of offering any other amendment appropriate to the bill, in view of the fact that the hour for a vote on the bill was stated in the agreement and the time for debate was to be limited to 20 minutes on each amendment. I have the very highest regard for the distinguished Senator from Texas, and he was very cooperative in arriving at the unanimous-consent agreement, and at what I would call the amended amendment to it. He agreed to it. A few moments ago he said that he had to protect the rights of Senators.

Of course, technically if a Senator wishes to raise the question of germaneness, he has the right to do so. That right exists with respect to any amendment. We could debate the issue, and we could accept, or not, the interpretation of the Presiding Officer with respect to it. However, that does not foreclose a method of procedure by which it would be possible to get a vote on the amendment offered by the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND].

Personally I would deeply appreciate it, in view of the situation and the effect it would have on obtaining future unanimous-consent agreements, if the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY], in line with the observations made by the Senator from California, would permit his

amendment to be considered, with the understanding that debate on it would be limited to 20 minutes, with 10 minutes allotted to each side, and that a vote on it be then taken. If the Senator from Texas would agree to such procedure, it would preserve the rights of all Senators, and I am satisfied that in the future it would not create difficulty on getting unanimous-consent agreements. Otherwise, if we are to rely on technicalities we may be forced to see to it that a quorum call is had under similar circumstances, and great care in that respect would have to be exercised. It may be that Senators who are today relying on technicalities will be the first to say, "Let us waive this right. It is not important. Let us expedite the work of the Senate."

I hope and pray that the distinguished Senator from Texas will allow this amendment to be considered under a 20-minute limitation, and permit a vote to be taken on it. If we can do so, it will help the unanimous-consent procedure, and there will not be any hesitancy about continuing to enter into unanimous-consent agreements. Otherwise, those who are responsible will be forced to see to it that the rules are strictly interpreted with reference to unanimous-consent requests.

I thank the Senator from Nevada for giving me time. I hope the distinguished Senator from Texas will agree that it is the proper procedure to expedite the work of the Senate to give us an opportunity to vote on the amendment.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, in response to the urgent language of the Senator from Nebraska, I yield such time as is necessary to the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I should like to make one or two observations. I think the chairman is entirely correct, for this reason; we had no hearings whatever on this proposal. It was not suggested to the committee at all during the hearings. No member of the committee offered an amendment of this kind. That includes the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], who, I am sure, is sympathetic to this idea. In fact, no amendment dealing with this subject was considered.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Just a moment.

Under the normal procedures, proposals which have not been considered in committee are not usually accepted on the floor of the Senate.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, before the Senator leaves that point, will he yield for a question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I am not sure about this, but I am asking for information. Was the amendment of the Senator from Nevada considered by the committee?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was not.

Mr. WHERRY. My understanding is that on Friday before the Senate took a recess the committee was perfectly willing to accept the amendment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The amendment of the Senator from Nevada is not a

matter of substance at all. It deals only with the procedure of making the money available. It does not go to anything of substance. On the other hand, here we have an entirely new subject matter introduced, a matter which I think the Parliamentarian will have to hold is not germane. The amendment of the Senator from Nevada is in no sense comparable to the amendment of the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. WHERRY. I think the amendment of the Senator from Nevada is far-reaching. It is my opinion that if there were an unexpended balance the Senator's amendment would provide not only the authority, but the appropriations in the same amendment. If the McCarran amendment is adopted, if there is an unexpended balance the effect of the amendment will be not only to authorize, but to appropriate. That is pretty far-reaching. That is a pretty important amendment as a precedent for the future. I submit to the Senate that if the McCarran amendment was not presented to the committee, committee members should not complain that the amendment of the Senator from California was not submitted to the committee. Both amendments should follow the same procedure.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I see no analogy and no similarity whatever between the substance of the amendment of the Senator from Nevada and the amendment of the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point for a question?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I know that the Senator wants to be fair in this situation, as he always is.

In the first place, the amendment which I have offered neither authorizes new funds nor appropriates new funds. Both legislative committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committee, have already twice passed upon the subject, and the Committee on Appropriations has already twice passed upon the question of appropriations. So the amendment would not provide any new money. It would merely ask the executive branch to carry out the intent of Congress. So the question has had legislative consideration.

Secondly, I do not believe that even the able Senator from Arkansas would maintain that the United States Senate, consisting of 96 Members, should surrender all its legislative prerogatives into the hands of any 13-member committee. I speak as a member of the Armed Services Committee. I would not expect to foreclose amendments from the floor by Senators other than those who are members of the Armed Services Committee. That question goes to the heart of the subject of legislation.

Each of us has an obligation not only to the entire United States, but to our States. The fact of the matter is that there are vast areas in this country which are not even represented on the

Foreign Relations Committee. So we must not take the position that 96 Senators are foreclosed from offering amendments to a bill, and that we must merely rubber-stamp anything which any Senate committee reports to this body. On reflection, I do not believe that the Senate can accept any such doctrine.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, the authorization of \$75,000,000 was not made under existing conditions. As I recall, there was discretion for its use in the general area of China. The conditions which have arisen in the past few weeks, or the past 6 months, from one point of view have altered our relations in the Far East very substantially. I believe that a proposal of this kind should be considered very seriously.

I am slightly acquainted with some of the speeches of the Senator from California. I am not prepared to say that I agree or disagree finally with his views about what our foreign policy should be with regard to China. I think it is an extremely serious question. I would not want to do anything which might seem to commit us to a war with the existing Communist regime in China. At the moment I am inclined to think that that would be a disastrous policy. Whatever may have been done prior to the recent developments with regard to China, I think that question—to use a term to which I do not object—should be re-examined in view of recent developments. I do not believe that we ought to take precipitate action in a matter of this kind. I do not say that I would definitely oppose such action. I think that our action should be consistent with the position of the best minds we have, both military and civilian. I do not believe that the committee or the Senate, without any hearings and without having consulted our leaders in the military and civilian fields, should take such action as is proposed, which certainly could be subject to being interpreted as an overt act toward the reopening of the active intervention or active warfare between Chiang Kai-shek's forces and those of Red China. The position at the moment is an extremely delicate one. I do not wish to commit myself today. I do not believe that I know exactly what I think is the wisest thing to do; but the wrong thing to do is for the Senate, without ever having examined the question, and without having the benefit of any advice from our executive department, to take such action. That is the only point I make. The amendment is not germane to the subject matter of the measure under consideration, and I do not think it ought to be passed at this time. I see no reason why the Senator from California cannot this afternoon introduce a bill which would go to the committee, where it would be immediately subjected to study. I do not say that I would be against the proposal. I am against it being adopted in this fashion, without any hearings and without any advice.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know what the Secretary of Defense, the Secre-

tary of State, or the President would say about it as of this moment.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield for a question.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Does the Senator know that 2 years ago the Senator from California submitted a resolution in which he requested that consideration be given to an examination of the entire Far Eastern policy? The resolution was referred to the Senator's committee, but no hearing was ever held on it. Does the Senator know that this amendment was introduced in the committee in the belief—and I believe there was fair reason for the belief—that funds in substantial part would be used for the help of the Republic of China? For 2 years, with two different amounts of \$75,000,000 authorized and appropriated, an infinitesimal amount, if any, has been spent. That is the reason why the Senator from California feels that it is necessary to proceed in this way.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As I have tried to point out, whatever may have been done 6 months, a year, or 2 years ago is not very pertinent to what we ought to do in the immediate difficulties which confront us. We did a number of things back in those days we might not want to do now. I certainly think that what has been suggested by the Senator from California is a matter we ought to examine with a view to determining just how far we desire to go.

I believe the Senator from California stated on the floor that we ought to advance and help in every way attacks by Chiang Kai-shek's forces on Red China, and so on. That may turn out to be our policy; but it is not our policy as yet. I must say that I am very fearful of becoming involved in China, whereas our real enemy is not China at all. That is the secondary enemy. The primary enemy is in Moscow, as the Senator knows, and the inspiration for all these moves in the Far East, in the Middle East, and in Europe, comes from Moscow.

Mr. President, I do not believe our objectives are different at all. We may disagree as to what is the most effective way to reach the objectives. I know the Senator from California is just as sincere and anxious to promote the safety and preserve the integrity of this country as I am, but there is always room for legitimate differences as to the best way to accomplish that objective. That is the only difference between us.

We are in a period when very difficult decisions must be made. As I have tried to say on one or two occasions, this is a time when as respects both Houses of Congress and the Executive, there is no longer room for personalities, when we must close ranks, and try to develop some kind of concrete action in the near future.

In my opinion, the worst thing that could happen would be the creation of the impression, either in the minds of our allies or in the minds of our enemies, that we were all torn up, that we did not know what we were about, that we were fighting among ourselves. I think we have got to compose our differences.

The Senator says he has sent several amendments or bills of a similar nature to the committee. I do not recall—and, of course, the Senator from California knows that I do not set the agenda of that committee—why such a bill was not considered or reported.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I should like to observe that I did not become a member of the Foreign Relations Committee until the Eighty-first Congress, and I know the Senator from Arkansas became a member of the committee during the Eighty-first Congress. I am sure the Senator will remember that during the late spring of 1949 we spent days and weeks in reviewing the situation in the Far East, listening to the testimony of military men, listening to the testimony of Navy men, and of the State Department, and in obtaining all the information we could get with relation to the far-eastern situation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. McMAHON. It was the full committee which heard that testimony. The testimony was not given in executive meeting, and the majority of the committee certainly did not exclude the minority. I can remember very well our distinguished colleague, the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG], who, unfortunately, is not with us now because of illness, being present at those meetings. I can remember the active part he took during those deliberations. It may be true, as the Senator from California said, that he did not secure a hearing on his specific proposal, but that there was not a very thoroughgoing review of the Chinese situation, and the oriental situation I think is contradicted by the record.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for reminding me of the hearings on the far-eastern situation. I do recall now that we went over the whole program very carefully. Particularly I recall that the Korean ECA situation was discussed and rediscussed. As a matter of fact, at that time, as the Senator will recall, I moved to cut the Korean appropriation to \$50,000,000, from \$150,000,000. We also discussed the area of the Chinese appropriation. I do not think it ever was specifically for the Republic of China. Discretion was left to the Executive to use the appropriation in that general area.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arkansas yield to me for an observation?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. LUCAS. I invite the Senator's attention and the Senate's attention to the report, under the caption "The main purpose of the bill":

This assistance, most of which will be in the form of food, is being provided in order to assist the Yugoslav people to avoid economic havoc arising out of unusual drought conditions during 1950 and thereby to maintain their independence from the Soviet Union which can be expected to do its utmost to encourage the disintegration of an independent Yugoslavia.

This is emergency legislation, as I understand the report of the committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

Mr. LUCAS. So, it ought to be passed with all convenient speed. Yet when we read the amendment offered by the able Senator from California we find:

This act shall not become effective until at least \$38,000,000 of the \$75,000,000 appropriated for the purpose of carrying out section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, has been expended or obligated for expenditure for assistance to the Republic of China.

If the amendment offered by the Senator from California is adopted, then, before we can do anything for Yugoslavia, it will be necessary to carry out the conditions set forth in the amendment of the Senator from California. The Senate well knows that the State Department, which will have the power to do what the Senator from California expects to be done by his amendment, is not going to expend \$38,000,000 for some time, and it is not going to obligate that sum for some time. If the State Department has to go into this phase of the program at this particular time, I undertake to say that it will be probably many, many days before the Department finally determines how it is going to obligate the \$38,000,000; therefore, the result of the amendment will be to defeat the very program the Senate of the United States is seeking to put through.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish to make one observation before yielding. I appreciate the contribution by the majority leader. Obviously, adoption of the amendment offered by the Senator from California would cause considerable delay in putting into effect the proposed legislation which is under consideration. Even with the best of good will, the expenditure and obligation of the funds would necessarily take a substantial time. It is important that the food be made available to Yugoslavia prior to the next crop year. That is when the real crisis will come in Yugoslavia. I believe the testimony was that it would be reached along in February, March, and April. If we now get into a controversy over the matter involved in the amendment of the Senator from California, it is obvious that it will take longer than that actually to obligate this substantial amount of funds.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield for a question.

Mr. KNOWLAND. First, if the Senator from Arkansas will permit, I should like to place in the RECORD section 303 of title 3 of Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress, and also section 8, which relates to section 303, of Public Law 621, of the Eighty-first Congress, second session, which relates to the \$75,000,000 fund.

There being no objection, the sections referred to were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SEC. 303. In consideration of the concern of the United States in the present situation in China, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$75,000,000 in addi-

tion to funds otherwise provided as an emergency fund for the President, which may be expended to accomplish in that general area the policies and purposes declared in this act. Certification by the President of the amounts expended out of funds authorized hereunder, and that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of such expenditures, shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amounts expended.

SEC. 8. Section 303 of such act is hereby amended by designating such section as subsection (a) and by adding thereto subsection (b) to read as follows:

"(b) In addition to the amounts heretofore authorized to be appropriated, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$75,000,000, to be used as provided in subsection (a) of this section, of which not more than \$35,000,000 may be accounted for as therein provided and any amount accounted for in such manner shall, with the exception of \$7,500,000, be reported to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives."

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Arkansas first, if he does not recognize that what the amendment seeks has been authorized by Congress not only once but on two occasions, so that under the Knowland amendment all that is necessary is an administrative act by the executive branch of the Government to carry out the intent of Congress.

The second point is that the full needs of the Republic of China have been carefully surveyed by a group which was in the Republic of China, and received the figures from the Government of the Republic, that those figures have been sent on from the Far East to the Government of the United States, and have been in Washington for at least 2 months; so that, so far as surveying the needs is concerned, all the necessary information is presently available in the hands of the executive branch of the Government of the United States.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator if he interprets the language appropriating the \$75,000,000 as meaning that this money must be given to or spent upon the Republic of China, that is General Chiang Kai-shek's government.

Mr. KNOWLAND. No. I will say, as I explained, I think before the Senator came into the Chamber, that the legislative history of it was that the first amendment I submitted provided the aid specifically for the Republic of China consisting of about \$125,000,000. We had a considerable discussion in the combined committee. There was some objection to giving the Republic of China anything. There were some who wanted to give less, and some who wanted to give the Republic of China more. We had Admiral Badger before us. We questioned him on the needs of the Republic of China. I believe the Senator from Maryland [Mr. TYDINGS] or one of the other members of the combined committees had asked, "Cannot we agree upon \$10,000,000?" That question was put to Admiral Badger. His testimony

was that the minimum amount they would need in order to do any kind of a job for the Republic of China was \$75,000,000. That is the legislative history of the figure \$75,000,000.

The committee was still in dispute. Finally the Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] suggested, so that we could make a unanimous report of the combined committees, the language "in the general area of China." The argument was made—and quite properly, I think—that we could not be certain that the Republic of China would still be in existence when the funds were provided; perhaps the Republic of China would have been overwhelmed by that time.

So, in order to provide some flexibility to the administration in the use of the funds, so that they would be available perhaps in southeast Asia or elsewhere in the vicinity of China, we agreed upon that language. None of us thought China would be excluded in that situation or that the funds would be put into a deep freeze, so that they could not be used to help defend the Island of Formosa, which many of us believe is vital to the security of the entire defense perimeter in that area of the world. That is the legislative history of that matter.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I think the Senator from California has accurately stated the legislative history; and from his point of view, he had that in mind. However, the fact is that we did not provide that the money would be spent by or given to the Republic of China. I happen to be one member of the Foreign Relations Committee who would not have gone along with such a bill. I objected to the China-aid bill, and I offered amendments to the Korean bill.

So it is not correct to say that the Congress has appropriated \$75,000,000 for the Republic of China. That simply is not a fact. The money was appropriated to be spent in that general area.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not yield at the moment. The Senator from California has made his speech, and now I should like to have a little time in which to present my own thoughts. I shall yield to the Senator a little later.

Today, Indochina, in southeast Asia, is in the throes of a civil war brought on by Ho Chi-minh and his adherents against the established authorities there. I think it is very pertinent for us to consider whether the funds should be spent in Indochina; at least, that should be considered. We know that the funds of our Government are not unlimited, and that we must get a dollar's worth of value for every dollar we spend in this field.

Therefore, Mr. President, in view of the situation today, we should give very serious consideration to what we do with our money. I, for one, do not want to make a snap judgment in regard to a matter which would constitute an overt act and certainly could be considered by the rest of the world as a step by us

toward entering into a war with the rest of China.

There is a point which I should like to mention in order to impress upon the Senator from California that there are Members of the Senate who have very different views from his about our ultimate over-all security.

The Senator from California—and quite properly and legitimately, from his point of view—sees our entire future and safety in Asia. I happen to disagree with him.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Oh, Mr. President—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I wish to make one or two points without being interrupted.

Mr. KNOWLAND. As a matter of personal privilege, Mr. President, when my position is unintentionally misrepresented here on the floor, I should like to have an opportunity to state what my position really is.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Very well; I yield on a question of personal privilege.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I wish to say that I have never taken the position that our whole future is wrapped up in Asia. On the contrary, I have supported the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY] and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] in connection with all proposed legislation calling for aid by us to Europe.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree that perhaps I overstated the case. However, I believe that every time the Senator from California has made speeches here in the Senate, many of which are extremely well prepared and good, they nearly always present that point of view.

As I have said, I am not criticizing the Senator from California for that. He is acquainted with that area, and it is perfectly proper for him to present that viewpoint. However, certainly it is accurate to say that the emphasis in the Senator's viewpoint is upon the Far East, as are most of his speeches and discussions. I have read them with much interest, and I must say they are well prepared and excellent. The Senator has just been in that area of the world on a trip, and so forth; and he is well qualified to speak regarding it.

However, I must say that from my point of view our really basic relations in this world are with and toward Europe. Our basic institutions, including the legislative branch of our Government, our religious system, and most of the ancestry of the people of the United States, derive from Europe, not from the Far East. We have connections there that are very significant in an all-out struggle for survival. In Europe there are organized governments which have institutions similar to ours. When people really are in desperate straits I think they are inclined to cooperate.

The people of Europe understand our system of society much better than do the people of the Far East. I do not say this in criticism of anyone; it is simply a fact of life. In fact, those societies in Europe are capable of being directed either for or against us much more affirmatively in the long run, than is the Far East. The productive power in the case of steel and similar commodities,

which I do not wish to review at this time, for we have discussed them many times, is much greater in Europe. Europe can be an offensive power if directed by the Russians, I think, to a much greater extent than in the case of China, especially if we get away from land warfare, where great masses of troops are a major consideration. In other words, if we get into push-button warfare or aerial warfare or other types of warfare which are largely dependent upon the developments of science, Europe will be much more important.

I happen to think that it would be much more dangerous to us if western Europe and England were to fall under the domination of the Kremlin than if Asia were to fall under Kremlin domination. Of course, it would be better if none of them fell under the domination of the Kremlin; but if we have to make a choice in connection with that matter, as it increasingly seems likely that we may have to, I would say that our emphasis should be placed upon the society and the peoples in western Europe; I think that should be our objective.

I recognize that there is a fundamental difference between the objective of the Senator from California and my own, and it is one which must be weighed carefully in connection with the consideration of these matters and these legislative proposals. I am not willing, and I do not think our Government is in a position, to make a snap decision in regard to a matter of this much importance, which the Senator from California is seeking to have the Senate act upon now. I think the matter should be studied and carefully considered by the Senate.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I wish to speak in behalf of the bill providing authority for the appropriation of funds for Yugoslavia. I am in favor of the passage of this bill because I conceive that it is in the minds and the purposes of all of us that the Soviet Government should not overrun and control the continent of Europe. If there is anyone who lacks interest in that objective, I can readily understand why such a person would vote against this measure authorizing an appropriation for Yugoslavia.

One has only to look at the map of the Mediterranean to realize that the country of Yugoslavia, with its two-hundred-fifty-odd miles of coast-line as the crow flies, and probably double that amount if the indentations of the coast are included, could be a serious menace if it were under the control of the Soviet Government. It represents an ideal location for nests of submarines. The only location which perhaps would be better in that respect would be Greece; but for the time being—and permanently, we hope—we have saved Greece from conquest by the Soviets. We must help Yugoslavia for the same reason—we have saved Greece—to prevent her conquest by the Soviet Union.

For Russia to have usable submarine bases on the Mediterranean would be an inconceivable situation. True, we are informed that the shorter coast line of Albania, which continues to be under Soviet control, is provided with a least one major submarine base. This is a menace. But so long as Albania is cut off from land connected with the Soviet Republic by Greece and by a hostile Yugoslavia, the usefulness to the Soviet Union of the Albanian submarine base will remain very small indeed. So it is in the support of Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Government that we find our tactical and strategic reason for the appropriation called for by the pending bill.

The bill is designed primarily for the relief of populations; but it will not help from the military standpoint, because, unless the people of Yugoslavia or of any other European or Asiatic country are reasonably well taken care of according to their own standards, so far as food, clothing, and shelter are concerned, they are bound to fall under the influence of Soviet propaganda. So, from the military standpoint, the first thing we have to think about in connection with Yugoslavia is that her people shall not be subject to subversive influences; and the means of insuring that is to carry her people through the coming winter and into the harvest of next year, when they will again be able to feed themselves and to become prosperous as a result of their own work, done upon their own soil, under their own government.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All the time of the Senator from Texas has expired.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, if the Senator from Vermont desires to continue, I shall be glad to yield 5 or 6 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator may proceed for 5 or 6 minutes.

Mr. FLANDERS. I thank the Senator from Nevada. I may say that I had about concluded my argument and was planning to finish in a burst of oratory. However, the interruption has interfered with the burst of oratory, and I trust that I may be pardoned if I conclude without it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, in my opinion the sum which we are about to authorize in behalf of Yugoslavia, dollar for dollar, as was said here recently, is about the best investment we shall have been able to make by way of loans or grants to foreign countries, perhaps, aside from aid to Turkey. In the report prepared by the Committee on Foreign Relations, we find the following statement, which I think should go into the Record:

Tito espouses nationalist communism rather than imperialist communism which seeks to bind all Communists to the Kremlin. Soviet imperialist communism seeks to rob

all states of their independence. Titoism seeks the independence of Communist states from Soviet dictatorship.

Mr. President, I may be wrong about that, and the committee may be in error, but I am absolutely convinced that that is true. In 1948, before Tito broke with the Kremlin, there can be no doubt that Yugoslavia under Tito's domination was at that particular time the principal satellite of the Russian Government. Yugoslavia has now definitely broken with the Kremlin according to all the information which we have in this country. To me, the best evidence of the break with the Kremlin is to be found in the very thing we are doing here. In other words, the Russian Government definitely and categorically refuses to give any economic aid, or to give any relief in the way of food, to people who, as a result of the drought in that country, are on the verge of starvation. If that is not evidence of a break between the two governments, then in my opinion there can be no evidence of such a break. To me, it is conclusive evidence that there is a break, and that it is definite and final; and I sincerely hope that it is.

It seems to me that Tito's government is the one government in central Europe at the present time which stands against Russia and her satellites in their purpose to overrun the Balkans entirely. Perhaps they can overrun them anyway, but at least the Yugoslavs at the present time have 32 divisions, fighting men, if you please, Mr. President, who, I believe, despite what others may think, will fight if and when the time comes. Certainly by giving this small amount of aid to Yugoslavia, which will reflect itself in the army and in the strengthening of Tito's government as a whole, we are doing a very helpful thing.

A moment ago the Senator from Vermont spoke of what had happened in Greece. The truth of the matter is that the guerrillas are out of Greece at the present time, in my judgment, basically because of what Tito has done. In other words, Tito has drawn off his forces around the Greek border, and that is one of the primary reasons for what we find in Greece at the present time. Had Tito continued the course he was pursuing prior to 1948, there would have been a possibility that Greece at the present time would be dominated by the Communists. It is highly important to keep that area from going Communist, because, once Yugoslavia went Communist, Greece would go Communist, and Russia would then control the Mediterranean, a thing which she has sought for a very long time.

I desire to discuss one other point briefly. I hope every Senator will read the report which has been prepared by the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is a very important one. It is constructive and very brief, although it really tells the whole story.

I wish to speak briefly concerning the mathematics of the situation. Merely to equip a single American infantry division costs \$75,000,000. It costs another \$94,000,000, or approximately \$5,000 per man, to maintain such a division at full

strength for a year. The grand total is about \$170,000,000, the cost of maintaining one American division in this country for 1 year at the present time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. LUCAS. May I have 3 minutes more?

Mr. McCARRAN. I yield 3 minutes more to the Senator from Illinois.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois may proceed for three additional minutes.

Mr. LUCAS. Tito, as I said before, commands 32 divisions. If Tito is kept in power, these divisions, I am convinced, will fight in case the Kremlin attacks. The Congress is being asked to appropriate less than one-third of what it would cost to equip and maintain an American division for 1 year, in reality, in order to keep 32 divisions going in Yugoslavia. That is why I said a moment ago that from my own viewpoint the dollars we are spending now are the best dollars we shall have spent in a very long time in Europe, because, as I view the matter, the \$39,000,000 we are appropriating is enough to keep the 32 divisions going, and yet it represents but a third of the amount required to equip and maintain one American division in the United States for a year.

Even in simple terms of dollars and cents, if any Senator is economically minded about it and desires to oppose it upon grounds of economy, it seems to me it would be rather foolish to do so, in view of the example which I have given.

Mr. President, those are the two points which I desired to make briefly with respect to the amendment offered by the Senator from California. I hope the Senate will not adopt the amendment at this particular time. It is inconsistent with section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The amendment provides as follows:

This act shall not become effective until at least \$38,000,000 of the \$75,000,000 appropriated for the purpose of carrying out section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, has been expended for assistance to the Republic of China.

Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act does not, as the Senator from Arkansas said a moment ago, confine itself solely to China, but refers to funds which may be expended in that general area.

The Senator from California wants to expend \$38,000,000 of the \$75,000,000 for the Republic of China. Where is it to be spent? What use is to be made of it? That information would all come out in a hearing, I take it, with respect to the \$38,000,000 which the Senator wants to expend or at least to obligate for the purpose of helping the Republic of China. I did not hear the Senator's speech, but I doubt if he outlined what he would do with the \$38,000,000.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Illinois has expired.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I yield a minute so that the Senator from California may make his statement.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I will say to the Senator from Illinois that when he was out of the room I pointed out that there have already come from the Republic of China requests which have been screened by the proper authorities, for funds in order to maintain a body of non-Communist troops on the island of Formosa, which is an even larger body of troops than is the group in Yugoslavia.

Mr. LUCAS. Very well. But I think Congress should know for what this \$38,000,000 would be spent. Suppose it were to be used to help blockade China. Would the people of the country agree to that? In other words, what does the Senator mean when he says he wishes to have expended \$38,000,000 for the Republic of China at this particular time in the crisis which exists in the Far East? The President now has the power to spend \$75,000,000 in that area, but by the Senator's amendment we would be telling him to spend \$38,000,000 for the Republic of China. If we are going to tell him that, we who are responsible for the amendment ought to indicate to him, before it is appropriated, how he is to spend it and how the Secretary of State would spend it or how the military forces would spend it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] intimated that he wanted some time. So far as I am concerned, he may have the remainder of my time.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I should like to say a word in order to make it perfectly clear that, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I am heartily supporting the Yugoslav bill, so-called. I also want to make it perfectly clear that the amendment of the Senator from California has my full approval. The \$38,000,000 provided by the amendment comes in the category of the \$75,000,000 which was definitely appropriated for China 2 years ago and continued last year, but was to be spent by the executive department in areas which needed it most.

I have been as much concerned as has been the Senator from California because practically nothing has been contributed to the Republic of China. As I understood, when the Korean crisis arose it was the policy of the Government to support the forces in Formosa against any attack which might come. In fact, we went so far as to say it was to be used to protect against an attack. I have been urging on the State Department and on the Department of Defense that such aid be given to the Nationalist forces to help them to defend themselves. I am not talking about the war in China as referred to by the Senator from Arkansas, but to the Nationalists there. I think the administration is open to criticism for not having given attention to this phase of the matter and in not using some of the appropria-

tion in that area. But I pass that for the moment, because we shall soon be discussing it when the Senator from California makes his motion to recommend the bill.

I listened to all the testimony with respect to the bill. I had as many doubts as had any other members of the committee. Every member of the committee had doubts. The reason for the hunger in Yugoslavia today is that the Yugoslav farmers themselves have been dragging their feet when it comes to producing because of Tito's regulations with regard to farming, and so forth. It was due to their own fault and to the regulations of the government that food was short. But I was convinced that the case had not been overstated when a representative of our own Agriculture Department, who has been in that country 2 or 3 years and has made a complete study of the whole situation, pointed out that the famine this year probably was unprecedented in the history of that area, and that unless aid came very quickly there would be widespread famine and distress. If that should come about, then we would be faced with the danger that if we declined to render aid, aid would come from the other side of the iron curtain, and Yugoslavia would become a satellite of Russia.

So we had all the humanitarian inducements to save people from distress, and we had all the inducements growing out of the feeling that it was necessary and desirable at this time to keep Yugoslavia on this side of the curtain and a member of the western nations who are resisting Communist domination from Moscow. Of course, we know that Yugoslavia is a Communist state, but it is no longer, in my judgment, connected with or dominated by Moscow. It is opposed to Moscow and is trying to prevent being taken over by Moscow. When we considered the eastern end of the Mediterranean in its relation to Turkey and Italy, looking at the matter from a purely military standpoint, I was convinced from the testimony of our military advisers that the thing to do was to give this aid to keep 30 divisions in Yugoslavia in line with the western group of nations if there should be any invasion of Europe.

Mr. President, I support this bill and I hope it will pass.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I have no desire to take up the time of the Senate, except to make one expression, and that is that the amendment which I have offered will take nothing from the effectiveness of this bill. It will permit the utilization of not to exceed \$50,000,999 from ECA funds for Yugoslav relief. Already \$12,000,000 has been morally committed for the relief of Yugoslavia, and \$38,000,000 more is requested by the bill. The amendment, if it is adopted, will eliminate the idea of having to make another appropriation. It will simply use not to exceed \$38,000,000 more than has been already used from ECA funds for relief purposes in Yugoslavia.

Mr. President, I repeat what I said a little while ago, that I have no faith in Mr. Tito. I do not believe he means to be friendly to this country. I do not believe he is at heart other than the reddest of red Communists. I do not believe he has any sympathy with our form of government. But the people of Yugoslavia may be starving and may be dying, and it may be that by this shot in the dark we may be able to strengthen ourselves in central Europe.

So far as I am concerned, without any faith in Mr. Tito whatever, because I think he is a brigand and a murderer of the first order—he has murdered his way into the position which he now occupies, and he is destroying every phase of godliness that there is in his country—at the same time, if it will save American lives when the struggle comes, which I believe is coming, between this country and Russia, I am willing to go along with the bill. But I do not think we should make another appropriation and thus lay another burden on the taxpayers of America when we have more than enough money to carry out all the plans of ECA, and, at the same time, to take care of this item out of ECA funds.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The hour of 4 o'clock having arrived, the question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. MAHON], for himself and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY]. Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested.

Mr. CONNALLY. Then I cannot proceed.

Mr. WHERRY. I shall be glad to withhold my suggestion of the absence of a quorum.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I should like to state that the committee accepts the amendment offered by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state that the so-called McMahon-Connally amendment, with respect to religious persecution, is the pending amendment. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. The clerk will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Gillette	McCarthy
Anderson	Gurney	McClellan
Brewster	Hayden	McFarland
Bricker	Hendrickson	McKellar
Bridges	Hickenlooper	McMahon
Butler	Hill	Magnuson
Byrd	Holland	Malone
Cain	Hunt	Martin
Capehart	Ives	Millikin
Carlson	Jenner	Morse
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	Mundt
Clements	Johnston, S. C.	Murray
Connally	Kefauver	Neely
Cordon	Kerr	Nixon
Donnell	Kilgore	O'Connor
Douglas	Knowland	Pepper
Dworshak	Langer	Robertson
Ecton	Leahy	Russell
Ellender	Lehman	Saltonstall
Flanders	Long	Schoeppel
Fear	Lucas	Smith, Maine
Fulbright	McCarran	Smith, N. J.
George		Smith, N. C.

Stennis	Thye	Wiley
Taft	Tobey	Williams
Taylor	Tydings	Young
Thomas, Okla.	Watkins	
Thomas, Utah	Wherry	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Under the unanimous-consent agreement, the question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON] for himself and on behalf of the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY]. The clerk will state the amendment.

The CHIEF CLERK. At the proper place in the bill, it is proposed to insert the following:

SEC. —. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair understands that all time for debate on the amendment has expired. The question is on agreeing to the amendment which the clerk has read.

The amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. McCARRAN. Mr. President, I offer my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 1, line 5, through 8, it is proposed to strike out all of section 2 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Administration Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I accept the amendment offered by the Senator from Nevada.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the terms of the unanimous-consent agreement, debate on the amendment is limited to 20 minutes, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN] and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY].

Mr. McCARRAN. So far as I am concerned, I have no further remarks to make.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If no other Senator wishes to be recognized, the question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. McCARRAN].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MAGNUSON and Mr. McMAHON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON].

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I make a point of order against the amend-

ment offered by the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I have not yet offered the amendment. I should like to have an opportunity to explain it. I am entitled to be recognized for 10 minutes. I thought some other amendments would be accepted by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and we could get such amendments out of the way first.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair has recognized the Senator from Washington.

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The legislative clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 3, line 11, it is proposed to insert a new section, as follows:

SEC. 5. At least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liners and tankers) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels, if available.

On page 3, line 17, strike out "6" and insert in lieu thereof "7."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the terms of the unanimous-consent agreement entered into, 20 minutes of debate is allowed on the amendment. The time for debate is to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY].

Mr. MAGNUSON. Mr. President, I shall take only a few minutes. The purpose of my amendment is to again place into the economic aid acts the restriction that at least 50 percent of the goods which America sends to foreign countries shall be transported in American-flag ships if they are available. This is the only way in which we can keep our merchant marine alive. The amendment would bring the pending bill into conformity and uniformity with all other foreign-aid acts. I am sure there will be no objection to it.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Why not make it 100 percent? If we are to fly our flag over there, why not let the people over there see it as often as possible, since we are to spend our dollars over there?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I should like to make it 100 percent, but as a practical matter is it not advisable, because in many cases the availability of American-flag ships is such that they could not transport 100 percent of the goods. In this particular case there may have to be some deviation, as provided in the bill, if the ships are available. Like the Senator from Arkansas, I believe that the day is coming soon when we can ship in American-flag ships a great deal more of the goods we are providing for Europe.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amend-

ment offered by the Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I offer the amendment which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

Mr. McMAHON. I am informed that the chairman of the committee has agreed to take this amendment to conference.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the end of the bill it is proposed to insert a new section, as follows:

SEC. —. At the termination of each 3-month period after aid has been extended under this act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said 3-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, so far as the chairman of the committee is concerned, and the committee, we are willing to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it be read for the information of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the end of the bill, it is proposed to add the following new section:

SEC. 7. This act shall not become effective until at least \$38,000,000 of the \$75,000,000 appropriated for the purpose of carrying out section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, has been expended or obligated for expenditure for assistance to the Republic of China.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President—

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I have not yet offered the amendment. I wish to explain it in the 10 minutes available to me.

Mr. CONNALLY. How can the Senator have it read and speak on it without offering it?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have not yielded for the purpose of the Senator making a point of order. I shall offer the amendment, but I desire the floor so that I may explain it.

Mr. CONNALLY. The Senator will get the floor when his time comes. I insist on my right to make a point of order.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have not yielded for that purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair has recognized the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President—

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I make the point of order—

Mr. KNOWLAND. I have not yielded for that purpose, I respectfully say.

Mr. CONNALLY. I yielded to the Senator and let him speak for 10 or 15 minutes, but now he has not the courtesy to yield to the Senator from Texas.

Mr. KNOWLAND. No; because I do not want my amendment ruled out by the chairman before I have an opportunity to explain the background for it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time is running.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, since it is obvious that a point of order is to be made, I think the Senate should understand the background of this situation. In the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of December 8 it will be found that there was a quorum call, as is usual when a unanimous-consent agreement is entered into, in connection with the railroad labor bill. That information is found on page 16494. Fifteen pages later in the RECORD, without a quorum call, the original unanimous-consent agreement was amended to include the bill for Yugoslavia. The agreement also contained a provision that amendments which were not germane should not be included. My general understanding of the purpose of such a provision is to prevent, for example, an FEPC amendment, or some civil-rights amendment being offered. I believe that my amendment is quite germane, although technically it may not be, under this provision.

It is therefore foreclosed, even though I was present at the time of the original unanimous-consent agreement, but then I left the Senate Chamber to participate in hearings of the Senate Armed Services Committee. I was engaged in Senate business. I had no idea that a unanimous-consent agreement was to be entered into in connection with the Yugoslavian situation. Had I been present, I would at least have insisted that I be allowed to offer this amendment. So I am foreclosed from offering the amendment if, presumably, the Chair sustains the point of order.

Mr. President, I am prepared to support some aid for Yugoslavia, even though I recognize that it has a Communist government, although it is temporarily not alined with the Kremlin. On two different occasions, in the first session of the Eighty-first Congress and again in the second session, the Congress provided \$75,000,000 for the general area of China, with the clear intent that at least a substantial part should go to the Republic of China. First, there was authorization legislation, which was later confirmed by appropriation legislation. Then the money was put into a deep freeze and buried, so that little if any of the money was used. So the only point at issue is that it seems to me that, since communism is global in character, we have a right to say that our Pacific flank is no less important than our Adriatic flank.

The able Senator from Illinois [Mr. LUCAS] stated that Mr. Tito had approximately 32 divisions. If those divisions are on the Russian model of 10,000 men each, that means 320,000 men in the Communist army of Mr. Tito, who is temporarily not alined with the Kremlin. If those divisions are approximately as large as ours, consisting of 15,000 men, it means a total of 470,000 men. But I call attention to the fact that on the island of Formosa there are more than 600,000 non-Communists; and if it is im-

portant from a manpower situation to give aid to Communist Tito, it is equally important to give aid to the non-Communist Republic of China, which has been our ally in two world wars, is a permanent member of the United Nations, and is a permanent member of the Security Council.

I point out that the Republic of China has never shot down any American planes and Mr. Tito's Yugoslavia has. The Republic of China has consistently supported in the United Nations the efforts of the free world against aggression in Korea. China has voted with the free nations of the world 100 percent of the time I submit that the record of Yugoslavia is that she has very seldom voted with the free nations of the world.

I have been on the island of Formosa twice. In Formosa there is freedom of the press. There is freedom of religion for every church of every type and character. I submit that that situation does not exist in Yugoslavia.

I have no objection, in order to drive a wedge into the ranks of the satellites, to giving some aid to Yugoslavia, and will support it. But I also say that it is equally important, since communism is global in character, to take advantage of some 600,000 non-Communist troops who are subject to aggressive action by communism, across the straits between the Republic of China on Formosa, and Red China on the mainland.

That is the basic issue. This amendment does not provide a single extra dollar. The money has already been appropriated by the Congress. It does not provide a new authorization. The authorization was made in two sessions of the Eighty-first Congress, by the Congress of the United States.

When it was obviously shown that the legislative history was that the Republic of China was meant, some flexible language was inserted so that in case the Republic of China should be overwhelmed, the funds could be used in southeast Asia or elsewhere. But it was never intended, so far as the Republic of China was concerned, that the funds should be put in a deep freeze, and that the Republic of China should get very little, if anything, from the two appropriations of \$75,000,000.

Mr. President, I am forced into this situation because of the background which I have pointed out. There was no quorum call prior to the unanimous consent agreement. If the point of order is made and sustained, I do not intend to appeal from the decision of the Chair, but I do intend to offer a motion to recommit, reading as follows:

I move that the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia be recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report the bill back to the Senate forthwith, including therein all amendments agreed to by the Senate to date, together with the following amendment:

Then follows my amendment adding a new section at the end of the bill.

I am forced into this situation, because I am foreclosed from offering and

securing a vote on the amendment itself. All it will do will be at least to give the Senate an opportunity to vote on the question as to whether non-Communists in the Republic of China are at least worthy of as much consideration as the Communists of Yugoslavia.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, am I in order to make a point of order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STENNIS in the chair). Yes; the Senator is in order.

Mr. CONNALLY. I make a point of order on the amendment of the Senator from California.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from California propose his motion now?

Mr. KNOWLAND. No. I move my amendment, which is now subject to a point of order.

Mr. CONNALLY. I make the point of order that the amendment of the Senator from California is not germane as an amendment to the original bill. It is set forth clearly in the unanimous consent agreement that amendments have to be germane. I make the point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Texas desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. CONNALLY. No.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, it seems to me obvious that the amendment offered by the Senator from California is germane. Exactly the same question is involved in it as is involved in the bill. Many Senators may hesitate to vote for aid to a man who has killed American boys, who murdered Mikhailovich, unless the Senate is prepared to adopt, as a part of a general policy, that Nationalist China shall be treated in a similar way. Just as Yugoslavia is considered at least to be a diversionary force against Russia, so non-Communist China may be considered as a diversionary force against Communist China.

Mr. President, it seems to me the amendment is perfectly germane. It is clearly involved in the general subject of the bill. It is a part of the one general policy. I submit that the Chair should rule the amendment to be in order.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I wish to clear my mind on one point in regard to the question of germaneness. Did I understand the Senator from California to designate in his amendment the Republic of China?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes.

Mr. FLANDERS. Was there a Republic of China designated in the original legislation authorization, or was it some vaguer term like "in the general vicinity"?

Mr. KNOWLAND. In the original bill, in order to obtain a compromise and receive the support of those who would vote for aid to the Republic of China as well as those who would not, the general language was adopted "in the general area of China," but it was felt, I am sure, that no one would claim on the floor that the Republic of China was not one of the nations in the general area of China.

Mr. FLANDERS. It would seem to me, Mr. President, that in coming to a determination as to whether the amendment is out of order, consideration should be given to whether it introduces a new piece of legislation in that it restricts application of the fund to the Republic of China instead of to the general area.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. The section which is involved, section 303 of title III of Public Law 329, Eighty-first Congress, reads as follows:

In consideration of the concern of the United States in the present situation in China, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$75,000,000 in addition to funds otherwise appropriated as an emergency fund for the President, which may be expended to accomplish in that general area the policies and purposes declared in this act.

The amendment of the Senator from California now would direct the President to spend \$38,000,000 in the Republic of China, which clearly conflicts with the original language.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I should like to say I am in sympathy with the Senator from California in feeling that there has been a complete evasion of the intent of Congress in making the \$75,000,000 appropriation. I nevertheless feel strongly that anything which delays or cripples the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against a new nest of Russian submarine bases has got to be considered on its own merits. It is for that reason I hope that, so far as the substance is concerned, real justification will be found for ruling this particular amendment out of order.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FLANDERS. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is the Senator from Vermont familiar with the fact that while there may be potential submarine bases in Yugoslavia, there are also potential submarine bases and air bases in Formosa; that it was from Formosa that the Japanese war lords attacked the Philippines, and that we have a very deep obligation to the Philippines and to Australia? So if we are going to close the door to communism in the Adriatic, we should take some realistic and practical steps to close it in the Pacific Ocean as well.

Mr. FLANDERS. I may say to the Senator from California—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Permit the Chair to make an observation. It seems to the Chair that the point of order comes under the 20-minute rule. The unanimous-consent agreement provides that the time be divided equally between the mover of the amendment and the Senator from Texas [Mr. CONNALLY]. If there is going to be extended debate the Chair thinks the time limitation ought to be observed. Does the Senator from Texas wish the floor?

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, does the unanimous-consent agreement cover

debate on a point of order when the Chair is about ready to rule?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is discretionary with the Chair whether he wants to hear debate or not. He is glad to hear the Senator from Texas.

Mr. CONNALLY. I do not care to argue the point of order. It seems to me that under the unanimous-consent agreement it is perfectly obvious the amendment has no relation whatever to the bill, which deals exclusively with Yugoslavia. Now to endeavor to bring in Chiang Kai-shek is not germane at all. Besides, as pointed out a minute ago, the amendment does not even comprehend the original law, because instead of saying, "in the general area of China," which the authorization provided, it restricts itself to "assistance to the Republic of China." So the amendment narrows the original scope.

Mr. President, I do not care to argue the point of order. I simply think the amendment is not germane under the language of the act, and I submit the question to the Chair for decision.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, will the Senator from California yield to me for a question?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I do not have the time.

Mr. PEPPER. I did not understand there was any time limitation. As I understood, the Chair said discussion could be had in the discretion and indulgence of the Chair at this time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. If I may do so, I yield.

Mr. PEPPER. I regret I did not hear all of the learned address delivered by the Senator from California. I have read the able Senator's amendment, however. I do not know how he happened to have chosen the figure \$38,000,000. What I wanted to ask the Senator is, Does he know what commitments have already been made with respect to the \$75,000,000 provided for in the original act, which was to be spent in the general area of China?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I will answer the Senator from Florida in this way. The \$38,000,000 is to place the far eastern flanks on a parity with the situation dealt with in the particular bill before us. That is number one.

No. 2. It is within, and well within, the over-all figures of \$75,000,000, which the Congress has twice approved as a matter of policy, and twice approved as a matter of appropriation.

The third point is that with the exception of a very infinitesimal amount, there has been little, if anything, given to the Republic of China out of the two \$75,000,000 amounts. The last figures I saw showed that a considerable amount, in the neighborhood of from thirty to thirty-five million dollars, was left out of the last appropriation of some \$75,000,000. I do not have the most up-to-date figures, but that is, I believe, substantially correct.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield again?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes.

Mr. PEPPER. The reason I make the point is that on the one question whether

we would appropriate \$38,000,000 or not I might feel entirely different. But if we direct that \$38,000,000 be taken out of a particular appropriation we might be running the risk of taking away funds that had perhaps already been committed. For example, I remember distinctly that some of that money is going to Siam, to provide for its defense, and Siam has troops fighting with us in Korea. There might be other cases in which commitments of this money have been made, and the \$38,000,000 might not be available. If the Senator wants to have Congress appropriate \$38,000,000 of new money, so there would not be any possibility of conflict, that would be something else. Has the Senator assurance that \$38,000,000 of the particular fund he describes remains available and is not committed? That is something that should be considered.

Mr. KNOWLAND. In the first place, there have been two appropriations of \$75,000,000. Certainly in both of them it was not expected by the Congress that the Republic of China would be put into a deep freeze and not obtain any substantial help out of either of those \$75,000,000 appropriations.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I raise a point of order. I judge that debate on the amendment has been concluded by reason of the time factor, and that we ought to be debating the point of order. Should not the subsequent discussion be directed strictly to the point of order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question before the Senate is the point of order.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. The Chair does not mean to state, does he, that the point of order on the question of germaneness, which is being raised, is subject to the limitations of the unanimous-consent agreement?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair understands that it is discretionary as to whether debate shall be heard. The Chair has been very glad, indeed, to hear the debate, so far as it has covered the subject matter.

Unless some Senator has a point to make as to the germaneness of the amendment, the Chair is prepared to rule.

Mr. WHERRY. I thank the Chair for that observation, because it is in keeping with the decisions of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the only question in the mind of the Chair.

Unless some Senator has something to say that is particularly pertinent to the immediate question before the Chair, the Chair is prepared to rule.

By referring first to the provision contained in the unanimous-consent agreement:

That no amendment or motion that is not germane to the subject matter of the said bill shall be received—

We find that any motion or amendment must be germane to the subject matter of the bill.

What is the subject matter of the bill? It is "to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia."

In other words, there is a very broad opening there, but a very fine bead is drawn by the word "by." The words "furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia" seem to limit the entire scope of the bill. Strictly under those terms, the Chair thinks the point of order is well taken; and the Chair so rules.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I should like to observe that sometimes we move along very rapidly. I have prepared a motion to recommit, and I understand that the motion is in order following the third reading of the bill, just before the final passage of the bill. I wish to be protected in my right to offer that motion, and therefore I give notice that I intend to offer it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's motion will be in order at any time before the final passage of the bill.

The bill is open to further amendment.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, a further parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. WHERRY. When the Senator from California makes his motion to recommit, he then will have 10 minutes to speak on his motion, will he not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I am very happy to note that the Senate adopted the amendment offered by the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON]. That amendment, as I understand from reading it, requires, among other things, that there shall be a periodic report upon the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to the observance of basic human rights by the Government of Yugoslavia. It is the observation of basic human rights which lies at the very heart of the present critical dilemma with which the world is faced.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Let the Chair observe that the Senate is operating under a special limitation of debate, with 20 minutes allowed for debate on any motion or amendment. No amendment is pending, so far as the Chair understands, and no motion is pending.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I do not intend to take very much time. If necessary, I offer a technical amendment to strike out paragraph 3 (a) on page 2 of the bill, an amendment which I shall later withdraw.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Very well; the Senator from Wyoming may debate his amendment for 10 minutes.

Mr. O'MAHONEY. Mr. President, I am about to say that I have observed that section 3 of the bill provides that:

No assistance under authority of this act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States—

Containing certain undertakings.

I wish to make the record clear that, for my part, I believe that the provisions of the amendment of the Senator from Connecticut are just as binding as are the provisions of section 3 with respect to the agreement. As a member of the Appropriations Committee, I shall be free at all times to pass upon not only the agreement contained in section 3 and the reports which may be made upon the manner in which that agreement is to be carried out, but also the reports which are to be made with respect to the observance of basic human rights. I wish it to be clearly understood that I undertake no obligation, legal or moral, with respect to my judgment as a member of the Appropriations Committee to vote for or against any of the appropriations which are authorized in this measure.

I now withdraw my amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment of the Senator from Wyoming is withdrawn.

The bill is open to further amendment.

If there be no further amendment to be proposed, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was read the third time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I submit the motion, which I send to the desk and ask to have stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

I move that the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, be recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, with instructions to report the said bill back to the Senate forthwith, including all amendments agreed to by the Senate to date, together with the following amendment; viz, at the end of the bill, add the following new section:

"SEC. 7. This act shall not become effective until at least \$38,000,000 of the \$75,000,000 appropriated for the purpose of carrying out section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended, has been expended or obligated for expenditure for assistance to the Republic of China."

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, as I understand, I have 10 minutes in which to speak on the motion.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. The Senator from California is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I wish to point out to the Members of the Senate that, had it not been for the second unanimous-consent agreement, which was made some time after the first one, and appears in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 15 pages after the first one, for which there was properly a quorum call, although there was not a quorum call immediately prior to the second unanimous-consent agreement, the amendment would be germane to the bill. It is foreclosed by the second unanimous-consent agreement, immediately prior to which a quorum call was not had.

I wish to point out that if the Senate, consisting of 96 Members, representing the 48 States of the Union, surrenders the power to legislate into the hands of any committee of 13 members, regard-

less of how distinguished its members may be, we shall have completely surrendered into the hands of the committee the legislative power of the Senate of the United States.

If we are to discharge our responsibilities properly, I take it that we are not required to rubber-stamp the action of the Foreign Relations Committee or of the Armed Services Committee or of the Appropriations Committee; and I say that most respectfully, as a member of both the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee. Certainly I would never consider urging upon the Senate the passage of a bill, as reported by any of its committees, without the crossing of a "t" or the dotting of an "i," because the legislative power and the constitutional responsibility for foreign policy as well as for domestic policy rest in the hands of the Congress of the United States, of which the Senate is a coordinate branch.

I quite frankly admit that there is room for an honest difference of opinion as to whether we believe that in dealing with communism, an international world-wide menace, the door to Asia should be closed as tightly as the door to Europe is closed. However, I submit that is a very pertinent question in connection with the matter of foreign relations.

I speak as one who has supported the bipartisan foreign policy. However, it does not make sense for us to close the door of Europe against communism, but leave the door of Asia wide open to communism, when there are many persons who sincerely believe that if we permit the billion and one-half persons in Asia and all the vast stores of tin, rubber, petroleum, and other important products to be found in that part of the world to fall into the hands of the Soviet Union, it will be most difficult to stop aggressive communism in Europe alone. That is a basic issue which we are facing today, and I am forced to this parliamentary procedure because I was foreclosed by the unanimous-consent agreement to which I have already referred.

I now yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, in answer to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], I wish to point out that this would involve no delay, because the motion to recommit provides that the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations shall report back forthwith. There cannot be a delay of more than 24 hours at most, and it would be a very wise delay, for it would enable us then to provide some aid where it would help protect the American boys who are now fighting in Korea, at the same time that we are providing aid to save the starving people of Yugoslavia.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, the motion is made to recommit the bill to the committee for the purpose of having the committee report some provision to give money to the Republic of China. We all admire the zeal with which the Senator from California rushes forth, sword in hand, whenever anyone mentions the Chinese Nationalists or Chiang Kai-shek.

It is really a fine, loyal position for him to take. But, Mr. President, why should we restrict it to the Republic of China? I invite the attention of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS]. Why should we not give some of this money to Indochina? Why should we not bring in Burma and appropriate a large amount of money for Burma? Why not aid Pakistan? Why not aid other Asiatic countries? Why should we restrict it to the Republic of China?

The Senator says, "We have not done anything for China, and we are not doing anything for her." Did we not do something for China when she was supposed to be fighting the northern Chinese and the Communists? Did not the United States, from its coffers, hand over to Chiang Kai-shek \$2,000,000,000 in supplies and ammunitions? General Barr, an American, was in the Far East as an observer. He testified before our committee that Chiang Kai-shek's troops had never lost a battle as the result of lacking arms, supplies, or materials—which we were furnishing. The only battles they lost were those in which they did not want to fight, and in which they did not fight. The situation is quite different today. Do Senators want an all-out war with Red China?

Mr. President, why should the Senate recommit this bill? It is an important measure which has been carefully considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations. The committee held hearings. Witnesses appeared before the committee. The situation is important, and the demand is insistent. Everyone knows the attitude of communism in Europe. The pending bill is a vital one, designed to put a stop to Communist pressure on Yugoslavia and other Balkan states, upon Greece, and upon the Mediterranean area generally. I trust that the Senate will not vote to recommit the bill.

Why did not the Senator from California come before the committee when the bill was pending there to propose his amendment? He did not come. He was not even present when the unanimous-consent agreement was entered into in the Senate. The Senator says, "Mr. President, we are not going to permit one committee—we are not going to permit any committee—to take over the legislative duties of the United States Senate." The statement is gratuitous. We are not proposing to take over the duties of the Senate. Merely because the Senator does not happen to be present in the Senate when a unanimous-consent agreement is made is that a denial of the power, the authority, and the sovereignty of the Senate itself? The Senate is governed by rules. If we do not follow the rules, they can be invoked through points of order followed by appropriate action. One may not remain at home, or in a committee room, and expect to run the Senate.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CONNALLY. I yield.

Mr. LUCAS. If the Senator will permit me to make this observation in his time, I desire to say that it seems to me the important thing about the bill is that it is an emergency measure. It

has been reported as such. The Committee on Foreign Relations, at the request of the President and of the Secretary of State, were diligent in bringing this measure before the Senate, in order that we might make some disposition of it before this short session closes.

Mr. President, as surely as I stand here, if this bill is recommitted, the Yugoslavs will receive no aid during this brief session of the Congress, because the committee will take time to discuss this \$38,000,000 item, as to where it shall go and as to how it shall go, and as to how it shall be expended. Witnesses will have to appear. I undertake to say that we are jeopardizing our own interests through not speeding this measure on its way and appropriating the money it provides for Yugoslavia, if the drought and the resulting shortage of food are as reported to the Senate and to the people of the country.

The bill should be passed speedily in the interest of the safety and security of the country. With all due deference to my friend from California, and even though he may be justified later in seeking to have what he proposes done through a separate bill, I say it should not be tied into the pending bill, perhaps resulting in defeat of a measure which is so urgently needed at this particular time.

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Illinois that, if this proposal came before the Senate by the introduction of a separate bill, it would be another matter. The Senator from California could have such a bill considered by the appropriate committee, and it would be given proper consideration by the Senate. I submit that to tie down the present bill with an amendment of this sort would be destructive of the purposes of the bill. Furthermore, it would not, in the long run, accomplish what the Senator from California has in mind. If it is proposed to penalize the Yugoslavs in order to make a gesture toward the Chinese Nationalists, the result would be that neither of them would be served properly.

This is a vital measure. The emergency is upon us. We ought to act upon the bill as reported, and we ought to act promptly in order to get this relief to Yugoslavia. If we hesitate, if we play tricks here in considering this matter, the effect of it will be that the Yugoslavs will lose some of their ardor. They will begin to doubt our sincerity. They will begin to doubt our anxiety to give them aid. So, Mr. President, I oppose the motion to recommit, and I urge the Senate to vote it down, so that we may proceed to a vote upon the pending bill.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California has 6 minutes remaining.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall merely take 2 minutes, after which I want to yield some time, because certain questions have been raised. I want to be stopped at the expiration of the 2 minutes.

The question is: Why did not the Senator from California offer this amendment earlier?

I shall give a very real reason: It is because I had hoped that in the com-

muniqué which was issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain they would show that a firm stand would be taken in the Far East. But I did not expect the British Government to offer its hand of welcome into the United Nations to the bloody Chinese Communists who are killing United Nations forces in Korea today. I did not expect that to happen. That is why I was not before the committee earlier.

I called the attention of the Senate to the fact that from VJ-day until last year the Chinese Communists had suffered a million and a quarter casualties at the hands of the Chinese Nationalists. It is true that the Chinese Nationalist forces were being pushed back; but so are United Nations forces in Korea today.

I called attention also to the fact that in the white paper itself, in the statement by the President of the United States in January 1946, he said that of the surplus material there was none that had not been demilitarized.

Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes, first to the Senator from Maine [Mr. BREWSTER], and the remainder of my time to the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. WHERRY].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 2 minutes.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I regret that this has become a matter of controversy. I think we all recognize the seriousness of the situation. I desire to make clear that it is not at all evident exactly what we are getting for the \$38,000,000 or the \$75,000,000 we are making available to Yugoslavia. In that connection I want to read briefly from a letter published in the New York Times of today under the heading "Appraising Tito's Army" and to have the entire letter inserted in the RECORD. I read:

In his dispatches, your Belgrade correspondent has repeatedly stated that "the Yugoslav Army is the strongest army in Europe except the Soviet Army." It seems that the same opinion has been shared by some other American observers in Europe also; so it is stated by one of them that Tito's army has "30 or 32 divisions of hard-beaten fighters."

Moreover, some official American documents recently published show that the above opinions have been accepted by the American authorities as statements of fact.

May I warn against precipitate and hasty acceptance of such opinions?

The superficiality of western and especially American opinions regarding the real strength of the Yugoslav Army in the wars sounds a warning against hasty opinions. In the years when the Nazi menace was growing on the European continent, western observers considered and publicly praised the Royal Yugoslav Army of those days as "the strongest army in Europe." Even the shrewd observer John Gunther wrote in *Inside Europe* in 1936 that the Royal Yugoslav Army was "probably the most formidable army in Europe."

When, however, this army was put to the test, it proved worthless and was unable to offer any serious resistance. The enormous discrepancy between the opinion of western observers and the realities was due principally to the uncritical acceptance of the information supplied by an authoritarian regime as well as to the inadequate regard for the feelings and opinion of the masses

which form the vital component of a modern army but have no possibility of expressing freely their sentiments in peacetime.

I wonder whether they are aware that Tito's army officers, owing to their overbearing and haughty behavior and to their privileged position, are the most hated and despised group of the present ruling class of Yugoslavia.

Mr. President, I ask that the remainder of this letter be incorporated in the RECORD at this point, and I hope we shall have some assurance that some of these persons will fight with us and work with us if we go forward in this program.

There being no objection, the remainder of the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

May I quote in addition three points which call for cautiousness in conclusions:

How little western observers on the spot know of Tito's army is illustrated by the fact that they were able to get Tito's military publications only recently.

I wonder whether they are aware that Tito's army officers, owing to their overbearing and haughty behavior and to their privileged position, are the most hated and despised group of the present ruling class of Yugoslavia.

The problems arising from the formation of only one up-to-date division should indicate the value of statements regarding Tito's "30 or 32 divisions of hard-beaten fighters."

JURAJ KRNEVIC,
Former Vice Premier of Yugoslavia,
Secretary General, Croatian Peasant Party.

LONDON, December 4, 1950.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I am wondering if the distinguished Senator from California would consider amending his motion so that it would provide only that the bill be recommitted with instructions to report forthwith, and omit the specific portion of the amendment, for this reason, that I hope if the Senator modifies his amendment the Senate will approve it. Certainly the Senator from California has a right to his day in court, without setting out the specific amendment, but letting the committee report the bill to the Senate forthwith, at which time the Senator from California can offer any amendment he chooses to offer.

I make that plea because, when the agreement was entered into, I was not on the floor. I later suggested that there might be other Senators who desired to offer amendments, which is the general rule, so that there would be 20 minutes upon the amendment, 10 minutes on each side.

The Senator from California offered an amendment. It does not make any difference whether it was submitted to the committee or whether it was not, because he had a right to offer it, and he feels strongly about it.

Mr. President, this is a moral obligation. It is in the interest of fair play that the Senator be given an opportunity to offer his amendment on the floor of the Senate. If he should do what I have suggested, it would not mean that we would be voting on the amendment at all; we would simply be recommitting the bill so as to clarify the procedure, and the committee could report the bill. If we do not want the amendment, we can vote it down, or some other amend-

ment can be adopted. That is the fair way to do it.

I hope every Senator will give the Senator from California a chance to have his day in court. It can be done in that way without hurting anyone's feelings.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I modify my motion to that extent, cutting out all the language beyond the word "forthwith."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator modifies his motion to the extent of eliminating certain language. The clerk will read the language of the motion as modified.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to modify the motion to read as follows:

I move that Senate bill 4234 to promote the foreign policy and to provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia be recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report the said bill back to the Senate forthwith.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, if the bill is recommitted and then reported to the Senate, does that mean that the debate starts anew and can continue for an indefinite period?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There will be a new day in court when it comes back.

Mr. AIKEN. And the debate can continue indefinitely?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes; the Senator is correct.

The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from California, as modified.

Mr. WHERRY and other Senators requested the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. LUCAS. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. TAYLOR], and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. THOMAS] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CHAPMAN] and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] is absent because of illness in his family.

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed a delegate from the Senate to attend the meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Australia.

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY] and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYERS] are absent on public business.

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business as a representative of the United States to the fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I announce further that if present and voting, the Senator from Connecticut

[Mr. BENTON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CHAPMAN], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYERS] would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed as a delegate from the Senate to attend the meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Australia.

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] is necessarily absent.

The result was announced—yeas 38, nays 42, as follows:

YEAS—38

Brewster	Hickenlooper	Mundt
Bricker	Ives	Nixon
Butler	Jenner	O'Connor
Cain	Kem	Saltonstall
Capehart	Knowland	Schoeppel
Carlson	Langer	Smith, N. J.
Chavez	McCarran	Taft
Cordon	McCarthy	Thye
Donnell	McClellan	Watkins
Dworshak	Malone	Wherry
Ecton	Martin	Williams
Gurney	Millikin	Young
Hendrickson	Morse	

NAYS—42

Aiken	Holland	Magnuson
Anderson	Hunt	Murray
Byrd	Johnson, Colo.	Neely
Clements	Johnson, Tex.	O'Mahoney
Connally	Johnston, S. C.	Pepper
Douglas	Kerr	Robertson
Ellender	Kilgore	Russell
Flanders	Leahy	Smith, Maine
Frear	Lehman	Smith, N. C.
Fulbright	Long	Stennis
George	Lucas	Thomas, Utah
Gillette	McFarland	Tobey
Hayden	McKellar	Tydings
Hill	McMahon	Wiley

NOT VOTING—16

Benton	Hoey	Sparkman
Bridges	Humphrey	Taylor
Chapman	Kefauver	Thomas, Okla.
Eastland	Lodge	Vandenberg
Ferguson	Maybank	
Green	Myers	

So Mr. KNOWLAND's motion to recommit was rejected.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.

Mr. BRIDGES. I vote "aye."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The result has been announced. The vote of the Senator from New Hampshire cannot be cast at this time.

Mr. FLANDERS. Mr. President, I wish to say that it was with some regret that I placed myself on the side opposite to that taken by the Senator from California. I did so because of my feeling that the undertaking in Yugoslavia ought to have a free road. I also feel that the discussion and determination of our policy with reference to the Chinese Republic should likewise have a free road, and that we should have early discussion and an early decision of that question. I merely wish to place myself on record as feeling that necessity exists

for arriving at such a decision, and to express the hope that we can get to a consideration of the subject in the opening days of the new Congress.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted at this point in the RECORD a statement prepared by me relating to the pending bill.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The total proposed program of emergency relief assistance for Yugoslavia consists entirely of commodities procured or to be procured through the Department of Agriculture and shipped directly to Yugoslavia. The program totals 603,900 tons, including 464,500 tons of grains, 70,000 tons of vegetables and rice, 20,000 tons of lard, 20,000 tons of sugar, 4,500 tons of dried eggs, 6,000 tons of dried milk, 900 tons of canned meat, and 18,000 tons of seeds. The total costs of supplying these foods including transportation is \$69,400,000.

Under the stopgap program already in progress, 248,900 tons of food and feed are being provided under the Economic Cooperation Administration Act, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act and under a line of credit extended to the Yugoslav Government by the Export-Import Bank. As a part of the stopgap program 140,000 tons of wheat are being shipped by the ECA from the United States to Italy and Germany, which countries are in turn supplying about 110,000 tons of milled flour to Yugoslavia. The processing of this wheat into flour has afforded the milling industries of Italy and Germany an opportunity to utilize their facilities more fully and in this way a definite contribution has been made to the economic health of these countries. The \$5,600,000 in funds provided by the Export-Import Bank were used for the purchase and shipment of surplus beans, eggs, and meat from the Department of Agriculture, also for lard purchased in the open market by the Department of Agriculture for Yugoslav account.

The remaining portion of the program now before the Congress consists of 355,000 tons of food, feed, and seeds as follows: 276,000 tons of grains, 50,000 tons of vegetables and rice, 5,000 tons of lard, 6,000 tons of dried milk, and 18,000 tons of seeds. The cost of the commodities and their shipment under this part of the program is estimated at \$34,400,000. All of these commodities will be procured by the Department of Agriculture with appropriated funds. No funds will be turned over to the Yugoslav Government.

Of the total program before the Congress, 71 percent will be procured from stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation while the balance or 29 percent, chiefly flour, lard, and seeds, must be purchased in the open market.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to further amendment. If there be no further amendment, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was read the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now is, Shall the bill pass?

Mr. SALTONSTALL and other Senators requested the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered, and the Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LUCAS. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON], the Senator from Idaho [Mr. TAYLOR], and the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. THOMAS] are necessarily absent.

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CHAPMAN] is absent on official business.

The Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND] is absent because of illness in his family.

The Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed a delegate from the Senate to attend the meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Australia.

The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY] and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYERS] are absent on public business.

The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business as a representative of the United States to the fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I announce that the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN] is paired on this vote with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from Rhode Island would vote "yea," and the Senator from Michigan would vote "nay."

I announce further that if present and voting, the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CHAPMAN], the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. HOEY], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MYERS] would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. FERGUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official business, having been appointed as a delegate from the Senate to attend the meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in Australia, and on this vote he is paired with the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN]. If present and voting the Senator from Michigan would vote "nay," and the Senator from Rhode Island would vote "yea."

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. VANDENBERG] is absent by leave of the Senate.

The Senator from Maine [Mr. BREWSTER] is detained on official business and is paired with the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] who is necessarily absent. If present and voting the Senator from Maine would vote "nay," and the Senator from Massachusetts would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 60, nays 21, as follows:

YEAS—60

Aiken	Flanders	Johnson, Colo.
Anderson	Fulbright	Johnson, Tex.
Bridges	George	Kefauver
Butler	Gillette	Kerr
Cain	Gurney	Kilgore
Carlson	Hayden	Knowland
Clements	Hendrickson	Leahy
Connally	Hill	Lehman
Donnell	Holland	Long
Douglas	Hunt	Lucas
Ellender	Ives	McCarthy

McFarland	Nixon	Smith, N. C.
McKellar	O'Mahoney	Stennis
McMahon	Pepper	Taft
Magnuson	Robertson	Thomas, Utah
Martin	Russell	Thye
Millikin	Saltonstall	Tobey
Morse	Schoeppel	Tydings
Murray	Smith, Maine	Watkins
Neely	Smith, N. J.	Wiley

NAYS—21

Bricker	Frear	McClellan
Byrd	Hickenlooper	Malone
Capehart	Jenner	Mundt
Chavez	Johnston, S. C.	O'Connor
Cordon	Kem	Wherry
Dorshak	Langer	Williams
Ecton	McCarran	Young

NOT VOTING—15

Benton	Green	Myers
Brewster	Hoey	Sparkman
Chapman	Humphrey	Taylor
Eastland	Lodge	Thomas, Okla.
Ferguson	Maybank	Vandenberg

So the bill (S. 4234) was passed.

Mr. O'CONOR subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement explanatory of my vote on the Yugoslav bill be printed in the RECORD immediately following the vote on its passage.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The statement is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR O'CONOR

In the light of established facts as to Tito's antagonism to the United States and to the democratic freedoms for which this Nation always has stood, our people have a right to ask—as they are asking—"When are we going to stop giving aid to our enemies; when are we going to cease strengthening those whose announced purpose is to destroy us?"

In my opinion a Communist is a Communist, whether he practices his nefarious creed in Russia, north China, or in Yugoslavia. Their ultimate objective is to destroy our way of life, which is the only barrier to their quest for world supremacy.

I am not unmindful of the new doctrine which the State Department is espousing at the moment, that Tito is going to help save us from Russia, if we, in turn, will keep him from being driven out of his Communist dictatorship. But, like so many of my fellow citizens, I am becoming somewhat disillusioned about the chances of winning avowed Communists to our side. The glaring evidence of Communist solidarity against western aims for peace is vividly before us in Korea. We were going to wean the Chinese Communists away from their motherland, Russia, by kindness, but, instead, the United States helped to make possible their recent conquest of the mainland and their aggression in Korea, and has paved the way to a possible show-down struggle between the east and west by supplying them with many of the vital supplies they needed to prepare them for war against us.

Are we going to make the same blunder again, by strengthening Tito just when nature and the accumulated results of his diabolic rule were threatening to bring about his downfall?

Has Tito proven his friendship for the United States? In the light of Moscow's oft-demonstrated policy of double-dealing and hypocrisy, of lying and deceit, can anyone be reasonably sure that Tito's protestation of enmity toward the Soviet is genuine, and not simply another of the devious deceptions for which Moscow is so well known?

Yugoslavia, under Tito, has violated, time and time again, every principle of justice and humanity in its dealings with minority groups within its own borders. To question any of the unjust practices of Tito's totalitarian regime has been to invite death or

banishment; even to question the morality of the most vicious acts of violence against members of racial or religious groups has been an open invitation to disaster. Many of Yugoslavia's leading patriots and finest citizens have faced the firing squad, or are undergoing the living death of forced labor, because they could not approve the injustices upon which their dictator depends to rule.

Tito has vented his rancor against America on many occasions. His underlings rarely have missed an opportunity to express their scorn of all things American in their treatment of United States nationals, and in their replies to official United States protest. Their shooting down American flyers, 2 years after the war's end, in two separate attacks, killing five of our aviators, at the very time when American help was being given generously to aid Yugoslavia's hungry people, was an instance of their supreme contempt for their benefactors.

What of the vicious facts of Tito's dictatorship and of the thousands of members of Yugoslav religious groups, Orthodox, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, whose persecution and sufferings have shocked the world since Tito's accession to power? Civilization was aghast at the farcical trial of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac, a patriot who had won highest military honors in the army of his native land, and whose heroic resistance first to Nazi intolerance and later to Tito's ruthlessness knew no boundaries of color, or race, or creed. But Archbishop Stepinac was only one of 1,500 Yugoslav priests who were killed, imprisoned, or exiled—only one of 400,000 members of his faith in Croatia alone who have given their lives because they would not bow to Tito's will.

That our memories may be refreshed as to the type of government and type of dictatorship to whom we are now being asked to supply additional aid, I will take but a moment to quote very briefly excerpts from statements and editorials, the truth of which has not been controverted by any later developments in Tito's regime.

Winston Churchill advised the British House of Commons on November 1, 1946, and I quote: "Conditions in Yugoslavia are sinister and melancholic. The whole country is being as far as possible converted into a Communist area. Communism is being taught in schools and every effort is being made to create a Soviet Socialist Republic."

The New York Times in an editorial declared in condemning the trial of Archbishop Aloysius Stepinac: "The Communist dictatorship will not tolerate among the masses any influence it cannot digest and use for its nutriment. It will acknowledge no control over men's minds other than its own."

Again the New York Times declared editorially: "The Croat prelate's trial and conviction violates Yugoslavia's pledge to the United Nations to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

In resigning as Yugoslav consul in New Orleans Basil S. Rusovitch declared: "I no longer feel that I can belong to such a mockery of government. * * * My decision was prompted by the unjust trial and execution of Gen. Draza Mihailovitch, the killing of American pilots over Yugoslavia, and finally the infamous trial of Archbishop Stepinac, an innocent man, beloved in Yugoslavia."

The quotations could go on indefinitely, but brief as they are, they emphasize the infamous character of the man and the regime we now are asked to help keep in power.

As indicative of the outraged feelings of our countrymen with regard to the wanton killing by Yugoslav flyers of our airmen who were forced off their course by bad weather I quote from the New York Times of Tuesday, September 10, 1946, the refusal of members of the International Longshoremen's Associa-

tion, AFL, to continue loading relief supplies aboard a ship bound for Yugoslavia. The president of the longshoremen's association, Joseph P. Ryan, declared at that time that no members of the union would load any ships with relief supplies for Yugoslavia, "until proper action was taken against those who were responsible for shooting down our planes in Yugoslavia, which caused the death of our airmen."

It is interesting also to note the authenticated reports that UNRRA vehicles were used by Yugoslav Communist youth groups to carry out their program of intimidation against religious groups in their country.

As further evidence of the type of injustices dealt out by Tito to his own subjects I have just been advised by a well-informed citizen of Maryland, that her aged aunt and uncle in Yugoslavia have had to serve 30 days each in jail because they were unable to furnish the Yugoslav Government with their quota of grain.

They could not raise their normal amount of grain because of the drought. Tito's agents refused to accept such an explanation even at the very time that their government was appealing to Washington for increased assistance because of the very drought which had prevented these poor people from meeting their commitments to the government.

I am informed likewise that this is not the only incident of its kind—rather the practice was general of requiring the poor farmers to serve time, pay fines, or give up their cows and other stock in lieu of their allotted quota of grain.

In the face of all these facts I cannot in good conscience vote to supply money exacted from the American taxpayers to a nation which is committed to communism and therefore to the destruction of freedom and liberty throughout the world.

Mr. LANGER subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to insert in the body of the RECORD tomorrow an explanation of my vote against the bill providing aid for Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

EXTENSION OF RENT CONTROL IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 209, Calendar 258, and I ask the clerk to state the joint resolution by title.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be stated by title for the information of the Senate.

The CHIEF CLERK. A joint resolution (S. J. Res. 209) to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act as amended.

Mr. LUCAS. I may say that if there is no serious objection to the joint resolution—and I understand that there is not—we may pass it yet this evening.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the distinguished majority leader yield?

Mr. LUCAS. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. Earlier in the day the distinguished Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY]—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The motion has not yet been put.

Mr. WHERRY. I understand.

Mr. LUCAS. I merely moved that the Senate proceed to consider the Senate Joint Resolution 209.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the motion of the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I stated earlier to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia that I should like to have him withhold the request for the consideration of the joint resolution until some Senators who were particularly interested in it could be present in the Chamber. They are now present. Therefore, so far as the minority leader is concerned, there is no objection.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I ask that my motion be put.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Illinois.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 209) to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended, which had been reported from the Committee on the District of Columbia with an amendment, after line 7, to strike out down to the end of the bill, as follows:

Sec. 2. (a) Subsection (3) (b) of section 2 of such act, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"(b) Any housing accommodations the construction of which was completed after March 31, 1948;"

(b) Subsection (4) of section 2 of such act is repealed.

Sec. 3. Section 2 of such act, as amended, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:

"(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the maximum rent chargeable for any housing accommodations which on or before June 24, 1950, were self-contained family units located in hotels (as defined by regulations issued by the Administrator) or which now are such self-contained family units located in hotels shall be (1) the rental rate prevailing for such accommodations on June 24, 1950, or (2) if not rented on June 24, 1950, the rental rate prevailing for comparable housing accommodations; subject to such adjustment as may be made pursuant to sections 3 and 4.

"(7) Any additional housing accommodations, created by conversion after March 31, 1948, and any housing accommodations created by conversion resulting in additional self-contained family units after May 1, 1949, shall continue to be housing accommodations subject to maximum rent ceilings and minimum service standards: *Provided*, That the rent first charged by contract between the landlord and tenant for additional housing accommodations created by conversion after March 31, 1948, or conversions resulting in additional self-contained family units created after May 1, 1949, shall be deemed to be the maximum rent ceiling until the Administrator shall determine an appropriate rent for the same. In making this determination the Administrator may consider costs of materials and labor used in bringing such housing accommodations into existence, and he may issue any necessary regulations and general orders to effectuate the administration of the above provisions."

Sec. 4. This act shall take effect on the first day of the first calendar month following the month in which it is enacted.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, if Senators desire to discuss the District of Columbia rent control joint resolution, I have no objection to postponing its further consideration until tomorrow. I made the suggestion a moment ago that

we might conclude consideration of the joint resolution tonight, in view of the fact that the Senator from West Virginia understood, after discussions with various Senators, that there was a probability that we might pass it tonight. I am not trying to hurry Senators.

Mr. WHERRY. I am quite satisfied that there are some Senators who would like to say a word briefly, and that there will be no opposition to the joint resolution.

Mr. LUCAS. I yield the floor.

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, the sole purpose of the joint resolution is to extend the present rent-control law of the District of Columbia until the 28th day of February. It was unanimously approved by the District Committee.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. NEELY. I yield.

Mr. LANGER. Exactly what does the joint resolution do?

Mr. NEELY. It merely extends the law enacted during the last session of Congress until the 28th day of February.

Mr. LANGER. As I understand, it deals with rent control.

Mr. NEELY. For the District of Columbia only.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question?

Mr. NEELY. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. Does the joint resolution to extend until the 28th day of February Federal rent control for the District of Columbia change in any way whatever the law under which rent controls are being administered in the District today?

Mr. NEELY. Not even to the dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a "t."

Mr. CAIN. As the Senator well knows, the Senator from Washington voted against the present rent-control law for the District of Columbia.

Mr. NEELY. That is true.

Mr. CAIN. I therefore feel constrained to vote against the measure which is now the pending business. However, the Senator from Washington has no intention of arguing the question at this time, in view of what the Senator from West Virginia has just said.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the committee amendment.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, how long would rent control be extended under the joint resolution?

Mr. NEELY. Until the 28th day of February. However, there is an amendment, offered by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] to extend control in the District until the 31st day of March in conformity with the general law.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the committee amendment.

Mr. NEELY. Mr. President, I move the adoption of the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. NEELY. There is another amendment proposed by the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 1, line 6, after the word "thereof", it is

proposed to strike out "February 28" and insert in lieu thereof "March 31."

Mr. NEELY. I move the adoption of that amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there further amendments to be offered? If not, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution (S. J. Res. 209) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, read the third time, and passed as follows:

Resolved, etc., That section 1 (b) of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended (D. C. Code, 1940 ed., sec. 45-1601 (b)), is hereby amended by striking out "January 31, 1951" and inserting in lieu thereof "March 31, 1951."

COMMITTEE SERVICE

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, the steering committee of the majority has discussed the question of the assignment of committee memberships to the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLEMENTS] and the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. SMITH]. We have agreed temporarily to assign both Senators to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Rules. The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. SMITH] will take the same two positions our former colleague, Senator Graham, occupied, and the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLEMENTS] will take the same two positions the Senator from Kentucky, Mr. Withers, our former colleague, occupied.

Mr. President, I send to the desk an order and ask that it be read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The order will be read.

The order was read, as follows:

Ordered, That Mr. CLEMENTS, of Kentucky, and Mr. SMITH of North Carolina be assigned to service on the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Rules and Administration.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, one word before the Chair puts the order before the Senate. It is definitely understood by members of the steering committee on the majority side, as well as the two Senators who are receiving these assignments, that the assignments are temporary only, and that the new steering committee which will be named in January will then reconsider the assignments because it could be possible that older Members, who have seniority rights, may make request for these positions. I merely state that for the RECORD so that the Senators who are receiving the appointments will be under no misapprehension as to the position of the steering committee of the majority.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the order?

The order was considered and agreed to.

PREVENTION OF CORPORATIONS FROM ACQUIRING ANOTHER CORPORATION BY MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF ITS ASSETS

Mr. AIKEN obtained the floor.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of House bill 2734, Calendar No. 1777, an act to amend an act entitled

Eightieth Congress on the Public Lands Committee when he was chairman of the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation. I had the good fortune to visit some of the projects of the West in company with Mr. Rockwell, and I found him both helpful and understanding in all of the developments of the West with which we came in contact. He was a good friend, a sincere statesman, and a real American.

I wish to extend my heartfelt sympathy to his family who feel most the loss and passing of Mr. Rockwell.

(Mr. SANBORN and Mr. ASPINALL asked and were given permission to revise and extend their remarks.)

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the life and character of the late Honorable Robert Rockwell.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT WOULD PROTECT ENEMIES WITHIN OUR GATES

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, in all the history of America our country has never been in such a deplorable condition as it is today.

Thomas Jefferson once said that if this Government were ever destroyed it would be destroyed by the courts.

A long step in that direction was taken by the Supreme Court of the United States on yesterday in its holding that you could not ask a witness whether or not he was a Communist.

Communism is treason. Every real Communist in America is a traitor to the United States.

Today we are threatened with the most serious condition the world has ever known.

Our boys are dying by the thousands in foreign lands, where they were sent without Congress even being consulted. We had just passed through one of the bloodiest wars in history in which our boys won the fight, but the victory was turned over to Russia, the worst enemy civilization has ever known, a result of a Communist conspiracy led by Alger Hiss and his Communist collaborators who were endeavoring in every way to undermine and destroy the Government of the United States.

For the Court to even attempt to compare this decision with the decisions of John Marshall and other great jurists of the past is an insult to their sacred memories. John Marshall would probably turn over in his grave if he even knew that his decisions and his reasonings were so distorted as to leave the impression that he would have even con-

sidered protecting these communistic traitors by judicial fiat.

If this decision is permitted to stand, and Anna Rosenberg is confirmed as Assistant Secretary of National Defense, you may expect to see these Communists packed into our Defense Department by the thousands.

It is about time the Congress woke up and assumed the prerogatives with which it is endowed by the Constitution, of governing the United States, and declaring war whenever that becomes necessary.

We cannot afford to let this so-called United Nations declare war for us and send our boys all over the world to do the fighting and dying and then protecting the enemies within our gates with decisions of this kind.

We had better follow the advice of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson whom these wild-eyed internationalists now brand as isolationists. We had better follow their advice, bring our boys home, build up our own defenses, and strengthen our own country to where no Nation will dare attack us. Then we can lead the world by precept and example into the enjoyment of a more glorious civilization. But we cannot accomplish that end by international bribery, that is by trying to feed and clothe the rest of the world out of the pockets of the already overburdened taxpayers of America, nor can we accomplish it with the bayonet when the very nations that attempt to plunge us into war refuse to send their own men to help do the fighting and refuse to tax their own people to help pay the cost.

I repeat that this is one of the most dangerous decisions I have ever read. Instead of following the decisions of John Marshall, it flies right in the face of them.

We cannot restore the peace of the world or insure the safety of America by having our boys shed their blood on foreign soil while the courts use their powers to protect the enemies within our gates.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. RANKIN] has expired.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

SUPREME COURT STILL DEFENDERS OF LIBERTIES

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. RANKIN] who just preceded me made an attack upon the Supreme Court.

The gentleman's attack on the Supreme Court might well be leveled against every judge that ever sat on the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice John Marshall. The decision for which he upbraids the Court is on all fours with the ruling made by Chief Justice John Marshall in the circuit court for Virginia district in the case of Aaron Burr. This

kind of unheeding talk is enough to wake up the dead and disturb the bones of such eminent jurists as Chase, Fuller, Taft, and Stone. The legal doctrine supported by such men as Cardozo, Holmes, Roberts, and Brandeis, and now Vinson cannot be made light of.

The principle of immunity from self-incrimination goes far back into the memory of man and was an integral part of enlightened jurist prudence even years before the adoption of the Bill of Rights. It derives from the democratic struggles of the Puritans of the seventeenth century England against the attempts of the Crown to crush religious and political liberty.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. ANDERSON of California asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article, notwithstanding the fact that it will exceed two pages of the Record and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$191.34.

Mr. TALLE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter addressed by him to the Honorable Warren R. Austin, United States delegate to the United Nations, and Mr. Austin's reply thereto.

Mr. BROWN of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial from the Record-Herald of Washington Court House, Ohio, under date of December 8, entitled "May God Grant Us Some Real Leadership."

Mr. JOHNSON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. D'EWART asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an address by Mr. Harry Polk, president of the National Reclamation Association, notwithstanding the fact that it will exceed two pages of the Record and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$300.68.

Mr. O'KONSKI asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article.

Mr. BAILEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include comments on an educational project as well as correspondence having to do with the same subject.

Mr. NOLAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a newspaper article.

Mr. LANE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in three instances and include extraneous matter.

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, on yesterday I was given permission to extend my remarks and include an article entitled "Shortage of Doctors." I am advised by the Public Printer that it will exceed two pages of the Record and is estimated to cost \$246. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed, notwithstanding that fact.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, notwithstanding the cost, the extension may be made.

There was no objection.

[The matter referred to appears in the Appendix.]

Mr. O'SULLIVAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in

three instances and include extraneous matter.

YUGOSLAVIA EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 878 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read as follows:

Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9853) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia. That after general debate which shall be confined to the bill and continue not to exceed 3 hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH].

The resolution which has just been read speaks for itself. It provides for the consideration of the so-called Yugoslav relief bill, which is H. R. 9853.

I have no requests for time on this side on the rule. I wish to address the House briefly myself later during the discussion. I therefore reserve the balance of my time and yield now to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ALLEN].

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, this bill provides that the United States taxpayers, turn over \$38,000,000 to the most ruthless Communist dictator in the history of the world to spend where, how, and when he sees fit, without giving one promise to the Government of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, who is this Tito? What is his background? Since early manhood he has associated himself with whom? With people who believe in democracy? Of course not, but with the people of the Kremlin in Russia; Lenin and Stalin.

Would anyone think for a moment that he is going to be different? This ruthless dictator who did not apologize when five American flyers were shot down; this same dictator who when Cardinal Mindszenty came before him defenseless, permitted him to be tortured until he confessed. Why, is not this the same Communist dictator that has permitted every church under his jurisdiction to be torn down?

Yet here today, Mr. Speaker, we are asked to accept the bloody hands of this dictator in a spirit of friendship. Members will come before us today and say: "Why, this is a military question." I say Tito will not promise anything, he will not even permit one man to fight on

the side of democracy out of his 32 divisions of men. Because he is opposed to existing democracies and will fight against its growth.

They will come in here, Mr. Speaker, with such innuendos as "Maybe they will fight." I say again there is no promise on the part of this ruthless dictator to do anything for democracy. In fact, his past record shows conclusively that he is against everything the people of democracies stand for.

Right at this moment do you think that he is on the side of the democracies in the United Nations? This Tito government has appeared before the Security Council 54 times, and I should like to have the Members refer to the Appendix of the report on the United Nations. Out of 54 votes the representative of the Tito government has voted but one time on the side of the United States and the democracies when communism was involved. I repeat, only one time did he vote on the side of free nations.

Mr. Speaker, now they are trying to turn over \$38,000,000 of the hard-earned money of the American taxpayers to this same dictator whom our American taxpayers have already turned over \$377,706,000 to. Oh, I know some are going to say here today: "During the last war he fought on the side of the United States." Why, he was forced to do so, not because he liked the United States better but because he hated Hitler worse. Hitler, with his fascism, then was trying to stop communism. Hitler and Tito are of the same caliber.

Our boys are fighting in Korea. We are losing tens and tens of thousands of our boys through casualties and death. When the time comes to recognize Red China in the United Nations, and in my opinion and in the opinion of others Red China will be recognized within 2 months, do you think this ruthless dictator, Tito, will vote on the side of the United Nations? Do you think we can expect Tito to vote once even on the side of the democracies, this man who has sat at the feet of Lenin and Stalin throughout his entire life?

It is going to be mentioned here that Stalin and Tito have had a little falling out. Well, they have not gotten along too well during the last year or so. But why? They both believe in this communistic government idea, but Tito says: "We should have individual communism, puppet states. I want to run Yugoslavia, and I am for you running Russia, I am for Red China running Red China, but I want to run Yugoslavia."

He further says, "We agree on the principles of communism. Our only difference is I want you to let me be the ruthless dictator in Yugoslavia, and you can be the same in Russia."

How can we expect this Tito to furnish troops to those who are fighting for democracy, how can we expect him to furnish troops to fight down Stalin's aggression when we cannot get the United Nations, those who believe as we do, to do any fighting? We are over there now fighting for ourselves and by ourselves.

Now, I cannot prescribe to the theory that we can expect Communists to fight

alongside of democracy when we cannot even get the ones who believe as we do to go over to Korea and fight and help us win this war. I am sure that many Members here recall when the United Nations started how Members of this body and the other body got up and said, "We will join the United Nations, and any time anyone starts aggression there will be 50 or 60 flags right shoulder to shoulder, 50 or 60 separate armies of these countries fighting shoulder to shoulder. Why, no one will dare make aggression. When they start there will be 50 countries united, united as one to fight down that aggressor." I ask you whether these predictions have become true.

So, I say to you Members here today that you do not have to apologize to the people of your districts one bit when you stand up here and say, "I am against giving the most ruthless Communist dictator in history, who is alined with the theory, at least, of Stalin, one dime, and I am not just going to have you people, who have been bled white now in taking care of these countries, be taxed additional millions of dollars."

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BROWN].

(Mr. BROWN of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BROWN of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, we meet here today in a time of most serious crisis to consider H. R. 9853, a bill which would make a gift of \$38,000,000 to the Government of Yugoslavia, which is headed by the Communist dictator, Tito, without any strings whatsoever attached thereto with the small exception the people of Yugoslavia are presumably to be made aware of who has furnished the money.

Yesterday another body of this Congress enacted legislation on this same subject, except the bill, as it passed the other body, did provide the money to be used for this gift purpose should be taken from the ECA or Marshall-plan funds and charged against Yugoslavia's quota; and that counterpart funds should be set up by the Government of Yugoslavia, in Yugoslavian currency, to equal the amount of the gift, under the arrangement that the United States might control the disposal of these counterpart funds within Yugoslavia, for purposes that may be for the benefit of both countries.

Two arguments are made in support of the enactment of this legislation. One is that it is necessary to make this gift to Tito in order to at least immobilize, if not to obtain the active help of, some 32 divisions that he now has in his army. The other argument in its favor is that most of the gift fund will be used for the purchase of American agricultural products in storage, or owned or controlled by the Federal Government. The argument is made that Tito is friendly or will be friendly to us because he has broken, or is supposed to have broken, with Stalin and Soviet Russia.

I notice the House committee report states that the break actually took place. However, the Senate committee report simply says that it seems to have taken place, but that there is no direct evidence there has been an actual break; in other words, the Senate is not certain about it.

I am rather firmly convinced, in my own mind, that if the break has not taken place between Tito and Stalin we will be unable to purchase his friendship or the services of his 32 divisions for \$38,000,000; but that if the break has taken place, and if it is an honest and real break, regardless of whether we loan Mr. Tito \$38,000,000 he will not dare turn back to Russia, because it would mean the end for Tito and his group. So I think such an argument that it is necessary to furnish these funds in order to purchase either the immobilization or the use of the 32 Yugoslav divisions falls of its own weight.

Neither am I impressed greatly with the argument that we will simply be shipping Tito foodstuffs that are in surplus supply, in view of the fact that the Secretary of Agriculture has but recently called upon the farmers of America, and has called upon the great organization representing the farmers, the American Farm Bureau, now in session at Dallas, Tex., to increase the production of foodstuffs because of the coming scarcity, and the need for abundant food crops to meet the requirements of global war, should such a war come.

Let us analyze, if we may, for a moment or two just what the situation is. We have not been unkind or unfriendly to Mr. Tito in the past, I quote from the Senate report, if I may, Mr. Speaker, because I believe it deals with this subject more factually and more clearly than has the House committee report.

If I can read the Senate report correctly, we have already given something like 350 or 360 million dollars to Mr. Tito and his government. If you will refer to page 7 of the Senate report, you will find that during wartime we gave under plan A to Mr. Tito \$6,500,000, and under lend-lease, which has never been repaid, \$32,125,000; under UNRRA we sent into Yugoslavia \$299,081,000 in food and relief; that since the break came with Russia, if it did come, we have made three loans to Tito totaling \$55,000,000, one on September 19, 1949, one in March 1949, and another in August 1949; and that in addition we arranged for certain credits for Mr. Tito and his government in the amount of some \$3,000,000 in September 1949, all at the expense of the American taxpayer. Again, in October there was a \$2,700,000 loan, and again in October a \$6,000,000 loan. Again, there were certain off-shore arrangements through ECA benefitting Yugoslavia, the amount of which I do not know. Further, in September 1949 we arranged for the transfer of some \$35,000,000 in Western Germany credits to Yugoslavia, in dollars, and of course the only currency involved were American dollars. Let me conclude that segment of my argument by reiterating that we have not been unfair or unkind to Mr. Tito and his government.

Of course, as the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ALLEN] has explained, Tito is a Communist dictator. I believe the American people are growing quite tired and very sad over our continued coddling of communism. They are beginning to feel the time has come to do that which some of us have argued for a long while should be done, to become realistic in our international dealings and to fix our foreign policies in enlightened self-interest.

May I point out this legislation as brought here contains no requirement or commitment of any kind, whatsoever, that Mr. Tito and his government will or will not do anything. Remember all of the relief in the way of surplus foods and other goods that we have shipped into Europe, have been sold by the governments which received them. Remember, if you please, that Mr. Tito will control the distribution of the food to be purchased with this gift, and it is only natural he will not give food to those who oppose him or communism. Also that the real reason why there is a shortage of food in Yugoslavia is that the peasants there are so opposed to communism and to Tito that they refuse to produce food which is needed for their country under the collectivist ideas Tito is imposing on agriculture in Yugoslavia, just as Stalin imposed them in Russia.

Of course there are all kinds of dictators, and there have been all sorts of famines. There are such dictators as Franco of Spain and there have been Spanish famines. Dictator Franco, however, is not a Communist. I hold no brief for any dictator. But Franco is opposed to communism. Franco fought communism, and he whipped the Communist forces in Spain. Yet he has never been recognized by the United States, or any of those elements here in this country now directing our foreign policy. Franco has come to this country for aid in time of Spanish famine—and certainly a Spaniard can be just as hungry and starve just as terribly as any Yugoslav. But when Franco came to the United States pleading for help to meet the famine in Spain, he did not ask for a gift. He did not even suggest a gift. He asked only for a loan. There are strategic supplies in Spain which we need just as much as there are such supplies in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavians supplies will be one of the arguments used in favor of this bill. But we would not even consider the loan to Spain until Congress, realizing that the Iberian Peninsula was the most important and strategic spot in all Europe in case war should come with Russia, last year voted \$100,000,000 to be loaned to the Spanish Government. Up to this moment not a single dollar of that amount has been sent to Spain—not a single loan has been made under the authorization of the Congress by this so-called administration which has been drafting our foreign policies. The people of America are well fed-up with those foreign policies and are complaining to us about them. I think it is time we looked at this bill very carefully—stop coddling communism—and start being realistic in the conduct of our foreign relations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. WHITTINGTON). The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McSWEENEY].

Mr. McSWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, I come with disturbed thoughts this morning with regard to the pending legislation. I do not believe the House should ever be burdened with a repetition of what a Member has said before in the well of the House, but I find that a previous statement which I made with regard to the Marshall plan enters my thoughts, and I am going to ask your indulgence, to allow me to repeat it.

At the time when we were discussing the Marshall plan I spoke of a situation which existed before the war broke out between the States. At that time a man had come to the Presidency. He was terribly troubled by the situation which existed. He knew that war was imminent, and he felt if he could induce the Congress to buy the slaves, he might eliminate the chances of that war. He felt at least that he would be taking at least one of the very, very serious problems off the shoulders of the people if he could get rid of the slavery question in that way and that they could meet the problem of the States' rights and the question of secession. This man, by the Wall Street bankers and others, was considered an illiterate, uneducated man who came out of the West, and would eventually break this Government if he carried out his program of spending so much money to pay for the individual slaves.

I, while teaching in my class in Wooster High School, 67 years after Mr. Lincoln had made this proposal, discussed this problem with my students. Our beloved Abraham Lincoln was the President to whom I refer. My class found that by multiplying the number of slaves by the purchase price Mr. Lincoln would have paid for them, and dividing it into the cost of the Civil War, considering both the North and South, but not taking into consideration any of the heart-rending things that came from the war, merely the actual material expenditures, that the purchase price of the slaves was equal to 11 days of the cost of a 4-year war. In asking for an extension of the Marshall plan, I found that the cost of extending it for 15 months was equal to 21 days of the cost of the last war. Now, I find we are asked to expend an amount which, when we consider the cost of the last war, would be equal to about 10 hours of that war.

I do not know whether this money will do all the things that they speak of. I do not know whether it will save American lives, but I want to say in the presence of this august body that I am not ashamed to admit that I am floundering, trying in some humble way to find a solution for these terrible problems. Do you not feel that under the circumstances we can try this as one of the things that might lessen the opportunity of bringing on a war, or, in fact, save the lives of the men who have already been fighting for us?

I offer this humble suggestion and hope that today providential guidance will be given to us to do that which is best for the people who supply this money—our taxpayers—and for those boys who are fighting in the field, as well as for the future happiness not only of America but of the world.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McSWEENEY] has expired.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may desire.

Mr. Speaker, it is perfectly obvious that the issue confronting us is in a sense distasteful. I share that sensation myself. It is a difficult decision for us to make. We would better be just as practical and cold as possible, despite the fact that we do not like the atmosphere in which we are proceeding.

Referring to the situation in Yugoslavia just for a moment, all of our reliable information is to the effect that the break between Tito and the Politburo in Moscow is irreparable. True, in both capitals, Belgrade and Moscow, communism is supreme—a thing we dislike intensely, but there is a sharp division on one certain fundamental issue. Tito contends that Marx did not teach that communism should be spread over the world by a single, all-powerful government. Stalin insists that that is what communism is meant to do. As has already been indicated, Tito has resisted that conception of communism, has insisted that he and his countrymen shall work out their Communist philosophy in Yugoslavia without dictation from the outside. When Communist rebels against Communist the sin is inexcusable, unforgivable. Should Tito fall, Stalin walks in. There can be no question about it at all. He would be glad to walk in with all the power which he could gather behind him. He would walk into a country which geographically occupies the most strategic position in eastern and Balkan Europe. Just take a look at the map and you can see the enormous importance of Yugoslavia in the event of world-wide trouble breaking out.

Tito cannot surrender to Stalin; if he did, his head would fall, and there is no doubt about it. He must go on in order to survive and save his government as presently constituted.

There is the fundamental issue between these two people. You and I do not like the principles professed by either of them; in fact, we detest them. But the question is: Is it wise for us to look at this thing from a practical standpoint? And having done so should we take a step which will tend most importantly to prevent the fall of the Tito Government? That government has been threatened for several months as the result of a terribly severe drought for which no political group is responsible. The Army of Yugoslavia to which reference has been made has had to be fed by special concessions already granted in order to keep it together, and the peasants of Yugoslavia are in a desperate condition in their mountain valleys. Should they break down completely,

Moscow taking advantage as it always does, taking advantage of suffering and distress, walks in.

As I confess to you that there is an element in this whole situation which is distasteful, let us look at the things that have happened. Some of them are significant; they are like signposts along the way, signs and signal smokes. Let us look, for example, as the troubles in northern Greece when from Yugoslavia came the guerrillas torturing the people of Greece and seeking to condemn that whole country into the arms of Stalin, guerrillas emerging largely from Yugoslavia. That occurred prior to the break between Tito and Stalin. Following the break the infiltration stopped. Of course, we contributed tremendously to the victory of the Greek Government and the defense of that country from communism, but it is to be noted that apparently Tito made up his mind that it was wise not to offend the democracies much more. We gained a little bit there.

You remember also that in 1946 and 1947, I think it was, the very very critical situation that existed at Trieste, a city garrisoned by British and American troops of about equal numbers, with the Yugoslavs in the hinterland demanding the evacuation of Trieste by the Americans and British, and even upon one occasion delivering an ultimatum to the allied government of Trieste saying in effect: "If you do not agree to the entry of our military forces at midnight tonight, we will come in nevertheless." And you will recall, I am sure, as an incident in that occasion the young American lieutenant who with not much more than a squad of infantry stood on the border as thousands of Yugoslav troops marched with every evidence of intent to go across the border. He ordered them to halt. They halted. It was a narrow squeak. That happened before the break between Tito and Stalin. No doubt Yugoslavia policy at that time was Stalin inspired. As you probably have noted, there has been no trouble in Trieste since then—none whatsoever. That is due to a change in policy on the part of Yugoslavia.

You will remember doubtless that Yugoslavia in 1946 and 1947 demanded a slice of the territory of Austria, shouting loud for it. That has been abandoned. It is agreed now by Yugoslavia that they are not entitled to that slice of Austrian territory.

Trouble arose in those days in the treatment accorded American citizens found in Yugoslavia. Following immediately after the war quite a number of American citizens of Yugoslav descent, legally American citizens, returned to their country for one reason or another, probably to see their families. For a long, long time Tito would not allow any one of those American citizens to return to the United States. He has now agreed that they may return.

Those are little signs or signal posts all along the road.

During the Greek insurrection or civil war, if you may call it such, thousands and thousands of Greek children were

abducted and taken into Yugoslavia and other Communist satellite countries. Tito is now returning them.

I do not contend for one moment that these little incidents prove that Tito is abandoning communism as such; or that he is repentant as a Communist. I do bring them to your attention believing that these incidents are significant. Actually Tito knows that turning to Russia means for him total destruction and he is more than willing to lean a little bit toward the west. That is what he is doing.

Now, here we have the possibility, and it is a dread possibility, of an all-out war in Europe due to Russia's aggression. I think we can be fairly safe in our assumption that Tito would never take the initiative in that. I do not think you will find him attacking the western democracies. But should Russia do it and Tito stand neutral and say: "I am going to run my own country, you leave me alone," it would be a very grave embarrassment to Stalin and all of his military plans. I do not contend for one moment that we can count on Tito's divisions fighting on our side, but I would rejoice if, having made it possible for him to survive, we could then see those divisions standing ready in Yugoslavia and neutralizing at least an equal number of Russian troops. So in my view this thing comes down to a very practical proposition. It may not be pleasant. It is not pleasant. Nearly everything we see in this world today is unpleasant. Some of our other problems are going to demand solutions which will not be pleasant. But I am trying to look toward the future.

I cannot escape the conclusion that by the passage of this or, even better, the Senate bill we would do something which would make our cause more secure. That is the way I sum it up. My summation may be inadequate, but I speak from my heart.

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois. I admire, like all Members, the gentleman's judgement. I am just going to ask the gentleman this question. Inasmuch as that lieutenant and that squad showed no signs of appeasement when the troops came in there and stood there ready to fight, I am wondering if the gentleman admits that that is probably the only way to handle this subject, instead of giving them everything without any strings attached.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I think that incident and the problem that now confronts us are scarcely analogous.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. CANFIELD. Has the gentleman taken into consideration, in connection with Tito's action since 1947, when I, personally saw on every other house in sections of Trieste the two pictures of Stalin and Tito painted thereon, this thought, that the whole pattern of Tito's

behavior within the last 3 years may be a Moscow-inspired fraud on the free democracies of this world? Has the gentleman taken that thought into consideration?

Mr. WADSWORTH. The best information that comes to us, and I happen to be absolutely sure of this, from our Embassy in Belgrade and men who have been there a long time and are thoroughly familiar with the conduct and motives and plans of the Tito government, is to the effect that the break between those two men is incurable.

Mr. McDONOUGH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WADSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. McDONOUGH. I was interested in the gentleman's opinion concerning the type of communism that he believes Tito represents and the type that Stalin represents. Does the gentleman believe that there is any degree in communism that can be recognized? For instance, in this bill, where we are aiding a country that we know is controlled by Communists, can we treat communism by degrees?

Mr. WADSWORTH. No. Communism inside Yugoslavia is exactly like communism inside Russia. The only difference between the two leaders is the fact that the leader of Yugoslavia says, "You keep out of my country while I run my own communism."

Mr. McDONOUGH. And communism in Yugoslavia and in Russia we oppose as a nation.

Mr. WADSWORTH. We do.

Mr. McDONOUGH. There is no reason, therefore, for us to support this kind of legislation, if that is the case.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Unless we are willing to let Stalin walk into Yugoslavia.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from New York has stated this case so clearly and so frankly and so fully that there hardly remains much to be said to lay the proposition before you for what it is. It is one of those experimental gambles that we have been taking over the years with our foreign situation. It may work out as we hope it will work out. The evidence seems to be that it will work out to our advantage. I have not heard anyone on the Committee on Foreign Affairs say that this guarantees us anything. The gentleman from Ohio and the gentleman from Illinois both said that we ought to exact promises from Tito as to what he was going to do to Stalin. Well, you cannot expect Tito to spit in the lion's eye; now, that is just all there is to it. We cannot expect to ask him to do this or do that or do the other. We can only rely upon the information that we have. We have done a lot of things here; many of us have gone along on some of these proposals with grave doubts about them. And, some of them have worked well. Some of them have probably worked out better than we ever thought or know now, and it will all come out in the final outcome of this

whole grave situation. Here is just a proposal to go along with this one item. Those who have the most knowledge of this subject believe it is a good gamble, nothing more or nothing less, and nobody is telling you any different.

There is a whole lot of difference between the philosophy of Tito as we understand it and the philosophy of Stalin. Stalin, as has been said, wants world domination by communism. Tito believes in home rule, that he is entitled to communism in his country and the other fellow is entitled to democracy in his country. Is not that just what we are for? Did we ever say to Stalin, "We are opposed to your having communism in Russia"? We are not trying to tell Stalin what he shall do in Russia. All we are trying to do is tell Stalin what he shall not do in this country or the rest of the world. I am just wondering how much difference there is in the whole over-all attitude on the subject of communism between Tito and our own policies in that regard.

Mr. McSWEENEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlemen yield?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. McSWEENEY. Did we not have Zoar and Zion City in Illinois and Brook Farm in New York? They were themselves a kindly group of people but did they not call themselves Communists?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I believe they did. I am not expressing any degree of affection or tolerance for any of them, but I do say that as far as the policy of this country has always been, we have never said to Stalin, "We are not going to permit you to have the kind of government you want in your country," and we have never said that to any other country.

Look what we are doing for Great Britain. I hesitate to say this, but I believe it. Great Britain took the midway step between democracy and communism when it went to a socialistic government. We have not undertaken to tell Great Britain what she should do. We do not believe in that kind of government over there, yet we have, some of us with a great deal of reluctance, I might say, helped Great Britain under the Marshall plan to maintain itself under a socialistic form of government in which we do not believe for one minute.

Let us see about this bill. We propose to take this gamble, \$38,000,000. Three-fourths of that money is to be spent in buying the surplus agricultural products we are going to try to get rid of. In dollars and cents that does not amount to a great deal. If you accept the Senate amendment, it comes out of the appropriation for the Marshall plan already made by this Congress, so that so far as the dollars and cents proposition is concerned, it is a very minor gamble when compared to some others we have made.

The gentlemen who oppose this have said there are no safeguards in this bill. There are plenty of safeguards in the bill. There are some safeguards in there that I think we would have been well advised to put in the Marshall plan and some other plans we have carried out.

Under this plan this Congress by concurrent resolution, if we think Tito is not carrying out the agreement, can stop this relief at any moment.

Under the provisions of this bill, our country is to have access to that country. Our people are to go in there. We have the right to determine that this relief is being given to all of the people without regard to race or religion, that there is a fair distribution of this food.

Under this bill, if Tito accepts this relief he is bound to give us the opportunity for publicity, to tell those people where this money is coming from, where this food is coming from, and who is coming to their rescue in the time of their great distress.

Why not do this and take the chance that we may at least gain the neutrality of Tito in any future misfortune, which neutrality would guarantee, as has been said, the neutralization of a large section of the army of the Communists of Russia.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. COLMER. With reference to the question of the cost and the gamble that we are taking I would like to call to the attention of the distinguished gentleman the fact it is estimated this loan or gift to Yugoslavia would amount to the cost of about 5 hours of World War II. Further, we are building jet bombers at a cost estimated at a little better than \$3,000,000 apiece. In other words, this would be the cost of about 12 jet bombers. Therefore, the gamble we are taking is comparatively slight.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Yes, the gentleman has stated the proposition very realistically. It is just a plain, common-sense proposition. Certainly I have no patience with communism and that is well-known. But I do think this is a case where we can well look at the thing from a practical standpoint and do that which appears to be the practical thing, and which may result in great good and can result in no harm to this Nation.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. COX. Mr. Speaker, to me, feeling as I do, this does not seem to be rational behavior, but there are so many fine people who favor the adoption of this measure, people like the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SMITH], who is now addressing the House, and the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH], that very frankly I am somewhat confused. But if you turn to the report of the committee you will find the committee at the outset recommends the adoption of the bill and then painstakingly sets forth not fewer than 100 reasons why it should not be passed.

The gentleman says provision is made which will give our country the right to supervise the manner in which this bounty shall be distributed or at least to go along with it and advertise that it is a gift from the United States. I am wondering just what value the opinion of an individual or group of individuals

or of many individuals may be in a country which is completely dominated by communism.

There is not the slightest indication to be found in the record which would justify the hope that in the event of an all-out conflict with Russia Tito would stand neutral. Certainly there is no ground to hope he would come to our aid. My desire of course is to support the administration's foreign policy, and yet I must confess I find much in it to which I take violent exception and much in it which frightens me tremendously.

I have supported the Marshall plan, and I desire to testify that in my opinion it has to a very considerable extent paid off, but I have for a long time taken exception to the policy of appeasing Russia and everything which partakes of the complexion of communism.

In spite of the finally aroused public opinion that communism threatens to dominate the world and that our country is in danger of being encompassed by Stalin, here we kneel and beg the privilege of contributing \$38,000,000 of money, wrung from the taxpayers of this country, to a unit of a group of countries that is dominated by communism. To me, it is hopeless to think that under any circumstances, in the event of a conflict between Russia and the United States, Tito would not play the role dictated by Stalin. It would be impossible for him to offer any resistance, and it being confessed that communism is communism everywhere, there can possibly be no withholding of aid on the part of Tito to his old cohort and brother in communism, Stalin.

I regret to have made these remarks. I had not the slightest idea in the world that I would open my mouth. I meant to come here and take the punishment in silence, but, Mr. Speaker, those are my sentiments, and I must be true to the dictates of my heart.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield briefly.

Mr. CANFIELD. When I was in Trieste in September of 1947, two American GI's, one from Arlington, Va., and one from East Orange, N. J., were seized by Tito's men for stepping over a poorly marked line between Yugoslavia and Trieste. Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, commanding our troops, commissioned me to try to get those boys released. I talked with officers of the Yugoslav Army. These officers talked as if our boys had committed a terrible crime. They finally were released. They told me later, particularly the boy from Arlington, Va., that they were briefed on communism hour after hour and asked the disposition of American troops in the free zone of Trieste. They were given rather shabby treatment and I was at that time informed by Army Intelligence there had been more than 60 incidents of this nature, some more serious.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, the Gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Cox] has expressed in his frank and fearless manner, of course, the fears and doubts that we have on this whole situation. As I said before the gentleman came in; it

is a gamble that many of us think is worth taking. None of us holds any brief for Tito. None of us has any apologies to make about this thing. We are going about it in a cold-blooded fashion, in the hope that it would pay dividends. Many of those who know more about it than I do think that it will pay dividends. However, there is a safeguard in that bill, that whatever we send there, our own people go there and see that it is distributed to relieve the famine in that country. Our own people are permitted to give the fullest publicity, both by press and radio, to our charity to those folks over there. Any time we feel that Tito is not carrying out his part of this bargain the President can cut off this relief. If he does not do it the Congress, by concurrent resolution can do it at any time. So this is not a final proposition. We can cut it out any time we feel it is not paying the dividends we expected it to pay.

Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

The resolution was agreed to.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 9853) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 9853, with Mr. MCSWEENEY in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS] is recognized for one hour and a half and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VORYS] for one hour and a half.

The gentleman from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 15 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, whether or not we agree as to the wisdom of what has been done or not done in the field of foreign policy up until this time, I am sure we will all agree that the bill before us should stand or fall on its own merit, and on that basis only I hope it will be considered.

The bill proposes that we grant to Yugoslavia the sum of \$38,000,000 for the relief of want and suffering brought about by a great drought and resulting shortages in food crops in that country this year. I should inform the House that, since Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform, Export-Import Bank loans by this country to Yugoslavia have amounted to \$55,000,000. Of this sum there remains unused \$10,400,000.

Since the great World War, the United States has been lavish in providing relief and economic recovery funds for our friends abroad, but even in this field we

have got to stop, look, and listen. We are nearing the point where we must strictly conserve our national resources and drastically curtail our expenditures abroad. Those who fought beside us in the last war had just as well realize that fact.

Now comes Yugoslavia, certainly not a democracy and long-time friend, with a request for aid. The question is should we grant funds in addition to what has been provided under previous legislation.

In the face of the world crisis confronting us today, we must look to our own house and the case of Yugoslavia must be judged on its individual merit and from the standpoint of what would be best for the United States.

Tito has requested this aid. Once again, as of old, the cry comes from Macedonia: "Come over and help us." And why should we heed the call for help of a dictatorship? In considering what the answer should be, we must face the facts of life as they may affect the welfare of our country. We must consider the question in the blazing light of the unholy conspiracy of communism against freedom everywhere.

The answer may be found in careful study of the strategic position of the Yugoslavia of today in the world arena, politically, militarily, geographically, and economically.

Politically: It is trite to say that Yugoslavia is a dictatorship and that Tito is a dictator. Everybody knows and admits that. Tito is a dictator, yes. But he is the only dictator or head of a state who, once having been bound by the chains of the Cominform, has kicked over the traces, reasserted his country's independence of the Kremlin, remained in power, and lived to tell the tale.

Since the end of the last great war, 13 countries and 600,000,000 souls have been brought into the circle of satellite nations of Russia. Of all these, only Tito has asserted his independence of Stalin and has dared to say to the master of the Kremlin that, though a Communist he is, he refuses to bow in obedience to the international super-Communist state. He has asserted the right of his country to work out its destiny free of Russia and along the lines of the historic national aspirations of the Yugoslav peoples. For this he has been condemned and ostracized from world communism. For this his country has been boycotted politically and economically. For this the armies of Russia and her satellites hover around his borders. For being so bound, he must turn his eyes to the west for help and receive it, else doubtless his government will fall. And there are none here who will doubt that, should his government fall, Stalin and the Cominform will be in the saddle there again and another satellite will have returned to the fold. What discouragement that would be to other nations which might consider throwing off the chains of despotism.

Remember, the United States Government and its people have never denied the right of the Russian people to choose their own form of government, communistic or otherwise. Our objection to

Stalin and the Politburo is that they not only force communism upon the Russian people but they seek to destroy free democratic governments everywhere and bring all others under their sway. Tito, while still asserting his belief in communism, just as vigorously asserts the right of a nation to work out its own salvation without obedience to any other nation. With that tenet the American people cannot quarrel.

Militarily: The armed forces of Tito on our side, or at the least not arrayed against us, in the event of a war with Russia cannot be sneezed at. He has an army of over 30 reasonably well-equipped divisions of over 350,000 men—the largest army in Europe next to Russia's. We need him on our side. We need only remember the Yugoslavs' great fighting qualities during the last world war when their nation's national existence was endangered to realize their value as friends in any coming conflict. It is our interest to help keep that army well fed and well clothed with a people behind it not driven by the despair brought about by hunger.

We should remember too the lessening of the military tensions in the Mediterranean area since early 1948 when Tito asserted his independence of the Cominform. The guerrillas have been quieted on the Greek-Yugoslav border and Tito has been in a large measure responsible for this. The tension at Trieste has decreased. Italy is more secure. Albania has been cut off from her contemporary satellite states.

Geographically: Yugoslavia lies in a strategic position on the Adriatic and in the Mediterranean area. In the case of war between our country and Russia, it is an important link in a defense line reaching through Iran, Turkey, Greece to Italy and from there to the European Atlantic Pact states. Yugoslavia is the land bridge between the free world and the Communist world in South Europe. In Stalin's hand, Yugoslavia is a threat to Greece, Turkey, and the Near East.

Economically: One of Yugoslavia's main economic assets is a plentiful supply of nonferrous metals—copper, lead, antimony, and quicksilver. All of these are vital to the United States and to its allies in western Europe. Formerly these metals went to the Soviet bloc. Now, since Tito's break with the Cominform, they are going to the West. The United States gets now 60 percent of Yugoslavia's copper export, 54 percent of its lead, 35 percent of its quicksilver, 33 percent of its antimony.

The program: The Yugoslav program is not a grant of dollars, but a grant of funds with which to purchase commodities. The market value of the Yugoslav request was \$85,900,000. After careful consideration by our own governmental authorities, this request was trimmed down to a market value of \$81,000,000. This represents 603,900 metric tons of foodstuffs with a market value of \$81,000,000, but which in actual cost is estimated at \$69,400,000. Under existing legal authority, the executive branch has already furnished 248,900 metric tons of food with a market value,

including transportation costs, of \$43,000,000 and an actual expenditure, including transportation, of \$31,400,000. The program in this bill is for the remainder; namely, 355,000 metric tons of supplies having a market value and estimated program expenditure, including transportation, of \$38,000,000. It is that part of the total program which was not provided in the so-called stop-gap program. This program calls for \$34,400,000 worth of commodities and \$3,600,000 worth of ocean transportation charges.

The large bulk of these commodities will be purchased from stocks held by the United States Government. Three hundred and one thousand metric tons to cost \$24,600,000 are held in Government stocks. The remainder—54,000 metric tons—will be purchased in the open market at a cost of \$9,800,000. All of the items in this program are food, feed, and seeds.

It should be important to the American people that 72 percent of the commodities bought under this program will come from Commodity Credit Corporation's surplus stocks and 28 percent of the program will be purchased in the open market.

Conditions of assistance: The assistance in this bill is not being handed to Tito with no conditions asked. Section 3 requires an agreement in which the Yugoslav Government undertakes to do certain things the United States considers necessary.

(a) Yugoslavia finances our operating expenses in Yugoslav currency.

(b) Yugoslavia publicizes this program to make sure that the people know where the assistance is coming from. In addition, the United States will have the opportunity and the access to Yugoslav information facilities to make sure that this fact is known to the Yugoslav people.

(c) United States will be permitted to have its own people in Yugoslavia to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution of relief commodities.

(d) Yugoslavia must make an equitable distribution not only of the commodities we make available, but similar commodities produced locally or imported from anywhere else.

Method of assistance: United States agencies will procure the commodities and ship them to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia will distribute the commodities through regular commercial channels at reasonable prices. However, commodities will be furnished free to those who are unable to pay for them.

Distribution by the United States would require large staffs of people and a considerable administrative cost. This is not necessary. The Yugoslavs can distribute the commodities under our supervision. If they do not comply with the agreement or satisfy our requirements, we can terminate the aid at any time.

Sanctions: The bill provides ample means for us to stop the program at any time we feel it is desirable. The termination clause permits us to suspend the operation if the Yugoslavs are not complying with the agreement. If con-

ditions change, we have the power of discontinuing the program. This means that if there is a change of regime, in spite of our assistance, we can stop immediately; if the need should be less than we now anticipate, we can stop it too. When this program no longer serves our interest, the bill directs the President to cease the assistance.

Congress has the power to direct termination whenever it considers this to be desirable. We cannot control every detail of this program; we should not. But we have an immediate control at any time. The Executive must act under certain circumstances, and Congress can act whenever it deems necessary.

It is my considered opinion and the considered opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House that whatever we may be unable to do from a financial standpoint for the rest of the world during this great crisis, we can ill afford to miss this chance to do what we can to help prevent the possible fall of the present Yugoslav Government and thereby drive a strong peg in the battle lines against international communism.

Mr. COX. Who pays for that?

Mr. RICHARDS. Our people, of course. But I do want to emphasize the fact that we are also taking into consideration the plight confronting our own farmers here in the United States today in the field of surpluses.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDS. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. WHEELER. The gentleman mentioned the fact that international communism had spread over 13 or 14 countries.

Mr. RICHARDS. It has taken under its banner 13 countries.

Mr. WHEELER. I would like to ask the question if we have not financed the spread of that communism by giving to Russia itself approximately \$11,000,000,000?

Mr. RICHARDS. In years gone by we made a lot of mistakes in regard to Russia, we made a lot of mistakes in the whole field of foreign policy, we made a lot of them on the battlefield, some of them over in Korea; but I am not discussing that question. I am talking about what is the best thing to do today. The whole question is whether or not the United States Government is going to let Tito have \$38,000,000 worth of stuff, most of it farm surplus commodities.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDS. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. COX. The gentleman will agree that for many years we have been trying to buy security and more friends. Does he not agree that that sort of friendship lasts no longer than the money flows?

Mr. RICHARDS. We are not trying to buy a friend. I do not know whether, even if this money accomplishes what we seek, that it will buy a friend. But I do say that through this proposal we are driving a peg against communism as Stalin teaches it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina has expired.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I plead for bipartisan consideration of this measure in the light of our whole foreign policy. In this grim and fateful period we should have a bipartisan foreign policy. It will need to be bi-hemispheric. We cannot unite in a policy that divides the world into two hemispheres, the European and the Asiatic, and proposes that we go along together on the European side and fall apart on the Asiatic side. I live in the Middle West. We would be right in the middle if we attempted to divide the world that way. In order to be bipartisan, we must have one whole world of the free, sticking together in Asia and in Europe, or we must develop a separate Western Hemisphere policy.

This bill involves 32 divisions—maybe. Maybe there are 32 divisions in Yugoslavia. Maybe they will be on our side. This must be considered against the background of our world policy. There is grave danger that the free world is falling apart. Our forces have taken a military beating in Korea, but that has happened to us before. We had to retreat at Lexington and at Bunker Hill. The British burned the Capitol in the war of 1812. We will leave out the defeats that were involved between 1861 and 1865. The battleship *Maine* was blown up in the Spanish-American War. We went through Pearl Harbor and Bataan in World War II. Always before we have come back strong. The danger this time is that we are coming back weak, because we are taking a beating in Washington and in the United Nations; not a military beating but a diplomatic, political, moral beating, from our friends as well as our enemies.

In that situation we Americans want to stand together. We thought the free world slogan was "One for all and all for one." Instead, there is a tendency for too many nations in the free world to say, "One for all and the rest for themselves."

Facing that situation, our answer has been firmness. We have been saying we are going to demand more promises from the free and better performance of past promises. From rumors I hear that is what the President and Secretary Acheson stood for in the recent negotiations. There was to be no appeasement, no reward of aggression; on this we can stand a united country.

Then comes this proposition, a brand-new policy, a new kind of give-away we have never done before. I think this is a mistake. I urge that we consider this as my beloved colleague from South Carolina has suggested, on the basis of what is best for the United States. I do not think it is good for us to change at this time.

Let us look at this proposal. It is not famine relief. Albright, in the Washington Post, called it drought impoverishment. This is an economic aid bill, not a relief bill. Yugoslavia's ordinary diet is 2,800 calories. They are down to 2,300 based on the \$31,000,000 of food they have gotten from us already. If they get

what they are asking for, their diet will go up to 2,500 from now until next June.

There are hungry people in Yugoslavia. I talked to a visitor there who saw children with rickets and beri-beri this summer before the drought. That was not because Yugoslavia was not raising enough food; they were exporting food; it was because those children and their parents did not belong to the right crowd, the Communist Party. But this is not a famine relief measure, because if we did not furnish anything more the people of Yugoslavia would be better off for food than more than half the people living on this planet, and I have the figures to show it. Thirteen nations have a lower standard of diet than the Yugoslavs will have if we do not send them anything else. In 1947, when we had before us the post-UNRRA relief bill, our target for urban populations was to bring them up to 2,200 calories. The Yugoslav diet, even without more aid, is above this. So this is not a humanitarian, charity proposition.

As has been pointed out, this is not for military security. Tito has no place else to go, we are told. He will not promise anything by way of military cooperation. He will not promise to join in the common cause. Further, let us remember what Tito knows, that he is a dead goner without us. If the rumors are true about the split between Tito and Stalin, Stalin would have gobbled him up long ago but for the possible threat of what we might do.

Now abideth faith, hope, and charity—but this is not charity and it is not faith, because we have no reason to trust Tito. This is a new policy based on whispering hope. I do not think we should follow that policy now.

Remember what this is: They are all fed there until the end of January. The people in the mountains now have all the food they are going to get because they will be frozen in until March. There is enough there to take care of the army. This is an economic-aid measure, based on food from February until next June. If you are an optimist as I am, and if in this critical period you feel the free world is going to hold together in a bi-hemispheric policy, just as sure as the Lord made little green apples we will have problems of economic and military aid to Tito in the next session of the Congress in order to keep him doing his part among the forces of the free. Even if things turn out well for our side, this is just a start, not a finish, on economic aid for Yugoslavia.

After pain, anguish, and UNRRA we have developed certain postwar policies which apply to all aid that we furnish. We furnish loans and there is a promise to repay. Economic aid requires a promise of economic cooperation. Military aid requires a promise to fight in the common cause. None of those requirements are in the measure now before us. That establishes a new precedent. I am told we have been putting the heat on France to agree to the use of German forces in the fight of the free against world communism. We have been saying, "You promised to cooperate; now perform." And the French have agreed. The people of France can read

the papers. Suppose they find out next week that the way to get something for nothing out of the United States is to agree to nothing, to act tough, to go Communist in a new and separate way. That is the new precedent that we are in danger of setting. I do not want to see us set that precedent.

I think we should make this a loan. There is precedent for that. That is the way we handled the dictator Franco who has some divisions which are needed over there. That is what the British have done for Yugoslav relief. They loaned, and Tito accepted, £3,000,000, or \$8,400,000 for food. A loan would be my own preference. However, I would be willing to go this far—to offer Tito a loan or if he does not want that, and wants economic-aid grants, he would take it on the same terms which we have found through experience are necessary for our friends and for democratic people. That would mean that we would require counterpart funds; the deposit of the value of our relief in their currency in a special fund subject to joint control for expenditures. Counterpart was suggested first by Herbert Hoover in 1947 in the hearings on the post-UNRRA war-relief bill. It was defeated in our committee. It was written in by amendment on the floor of the House and Senator VANDENBERG sponsored it in the other body. It has been in every relief and every economic-aid bill since then. Paul Hoffman says that is a part of the structure of our aid which has been most helpful in all the economic recovery that we have obtained.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mr. RICHARDS. My friend will admit, I am sure, that there is a big distinction between this type of relief bill and what is commonly called ECA or UNRRA. Those are long-range programs. Counterpart funds in themselves envision long-range programs. On this proposition we want to chop it off after the \$38,000,000.

Mr. VORYS. All right, I will admit there is a big distinction in the bill before us, but it is just because I do not want to make a big distinction and create a new precedent that I say this should be tied in with some strings and promises.

Here is the reason we do not dare at this dreadful, fateful hour go off on any stopgap, piecemeal tangents any more. We have got to hold the lines, maintain some sort of teamwork, and discipline among and between the forces of the free. We cannot play favorites with the worst or we may lose the best. If Tito is sincere, if he realizes that he is perforce required to join with us in the protection of the free world, then certainly it is not asking something insulting if we treat him the way we treat Spain and say, "We will give you a loan," or if we treat him the way we treat Marshall-plan countries and say, "If you get a grant, it will be conditioned on counterpart."

We also should require Tito to take steps to prevent the recurrence of this, so that this will not become a habit. That means he must stop collectivizing

his farms. We were told that the drought impoverishment is only one of the reasons for food trouble in Yugoslavia. They have been exporting food to obtain other commodities. Mr. Haggerty, our own agricultural expert, said they have had a 10- to 15-percent reduction in agricultural production because of the apathy and discontent caused by collectivization of farms. If we furnish something, we do not want Tito to make a career of having these food emergencies that the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS] will bring here annually or semiannually as short-range relief bills. We want Tito to get his economy in shape so that he can help himself and help us and help the free world.

People say, "How could Tito pay back a loan?" Yugoslavia is probably the most important producer in Europe of copper, lead, and zinc, all strategic materials. He exported \$45,000,000 worth in 1948; \$37,000,000 in 1949, and in the first half of this year \$15,700,000. Well, those are things we need, those are things that Western Europe needs. If we are to continue, as I hope we will, in a united, integrated resistance to godless, ruthless communism emanating from Moscow, we are going to need those exports, and Tito is going to need us. We should provide merely for a loan, with repayment in these materials that we need, or we should offer a grant, providing for counterpart and these other obligations. We might offer both, and Tito could take his pick. I am no stickler for particulars. I am a stickler for the principle, that before we give our approval to any aid to Tito we put it in line with the policies that we apply to the free world.

You have heard the story of the little American lieutenant who went out on that fateful night in Trieste and faced the Yugoslav forces, and at that time Tito had the whole Russian Army behind him. As they came up through the dark toward our lines he said, "You cannot come further," and they stopped and turned back. That is what firmness accomplished.

What we need at this time and what we can unite on at this time is no appeasement, no reward for aggression, but merely firmness in the right. I hope that we can unite on both sides of the aisle in writing such policies into this bill.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mr. FULTON. If by this bill support is given to Tito, is this not ruling out any possibility of aid to a free Yugoslavia? If Tito should fall, there might be two eventualities, either Stalin communism will come in or the Yugoslav people would turn to democracy. Is that not correct?

Mr. VORYS. That is true. So that if we support Tito in his government, we want to have something more than simply the propaganda that we heard while this bill was under way, propaganda from Yugoslavia which I have on my desk now, that they are turning toward a better way of life. We want assurances it is going to happen. We hope that it will be by orderly processes.

Mr. FULTON. May I ask one more question. How many church people of various denominations are at present in jail? It has been said earlier that there was a show of improvement where Tito was moving toward freedom and also sending Greek children back home. Will you tell us the number of church people imprisoned in Yugoslavia and the number of Greek children not returned?

Mr. VORYS. As far as I know—and I hope to be corrected in this if I am wrong by those who are better informed—there were about 11,000 Greek children taken to Yugoslavia, and 60 or 70 of them have been returned. I have read in the papers that there are 700 priests and 400 nuns in jail. My only information on that is what I read in the newspapers.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mr. DONDERO. Is Yugoslavia a member of the United Nations?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. DONDERO. Is there one Yugoslav soldier alongside our men in Korea today?

Mr. VORYS. No.

Yugoslavia is a member of the United Nations. Bebler, as you know, was chairman of the Security Council last month. In the committee report you will find the voting record of Yugoslavia and how many times she joined forces with the free in controversial matters before the fifth assembly of the United Nations. I counted and found that out of 54 controversial questions Yugoslavia had sided with us against Russia at the most 12 times. I could only find one time in the Security Council, according to the list of votes in the report, where Yugoslavia voted with us. So, while there has been a change in the attitude of Yugoslavia which I hope will continue, they have not yet furnished any 32 divisions, or one division, or one man to the embattled forces of the United Nations, mostly United States, which is fighting in Korea at the present time.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Can the gentleman tell us whether the State Department has made any effort as part of the negotiations with Yugoslavia to secure the release of the priests, the nuns, the Protestant ministers, Archbishop Stepanic, or any other religious denomination who has been jailed by Tito?

Mr. VORYS. Someone else will have to answer that question.

Mr. HUGH D. SCOTT, JR. Does not the gentleman think that if we are to spend millions of money, and I agree that we may have to spend it, that we should at least receive some evidence from Tito that the statements made in that propaganda booklet, that freedom of speech and freedom of religion are really practiced in Yugoslavia?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 9 minutes to the gentleman from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the Committee has before it today H. R. 9853, a bill to authorize the appropriation of \$38,000,000 for relief in Yugoslavia.

I should like to make it very plain to the House that I have no sympathy for Tito personally or his Government in particular. I recognize the fact that only a very small minority in Yugoslavia are ideological adherents of Tito and that his Government is a police state, and that he is a Communist. That there has been a severe drought in Yugoslavia, there can be no question. The proposed grant is for the purpose of keeping Yugoslavia alive and most important, to keep 32 divisions of Yugoslavians soldiers in being.

It is my understanding that just to equip a single American infantry division, the cost would be \$75,000,000—the cost roughly \$5,000 per man or \$94,000,000 to maintain an American division at full strength for a year, or a grand total of about \$170,000,000.

Tito, although a Communist, finds himself at odds with Stalin. He is not turning to us because he loves us but he is doing so because he has no other alternative. We are not considering assistance to him because we love him or the type of government he typifies but we are looking at it on the cold-blooded basis of keeping 32 antiinternational Communist or anti-Cominform Yugoslavian divisions in being. I look upon the proposal now before us as a measure essential to the security of the United States. Tito, if he is not given this assistance, may be in danger of being overthrown. Much as I would normally welcome Tito's downfall, it would, under present conditions, give way not to something better but to something worse and that would be the direct control of the Kremlin in Yugoslavia as is the case in all other Communist states in the Soviet's sphere of influence. If that happens, the largest army in being in Europe outside of Russia's, would fall a prize to the Kremlin and Stalin's victory in Yugoslavia would dishearten many dissidents within the countries under his control.

This legislation represents a cold-blooded appraisal of the situation which confronts us. We can defeat this bill, allow the 32 divisions of Yugoslavian soldiers to deteriorate; allow famine to gradually creep in; allow chaos to develop and eventually allow Stalin to step in and take over a country which will fight but which will be in no condition to fight long. On the other hand, we can authorize this aid and keep the 32 Yugoslavian divisions in being so that if and when a show-down comes, Tito's divisions will be ready to fight any act of aggression in that area by the U. S. S. R. and/or its satellites.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON. I have a great respect for the gentleman's opinion and judgment. I would like to know what the gentleman thinks in reference to the basis for his approach. It is not on humanitarian grounds, it is not on principle grounds; it is solely on the strategic

ground of defense of the interests of the United States?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The gentleman is correct when he says it is not on humanitarian grounds and not on principle, because, as the gentleman from Georgia has pointed out, in our report on this bill we recommend its approval, then to paraphrase his words we give 100 reasons why we should not do anything for Tito. We did that because we wanted to lay the whole picture before the House. Every Member in this chamber is going to have to stand up and be counted. You can make all the speeches you want, you can look for all the outs you want, you can say all the nice words or harsh words you desire, but when you get right down to it, as far as this bill is concerned what we are doing is a matter of strategic importance, it is tied up to the security of the United States. We are keeping 32 Yugoslavian divisions in being, 32 divisions which in case of a showdown can very likely immobilize that many divisions of the satellite states in that area, or which could or would perhaps be used against the Russians when the time comes.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KEATING. Does there appear in the record of the hearings authentic proof that Tito has these divisions in being, ready to fight, if properly equipped?

Mr. MANSFIELD. May I say to the gentleman, who has a brilliant military background, that on the basis of testimony given by General Bradley, both in open and secret sessions, Tito does have these divisions in being.

Mrs. NORTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mrs. NORTON. I am a little confused about this bill. I understood that this money was to be used to feed the people in Yugoslavia and not to equip divisions; am I wrong about that?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; the gentleman is correct, as always. The purpose is to raise the caloric content of the food of the people of Yugoslavia, with special emphasis on the divisions in being on the Yugoslavian frontiers. But, it will mean, of course, that the rest of the people of Yugoslavia will receive a slight addition to what they are getting at the present time. But, the prime purpose in my opinion and in my belief is to keep the divisions in operation.

Mrs. NORTON. Is there any way that we can be sure that this money will be used for that purpose? It seems to me that is a very grave question.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that the gentleman can be assured that the money will be used for this purpose because, in the first place, it is not going to be a matter of dollars; it is going to be a matter of food taken out of surplus stocks in this country or, at least, stocks in this country, to the extent of about 72 percent of the total and the other 28 percent will be purchased in the open market in this country. It will all go for food.

Mrs. NORTON. And who will supervise its distribution?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The American Government, under the terms of the bill before us today, is given the right to supervise the distribution of this food or, at least, to observe and supervise, because we did put in that particular word, as I recall, and all of the food will be labeled so that the people of Yugoslavia will know where it is coming from.

Mrs. NORTON. Let us hope they will. Mr. BENNETT of Florida. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I would like to ask to what extent this arrangement of having 32 divisions possible on our side, if we have a conflict, has been made definite? Is there anything that the gentleman can tell us about what sort of a firm promise or commitment has been made?

Mr. MANSFIELD. So far as I know, no firm commitment or promise has been made, but looking at the picture realistically, where does Tito have to turn? He has his divisions at the present time on the Bulgarian-Albanian-Hungarian frontiers, and he is using them to keep out, as much as he can, any attempt on the part of those countries to infiltrate by armed methods.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. May I ask if our Government is attempting to get any firm commitment on this subject?

Mr. MANSFIELD. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. May I ask why they are not?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Montana has expired.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the gentleman 1 minute to answer that question.

Mr. BENNETT of Florida. I would like to ask why our Nation is not attempting to get a firm commitment at this time from Yugoslavia in return for the benefits that are forthcoming, in view of our own international situation?

Mr. MANSFIELD. For the benefit especially of the gentleman from Ohio as well as the gentleman from Florida, I do not know.

Mrs. BOSONE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Utah.

Mrs. BOSONE. Then what does the gentleman from Montana think if Tito does not get the \$38,000,000? What will be the situation?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think that he will survive, and I think that he will carry out his announced policy against the Cominform and the Soviet satellite states, but I think the will to resist will be weakened, and the result may well be that the Army will lose a further degree of its efficiency, that the civilian population will lose more of the food which is now going to it; that eventually Yugoslavia might have famine and chaos and Tito will fall on his own weight, and then the only country, in my opinion, which will step in, will be the U. S. S. R., and they will take over completely and be on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean.

Mr. Chairman, I am including at this point in my remarks, the gist of two amendments which I will offer in the House tomorrow when this measure comes to a vote. I am not the author of these amendments as they have already been introduced by my friend, Senator BRIAN McMAHON, of Connecticut, and passed by the Senate. I think, though, that they are of paramount importance, and I shall do all in my power to see that they are included in this bill.

SEC. —. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as indorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

SEC. —. At the termination of each 3-month period after aid has been extended under this act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said 3-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

Mr. Chairman, I am inserting at this point a newspaper article from the Washington Star of December 1, 1950; a resolution of the regional meeting of the Catholic Economic Association, and a telegram from my friends of the Helena, Mont., Diocesan Council of Catholic Women:

[From the Washington (D. C.) Star of December 1, 1950]

CATHOLIC VETERANS O. K. YUGOSLAV AID PLANS, BUT HIT TITO POLICIES

Support for sending food and other supplies to Yugoslavia has come from the Catholic War Veterans of America, it was disclosed here yesterday.

It is believed to be the first Catholic endorsement of the administration's plan for lending assistance to Marshal Tito as a means of combating further Soviet encroachment in Eastern Europe. It contained also a criticism of Yugoslavia's internal political practices "which violate many principles of international law and human decency."

The veterans' group claims to speak for nearly 6,000,000 American Catholic veterans of both world wars.

LETTER TO AMBASSADOR

In a letter made public yesterday National Commander Donald J. McQuade wrote to Yugoslav Ambassador Vladimir Popovic here:

"The Catholic War Veterans hope the United States will extend this much needed assistance to Yugoslavia. We also hope that you, in turn, will urge your Government to extend to the individual Yugoslavian the dignity that is his; that you will permit him to worship his God freely and that you will give free movement to those stalwart men of God whose only urge is to perpetuate in the hearts of all men the love of Jesus Christ."

STEPINAC CASE CITED

Mr. McQuade added: "Let us be frank. We are not unaware that the Yugoslav Government since the end of World War II has violated many principles of international law and of human decency. We have not forgotten that your forces shot down unarmed American fliers in a peaceful mission. We are aware that your Government imprisoned Archbishop Stepinac because he committed the crime of obeying the dictates of his conscience."

RESOLUTION CONCERNING AMERICAN AID TO YUGOSLAVIA ADOPTED AT THE REGIONAL MEETING OF THE CATHOLIC ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION NOVEMBER 18, 1950, IN PITTSBURGH, PA.

Whereas the emergency help to drought-stricken Yugoslavia from the United States Government is necessary: Be it

Resolved, That all such aid be accompanied by the dissemination of information which will impress upon the people of Yugoslavia that the United States helps them because—

The United States recognizes the distress of their people;

The United States, by sharing with others not so fortunate, expresses gratitude to God for His blessings;

The United States hopes that her material aid will hasten the end of the spiritual starvation which now grips Yugoslavia and bring to her people the enjoyment of basic human rights, freedom of worship, respect for the individual, preservation of independent family farms, and freedom of opportunity to earn a livelihood.

HELENA, MONT., December 11, 1950.
Representative MIKE MANSFIELD,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.:

The Helena Diocesan Council of Catholic Women, appalled by indisputable facts of widespread violation of human rights and brutal persecution of religion in Yugoslavia, demands that aid be given only on basis of proven need and with insistence of reestablishment of decency and justice as sole moral justification for any present or future aid, otherwise shall be parties to another betrayal of the real and trustworthy friend and allies we have behind iron curtain.

Mrs. HUGH CAMPBELL,
President, Helena Diocesan Council
of Catholic Women.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Montana has again expired.

(Messrs. RICHARDS, MANSFIELD, and VORYS asked and were given permission to revise and extend their remarks.)

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON].

Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, in the consideration of the bill H. R. 9853 it seems to me we need to have great judgment and wisdom, perhaps more than most of us possess.

As has been said here by several Members, this is a moment of great danger to all the people of the world. We do not need to kid ourselves, as the boys say. This is a battle for survival whether it be diplomatic or military. We need to remember that at every moment of our considerations, not only of this bill, but of every single legislative measure that comes before this body. To me it is of great importance that we meet with complete realism the terrible problems that each new day seems but to increase; I trust it will be so to every American.

Questions have been asked here, "Has Tito sent a division to Korea?" No, he has not. "Has he done this; has he done that?" No, he has not. The implication seems to be, then, "Very well, why should he have anything from us?"

Let us for the moment assume that Canada is the Soviet Union and we are Yugoslavia. What would we feel able to do for somebody way across the world if we were just beginning to come out from under the iron curtain, and that

is all Tito has yet been able to do. He has just begun the effort to learn what the responsibility of independence is. That is pretty dangerous business in these days. I rather imagine that Mr. Tito feels he is stepping on eggs lest he draw down upon himself and the country he controls the military wrath of the Kremlin.

Suppose he had sent one of his rather precious divisions to Korea. Suppose that act tipped the scales and brought the Soviet hordes down onto and across his borders. I merely suggest that as a method of thought while we are considering this bill.

Mr. Chairman, I recognize this measure as the military gamble that it is on the part of the United States. Possibly we should recognize more clearly than we do the part it would play as a move in our economic warfare.

It is my earnest hope that the food that will be sent to Yugoslavia under this act may reach those of its people who, by March and April, will be in real need of food.

Under this bill it will be the responsibility of the administration to see that the hungry be fed. Further than that, our administration is required to give a full accounting to the Congress. If the situation changes and we prove to be ill-advised, the program under the terms of the bill itself must be terminated. The program itself is small, but the objective it aims to attain is tremendous.

I believe no one in this body understands the dangers of Soviet communism better than I do. I would like, however, to emphasize the fact that the Kremlin with its undeviating goal of complete world subjugation is one thing, and a Communist country which dares to insist upon independence is quite another thing. That insistence runs counter to the basic principles of Soviet Communist world domination. The attainment of this diabolic purpose on the part of the Kremlin involves first the destruction of the whole fabric of independence, followed by enslavement. Tito's fight against this basic Soviet goal in effect is our fight as well, regardless of his internal policy. The help now being given to Yugoslavia together with the aid proposed in this bill will lay a groundwork for improvement in his internal policy. It is not Tito's internal policy that constitutes a threat to the United States. Rather is it the fanatic march of Soviet power which would destroy us. Tito is helping to halt that march. Let us do likewise.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio. I yield.

Mr. GROSS. The gentlewoman from Ohio says that if it is proven we are poor poker players the program will terminate. Does not the gentlewoman think that we have long ago demonstrated by the diplomatic beating we have been taking that we are very poor poker players?

Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio. Certain people among us have been very poor poker players, that is true.

Mr. NOLAND. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio. I yield.

Mr. NOLAND. If there is one thing which can be placed in the balance on Tito's side at this time—and we all grant there is not very much which can be placed in the balance on his side—would it not be that Tito saw fit to close the Yugoslav border into Greece and cut off the Communist rebellion which was going on there for many, many months and so far as that affected the situation where we were supporting the Greek Government and were spending millions of dollars for arms and aid to Greece that that alone could be placed in the balance and that if he sees fit to keep that border closed, then the money we might send to aid him would be well spent at this time?

Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio. The distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. NOLAND] does well to bring that to mind. I would like to continue his thought because the government in Yugoslavia—Tito—has begun to return those tragic Greek children to the Greeks. We have also been told that he has very definitely changed the whole method of procedure against religious groups in Yugoslavia. These are some of steps which have been taken already which would seem to indicate that though Tito recognizes the thinness of the shells on the eggs on which he is treading, he is going to try to reach a new goal.

Mrs. BOSONE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio. I yield.

Mrs. BOSONE. What would lead the gentlewoman to believe that his procedure would be different if we failed to give him the \$38,000,000.

Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio. Personally, I would be very reluctant to take the chance. It has two sides. Perhaps it is just the little straw which would break the camel's back and destroy his control, because my sense of Yugoslavia today, all I know of it, and I was there in 1945—my sense of it is that if Tito falls, Stalin will take over, and not any one more friendly to the United States. In addition to that I would like to feel that as the world comes out from under the iron curtain we would have done those things which would give the various countries a sense of our understanding and our friendliness that in the not too distant future a new world might be born.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON] has expired.

(Mrs. BOLTON of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE].

(Mr. COLE of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, the decision of extending financial assistance to Tito and his Communist government in Yugoslavia is a most difficult one. It is highly distasteful to me to give aid to a Communist government any place in the world at a time when American soldiers are being killed by Communist governments in other parts of the world. Based upon principle and

consistency, this measure for aid to Yugoslavia should not be adopted. But we must, I feel, lay aside the inflexible dictates of principle and recognize world conditions as they exist, our decision should be based on only what is best for America. There are times when expediency is justified.

It is asserted that Tito has a substantial military force estimated to be 32 divisions, which might be available to our side in any European conflict with the Soviets. There are some who feel that certain conditions and promises should be exacted in return for this grant of \$38,000,000. To me even though the conditions were imposed upon or promises made by Tito they would be completely ignored by him if necessary from the standpoint of his own interests. There are some who entertain serious doubts as to which side Tito may join. I do not entertain the naive expectation that this aid will cause him to entertain any feeling of undue fairness or obligation to the Western Powers. I do feel, however, that in the light of his present situation, having already incurred the displeasure of the Kremlin, and therefore unable to run the risk of Soviet domination in central Europe, his national interests require that he participate on the side of the Western Powers.

It may be as many persons reason that this assistance will only strengthen his Communist hold upon the Yugoslav people, 85 percent of whom it is reported are opposed to communism. Right at the moment our big concern is Communist Russia, and we can deal with Titoism at a later time after the major Stalinist issue is resolved.

Accordingly, I shall support this measure only upon the basis that by doing so it will aid in part to improve or maintain the physical vigor and stamina of the Yugoslavs, both military and civilian, with the confident expectation that their interests will require them to side with Western Europe in the event of open hostilities.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BATTLE].

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, the question before us today, whether or not to authorize relief to Yugoslavia by giving her some of our surplus food, takes me back to one of the most important decisions I had to make as a freshman Member of the House. It was back in March 1947, during the first session of the Eightieth Congress. The international situation was tense and serious. It was so grave that it necessitated the special appearance of the President before a joint session of Congress. It was a situation which involved the fundamental interests and security of the United States. The independence and integrity of Greece and Turkey, both strategically located on the eastern Mediterranean, were being threatened. Greece was being subjected to Kremlin-inspired terrorist activities along her northern borders, while Turkey was being bombarded with a furious campaign of intimidation by the Soviet Government. To meet the peril created by those alarming conditions, the President

urged that the Congress authorize a program of economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Chairman, I voted for that bill because I felt it was in the interest of the national security of the United States and of world peace for our Government to pursue a positive policy in behalf of Greek and Turkish independence. Those of us who voted for the bill recognized that if Moscow ever succeeded in her objective of dominating Greece and Turkey disaster would fan out all over the Middle East and Europe and eventually engulf the United States.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATTLE. I yield.

Mr. GROSS. Is there not a tremendous difference? There is no comparison between the two, for the reason that we have a former Communist at the head of the Yugoslav Government and you do not have a Communist at the head of the Greek Government.

Mr. BATTLE. I am not saying that the situation is the same nor comparing the countries. What I am saying is that we were facing troubled times and we came forward with a new program which succeeded to a great extent. We are facing an entirely different and more serious situation today, which calls for positive and new considerations. However, our interest—the security of the United States—is the same.

None of us could be sure then about the success of that program, just like we cannot be sure today of this proposed investment, but let us look at the results. Greece now stands proudly independent, having made considerable progress in getting her own house in order. A few weeks ago I participated in a ceremony in Athens which was a send-off for Greek troops on the way to Korea to fight with the United Nations forces. And what about Turkey? Turkey stands so firmly independent and so strong that she has become the guardian of the Middle East. The record of Turkish troops fighting in the ranks of the United Nations in Korea has won universal admiration.

Mr. Chairman, I hold in my hand at the present time an article which is entitled "Tough Turkey, Middle East Watchdog." I ask unanimous consent to have the article inserted at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Alabama?

There was no objection.

[From the Washington (D. C.) Evening Star of December 7, 1950]

TOUGH TURKEY, MIDDLE-EAST WATCHDOG (By L. Edgar Prina)

The heroic demonstration of fighting prowess by the 5,000-man Turkish brigade in Korea has afforded the peoples of the free world this comforting thought: There are 375,000 more like them in the army at home.

And should the Soviet Union make an aggressive move toward the Dardanelles, the Suez, or the Near East, the Turks probably could put nearly 2,000,000 trained men in uniform, thanks to universal military training.

That the tough, hard-bitten Turkish soldier is a first-class fighting man may come as a pleasant surprise to many Americans,

but not so to the Turks. An official of the Turkish Embassy here, commenting on reports describing the exploits of his countrymen in Korea, said:

"Give us a piece of territory to defend, and—depend on it—we'll defend it to the end."

The hand-picked Turkish brigade in Korea is a self-supporting, reinforced unit—a sort of souped-up regimental combat team. It has its own artillery and communications. It carries a replacement pool, medical organization, postal, and mess staffs.

Even men of the housekeeping units have got into the fight. The Embassy spokesman said that many of the cooks demanded to be allowed to go up front, contending they were soldiers first and cooks second. They got permission.

These fighting cooks were with other elements of the brigade cut off by the Chinese Reds last week. Low on ammunition, the Turks fixed bayonets and charged. When the action was completed 200 Reds lay dead and 200 others had been taken prisoner.

An American unit fought its way up to the Turks, providing an escape route. But the Turkish commander, Brig. Gen. Yaicki, declined to flee the "trap." "We are killing too many Chinese," he said.

The Turks finally broke out, carrying their wounded on their backs, after fighting a courageous rear-guard action to aid retreating Eighth Army troops. About 500 of them were killed.

The Turkish armed forces, which have been unified for 15 years, are commanded by Gen. Nuri Yamut. He has more power, relatively, than General Bradley, chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Yamut has the final say. Serving under him are Gen. Kurtdjebe Noyan, army chief; Admiral Sadik Altindjan of the navy, and Gen. Muzasser Goksenim of the air force.

Universal military training has been in effect in Turkey for many years. Men between the ages of 21 and 28 are required to serve for 18 months. Those who have had high school education or less are put in the noncommissioned ranks. College graduates are given officer training, but normally they can advance only to company grade rank.

The professional officer corps, up to the rank of general, are trained at the military college. Generals and admirals attend the staff college. Turkey keeps the officer corps large enough, even in peacetime, to meet the needs of full mobilization.

Before our Joint Military Mission for Aid to Turkey began functioning under the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Turkey never had a cadre of noncommissioned officers—the backbone of our armed services. Now, however, careers have been opened up for such men in the Turkish forces.

That isn't the only way the Turks have benefited from American aid. More than \$1,800,000,000 has gone to Turkey and Greece in the last 3 years in the form of Truman Doctrine, ECA and Mutual Defense Assistance program grants. With this money, modern equipment and training have been provided. Standardization of weapons is under way, and a network of military roads is being constructed. The 650-member military mission is training Turks to train Turks.

Acting on the recommendation of American experts, the Turks actually have cut down the size of their standing army from the 500,000-man force it maintained in 1947. Today they have a compact, hard-hitting machine of 22-25 divisions of about 15,000 men each.

In September the Turkish armed forces held what has been officially described as "extremely successful large-scale military maneuvers." Tank, planes, and ships participated.

The Turks say that theirs is not purely a defensive force, and point out that they

could, in the event of a Russian attack in Western Europe, smash at the Soviet flank.

Turkey has been negotiating a mutual defense pact with Greece which, when consummated, may later include Italy and Yugoslavia. Such a line-up would put a very sizable force on Russia's flank.

Turkey's chief strength lies not alone in its 2,000,000 bayonets but in the unity of its 20,500,000 citizens. Since it broke with the past in 1923, under Ataturk, it has embraced western ideals and democratic principles. Its firmness in the face of heavy Soviet pressure has earned it a high place in the ranks of the free nations.

When the American taxpayer contemplates the aid money spent since World War II, he probably will come up with the verdict of most of our military experts: Nowhere have the dollars been spent more wisely or to better advantage than in Turkey, guardian of the Middle East.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATTLE. I yield.

Mr. FULTON. The gentleman has good powers of observation, and I believe has visited Tito in his office only a few weeks ago. Is that correct?

Mr. BATTLE. I will agree with the gentleman on both counts.

Mr. FULTON. The gentleman then could probably characterize for us from what he saw what kind of a man Tito was from close observation and recent observation, could he not?

Mr. BATTLE. I will be glad to do my best.

Mr. FULTON. Would the gentleman explain to us the picture that Tito had—I believe the gentleman has spoken of it—that hangs behind Tito's seat in his office. What is that?

Mr. BATTLE. Does the gentleman want me to tell this story by degrees or all at once?

Mr. FULTON. Also tell us the kind of statue he has up there and the picture of the world?

Mr. BATTLE. I shall be pleased to tell all that as I go along, or I will be glad to digress now.

Mr. FULTON. I would like for the gentleman to characterize it right here if he will.

Mr. BATTLE. I can tell you about the man and the picture on the wall. Why not start with Tito's guards? They ushered us into his room, which was a very beautifully decorated room, incidentally.

Mr. FULTON. Does he not have a picture of Lenin behind him?

Mr. BATTLE. Do you want me to answer your questions or not? Tito was seated at the end of a long room. One complete wall was devoted to a picture or painting depicting a sixteenth century peasant uprising. To his left was a bust. When I asked him through an interpreter about this bust he said: "You will note that this is a bust of Lenin and not a bust of Stalin."

What else do you want to know?

Mr. FULTON. Did he not have some sort of world set up there, a globe, and then over that world was there not a plane diving down on the world? And above that was there not the hammer and sickle?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes. Now the gentleman has already told the Committee, so there is no use for me to mention it.

Mr. FULTON. Meaning that communism was to dominate the world?

Mr. BATTLE. I do not know what meaning was intended; but there was a globe in the room, and over this globe was a sickle and a hammer, and over the hammer was a silver airplane in a nose-dive. Now, it may have been an airplane of the United Nations dropping an atomic bomb; I do not know what interpretation the gentleman wants placed on it.

Mr. FULTON. I am asking the gentleman for his; that is why I wanted him to tell us about it.

Mr. BATTLE. There is no doubt in my mind that Tito is a dictator. I know what the gentleman has in mind, because this argument has gone on before. But Tito is not the aggressor; it is Stalin, and Stalin is the one we are trying to stop.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATTLE. I yield.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. I wonder if the gentleman can tell us as to whether or not there has been a change of attitude. When we were over there a year ago he told us that there was one thing he wanted made clear, and that was that they were Communists, that they were against the capitalistic system, and that they hoped to help overthrow the capitalistic system.

Is the gentleman able to state whether or not his attitude has changed on that at all?

Mr. BATTLE. It seemed to me there was a considerable change from that statement, because he indicated to us that the two nations could live side by side and that he had no idea of making aggression; in fact, he said that he would uphold his responsibility to the United Nations in stopping aggression in the future.

I would like to say that all of us, even though we are not from Missouri, would like to be shown, and we indicated this to Tito.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield.

Mr. BATTLE. I yield.

Mr. SUTTON. I quote from *Kommunist*, the organ of the central committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, March-May 1950, the article, the Equality of Nations and the Struggle for Peace, by V. Popovic, page 111:

The United States of America is in the frontline of the "imperialistic" coalition. "We considered earlier, with reason, the policy of the United States of America, as the expression of the leading imperialistic power. In this way we have not mistaken. This was and remains exact."

I wonder if they have changed since March or May of this year?

Mr. BATTLE. Well, I assume they have changed. It is my understanding that there has been a radical change in the last few weeks in the voting of the Yugoslav representative in the United Nations.

Mr. SUTTON. Is that because they wanted some more money from Uncle Sam?

Mr. BATTLE. I think the \$38,000,000 worth of surplus food involved would be too small in proportion to the stakes.

Mr. FULTON. On the question of whether or not the foreign policy of

Yugoslavia has changed, I refer to the book sent out by the Yugoslav Ambassador in the last 10 days in which under "Foreign Policy" it is stated:

Yugoslavia rejects the policy of dividing the world into "spheres of influence" as being harmful to the cause of peace and unjust to the smaller and less developed countries. For this reason, it will not condone aggression in any form or source, nor will it join any bloc, either in the East or the West.

Mr. BATTLE. It was my impression, and I believe it was also the impression of the gentlemen who were with me during the interview with Tito, that he wanted to be as independent as possible and that he wanted no entangling alliances with either the West or the East, which I believe is the substance of what the gentleman is saying. However, he also said that no nation could stay out of another world conflict.

The bill before us today calls for even more resoluteness and more realism. Again we are faced with a critical world situation. Only now Moscow has become more brazen, more imperialistic, more militant, and thus even more of a threat to our national security. To meet that threat will demand much strength from many sources. It will require that we increase the armed strength of the United States. It will mean further assistance to arm our friends, and it will involve the tactic of cracking the iron curtain and weaning the Soviet satellites away from Moscow. It will require taking advantage of every single opportunity. Today, Yugoslavia offers us one such opportunity. Because of the critical food shortage in Yugoslavia, the break with Russia and certain internal policies which we cannot condone, Tito is faced with the threat of economic chaos which could drive him back to the Kremlin or cause him to be overthrown by Stalin's henchmen. In either case the only regime which has been able to break away from the Kremlin would be swallowed up by the waiting Soviet forces. Needless to say, the loss of an independent Yugoslavia, having as it does the largest standing army in Europe, would be a serious blow to the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area and of the United States. Some of our surplus food that we cannot use could make the difference. It is a chance we must take.

Mr. BURNSIDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATTLE. I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia.

Mr. BURNSIDE. Along that same line, would it not be logical to think that Tito might disband some of those divisions and put those men back to producing food in February or March—they have an earlier season than ours—and we would then lose divisions that might be helpful?

Mr. BATTLE. I think that is a definite possibility although my personal opinion is that his armed forces are going to come first, almost through necessity for his own protection if for nothing else.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to suggest that the internal conditions in Yugoslavia today are the same as the conditions which existed in Greece and Turkey back in 1947. I do wish to emphasize, however, that the interest of the

United States is the same. And that is, the principle of assisting independent nations to remain independent and free from the domination threatened by Moscow. In voting for the Greek-Turkish aid program, our primary responsibility was to protect the national security of the United States. In voting for this program of relief to drought-stricken Yugoslavia, our consideration must also be that security.

Mr. Chairman, I visited Yugoslavia 6 weeks ago, together with my colleague on the Foreign Affairs Committee, the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. CHATHAM], and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. FISHER], a member of the Armed Services Committee. The devastating effects of the drought were apparent even from the plane before we landed. As we drove over the countryside we saw rows and rows of parched fields. They offered mute testimony to the hunger which is in store for the Yugoslav people this winter unless the United States comes to their assistance quickly with some of our surplus food.

During our visit, we were given an hour and a half interview with the man who dared to defy the Kremlin by refusing to be a puppet, Marshal Tito. He is a mild-mannered man with a square-set jaw, a dictator to be sure and formerly the star pupil of Stalin. We talked very frankly with him throughout the interview, and he displayed a genuine desire to answer our questions. We quizzed Tito sharply about his break with the Kremlin, recognizing that this represents the first roll-back of the iron curtain. Could we place confidence in the reality of the rift? Could we rely on his not returning to the Soviet fold? Tito was emphatic about this. His break with Stalin was real, he assured us. We asked Tito why Russia had not taken over Yugoslavia militarily. Tito explained that there were several reasons: First, he said, Stalin miscalculated in thinking that Yugoslavia would crack up economically. Tito said that they were not going to crack up and surplus food from the United States, if granted, would be a great help in preventing such a catastrophe. Second, Tito told us, he has over 30 divisions trained for mountain fighting, the kind of fighting an invader would find a hard nut to crack. He added that Stalin knows these Yugoslav divisions can tie up and hold up at least an equal number of Russian divisions.

One of the most significant statements that Tito made was relative to his obligations to the United Nations. It was the first time that he had made such a statement. In response to my question, he declared that in the future Yugoslavia would uphold its responsibilities in the United Nations whether or not Yugoslavia was attacked first. It will be recalled that previously he had said he would fight and defend Yugoslavia against any enemy that attacked his country. But this is the first time that he made the statement that in the future he would fight under the auspices of the United Nations irrespective of which nation was attacked. We thought perhaps we were having interpretation difficulties, so we quizzed him further along this line. But there was no misunderstanding.

Tito stuck to his original statement. This is how he reasoned: There will be no such thing as a bilateral war. In the world of today, if two great nations get into a war, it will inevitably spread into a global conflict. Irrespective of his strong desire to remain neutral and not to have entangling alliances with foreign nations, Tito realizes that no nation would be able to stay out of such a conflict.

While in Yugoslavia we visited a collective farm, and it was interesting to talk to the men, women, and children working on this farm. Except for the Communist leaders sent out to manage the operations, it seemed to me that these farm people were no more Communists than the man in the moon. I do not believe they know anything about political philosophy including Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism, or any other kind of "ism." They impressed me as being terribly poor, hard-working people who never have had much of a chance in life. We also visited a home along the roadside and I was pleasantly surprised in each instance at the good will toward America which was manifested toward us. Many of these people hope to come to America some day, or at least to have their children come to this land of opportunity and freedom. We have a lot of good will to build on, even in this country which used to be behind the iron curtain.

Mr. Chairman, the times are so critical and the danger so imminent that we must marshal all the independent nations which are standing up to Soviet imperialism. Yugoslavia is one of those nations. The fall of an independent Yugoslavia would have grave and far-reaching consequences. Our dangerous military position would become desperate if the largest and strongest army in Europe lined up with the Soviet forces against us. We cannot expect to swap this surplus food which is an investment in our own security for world-shaking bilateral agreements; nor haggle about tying strings which have no strength. We already have more commitments in this bill than we had in the highly successful Greek-Turkish-aid program. Neither can we afford to be choosy, picking out only those countries whose philosophies coincide with ours or those who have always been our friends. Above all, we cannot afford to miss the chance to marshal these independent forces while we still have the chance—in our tremendous task of preventing world enslavement.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATTLE. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON. The gentleman has stated as his opinion that the drought in Yugoslavia on its economy was devastating. If you will look at page 4 of the Senate report you will find a schedule of commodities produced in Yugoslavia, taking the 1947-49 averages. You will find that the corn production averaged 59 percent and rice 100 percent and sugar 108 percent. Now, which is true, the gentleman's estimate that it was devastating or the Senate estimate that they were actually averaging about 60 to 70 percent of their total production?

Mr. BATTLE. I do not think there is any doubt that Yugoslavia is suffering from a drought and that they are in need of food.

(Mr. BATTLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH].

(Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio has suggested that if we give aid under this legislation we ought to make it in the form of a contract, that is, a loan. There is precedent for that. Just a short time ago Mr. Tito accepted a loan from Britain to the extent of about \$8,000,000. Why should we not advance \$38,000,000 on the same basis?

As I listened, Mr. Chairman, to the proponents of this legislation while the rule was being discussed it seemed to be their view that this is legislation on which we must take a chance. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that we have been taking an awful lot of chances and have been brought to a terrible state of affairs. If we are going to use that as an argument in favor of this legislation we ought to review briefly just how far communism has advanced while we have been taking these chances. In 1945 communism dominated 190,000,000. In 1948 it dominated 450,000,000 people, and on January 1, 1950, it dominated 800,000,000 people.

Mr. Chairman, the Yugoslav aid bill which we are considering is not a program that can be justified on a humanitarian basis. The public and many Members in this body have been led to believe that a serious drought this last summer is causing a great food famine. Nor can it be justified as a military-aid measure. The proponents have failed to prove their case.

This bill is a new wrinkle in give-away programs. It is the worst of its kind ever to be submitted to us. It is a gross fraud upon the American people and another sop to buy a dyed-in-the-wool Communist who sits on a shaky throne. I am opposed to it.

The old calculated-risk theory is trotted out and the bait in the trap is Tito's 30 divisions of troops. It is the same old bogus argument that was used at Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, always the pious hope that Stalin would be a nice boy, and it was the same with the Chinese Communists, those agrarian reformers who are murdering our boys in Korea. Again we are wishfully hoping that Communist Tito will play on our side and not with Stalin. Once again we are compromising with communism.

Those who know something about the 30 divisions of troops deny that it is the strongest army in Europe. They say such reports are propaganda. I am informed that it is one of the weakest armies in a Communist-threatened Europe. Nearly all the old commanding officers in Tito's forces are present Stalinites. The rank and file of Tito's army are intensely nationalistic; they are

both anti-Tito and anti-Stalin. The only dependable force that Tito has is composed of his own personal followers and his police forces. There is serious question that Tito has anything like 30 divisions. Whatever he has is poorly equipped with weapons of Russian-German origin. It is poorly officered by men whose political dependability is open to serious doubt. To make this army effective, it would be necessary to arm it with modern American weapons and put it under the command of officers whose loyalty to democratic causes cannot be questioned. To do otherwise is to risk having American weapons turned against American boys.

I make this unequivocal statement, Mr. Chairman, that if this bill is approved that within 6 months or less the State Department will be back here with another bill asking Congress to authorize the shipment of military supplies to Yugoslavia. This would be a risky gamble. It would equip Tito's army with additional bargaining power by which the United States could be threatened with pro-Soviet action on the part of Yugoslavia. In other words should we refuse to approve a demand for military matériel, foxy Tito would say, "Well, if I don't get it from you, I'll get it from the Russians." That kind of argument has been quite effective in the past. It seems obvious to me that it will be used again as the occasion arises.

There is no showing that Tito will be on our team. Why not make that a condition of our aid? There have been no consultations between the Yugoslav military and our military leaders. That is General Bradley's testimony.

Now something has been said about the break between Tito and Stalin. I would remind you that there has never been a close relationship between the two. Tito has never been trained in the Kremlin; he was in power when Russian troops entered Belgrade in October 1944. Yugoslavia has never been a Soviet satellite as we understand that term. It was the British, aided by the United States, that backed Tito against Mikhailovich, the real Yugoslav patriot.

May I interpolate here. Do you remember when King Peter spoke to us from the Speaker's dias in the House in 1943 and he concluded his appeal to us for assistance, that it should go to support that great partiotic Mikhailovitch and we stood and cheered and those old girders in the House rang? Then, within less than a year we had sold poor old Mikhailovitch down the river and then they hung him.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, we appeased Tito and dumped Mikhailovitch, another dark chapter in our history—another calculated risk which brought disaster to Greece and instability in the Balkans. Had we continued to support Mikhailovitch, the West would be in a far better strategic position to day on the Danube. One writer has said that it would have controlled the balance of power in the middle and southeastern areas of Europe. There surely would have been no German or Austrian problem as we know it today. Many European wars have been

fought to secure an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. If Tito thought it would be profitable for him or because of overwhelming pressure that Russia would bring to bear upon him, he would bow to Stalin and then we would be in the same unfortunate position—as in Korea—of giving material and economic aid to these countries only to make them luscious prizes when the Russians decide to move in.

Mr. Chairman, Tito is a Communist and he boasts of that fact. He is a ruthless dictator; he oppresses freedom and liberty, his opponents are shot or hanged and thousands of loyal people are political prisoners. He has collectivized farms and imprisoned peasants who refuse to produce farm products that he demands. This is the Tito whose guerrillas kidnapped Greek children from their homes and he still refuses to surrender them. Of yes, we are told he has returned a few of them. Why not all? Should we not make this a condition? Would you trust him in any kind of a deal? Communists are liars—even the American brand. To do business with Tito is to do business with the Devil. But the State Department says, notwithstanding Tito's communism and his bad record, in our desire to stop communism we will take a chance. This is unadulterated compromise. Do we favor just a little bit of communism? It's a diabolical policy and will lead to the same failure as our appeasement policy has with Stalin. It is this policy that has plunged us into the mess we are in today.

There is another phase of the question before us, Mr. Chairman, namely, the effect of our policy upon the freedom-loving people in Yugoslavia and the other iron-curtain countries. In essence, what we are actually doing is to insure Tito's regime; we make certain that his dictatorship will continue.

Leopold Kohr, professor of economics at Rutgers, in a recent article said:

No ruler stands on shakier foundations than Marshall Tito. He is opposed by many Serbs because he is a Croat. He is opposed by the overwhelmingly Catholic Croats because he is an atheistic Communist. He is opposed by Communists because he is a Titoist. He is opposed by Democrats because he is a dictator. * * * Deprived of all means of support, Tito can now be maintained in power only through external aid furnished by the very nations he has hitherto denounced and at whom, as they prepare to help him, he now hurls the insolent warning that he does not intend to mend his ways.

Of course, he does not.

Recently, Mr. Chairman, American-Serbian organizations have been heard on this legislation. These organizations contend that Tito would have us believe that the famine was caused by drought. This is not the truth, they say. Its main cause has been Tito's oppressive measures for collectivization of farms. Peasants constitute 80 percent of Yugoslavia's population. This vast majority is being robbed of its right to own land and retain the fruits of its labor. Injustice has robbed them of the initiative to produce. While it is true there has been a considerable drought yet collectivization of

the peasants' farms is the basic cause for whatever famine that exists, according to the American-Serbian groups.

Mr. Chairman, if there is danger of famine and suffering then the aid rendered under this bill should be distributed by some American organization such as the American Red Cross or the Friends Society. Further if Tito is on our side then this bill should also provide important conditions; such as a guaranty of free and unfettered elections, of full religious freedom for all faiths, of the release of Cardinal Stepinac, of the end of collectivization of farms and the promise of a settlement of the Trieste dispute. I can hear it said that this is interference with the internal affairs of another government. I ask you what kind of traders are we? Where are the modern Yankee traders? The Communists would destroy us if they could and I shall not be a party to giving aid and comfort to the man who would destroy my home. I shall oppose communism so long as my voice can be heard. I do not intend to compromise with Tito's communism.

Our boys are dying in Korea today in a war they are told is to prevent the rush of communism. The bill we are debating today will, in effect, guarantee the continuance of communism in Yugoslavia—we guarantee the rule of tyranny and despotism. What will we say to the loved ones of those who have already given their lives in Korea if we vote for this bill. Are we against communism or not? Or can we be just a little bit for it? Consistency, thou are a jewel. When the final roll is called the record will reveal those who are for and those who are against communism.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 16 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF].

(Mr. RIBICOFF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Chairman, first I want to make a few brief comments on the statement made by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. SMITH], who preceded me. He talks about the roll call and states that by your vote will be indicated whether you are for or against communism. Basically, I think he overlooks the fact that not only are we against communism but we are also against Russian militarism, and there is no question in anyone's mind that the conduct of Russia during the past few years is one of naked militarism, using communism as a force. Anything that can be done to stop that militarism which threatens all mankind is definitely on the side of the United States of America.

The gentleman also mentioned the fact that Tito is weak and could fall at any time. I am willing to grant that proposition to the gentleman from Wisconsin, but is there any question in his mind that if Tito fell Stalin would take his place?

May I ask the gentleman from Wisconsin whether he would prefer Stalin in control of Yugoslavia instead of Tito? Would he prefer Stalin in control of those 32 divisions? Would he prefer

precepts of our world policy not in the narrow range of partisan striving, but in a broad framework of patriotic endeavor.

Not all of the Members of Congress have abided by that principle. Some have preferred the old habits of mutual distrust between the parties in foreign as well as domestic affairs. Their minds and hearts still operate in the framework of 30 years ago. You will remember the tragedy of that era resulting from the circumstance that men in positions of great political power in our Nation sought to raise party advantage above national welfare and international peace. The conspiracy to wreck the results of President Wilson's leadership was set in motion even before the terms of peace had been developed. Men whose skill was in excess of their principles, whose partisanship was vastly greater than their patriotism, managed to guide that conspiracy to success. The result was a chilling of men's hopes everywhere, a default of leadership on the part of this Nation through the fallow years of the 1920's. Our Nation went ahead on the assumption that it was not involved in the deterioration of the situation elsewhere on the globe. That assumption was blasted with the coming of World War II, which was the opening phase of the bitter ordeal in which we are still involved. Yet there are some who would write off the intervening facts and return nostalgically to the isolationism of the twenties. Fortunately these are a minority.

There are others who would share in the bipartisan foreign policy when it is to their advantage but would turn their backs upon it whenever a minor tactical gain might be scored in the contention between parties. These are half in and half out of the bipartisan approach. These are wont to share the credit for all successes and to disavow any part in the disappointments. They are wont also to regard the bipartisan idea of the foreign policy as an arrangement in which the constitutionally responsible officers must give hostages to the minority. They regard any refusal to give way to minority dictation as a breach of faith. They regard the bipartisan foreign policy as a warrant to raise their voices in condemnation whenever they wish and yet to claim immunity to any rejoinder.

Yet these have not been the prevailing moods. Our Nation has presented a continuity of policy and a determination of effort which are quite in contrast to the default of responsibility that obtained after Versailles a generation ago.

This does not mean that there has not also been a short-sighted approach to bipartisanship by the executive branch of our Government. While the direction and execution of foreign policy is within the executive branch, the Congress must implement, legislate, and appropriate to make foreign policy effective. Congress has been neglected too often. Consultation and briefing after the fact, yes; but consultation before the fact, no. An effective foreign policy is too important not to take into account the views of those who have legislative power. The

responsibility should be placed on congressional shoulders, too. The executive branch has given too little attention to the realities of the legislative process. This oversight should be rectified at once.

Further, each tick of time makes our job so much harder. Complete mobilization, controls, taxes, a price and wage freeze, and even roll-backs should be put into effect without a moment's delay. We are in a national emergency. Strong leadership will galvanize the entire people to action.

To avert the threatening tragedy and progressing toward the goal of a just peace based on a widening opportunity will require the best thoughts and the most earnest efforts of all men and women who can rise above party. The job is more than Democrats alone can do. It is more than Republicans alone can do. It is a job for all Americans acting together. It requires a steadiness of purpose above the vagaries of party fortunes.

That is why men of good will in both major parties must continue to place our foreign policy on a higher basis than party advantage.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. JAVITS].

(Mr. JAVITS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot today and we are hearing it, and justly, every day about the grimness of the situation in which the United States finds itself. One of the gentlemen who have discussed this pending bill said, and I think I quote him accurately, that the public opinion of the people of the United States was against appeasing communism. An effort was made here just a few minutes ago to intimate that those who are backing this bill are for the Communist idea, which is, I think, quite unfair. Those who have spoken for this bill are known as ardent opponents of communism and my own record of fighting the Communists and communism certainly needs no apology and it is clear; in fact, this bill is a strong anti-Communist measure.

The one thing that has not been said today is that this is the first time I know of and the first time I think the Congress knows of when the United States has gotten grim and has gotten realistic. This is the only opportunity which has been offered to us here to wage economic warfare behind the iron curtain. The gentlemen who argue against this bill cannot have it both ways. They cannot say they want to fight communism to the limit, that they want to fight it wherever they can find it, and at the same time oppose the only measure of effective economic warfare on communism which the Congress has had an opportunity to act on.

These Communists do not play for marbles. Tito knew he was risking his head when he came out against the Cominform. Yugoslavia, and that is the testimony before us, is running rife with Russian Communist agents seeking Tito's head and seeking to overthrow him. When we back Tito we are backing the only Communist leader who has dared to defy the Kremlin. So far as

the Kremlin is concerned, that is anathema. That encourages others to question its authority. That destroys the religion which is communism. This is the first fellow who has had the nerve to do it and we are arguing about the fact that we do not want to break the only effective dagger which has been pointed at the heart of the Kremlin from behind the iron curtain and which is not costing a single American soldier. It is costing thirty-eight million in dollars.

There is one thing that the action of Communist China in Korea should prove to all of us and that is that the strength of the Soviet Union is based upon satellites. What makes the Soviet Union dangerous and imperialistic is the fact that it has grown to control 800,000,000 people. It was not nearly as dangerous and we did not regard it as nearly as great a threat when it controlled the 200,000,000 people of the Soviet Union itself. Now we consider it very dangerous and Communist China showed us why—because the Soviet can now wage aggressive imperialistic war against the world and she can fight such wars by proxy. There is not a single Russian soldier engaged in Korea. Only Chinese and Koreans. Yet, American soldiers are dying there.

Here we have a good chance to immobilize, if we do nothing else, to immobilize, even if we do it only for a time and even if we do it only through next spring, to immobilize 32 Russian divisions. And what are we paying? We are paying \$38,000,000.

What do you gentlemen want for \$38,000,000?—32 divisions to use as we please? My colleague, the gentleman from Montana, just told us it cost \$3,000,000,000 a year to maintain them and equip them. You cannot buy 32 divisions with \$38,000,000—but you get a chance to keep them from being a threat to us.

The defection of Tito hurts the Soviet Union. It hurts it badly. Certainly that is shown by the fact that no event in recent history has so unnerved the masters of the Kremlin. No one has been the subject of more violent propaganda out of the Kremlin. They have not come out against anybody in the world, even including the United States and the people they call the imperialists as they have against Tito. He scared them to death. And what we want is to keep them scared. Is this bill not an awfully cheap price to pay?

This bill is the opening gambit in this grim game we are playing with the Soviet Union. This is nothing, pure and simple, but economic warfare, something which we learned was very effective in World War II and something which we are learning now in cutting off exports to Soviet-bloc countries. We still have not done enough in that regard.

We could still exercise more leverage on Hungary with respect to Cardinal Mindszenty and Robert Vogeler. We could still exercise pressure on every other Soviet-bloc country if we completely cut them off from the Western world with which they still must have trade relations, and with which they still do have relations.

There is one other point that is very important here. Tito has asked this aid. We are not shoving it across the counter to him and saying, "There, Mr. Tito, please take it." When he asks for aid from the United States he is making a commitment. He is compromising his position with the people of Yugoslavia themselves, because he was just one of those Communists like Stalin who had been raising hob about imperialists, of which he called us one. Now he comes to us and asks for this aid. You do not have to take my word or anybody else's word for that. The documents are in the record. There is the document of October 20, a note from the Yugoslavian Ambassador to the Secretary of State specifically requesting, at Tito's direction, aid from the United States. Now, Franco-Spain never did that, nor has anybody else in a situation such as this where we can take this effective, unbelievably effective act that we are asked to take in our life and death struggle against communism. There is one point which should be answered. It can be said that when we help Tito we are helping to maintain the status quo. There has been a lot of argument made on that score about our policy, that we almost always manage to get ourselves into a box where we maintain the status quo, whether in Nationalist China or South Korea or now in Yugoslavia. That is perhaps the most potent argument that can be made against this proposition, that by backing Tito we are maintaining the status quo. But I think that is decisively answered by the fact that if we do not back Tito at this time we lose two things: It is likely that if Tito falls he will be succeeded by a Stalinist. The country is in the complete grip of the Communist Party.

Second, and very important, if we do not help Tito now we do not get a nose under the tent even in Yugoslavia. Under this bill we are permitted to send our people in to observe the distribution of this food. Under this bill the food must be distributed and that is revolutionary in Yugoslavia—without any reference, not only to religious application but without discrimination on grounds of political opinion. One of the things which is happening in Yugoslavia today is that special bonuses to Communist commissars have already been eliminated.

Those are great gains for the Western World, in addition to those which the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] today mentioned, about the security of the Greek border. That alone is worth many times \$38,000,000.

The quieting of the situation in Trieste; improvement of the situation in Austria; improvement for American citizens in Yugoslavia who could not formerly get out; the beginning of the return of Greek children. All those things we are beginning to get, which is definitely breaking the Communist front; and we are getting it for what? For \$38,000,000, for food in a famine situation.

Let me pay my respects to that. It is nice to read figures about the fact that Yugoslavia has produced 59 percent of its corn crop. We have testimony before

the committee about the situation with respect to transport in Yugoslavia. It is a fact that they could have 100 percent food supply in the west or north of Yugoslavia and still have starvation in the south of Yugoslavia. That is exactly what has occurred. This food is needed in certain areas to which food cannot be brought because of the inadequacy of transport and transport connections in that country. And food that comes from the United States will go directly to those areas where there is famine, and our own people will see that it goes there.

Yugoslavia is still holding Archbishop Stepinac in prison and hundreds of other priests and nuns, church property has been invaded and taken and generally speaking there has been much activity there which we know to be associated with Communist regimes everywhere against religion. In recent months we have seen a few chinks of light with the release of the Vicar General of the Catholic Archdiocese of Belgrade and a little better climate for people who are practicing their religion in Yugoslavia. This, however, is a very small change and there is still practically everything to be done on this score. The question we must ask ourselves is how best can we begin to get it done, by letting Stalinists take over and getting the iron curtain tightly clamped on again over Yugoslavia, too, or by getting openings through which the injustices against religion and religious institutions in Yugoslavia may begin to be removed?

Now, we have got to make up our minds about this. Do we really mean it when we say we are in a grim situation and we have to fight with all the weapons at our command, or do we not mean it? If we mean it, we have to fight with economic warfare, too. This bill is the first chance we have had. If we do not mean it, then all we are doing is using arguments about the Yugoslav situation as a technique for killing what is proposed—good, bad, or indifferent—directed against Communists and communism, which means spending money.

One of my colleagues said if we can win out in this struggle with communism only by the expenditure of money, we will be getting out of it awfully cheap. I think we would all agree on that.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. SUTTON. Does the gentleman actually think for one-half second that for \$38,000,000 we will get even one man on the United Nations side?

Mr. JAVITS. I made it definitely clear that if we could get that, we could afford to spend far more than \$38,000,000, but I regard this as being the opening gambit to keep a dagger pointed at the heart of the Kremlin. We will have to be following up on that in whatever way it suits us. That does not mean we will have to go along with Tito in economic aid or anything else, but at least we are keeping the situation favorable to us now.

Mr. SUTTON. We have already loaned them \$31,000,000, have we not?

Mr. JAVITS. We have already advanced \$32,000,000 in food, but to do the job takes over \$70,000,000.

Mr. SUTTON. Is there the slightest insinuation that they will send one man to Korea?

Mr. JAVITS. But if they would send men to Korea, it would be worth far more than this. I am not claiming for this more than it is. It is a great propaganda weapon and economic welfare weapon against the Kremlin the like of which we have not had before.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. JAVITS] has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HAYS].

(Mr. HAYS of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS] for giving me this 5 minutes. I realize I cannot begin to cover the field in that time, but I have supported all the foreign commitments that have been brought before the House since I have been a Member of it—the Marshall plan and all the auxiliary features of it.

I hesitate to differ with members of the Foreign Affairs Committee on this matter. As a matter of fact, I have made 86 trips back to my district in the past 2 years to sell my people on the proposition that we cannot be isolationists, and that we have to deal with the world. But it seems to me this is a fundamental matter, that if we are going to fight communism we have got to have some proper and sound ground to stand on when we begin to fight communism by aiding communism.

I was in Yugoslavia a year ago. Tito told us, and his foreign minister and assistant foreign minister told us, that they were Communists; that they have no ideological differences with the Kremlin except one, that is, who is going to be the boss in the Balkans.

There has been a lot made this afternoon about these 32 divisions. The military attaché in Belgrade told me a year ago that as far as he knew I was the only American who had ever seen the Yugoslav Army on maneuvers.

That happened purely through an accident, because we were not permitted to travel freely in Yugoslavia.

I want to say to you that if they have 32 divisions, they are not 32 divisions as we understand them; they are rag-tag, bob-tailed, ill-equipped, poorly clad fighting units. They may be good for guerrilla warfare, but that is about all.

Some have said Tito's alleged 32 divisions can be bought for \$38,000,000. We do not have any guaranty we can buy them either with food or even if we equip them. I have seen those men. I have information, and it is first-hand, that the first thing they would do would be to murder their officers, take to the hills and fight against Tito and the Communists from without and try to set up an independent government in Yugoslavia.

They talk about different United Nations organizations. I saw his trucks that his army used. Where the olive-drab and green had faded out or worn away you could see the letters "UNRRA"

showing through. That is where he got part of his military equipment. And, as to the UNICEF program, the children's aid program, we went out to a school where we saw them give this milk to the children. Before they got it they had to stand there and sing a little song. I do not understand the language and could not interpret it, but the interpreter said that the meaning of what they sang was: "Thanks to our great leader Tito for this milk we get today."

He did not give any credit to the UNICEF program, to the United Nations, or to anybody else.

The point I am trying to make is that if we follow this bill we are undertaking to fasten his brand of Communist dictatorship upon a people which has a tradition of fighting for freedom. You do not need to take my word for it. Go over to the Library of Congress and look at the history of World War I and find out who fought the Germans down in those mountains; go back and find who fought against the Turks. They will be fighting against communism now just the same as they fought against oppression in the past, because this people have a tradition of freedom and they have a tradition of loving to run their own business. Tito did not break with the Kremlin because he wanted to; he broke with them because he knew the temper of the people. He knew what would happen if he tried to subject those people to the orders and to the wishes of the Kremlin. Oh, yes; if Russia tries to invade Yugoslavia and take over if Tito fails, they might find they had more trouble on their hands than they have now with Tito.

I think we stand at a dangerous place when we give aid. They are using the drought as an appeal to support this loan. I heard what Mr. Haggerty said before the Foreign Affairs Committee. I will not attempt to give his exact figures, but he said that only a relatively small percentage of this lack of calories was caused by the drought; he said that a great deal of it was caused by Tito's collectivization.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON].

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, there was one thing that America has stood for during all the years—that there is something more than bread, and arms, and bombs in the world—there is such a thing as principle. We Americans cherish this basic concept. Our Government has stood as a standard to which people could repair who wanted freedom and justice and who were oppressed. We Americans take pride in this stand. The question then is in connection with this new bill, Shall we firmly and clearly stand with principle and, if necessary, fall with principle? Or shall we embark upon opportunism and expediency to save our skins and our security? My answer is a clear "No."

I hold no higher moral conscience, I hold no higher public judgment, than anyone here. My purpose is merely to point out that possibly this Nation is reaching for the small grain of corn and overlooking the full ear. We are not so

desperate as to cast off principle and reach for small things.

The people of this country down through our history have said, we would rather have freedom. This is worth sacrifice and dangers willingly encountered, and alone if necessary. It is an old saying that if Patrick Henry had said, "Give me security or give me death" we would not have had any free America. Liberty requires bold action.

Reduce this proposed course to a simple play for security, but your security will be small indeed. Most of the people of this world are not directly involved in this argument, in this great imperialistic dispute that now seems to be waging. We must convince those billions of people upon the basis of reason and fair conduct. You must appeal to them on their hearts and their consciences, and they will join you. They will know in their hearts they can trust you and propaganda will utterly fail if your words are tied to actions that are based on enduring principle.

The trouble with American foreign policy today is that we are trying to shore up old regimes, we are trying to maintain the status quo wherever it is regardless of principle. This proposed legislation even goes to the extent of trying here to shore up an inefficient and failing dictatorship, let alone an efficient one. Where must the right-thinking people of this world turn in this critical hour of revolution and misunderstanding and bloodshed? Not to opportunism, expediency, imperialism, power politics, and cloak and dagger diplomacy.

If you had two tigers out in your back yard and there was one big one that growled at you every morning, and you said, "I am going to be smart about this. I will take oatmeal out every morning and feed it to the little one. He will show the big one." So one morning you go out and you find you have two big tigers in your back yard instead of a big one and a little one. The little one will probably treat you just as much as you thought the big one might. If he is not for you and your principles, if he is not for your way of life when small, do not expect otherwise any time you go into the garden. The grown little tiger may not like either you or the big one. This bill's policy could be summed up tread softly and carry a big bowl. Teddy Roosevelt's policy was speak softly and carry a big stick.

America should stand up and still hold our banner so that the young people of the world who are looking for some place to place their confidence and their future, can see that the United States is not playing power politics, playing for 32 dictator divisions. Let the dictator have his divisions, as far as I am concerned. The man who chooses to stand with free men on his principles will be respected even by his opposition, but the man who trades his principles for a desperate expediency for his own safety and security will not be respected nor followed by the world's new generation. Let us show the way to build a better world based on principle and we need not buy friends nor enter greasy alli-

ances. Have we forgotten that ours is the job of building a better world, with freedom from fear and want, and justice for all?

You may say, "Well, this bill is not humanitarian." Of course, it is not humanitarian because, if it were, we would already have fed millions of starving people in India as Nehru came over here and pleaded with you to do. It is not relief, because according to the Senate report most of the produce in this year of 1950 in Yugoslavia is not below 60 percent of normal. As you know, the average daily calorie supply in Yugoslavia is about 2,300, whereas shortly before it has been 2,800, really less than a 25-percent decrease in the standard of living.

What else is it? Is it a relief program? Of course it is not, because there has been worse distress in many other places, including slum areas in the United States, and again you have done nothing.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Is this money or food going to be given to Tito to sell to the people over there, or is it going to be distributed?

Mr. FULTON. It is not being given to the people of Yugoslavia when they are able to pay for it. It is a grant to Tito's government, however, so that government will not have to repay the United States. Tito will put the supplies into his economic system and sell them as much as he can through the ration system. This is a concession to the Tito government whose finances will be greatly improved by such a gift. You would, therefore, by this bill, be assisting in keeping in power an inefficient dictatorship, by giving a grant-in-aid where Britain has just made a loan of £3,000,000 under similar circumstances.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. The result will be that the hungry people who do not have the money will not get the food?

Mr. FULTON. That is about right, as there is no doubt the Army will come first.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield to the gentleman from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. As I understand the question asked by the gentleman from Minnesota, and I wish the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs would correct me if I am wrong, where the people cannot afford to pay, this food will be given free, is that correct?

Mr. RICHARDS. That is correct.

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois. Does the bill say that?

Mr. FULTON. The bill does not say anything about the percentage either being given free or being sold by the Tito government. That is not stated in this bill nor is it proposed to be designated in the legislation. That is Tito's decision.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. VORYS. I yield the gentleman two additional minutes.

Mr. FULTON. On the humanitarian side and humanitarian principles, let Tito tell us where the Greek children that have been kidnaped, are spending their coming Christmas. Where will the 700 imprisoned priests and church leaders spend their Christmas? Let him come up with that before we give him the money.

The next question about this program is the question of direct alliances. There is no intention by this legislation to make direct alliance with Tito. In addition to that, there is no intention that Yugoslavia will come under the Atlantic Treaty as a treaty nation, because Tito has said he would not. And the irony of it is that Yugoslavia has already been given aid under the United States mutual defense assistance program to tide over temporarily.

There is no doubt that Tito will not go into the so-called western union or union of the nations for the joint defense of Western Europe, nor will he defend them. The written statement on foreign policy circulated to Congress by the Yugoslavian Ambassador several weeks ago proves that even to this date.

In addition to that Tito will not join with the Marshall plan countries to help rebuild Europe, so that he will not accept the Marshall plan in conjunction with the other democracies.

In short what you are doing is this: The State Department and our Government have stated as basic policy that in this question and hour of crisis in Europe there can be no neutrality. We said to France, and Sweden, and others: "No neutrality." "You must stand with the West." We said the same to Italy. Then the United States Government comes along and in Yugoslavia's case we finance a new neutrality for Tito, saying, "even though you spurn Marshall aid and refuse to join with other countries to help rebuild your own and other countries of Europe, even though you will not join in the Atlantic Treaty for the defense of the Atlantic Basin, even though you will not join in a western union to defend Western Europe, and even if you will not join in the United Nations effort to protect our own soldiers in Korea, nevertheless, with no strings at all, we will throw this bread on the waters and just hope that some good comes of it."

I say to you that there are only 3 percent of the people in Yugoslavia that favor the Tito dictatorship. The rest are non-Communists. There are less people in Yugoslavia that are for Tito than are Communists in many States of this country. If you pass this bill, you are shoring up this Government and holding 97 percent of the free people of Yugoslavia down in the throes of one of the worst and most inefficient dictatorships that ever existed in Western Europe. We must meet this issue squarely—shall we of the free world waiver and in waivering, compromise under the pressure of expediency, the principles that hold us together—and under which we move forward? My answer is a complete and direct "No."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON] made the statement that there was nothing in the record to show that any of this relief would go to people who were unable to buy it. The gentleman from Montana refuted that and I corroborated him in what he said. Here is what the Assistant Secretary of State said about it:

Foodstuffs supplied under the aid program are to be distributed within normal channels. Food will be delivered by each republic to regular consumer outlets where it will be sold for fixed dinar prices. Persons within the rationing system will require ration cards as well as dinars; others (chiefly in rural areas) will require only dinars, and not ration cards. Needy persons lacking sufficient dinars will receive food free of charge.

That was the testimony and that was one of the requirements of this program.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Carolina has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. FISHER].

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for the pending bill, and in doing so I join with others in explaining that I hold no brief for Tito. I have heard it repeated here many times, including a statement made by the gentleman who just preceded me, that Tito has one of the worst dictatorship set-ups of any in Western Europe. That may be true according to our standards. I think I know one other that is a little worse, and I think it is over in Moscow. If we are going to decide which of the two is the worst and which one we are going to take sides with here today, count me on the side of Tito. I repeat again, I hold no brief for him, but I do know that the issue here today, if this bill is a justified one, is on the ground of preventing Russian communism moving over and occupying the vacuum created if the present regime in Yugoslavia goes down and their economic system collapses. Therefore, the issue here, as has been stated and restated a number of times, is whether or not we can here, with this assistance so desperately needed over there, move in and help those people to sustain themselves and maintain their economy through this crisis, and in that way prevent the Government that exists there now from collapsing, because in case it does collapse then I think it is generally agreed by those who are familiar with the situation over there, who have made a study of it, that it means Russian communism will move in and take over. Which do you prefer—world communism sponsored by Stalin or Yugoslav communism sponsored by Tito, which does not seek world domination?

It has been argued here that probably they do not have much drought over there, only a 59-percent shortage in the corn crop and a few other shortages, and it is not bad, after all, and that this is a phony excuse for getting money. I might point out in that connection that the Ambassador at Belgrade, Mr. George Allen, told us not long ago that he paid \$2 a pound for potatoes on the open market in Belgrade. Red onions, which a year

ago sold for 10 cents, are now selling for \$3 a pound in Belgrade. Bread is selling for 20 cents a slice in Belgrade. A pork chop will cost you \$2.80 in Belgrade, and so on and on and on. Let nobody be confused or misled by the suggestion here that there is not a real threatened famine in Yugoslavia, or certainly in some parts of it. There is no question about that condition being a real one and a serious threat to the economy of that country.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RICHARDS. Did I correctly understand the gentleman to say that he, himself, visited Yugoslavia recently?

Mr. FISHER. With two other Members of the House, I visited Yugoslavia about 2 months ago. The country is parched. It is the worst drought they have had this century. Their crops in many areas are complete failures. Their over-all total food production this year as compared with last year is 50 percent. Those are facts.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the gentleman from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The gentleman visited Yugoslavia lately in company with our colleagues the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BATTLE] and the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. CHATHAM]. Can we assume that what the gentleman from Texas and the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BATTLE] have said—I understand the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. CHATHAM] is not here today because of illness—in brief comprises the feelings of your group as a result of your visit to this part of the world?

Mr. FISHER. Yes; that is true. Not only did we go there and look for ourselves, but, in company with Mr. Haggerty, who was a witness before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, we spent a day in the country visiting some of the farms and looking with our own eyes upon the conditions that exist there. Of course, we talked with our Ambassador and with all our attachés. I think we got a fairly good picture of the situation as far as the food shortage is concerned.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. VORYS. How long did the gentleman spend in Yugoslavia?

Mr. FISHER. We were in Yugoslavia 2 or 3 days. I do not pose as an expert on Yugoslavia, but I did see a lot, and I think I know a drought when I see one.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON. My good friend the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS] and I had a misunderstanding as to my intent on the distribution of food.

Mr. FISHER. I cannot yield for that, because I have a limited amount of time. Perhaps the gentleman can get some time

and answer the gentleman from South Carolina in his own time.

Mr. FULTON. Then may I ask the gentleman, when the gentleman saw Tito did Tito express any sympathy for the position of our forces in Korea or offer to help them?

Mr. FISHER. Not only when we talked with Marshal Tito but in repeated press reports out of Belgrade he condemned the invasion of South Korea. He said it was an unjustified thing. He has repeatedly made expressions along that line. I think that although we have to take a lot of what he said with a grain of salt—I understand that—I think we would do well also to indulge the hope that there may be some sympathy from him with respect to the viewpoint of the west at the present time.

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield.

Mr. FISHER. I yield.

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois. Marshal Tito did not come out against the North Korean invasion until Red China got into it; is that not true?

Mr. FISHER. The gentleman is probably more of an expert on that than I am. I do know that his expressions to which I referred happened long before Red China got into it.

Mr. ALLEN of Illinois. I say that he did not express himself about the situation until Red China got into it. Before that time he did not express himself at all about it.

Mr. FISHER. Yugoslavia's condemnation of Russia's aggression—through her stooges—occurred long before Red China entered the war. The press will bear that out.

Mr. Chairman, let us examine the situation briefly. It is true, as we all know, that Tito was formerly one of the fair-haired boys of the Kremlin. It was said here that he has never been in Moscow. He spent 8 years there. He was the No. 1 fair-haired boy of the Kremlin for a long time. There is no question about that. Then the break came in 1948, on June 29, to be exact. That was after he had refused to go along with the imperialist policies of Russian communism. He insisted upon Yugoslavia having some rights of their own and being permitted to assert those rights and to have some independence in the operation of their government and economy. Up to that time the Kremlin had been very insistent upon bleeding their economies as they do every other one of their satellites with about 75 percent of many of the products and commodities produced. But Yugoslavia decided that that was not a good idea. She was suffering internally as a result and Tito suggested that that be discontinued. The result was a break which has lasted ever since. At the moment that happened and continuously until this day the Kremlin has been booming broadcast after broadcast around the clock into Yugoslavia calling upon the peasants and the people there to rise up and throw off this yoke of communism of the type sponsored by Tito. They say he is a butcher—a butcher, to use their very words. He is a man who is friendly toward the west, this warmongering,

Wall Street dominated west; and every conceivable term that could be found in the dictionary, or could be devised, was used to undermine the confidence of the people in the Tito regime and thereby enable the Kremlin to retake that country which is so vital to them in a war against the west. But the vicious propaganda war and the Kremlin has only served to drive the Yugoslavs closer to Tito.

Why do they want Tito out of power? Because Tito is a thorn in the side of one man named Josef Stalin. He is the only man who has had the nerve and the temerity to rise up and throw off the Russian yoke.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I recognize that the proposed aid to Yugoslavia is a calculated risk. The money spent may be wasted. But on the other hand it may not be. It is a risk that I think is worth taking. We do know that Tito has 32 divisions in being. We know that it costs around a half billion dollars to recruit, equip, maintain, and support a division for 1 year in America. Just the cost of equipping one armored division costs over \$200,000,000. To recruit, support, equip, and maintain 32 divisions in the United States would cost around \$16,000,000,000 each year. So, if events should take a turn that would see the Yugoslavs on our side if Russia marches, you can readily see the value in dollars and cents alone in having that army either neutral or on the side of the free people of the West.

I call attention, further, to the fact, that since the Stalin-Tito break, we are importing many scarce strategic minerals from Yugoslavia. In 1949 we purchased 66 percent of the Yugoslav copper export, 54 percent of its lead export, 35 percent of its quicksilver, and 30 percent of the antimony. But if Tito's regime goes down, who gets all that? Russia, of course. No wonder Stalin is so anxious for Tito to fall and enable him to extend his domination to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. ST. GEORGE].

Mrs. ST. GEORGE. Mr. Chairman, I have not visited Yugoslavia—not for an hour nor for 3 days—but I am interested in this legislation because it seems to me if it passes in its present form and I very much fear it will, it will be another triumph of hope over experience. I can see nothing very new in this formula. It is one which has been indulged in by our people a great many years now—10 or 12, to be exact. It is that strange theory that you can buy friends and that if somebody is not doing just what you want them to do, if you give them enough dollars, they will come down and worship you. Truly, the experience of these years proves that has not been true. Where are our friends today, I ask you. What have these billions and billions of dollars bought for us? It has been well said on the floor of this House recently that in 1945 Communist Russia only dominated about 400,000,000 people. Today she dominates 800,000,000 people and they are no friends of ours. What has happened in China, where again we have tried to appease; where we have

invited the Communist Chinese to come and insult us at Lake Success, because that is all they have done.

They are living now in the Waldorf-Astoria in New York in great luxury and at our expense. When they arrived here I am told they were received with 32 boxes of flowers. Yes, we have done all that, and it is a wonder to me that during the last war we did not invite Ribbentrop and Goering over here while their people were slaughtering our men abroad. It is a strange philosophy. Why can we not have a few conditions to the giving of this \$38,000,000? What is the objection? Can we not ask Marshal Tito if he will not send back those 11,000 Greek children? Something has been made about a few of them having gone back, so few that it is almost a joke and an insult.

A great deal has been said about the 32 divisions. If we need them as badly as we have been told by the experts on the floor of this House today, why not incorporate that in an amendment to this legislation, that in case Soviet Russia begins to roll, those 32 divisions will be on our side as long as we need friends, and we do need friends so badly. But no. We are not doing that in this bill. We are just going along on that same old routine of giving away something for nothing. Did you ever find that you made a great friend of someone who borrowed money from you, or, better still, to whom you gave money? I do not think so. That is equally true of the nations.

I think these same people, including Marshal Tito would respect us far more if we said, "Yes, we will give you the help you ask for, but we will give it only under certain conditions. We will give it if you will release the religious who are now in your prisons. We will give it if you will restore religious freedom in your country. We will give it if you will allow our citizens, our newspaper men to travel freely through your country as they do in the other civilized countries of the west. Yes, we will give it if you will promise us that your armies, in time of war, will not be on the other side, against us."

Then I would be in favor of this legislation, but as it is written here today I cannot be for it.

We also seem to have developed a new and interesting theory here today. That is, that there are 2 or 3 brands of communism, and that we here in this country are going to uphold one brand against another. My friends, to paraphrase Shakespeare, I think that communism by any other name will smell as foul.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. ST. GEORGE] has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. BLATNIK].

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Chairman, in the few minutes allowed me I cannot adequately cover more than a few of the several points I would like to discuss on the subject before us today.

I am not an expert on Yugoslavia, but I have had some personal experience

over a period of several years that has given me a fair bit of information about a good part of Yugoslavia.

I was over there for the whole summer, 4 months, 28 years ago, as a child. I went back again in 1944 as a member of the American Special Military Mission in liaison with the partisan guerrillas. I spent 7½ months of that time in northern Yugoslavia behind enemy lines. I went again last year with a select committee from the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department. I am not going to try to repeat, summarize, or reevaluate the whole argument of the need for this relief for Yugoslavia because of the drought situation and all of the other implications in this issue. I shall merely have time to refer to three or four of the points that have been raised on the floor by the opposition and spend the few minutes I have on those.

No. 1. The argument has been raised, by the opposition, that if Tito fell there was a chance the country would fall into more democratic hands. Though this may be desirable, it is highly unlikely. Just the contrary would most likely occur and this is the consensus of opinion of many who personally know the Yugoslav situation from first-hand experience, including our own American embassy representatives in Belgrade. In fact, I feel that such a premise is based on an assumption as far removed from reality as it can possibly be.

Let us assume that in some manner or another Tito is deposed or removed as head of the present regime. What I feel is very likely to happen almost immediately is that overwhelming numbers of well trained and equipped military forces from the neighboring satellite countries of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary would move quickly over the plains, good roads, and railroads in northern Yugoslavia that lead to the easily accessible capital cities of Belgrade and Zagreb and get there in a matter of hours. Backed by Russian military forces, they could announce to the world that they are there to restore order. Perhaps there would have been some disturbance, or riot, or what you will, staged in advance. But regardless of whether or not there is any disorder or not, the satellite forces could move in quickly in superior numbers and Russia would be firmly entrenched in Yugoslavia before any of Yugoslavia's allies could move in to help if they were so inclined or were able to get there in time. That is what is far more probable and likely to happen—the control by Russia of one of the most, if not the most strategically, important land areas in Europe. This land has been the great natural land bridge between the Near East and the west for centuries. Hitler had to control this land bridge to make the other prong of his two-pronged drive into Africa, which, if successful, would have given him control of the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, which could have made ultimate victory his. Today Russia must have control of that land bridge to give her access to the Mediterranean, and consequently place her in a position to dominate the Near

East. So I hold that it is in the national interest and security of our own country and our way of life that this emergency relief assistance be granted by Congress.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLATNIK. I yield.

Mr. FULTON. Does the gentleman recall the history that in World War II when the Nazis were going into the country the Yugoslavs overthrew their government, rushed to the hills and resisted to the end? That is completely opposite to what the gentleman says would happen, especially when viewed in the light of Yugoslav history.

Mr. BLATNIK. I believe that all Yugoslavs, regardless whether they are pro-Tito or anti-Tito, whether Orthodox, Moslem, or Christian, they all will fight to the bitter end to resist aggression. I know of the courage that makes them battle with their bare hands.

Mr. FULTON. That is contrary to what the gentleman just said.

Mr. BLATNIK. What I am getting to, if the gentleman will allow me to finish, is that overwhelming numbers of well-trained, well-equipped troops from the neighboring Satellite countries, most likely backed by Russian military forces could strike decisively and get entrenched deep inside Yugoslavia. Look what happened in Korea late last June. There is no question but that the Yugoslav people would fight to the bitter end, from the mountains if forced back, as they did against Hitler's invading armies; but Hitler at that time was heavily committed in Africa, in Western Europe, deep in Russia, in much of the Balkans, and although even at that he was forced for a while to have as many and perhaps more of his own troops and Axis troops in Yugoslavia than confronted the combined British Eighth and American Fifth Armies in the early days of the Italian campaign. But today, a well-calculated military drive of overwhelming numbers concentrated on one country could well be more than partially successful and give Russia a more complete control than Hitler ever had.

Mr. McDONOUGH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlemen yield?

Mr. BLATNIK. I yield.

Mr. McDONOUGH. I just heard the gentleman say in previous statements that different Members were assuming situations; then I heard the gentleman continue in his own argument to assume a situation that might exist if Russia should invade Yugoslavia. Now, piling one assumption on top of another does not help us in arriving at the facts and a decision.

Mr. BLATNIK. I know from personal experience what the military facts are in this instance and what is probable.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLATNIK. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish to emphasize for the consideration of the House the fact that when it comes to assuming, the gentleman now addressing us has a great deal more to base his assumptions on than any other Member here. If I

remember correctly, the gentleman is not only of Yugoslav descent, but he also spent some months in Yugoslavia during the war as a paratrooper with the OSS; and I recall that just last year he was the chairman of a distinguished committee which visited Yugoslavia. I think he, above all others, is the most capable among our Members to assume what is happening over there and to tell us what he thinks.

Mr. BLATNIK. I thank my good friend from Montana. While I agree with the strategic importance of this emergency-relief aid, I also hope there will be a few who will share my feeling that there is a humanitarian need for helping feed the people of Yugoslavia during this critical winter. There is among those people such widespread friendliness and respect for the United States wherein live so many of their kinsfolk who have given them so much help in the past and as they do so today.

The tragedy of the wholesale killing of those people during World War II is beyond human comprehension. Over 10 percent of the entire population were killed; hundreds of thousands of others wounded, maimed, tortured. If 10 percent of the population in America were killed that would be 15,000,000 people, men, women, and children. Yet, in spite of such unbelievable horror, when it meant death to give assistance to American airmen or to American military personnel operating behind enemy lines, those people gave us food, shelter, information whenever they could. Boys 10 years old were used as couriers to slip through enemy lines at night, when they knew they would be tortured and shot upon capture. The old women were the great heroes of the war. Having seen tragedy in World War I and now in World War II, many having lost their husbands in the first, and some, or most, and many cases all of their families in this war, these women gave us and the fighting Partisans food, concealment, information about the enemy, at the risk of torture and death, or at the best being put in a concentration camp and having her home burned.

In the little area in which we operated for almost 8 months in northern Yugoslavia these helped rescue 350 American airmen that had to bail out of bombers damaged during air raids farther north in Budapest and in Vienna. We would then evacuate these men by Allied aircraft landing on secret landing strips at night. The landing strips were merely open spaces of ground, usually a meadow or cornfield.

There were other military advantages. We learned of enemy divisions moving into Italy from the eastern front days and weeks before they showed up on the Italian battle line. I have already mentioned the large number of Nazi and Axis troops forced to fight in Yugoslavia because of the devastating guerrilla warfare carried on by the Partisans.

There are thousands upon thousands of American boys who are alive in America today, because of the fierce resistance put up by the Yugoslavs.

It was in those early critical years of World War II where such resistance was so invaluable and contributed so much to ultimate victory. Gen. George Marshall referred to those dark days of the war in his report of August of 1945, when he wrote, "There are few who realize how slim was the thread by which hung Allied survival."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman two additional minutes and I should like to ask him a question. I agree with the gentleman from Montana that the Member now addressing the House is probably better qualified to speak on Yugoslavia than any man here.

I want to ask the gentleman what does he think of the proposal in this bill to provide \$30,000,000 for Yugoslavia relief?

Mr. BLATNIK. I firmly believe that it is unquestionably to our own national interest and our own security to secure passage of this bill providing this relief aid.

I have always supported economic aid for the needy of war-torn countries, including even the needy of countries that were our enemies in World War II. I feel that on this very eve of the Holy Season we can extend a helping hand to the needy of Yugoslavia. We can make our intentions clear and say, "Look, we do not approve of your administration or your leadership or the politics or the form of your government; but the people of Yugoslavia have our respect and admiration for what they have done during the war and for their independence and their determination to maintain their sovereignty and resist aggression to the last."

What we do give is largely surplus stocks of food we now have in abundance. The distribution of the food will be open to supervision and inspection by American representatives at all times, and at any time that the purposes of this act are not being carried out, the whole program can be stopped immediately.

However, to attach a series of conditions to the bill beyond the purposes of the act would be a serious error.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLATNIK. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON. Does the gentleman feel that conditions releasing all the people in jail, because of their religious beliefs, or sending back Greek children would degrade you.

Mr. BLATNIK. The gentleman misses my point. I yield to no one in my earnest desire to see the Greek children sent back, or to have innocent people released from the jails. But I do say, that to write those conditions in this relief-aid measure would preclude reaching those just and humanitarian and democratic objectives, rather than expedite them. Our State Department and our American Embassy officials in Belgrade have been working day and night and are now working to make that possible; some progress is being made, and hope for more progress in the future is more encouraging than ever. The

committee report and hearings are complete on this and I do not have time to go into detail. The Greek children are now in the process of being returned. The State Department says that of all the countries of Eastern Europe in which there are Greek children, Yugoslavia is the only one that has done anything about returning them. A Swedish Red Cross mission is even now en route to Yugoslavia to supervise and expedite this repatriation.

Progress is being made, the State Department further informs us, in the matter of religious liberties, and I do hope this will be broadened and continued. But the political aspects of the over-all problems should continue to be in the hands of our Ambassador, and I have been very impressed by the ability and the caliber of former Ambassador Cavendish Cannon and his staff who have done a singularly brilliant and most difficult job, and the same outstanding job is now being done under Ambassador Allen.

I do believe that approval of this aid measure is without question in our best interests, will substantially bolster opposition to aggression in a most strategic area, and will have a strong psychological impact on the peoples of eastern European countries in encouraging their will for independence and national sovereignty. Although there are many more assurances and commitments from Yugoslavia that I, too, would wish to have, as so many of you have today expressed, I do feel that with the bill we have before us, or even the Senate version, that we have very little, if anything to lose, and so much to gain in these critical days which confront us.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, the gentleman was giving the history of people being shot down in World War II and the part that Tito and the Yugoslav Government had in that. Why did he not go further and mention the five American boys, fliers, that were shot down over Yugoslavia by this very Tito Government that you now say we should help?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota has expired.

(Mr. BLATNIK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. GORDON].

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of passage of H. R. 9853, the primary objective of which is to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense—and I emphasize "defense"—and general welfare of the United States. This bill proposes that we do this by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia. Thus there is really only one issue involved here, and that is whether or not the bill is designed to accomplish that objective.

The foreign policy of the United States has always been directed toward the encouragement of independent nations to remain independent, regardless of their form of government. This is one of the key points of difference between us and

Moscow. The foreign policy of Moscow is directed ruthlessly toward undermining independent countries and forcing them within the iron curtain. The menace of Soviet communistic imperialism is the greatest, most critical, and most imminent which our Nation and all other independent nations have ever faced. The foreign policy of the United States has been realistic in this respect and recognizes the danger. Any gamble which this country may take to reduce that danger, no matter what the degree of reduction, is worth taking, in my opinion. The bill before us today involves just such a gamble. The cost is small and the stakes are high. Those who oppose taking the gamble consider only one side of the question. They ask: "What assurances do we have if we pass this bill?" Those who favor the bill realize that it would be nice if we could have assurances. But, Mr. Chairman, if the foreign policy of the United States were made only on the basis of assurances, we would have no foreign policy at all, but only a policy of defeatism and hopelessness. So far as I am concerned, I look forward to no assurances if we pass this bill. But, what about the other side of the question? An essential step in considering the wisdom of any policy is to look at the alternatives. What are the probable consequences to the foreign policy of the United States, to the defense of the United States, and to the general welfare of the United States if we do not pass this bill? The evidence on this point seems clear to those who favor the bill and to our highest military authorities, like General Marshall and General Bradley. It seems clear to me.

Yugoslavia under Tito is the first country formerly within the satellite domain which has been able to break away from the clutches of the Kremlin. Tito stands defiantly opposed to Kremlin domination and he is determined to maintain that defiance. I venture to say that when the history of the collapse of the Soviet Union is written Tito's break with Stalin will constitute one of the major contributing factors in that collapse—with one qualification. And that qualification is that we provide relief assistance to the hungry people of Yugoslavia and do it quickly and effectively. Unless we do this the ability of the Yugoslavs to continue the resistance to Moscow's military and economic pressures will be seriously impaired, Tito will be overthrown, and Yugoslavia, with the largest standing army in non-Soviet Europe, will be forced to submit and fall back behind the iron curtain.

That is the most significant alternative that we face, and that must be the center point for all discussion on the wisdom of this bill. It is in our national interest and in the interest of our defense plans that this tragedy should not take place. I can only think of the millions of people in the other Soviet-dominated satellite states of Europe: Albania, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland, with her rich tradition of freedom and independence. What is our answer to these people, who despise communism perhaps even more than do we, when we turn our backs on the only

country which has managed to break away from Soviet slavery? What hope do we hold out to these people, when we turn our backs on the only symbol of rebellion against Moscow to which they can look?

Mr. Chairman, there are many administrative details involved in this bill. Let us not become entangled in them, but let us rather concentrate on the only issue which we as Americans must consider in these perilous days: the national interest, defense and security of the people of the United States.

(Mr. GORDON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. O'Konski].

Mr. O'KONSKI. Mr. Chairman, if my heart were not so heavy I perhaps would just as soon not talk. However, for the record I think I should express my views on this pending legislation.

The reason why I say that perhaps I should not talk at all is because I have never been in Yugoslavia. I have never seen Tito. But I have never seen God, and I know there is a God. I have never seen the devil, and I have never been in hell, but I know there is a devil and I know there is a hell. We are underwriting a one-way ticket to hell when we pass this bill. Because in passing this bill we are going to take up truck with Tito, and in taking up truck with Tito we are taking up truck with the most brutal, the most daring, the most cold, and the most calculating and dictatorial murderer next to Joe Stalin himself. I am talking now about Josef Broz Tito commonly known now under the Communist title of Tito.

This bill is based on five very false assumptions: Number one, when all the world is burning at our feet and we are paying the heavy penalty of gambling, gambling on our future, we are asked to gamble again. We gambled at Yalta, we gambled at Potsdam, we gambled in Poland, we gambled in Czechoslovakia, we gambled in Yugoslavia when we discarded Mihailovich for Dictator Tito, we gambled in Korea, and we gambled in China. And we are losing these gambles in blood of American boys. We have not played a gamble yet that we have not lost. Now along comes the leadership and they say we have to take another gamble, we have to gamble on Tito.

I say that the time has come when we should not gamble with America's future and America's security any more. I want something better than a gamble. No one in this body has yet sold me on the idea that this is anything but a calculated gamble with the cards stacked against us.

We are told we should do this because we finally realize something, we finally realize what we have come to realize very bitterly in China. You remember when Lattimore and Jessup and Service sold the American leadership the idea that the Chinese Communists were not Communists, that there were two kinds of communism, namely, Stalin's communism and Mao's communism, that they

were merely North Dakota nonpartisans, that they were agrarians or land reformers, they were not real Communists. We were not going to have any trouble with the Chinese Communists we were told because they were different from Russian Communists. I wonder if the 20,000 or 30,000 American dead in Korea feel that Mao's Chinese Communists are different from the Russian Communists.

Of course, that argument wore thin so they thought up another one even thinner than that. They say now there is a difference between Tito's communism and Stalin's communism. They interpret Leninism in a different way, we are told. Stalin interprets Leninism to mean that communism must conquer the whole world, but Tito does not believe in that. Tito believes that communism should conquer the whole world except Yugoslavia. That is the only difference between the two communisms, the only difference, we are now told, are you laughing? You should laugh on this whopper.

What Tito is saying is, "I am a Communist. I believe in Leninism but, Joe Stalin, I will do the murdering for you in Yugoslavia, I will imprison the priests for you in Yugoslavia, I will collectivize the farms for you in Yugoslavia, I will communize Yugoslavia for you, but you keep out. I will do the job in Yugoslavia for you. You take over the rest of the countries. Don't waste your time in Yugoslavia—go elsewhere. I don't need you here."

Does Tito object to what is going on in Korea today? Not at all. Does Tito object to the Communist rape of Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, part of Austria-Hungary, and Eastern Germany? Not one iota. The only significant difference you have between Tito and Stalin today is, as someone said, they interpret Leninism in a different way. One says Leninism means that they must conquer the whole world, but here we have a great hero that we must help, we have a different kind of communism under Tito, who says, "Sure, Stalin, you can take over the whole world and communize it, but you don't have to do it in Yugoslavia because I will do it myself."

On the basis of that minute difference they say we should give Tito this aid. They say Tito has fallen out with Russia. I wonder if Tito has fallen out with Russia. Let me tell you this much. Stalin, cold, calculating killer that he is, if he thought today or felt one iota afraid that he might be betrayed by Tito or the people under him, would not wait until tomorrow to take Yugoslavia over. He would not have an enemy at his gates. But Stalin today is occupied with feeding 400,000,000 Chinese. Stalin today is occupied with feeding the people who are massacring our boys in Korea. Stalin is short of food and short of drugs, so he has to cut down on somebody. So he goes over to his best buddy of all the satellites, Tito, and he says, "I'll tell you what to do, Tito. I need the food and I need the goods for China. I need it for Korea. I need it to murder Americans. You go get yours from Uncle Sam. He is a big enough sap to fall for it."

That is exactly what we are doing. We have already given him \$400,000,000 since the war ended. Now, if \$400,000,000 does not secure him as our friend, are you so naive as to believe that another \$37,000,000 is going to do it? It certainly is not.

Let us take a look at this man Tito. There is some divergence of opinion as to where he came from. I do know this. You have a whole slew of them in Europe. You have Georgi Dimitrov, the dictator of Bulgaria; Clement Gottwald, head of Czechoslovakia; Boleslaw Beirut, dictator of Poland; Marshal Josef Broz Tito, dictator of Yugoslavia. You have Thorez, of France; Togliatti and Luigi Longo, of Italy.

I could go on, if time permitted. Who are all these people? They are Kremlin-trained propagandists and murderers for communism throughout the world. The best scholar and the most successful of them was Josef Broz Tito, to the point that when he fought in the Spanish Civil War—and that is where he got his start in international communism—together with Togliatti and Thorez and Clement Gottwald and all these other dictators in Europe today, he did such a good job that when he went back to Moscow they changed his name from Josef Broz, and gave him a Russian name of Tito, taken from four Russian words meaning "secret international terroristic organization." Of all the satellites in Europe the only satellite dictator that Russia could get to march against the United States or any of its allies was Josef Broz Tito, who marched into Greece, but who pulled in his horns when he found out that he might get licked. He tried to march into Trieste, but thank God for an American sergeant with guts—it was not a lieutenant—it was an American sergeant, and as I say thank God it was, because if it had been a representative of the State Department or a general, they would have bungled the job, but it happened to be a sergeant and he told the Tito men, "If you pass this line, you are going to get it." Since that time Tito pulled in his horns.

Mr. McDONOUGH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Would the gentleman give a little more explanation of the interpretation of the letters in Tito's name, T-I-T-O?

Mr. O'KONSKI. I forget what the Russian words are, but the interpretation of the Russian words is taken from the four words which in Russian mean secret international terroristic organization. He could not have a better name. Incidentally, of all the satellite dictators in Europe he is the only one who has a fancy title for the good work that he has done. A great deal has been said here about the suffering of the Yugoslav people. Yes, they have suffered. A great deal of credit has been given him more or less by inuendo. But let me tell you that Yugoslavia is a country by itself today, not under Russia's domination, not because of Tito but in spite of Tito. Do not forget that Yugoslavians were being slaughtered at a time when you had the Hitler-Stalin pact in existence. When Hitler was marching through Yugo-

slavia, where was Tito? Was Tito in the mountains and in the hills fighting with General Mikhailovitch and the Serbian patriots? He was not. He was in cahoots with the Hitler-Stalin pact, burning down cities and villages and murdering his own people. That is where Tito was until the war was over. That man who betrayed his own people became the leader of the Yugoslavian Government and that is where he is today. I think that with any man with a record of that type, if we underwrite this bill, we go into it in league with death and a covenant with hell.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. O'Konski] has expired.

[Mr. HESELTON addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Maine [Mr. HALE].

(Mr. HALE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HALE. Mr. Chairman, I expect to support this legislation. It is, of course, a very desperate gamble because no one can say what Tito will do; no one certainly can commend all the things that he has done in the past. Still the amount involved here is trifling in the general scale of our defense expenditures, and there is apparently a good deal of genuine anti-Soviet sentiment in Yugoslavia on which we might legitimately capitalize. I do not know how genuine or durable is Tito's opposition to Stalin, but in the last analysis we can afford to make a small gesture to encourage his schism with the Kremlin, for which, of course, there is plenty of excellent cause.

What troubles me, however, and the reason why I have asked for this time is that we are passing this bill without being given any assurance of what our policy is going to be in Asia. Everybody recognizes that our forces may have to be withdrawn from Korea. If such a withdrawal is a military necessity, like the British withdrawal at Dunkerque, let us not deceive ourselves that it is anything but a military necessity. I, for one, am still quaking with fear that we are going to end by making a deal with the Chinese Communists. If, with or without a Dunkerque, we concede Communist China a seat in the United Nations or agree to their occupation of Korea, or, still more, of Formosa, then we shall have made a surrender of vital principles. Furthermore, we shall have entered into an appeasement that can do nothing but add to the awful insecurity of our present position. A Dunkerque if need be; a Munich never.

While a communiqué issued by the President and Mr. Attlee seems to deny any intent on our part to seat Red China in the United Nations, the fact remains that the Attlee government has recognized the Red Chinese Government, is prepared to seat them, and the pressure on the Truman administration to give ground is bound to be very great.

Over and beyond this, I am distressed, and I want to take this opportunity to

say that I am very much distressed at the slow progress of this country in reaching all-out mobilization either on the military side or on the economic and industrial side. I understand that representatives of the great automobile companies are here today protesting that the 5-percent increase in automobile prices is justifiable and necessary.

If we are to pass legislation like this on the gamble of getting aid from Tito and neglect the vital and absolutely necessary things that we must do in national defense, we are certainly not putting first things first, and the importance of doing that I urge upon you as beyond every other consideration.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. McDONOUGH].

Mr. McDONOUGH. Mr. Chairman, there have been some very serious arguments made here today against this bill and if I can add anything to the seriousness of the arguments in opposition to the bill, I am going to do so. I have never been in Yugoslavia, I am not a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, but I have had in the last 24 hours the benefit of knowledge from a gentleman for whom I have a lot of respect, a man who has just returned from Yugoslavia. He was an OSS officer, Army Intelligence, in the Balkan States during the last war. He is an American-born Yugoslavian. He traveled through Yugoslavia by automobile to the small villages. He knows the habits and customs and talks Yugoslavian fluently. He talked to everyone he could. He went there for the purpose of looking over the country as an American, to observe what progress they were making and the general conditions.

To the arguments that have been made here today about the 32 divisions that Tito has, let me say this man tells me, and I have every reason to believe he is honest—he is a respectable businessman of southern California—that that is a myth, that if there is any armed forces in Yugoslavia which we can hope to come to our side in the event of an attack by Russia, they will disperse into the hills, they will not fight to support the Tito regime, and that those who are armed are poorly armed and not the kind of soldiers we would expect to support us in the event of an attack. He also told me that he found out Tito recently bought two American-made B-29's from England, if you please, B-29's that the United States sold to England which England in turn sold to Tito. B-29's have a 10,000-mile range, while Yugoslavia is only 900 miles long. He believed the only reason that Tito bought the B-29's was to get out of Yugoslavia as quickly as he could when the people of Yugoslavia revolt against him, because they do not like his dictator tactics, and neither do they want either Stalin's or Tito's brand of communism in their country.

He stated that insofar as the communism which Tito represents in Yugoslavia is concerned, there is no difference between that and the communism

which Stalin represents, except the nationalistic feature of Tito's Communists.

Mr. Chairman, we, as a nation, are opposed to communism in any form. In reply to my question asked of the gentleman from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] this afternoon he admitted that we could not treat communism by degrees; that is, we cannot favor Tito's communism because we think it is not as bad as Stalin's communism, but we are. We are saying, in effect, that this gift of millions of dollars to Tito is an appeasement to the possibility of making friends for us out of a Communist dictator. Well, no Communist is trustworthy and Tito is no exception.

Mr. Chairman, I venture to say that if this bill were submitted to the people of the United States there would be a resounding "No" across the Nation, and I make that statement because I believe the November 7 elections proved that. If this bill were introduced in the Eighty-second Congress it would not pass, in my opinion. It is offered in this Congress. It is being voted upon by many who are not coming back here. And why are they not coming back? Bill Green himself told the American Federation of Labor that the men who were defeated were defeated because they placed too much emphasis on the foreign policy of the United States and too little on domestic issues.

The foreign policy we have been following has made us no friends. I have said many times that we cannot buy military allies or friends with dollars.

My friend who just returned from Yugoslavia said that if this bill passed the food would go to build up Tito's army and that the people who need it would get little or none of it.

We have got to consider where we are going, and if we are going to represent American thought and belief in Government we should not support this bill. It is opposed to the thought, I would say, of the majority of the people of the United States and it will not give us the relief we are hoping for, and I recommend a vote of "no" on the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read the bill for amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That this act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950."

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. COOPER) having assumed the chair, Mr. McSWEENEY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 9853) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, had come to no resolution thereon.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

**YUGOSLAVIA EMERGENCY RELIEF
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950**

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 9853) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 9853, with Mr. McSWEENEY in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, in order to understand the action proposed by the bill under consideration, let us look for a moment at what we have done for Yugoslavia in the past.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the Senate companion bill printed in last Friday's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD gives in detail the money which American taxpayers have given and made available to Yugoslavia.

During the war we gave them \$36,666,000 under lend-lease and plan A. From 1945 through 1947 we gave them \$299,000,000 under UNRRA procedure. In 1949 we furnished them through the Export-Import Bank \$55,000,000, and in 1950 we have already furnished them \$31,400,000 worth of food supplies.

So far as I know, no one disputes the accuracy of these figures contained in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on this legislation.

During the UNRRA years, a total of \$430,000,000 was provided Yugoslavia under that plan. Seventy-two percent of this amount was furnished by the United States.

The magazine World Report in its issue of January 21, 1947, stated that taxes would go up in Eastern Europe when supplies from UNRRA ended, for the reason that the free shipments sent in under UNRRA were sold, with the proceeds intended to aid reconstruction. This magazine further stated that Yugoslavia may realize as high as a third of her revenue from sales of UNRRA goods.

I asked at that time the Library of Congress to check this statement for me, and the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress did check it and furnished me a report which said that UNRRA sent supplies into Yugoslavia totaling 2,000,000 tons, with a value of nearly \$400,000,000, by the end of 1946, and that UNRRA shipped into Yugoslavia enough food to give every man,

woman, and child in the country more than 150 pounds of food per year, and in addition to this, 9 pounds of textiles per person, two pairs of trousers, two shirts, three union suits, six pairs of socks, one sweater, one overcoat, and six handkerchiefs.

This report further contained the statement:

There can be no doubt that the whole of the Yugoslav Army and Air Corps was maintained on our supplies. The 12,000 trucks which UNRRA gave to Yugoslavia have, in the main, been diverted to moving supplies and soldiers of Tito's army.

The fact is that in terms of the total economy of the country Yugoslavia has received as a gift goods equal in sales value to more than 10 years of its total prewar national budget and to three full years of its gross national income. Yugoslavia has thus been saved from complete collapse despite Soviet depredation, only by the movement of UNRRA supplies into the country.

This report from the Library of Congress further stated that based on information furnished it, it would appear that one-third of the Yugoslav revenue for 1946 came from the sales of UNRRA supplies.

Thus, high American taxes in 1946 at one and the same time kept Yugoslavian taxes low, and paid for the equipment and maintenance of the Yugoslavian Army.

Thus our gifts, which we thought were going to starving people in Yugoslavia, actually went to swell the treasury of the Red Yugoslavia Government, then, as now, under the domination of the same Communist Tito.

In this same article prepared by the Library of Congress, it was stated:

What happened in Yugoslavia was that the Communists were able to do as they pleased with UNRRA supplies. People could buy UNRRA supplies only at government-controlled markets at prices which were from 3 to 30 times normal prices. By this selling at a huge profit, the goods we have been sending free to Yugoslavia, Tito's regime has obtained funds to equip and support an army which has put every eighth man in uniform. Even our country could hardly afford to keep such a vast manpower idle. Tito was able to do it on UNRRA.

Thus, we with our gifts enabled Red Yugoslavia to equip and maintain an army devoted to the promotion of communism.

The weak argument is now advanced in behalf of this bill, that if we now send \$38,000,000 in foodstuffs to Yugoslavia, our generosity will sway the Communist dictator, Tito, to such an extent that his military strength will be a threat to Russia in the event America and Russia go to war.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. COX. The gentleman's statement leads me to wonder what if anything of sanity and strength there is left to us besides Westbrook Pegler, Fulton Lewis, George Sokolsky, and the Chicago Tribune.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I thank the distinguished gentleman from Georgia for his comment.

Mr. VURSELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. VURSELL. I should like to suggest that the large amount of funds the gentleman has listed as furnished by us to Yugoslavia was the result of allowing Communists to get control of the allocation and distribution of UNRRA funds, of which the United States contributed 72 percent of the total. The gentleman is rendering a service giving us these figures showing the wastefulness of the American taxpayer's money through UNRRA in connection with Yugoslavia. Why again inaugurate another program of such waste?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I thank the gentleman from Illinois for his remarks.

If the \$38,000,000 we gave them during the war failed to achieve this result, how can it be hoped that \$38,000,000 now will accomplish the purpose? If the \$385,000,000 additional which we have poured into Yugoslavia since the war including \$55,000,000 last year and \$31,000,000 this year, has failed to accomplish that purpose, how can it be hoped that another \$38,000,000 poured in now will tip the scales and accomplish the purpose which up to this time nearly a half billion dollars has failed to do? Let it be remembered that the taxpayers of America already have poured into the coffers of this Communist country \$421,000,000, very nearly half a billion of taxpayers' money.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. COOLEY. The gentleman makes the statement that we gave Yugoslavia \$50,000,000 last year. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. We furnished \$55,000,000.

Mr. COOLEY. And that we gave it to them?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I did not say we gave it to them. I said we furnished it to them under the Export-Import Bank plan.

Mr. COOLEY. That was a legitimate loan; was it not?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I am not going into whether it was legitimate or not. I said that it was furnished to Yugoslavia out of the taxpayers' money of this country, which is a fact.

Mr. COOLEY. The reason I interrupted the gentleman was this: I was under the impression that he had left the impression with the House that we made a donation in excess of \$50,000,000.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I distinctly said it went under the Export-Import Bank plan.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, it was at least doing business with a Communist country at a time when we were with a death struggle with communism.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. That is true, I will say to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. I yield to the gentleman from Idaho.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. As a matter of fact, the \$55,000,000 referred to is to be repaid in metal, things taken out of the ground, including lead, in competition with the products of our own mines in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia has expired.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentlemen be permitted to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, Tito is as blackhearted and treacherous a Communist as Stalin himself. The very thought of voting to spend American taxpayers' money to support the Communist government of a Communist dictator is as repugnant and abhorrent to me as any act which I can conceive.

In the debate yesterday proponents of this bill stated that it is not based upon humanitarian motives, that it is not based upon a principle, but that it is a gamble, and a calculated risk. To me it is neither. The advocates of this bill seem to think that this generosity on our part will generate such gratitude on the part of Tito that his attitude toward Russia will stiffen and toward America will soften up.

We could make no greater mistake than this. There is no such word as gratitude in the Soviet dictionary.

If American generosity could arouse gratitude in Tito's heart, he would long ago have been our ally.

The four hundred and twenty-one million we have already furnished him has not in the slightest degree made him an ally of ours. Four hundred and twenty-one million dollars more will not make him our ally.

Now what is the reason for such haste in bringing up this legislation? Why must we hurry so to give this conscienceless dictator \$38,000,000 more worth of supplies, when we have already sent him \$55,000,000 in 1949 and \$31,000,000 in November 1950, particularly and especially when there is no food emergency in Yugoslavia? Does anyone believe there is a food emergency in Yugoslavia? If so, let us look at the facts. They are set forth in detail both in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report and in the House Foreign Affairs Committee report. The facts are, as set out in detail in both these committee reports, that in this present year Yugoslavia produced 108 percent of its normal crop of sugar, 100 percent of its normal crop of rice, 88 percent of its normal crop of wheat, 87 percent of its normal crop of barley, 83 percent of its normal crop of rye, 79 percent of its normal crop of oats, and 59 percent of its normal crop of corn. These are undisputed figures.

We are just now in the harvest season. This year's production cannot have been depleted to any substantial extent by this time. These yields, which approach so nearly to normal crop production, will not have been seriously depleted even by next spring.

Notwithstanding the fact that Yugoslavia's sugar production this year was 108 percent of normal, the food distribution program under this bill, and the committee report shows it, provides for \$2,400,000 worth of sugar to be sent to Yugoslavia.

Notwithstanding the fact that Yugoslavia's rice production this year was 100 percent of normal, the food distribution program under this bill provides that \$1,100,000 worth of rice is to be sent to Yugoslavia.

Thus in this food distribution bill totaling \$38,000,000, \$3,500,000 of it, or nearly one tenth of the total amount, is to be spent to send to Yugoslavia two articles of food of which Yugoslavia produced this year 100 percent of the normal crop, of one of these items, and 108 percent of the normal crop of the other item.

Mr. Chairman, how eager must this Congress and our Government be to give away American taxpayer's money to do an act of this kind? How gullible must this Congress and the American people be to engage in this kind of give-away program? I have not the slightest intention of voting one 5 cents to send more than a million dollars worth of rice to a Communist country which produced 100 percent of its normal rice crop this year.

I have not the slightest intention of voting one 5 cents of American taxpayers' money to send \$2,400,000 worth of sugar to a Communist country which produced a 108 percent of its normal sugar crop this year.

Further and beyond this, I have not the slightest intention of voting one 5 cents of American taxpayers' money to strengthen and bolster up any Communist government anywhere in the world.

We are fighting communism now in Korea. We are fighting Korean Communists and Chinese Communists there. A Communist is a Communist, regardless of his nationality.

Communism cannot be defeated anywhere by coddling it.

I believe we are making ourselves simple in the eyes of the world by trying to coddle communism in Yugoslavia.

We have scattered our substance all over the face of the earth under the mistaken belief that friendship can be bought.

Friendship cannot even be bought among allies, let alone among enemies.

If Tito's friendship could be bought, we have already given him enough to buy it. If what we have already given him cannot buy it, then we do not have enough, and cannot raise enough money or supplies to buy his friendship.

We are on the verge of bankruptcy now. We owe \$257,000,000,000. We are having to increase our military spending this year from \$13,500,000,000 to a minimum of \$50,000,000,000. We are on the verge this moment of going into wartime mobilization controls. We are saddling grave additional burdens upon the backs of our taxpayers, and yet the so-called statesmen of the world continue to coddle communism, and try to appease notorious Communist dictators.

We were gullible enough for a long time to say that Chinese Communists were different from Russian Communists. Our Communist coddlers said that they were not genuine Communists—they were simply agrarian reformers. Too late now we realize how grievously wrong that policy was.

While our boys in Korea are now being killed on the battlefields and frozen in the subzero temperatures of Korea, some of them being burned, butchered, and shot in the back as prisoners of war, while Chinese Communists are doing this, while Chinese Communists are overrunning the little helpless country of Tibet, while Chinese Communists are overrunning French Indochina, and are engaged in spreading communism over the face of the earth just as efficiently and fast as Russia herself is spreading it, England still insists on aiding and abetting Red China to spread communism over the face of the earth by insisting that Red China be seated as a member of the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Chairman, I say that there is one way and one way only to stop the spread of communism, and that is to oppose it openly, vigorously, and constantly. Communism cannot be stopped by appeasement. Communism cannot be stopped or even hindered by coddling it.

This legislation in my opinion is thoroughly unsound. I regard it as absurd. I believe it would be a most serious mistake to pass it, and I shall therefore vote against it.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FULTON: Page 1, line 4, after "1950" insert "Whereas the Government of Yugoslavia has urgently requested relief due to drought conditions, and has expressed an intention to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations."

Mr. FULTON. To explain this amendment, it comes in right after the phrase, "That this act may be cited as the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950." It is a "whereas clause" stating:

Whereas the Government of Yugoslavia has urgently requested relief, due to drought conditions, and has expressed an intention to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations—

And then you go on with the rest of the bill.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield to my good friend.

Mr. RICHARDS. I have just had an opportunity to read the gentleman's amendment. I do not think it would do the original purpose of the bill any harm, and I am willing to agree to it.

Mr. FULTON. I see my friend the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BATTLE], who with a congressional group in the last 4 or 6 weeks had visited Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. He will corroborate that. When the Congressmen were there Tito had orally assured this group that he would scrupulously live up to his obligations as a member nation of the United Nations.

Then the question came up in the Foreign Affairs Committee—was this statement an official statement of the Government of Yugoslavia or was it just a casual statement to several Congressmen as United States private citizens, among whom were the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BATTLE] and the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. CHATHAM], of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. To remove that question as to whether it was merely a casual conversation by the head of the Yugoslav Government and to put it on the ground of an official communication made to representatives of the United States Government acting in their official capacity in investigating Yugoslavia, I have therefore prepared this amendment. It puts in the preamble of the bill as the specific inducement that the Government of Yugoslavia has urgently requested relief due to drought conditions and has expressed an intention to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations.

That puts the question this way: If the Government of Yugoslavia then accepts this relief based upon such an inducement or promise, we then have it as an official matter and not as a matter of conversation between Congressmen and Mr. Tito. I certainly think if Tito once has said it he should be perfectly willing in this bill to stand by it; do not you, Mr. BATTLE?

Mr. BATTLE. I agree.

Mr. FULTON. He agrees; I thank the gentleman.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Does the gentleman think that placing the language in the bill will bind Mr. Tito? Will it establish a condition under which the money might be withheld if he fails to observe that as a condition?

Mr. FULTON. It is a statement of the record, of the official record of the relations between the United States and the Yugoslav Government as they stand at the time we pass this bill. Now then, under a later provision of this bill the President has the discretion of terminating relief. We cannot force Mr. Tito by an extraneous document to live up to his obligations under the United Nations charter, even though he has already agreed to that pledge. Nevertheless this amendment states the condition upon which this legislation is premised—that Tito himself, as an inducement to this Congress, has officially pledged this course to members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. If it can be the interpretation of the gentleman's statement, that having it in the bill under those conditions or those circumstances, it may be we are pretending or thinking that we are establishing a condition, but certainly unless Mr. Tito himself subscribes to it, there is nothing binding there so far as he is concerned.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield.

Mr. KEATING. Did the gentleman in his prefatory paragraph in his statement here refer particularly to the guaranty of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the United Nations Charter?

Mr. FULTON. That is correct, and everything that goes with being a good member nation of the United Nations—that the Yugoslav Government will conform closely to the obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Mr. KEATING. Would the gentleman feel it would be necessary for the United Nations to take some affirmative action with regard to those human rights and fundamental freedoms in order to bind Tito to anything, even by inference?

Mr. FULTON. No affirmative UN action should be necessary. The obligation is assumed under the Charter. I could answer the gentleman further in this way: I have another amendment that ties in with this, which I will offer to the next section, paragraph 2, which will put specific conditions in the bill as conditions precedent upon which the United States Government must be assured before a written agreement on the terms of aid can be entered into.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON] has expired.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may proceed for three additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Dakota?

There was no objection.

Mr. FULTON. That second proposed amendment says that "upon the express prior assurance by the Government of Yugoslavia," and then I cite the various items and others along the line that the gentlemen have suggested.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Would the gentleman say, in view of his statement, that he would feel that if Tito fails to live up to the implied commitments, the President would be obliged to withhold aid?

Mr. FULTON. If the Yugoslav Government does not conform to Tito's pledges set out in my currently considered preamble amendment, because of the change in the basic premise upon which this legislation is being based, the President must then, under the changed conditions on page 4, subsection (2) of section 6, terminate all assistance under this act. It is the intention of this amendment that aid shall be promptly terminated by the President under such conditions.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I think the Congress can certainly bind the President by establishing the conditions under which he extends aid. I do not think we can bind Tito.

Mr. FULTON. That is correct, but we want this express assurance by Tito placed in the bill as the basis on which the aid is extended.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Is there any difference in the pledge you have in your

amendment for Marshal Tito to perform the obligations as a member of the United Nations and the pledge that he took when he joined the United Nations?

Mr. FULTON. No; there is none. But it simply states, as an official matter of the record, the relation between the Yugoslav Government and the United States Government, and that the Congress assumes that that course will be followed in dealing with the United States. As you know, previously the Yugoslav Government has certainly not lived up to the obligations of the United Nations Charter in many things—religion, the Greek orphans, freedom, and so forth. And, therefore, the express obtaining of this assurance is well warranted.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield to my friend from New Jersey.

Mr. CANFIELD. I hope that our colleagues who heard those remarks from Tito's own lips will elaborate on how he elaborated on them.

Mr. FULTON. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. BATTLE] is here, and I hope he will do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON] has again expired.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, this mushy, moonshine, artificial, soft-pedaling, pussyfooting stuff as represented by this committee sickens me. I had thought that the visits made by Members of this body to foreign countries over the past few years was paying off, but, Mr. Chairman, I doubt now if that is so. I am against the wiles of communism wherever it exists, which is possibly everywhere.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, all of us must realize that in our day and generation tragic mistakes have been made. The miserable mistake, which was made in the partition of Germany we will long remember as one of the tragic mistakes of modern history. The same is true concerning the partition of Austria and even perhaps the partition of Korea.

In addition to these grave mistakes and to the others which have been made, I personally believe that our Nation made another grave and tragic mistake when it recognized Marshal Tito and the government he had established in Yugoslavia and when we placed our stamp of approval upon the elections which were held in Yugoslavia on November 11, 1945.

In the month of July 1945 even before the Yugoslavian elections and just after I had returned from a trip to Europe I made a speech on the floor of the House and at that time gave to the Members of the House the full benefit of information which I had been able to obtain concerning the situation then existing in

Yugoslavia. I emphasized the ruthless manner in which Marshal Tito was then conducting the affairs of that great little country. I pointed out that I had received information to the effect that he had either executed or exiled or imprisoned more than 60 professors of the University of Belgrade. A year later, our majority leader, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCormack] took the floor and told the House that in his program of religious persecutions Tito had caused to be executed or exiled 250 Catholic priests.

Within a few weeks after the November 1945 elections, I communicated with the Secretary of State, Hon. James Byrnes, and urged upon him the fact that we should not recognize Marshal Tito as the duly elected head of the Government of Yugoslavia. I then pointed out that the November elections were not in keeping with either the letter or the spirit of the Yalta Agreement, and I emphasized the fact that the citizens of that country had not been afforded free and unfettered elections and had not been accorded the rights and privileges of free and unfettered pre-election activities. But, notwithstanding, our country—yes; our officials—recognized Marshal Tito and the government he had established in Yugoslavia. I did not trust Tito then; nor did I trust him when in 1947 he had his open break with Russia. I had no faith in his sincerity; nor have I ever approved or condoned the high crimes and misdemeanors of which he has been guilty. Many tragic events have happened in Yugoslavia and we are living in a fast-changing world. Others appeared to have faith in Tito's sincerity, but actually I had none.

During the past summer I was invited by the speaker of the Yugoslavian House of Representatives to visit Yugoslavia. After arriving in Belgrade, I was invited by Marshal Tito to have dinner with him. Having heard so many fantastic and fabulous stories about this man and his country, I welcomed the invitations and the opportunities.

Socially, Tito is a very likable fellow but not even his personal charm could cause me to forget the many blood-curdling stories which I had heard. My visit with him was very pleasant indeed. I never met a more friendly man nor a man who was more frank and forthright. After dinner we had a conference that lasted almost until midnight, and we talked of just about everything under the sun. When I found that he was apparently perfectly willing to discuss every subject I asked him about the Greek children, and I asked him why he did not return them immediately to Greece and to their parents and loved ones. Tito said that he was anxious to return the Greek children to Greece and to their parents but that he must insist on proper identification of them and of their parents, and he stated that he had no moral right to turn the children over to people who had no right to them. After discussing this situation with Tito we went almost immediately to Greece and conferred with the Prime Minister, and we told him that Tito was apparently sincere in his assertion that he was

anxious to return Greek children to Greece and to their parents if proper identification of the children and the relationship could be established. The Prime Minister of Greece told us that he was delighted with such news and that he would immediately give public notice through the press and radio of Tito's willingness to return the children to their parents upon the presentation of proper identification. Since that time I have seen press reports to the effect that at least some of the Greek children have been appropriately identified and have been returned to their homes and parents.

Then I asked Marshal Tito: "Why is it, Marshal Tito, that you insist upon keeping Archbishop Stepinac in jail and making him a martyr? Why don't you free him and exile him and let him be forgotten?" His answer was: "I realize that I would make a lot of people happy if I could do just that, but the fact remains that such action would greatly offend all of the Serbs of Yugoslavia." Tito went on to say that the archbishop had acquired land extending over an area of 200 miles and that in an effort to protect himself and his property he had been a party to the crime of executing 6,000 Serbs. Whether that is true or not I do not know, but actually I had never heard that story before. I thought that the archbishop had been imprisoned as the result of some sort of religious persecution. I thought that he had been arrested and incarcerated without just cause. I did not know that he had joined hands with the German Army and had been particeps criminis in the killing of thousands of Serbs. Notwithstanding the archbishop's conduct Tito appeared willing to release him from prison if he would leave the country, even at the risk of offending a great number of his own people.

We do not seem to realize that the little country of Yugoslavia came into existence only a few short years ago. After World War I the country of Yugoslavia had its birth. It is made up of Czechs, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Germans, and people of many nations. That is the kind of country Tito is trying to run. As I sat in luxurious quarters with Marshal Tito and looked at him dressed in a beautiful uniform covered with gold braid and as I realized the bloody march to power he had made and tried to appreciate his present predicament, I thought to myself that I would rather be a poor tenant farmer in North Carolina than to have that man's job.

I do not intend to condone crime nor to embrace dictatorship, both of which I hate and despise, but as I look at the map of the world and realize how hopelessly weak we are I am convinced that we can afford to make this gift to the people of Yugoslavia, not with the idea of strengthening Tito nor with the idea of perpetuating him in power, but as a friendly gesture to the right-thinking people of his country and in the hope that the people of Yugoslavia will appreciate our friendship, I shall vote for the pending bill. Until the end of the war we were embracing Russia. In our

aid to Russia we were pouring out hundreds of millions of dollars, apparently in the honest belief that Russia was a real friend and ally. Tito was also friendly to Russia and his friendship continued until 1948. I asked Tito why he had broken with Russia and he said that Russia wanted to dominate the world and that he wanted no part of such a program. Of course Tito is a Communist. He frankly admits that he is a Communist, but somehow I am willing to believe that he has no designs on the world outside of his own country. Maybe I am wrong and maybe he has. Whether he is sincere remains a secret of the future, but the fact remains that we know that Tito has had a break with Stalin. We know too that a dictator must rule with an iron hand or he will not continue to be a dictator. I do not believe that Tito can ever again turn to the east and ask for aid. He must look to the west. If he should turn again to the east, off would go his head and I believe he knows it. He cannot show evidence of weakness, but he must at all times at least pretend to be strong. I have no idea that we will ever make a democrat out of Tito, but I do believe that by aiding the distressed people of his country we will be making an investment in our own future welfare. If his army will resist invasion this investment may prove worth while.

Mr. BARDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COOLEY. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. BARDEN. Did Mr. Tito give you any good reason as to why he kidnapped the 9,000 children to begin with?

Mr. COOLEY. No. I do not think anybody asked him why he kidnapped them. I do not think anybody would admit it was a case of absolute kidnapping. Some of the parents were already in Yugoslavia. But that is not the problem we are dealing with.

When those of us who served on the Herter committee, the special committee on foreign aid, wanted to insist upon certain conditions being attached to our loans and grants to foreign countries and wanted further to insist upon bringing about certain internal reforms in the nations to be aided by our charity and generosity, we were met with the argument that we shall not use their economic power to influence the internal affairs of other nations. I believe that the time has come when all of us must realize that we must reexamine not only our foreign policy but our foreign-aid policy. If we could, forsooth, bring about necessary reforms in Yugoslavia, certainly it would be a consummation devoutly to be wished. But all of us know that that is not now possible. In our foreign-aid programs of the future we shall very carefully guard the expenditures of every single American dollar.

Let us be realistic about our situation in the world today. If the Communists should attack Yugoslavia, the city of Belgrade would be immediately surrendered and the soldiers of that city would, of necessity, take to the hills and carry on guerrilla warfare. I was not too greatly influenced by the remarks and assur-

ances of Tito. I would not even now accept his mere statement as positive proof of his sincerity. I base my own opinion upon the information I obtained from many sources and from on-the-spot observations which I made. I earnestly believe that if the Communists invade Yugoslavia that Tito and his armies will fight to death resisting the foot of the invader. I am not kidding myself into believing that Tito is a reformed person, or that he will join the ranks of freemen, or that he will join with us in fighting Russia. But I do believe that he will do his dead-level best to keep the Russian Army off the soil of Yugoslavia.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COOLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Idaho.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Did Tito give any explanation of how they happened to shoot down American fliers over Yugoslavia?

Mr. COOLEY. No. I did not go into that with him. But let us look at the broad aspects of this picture. Take the map of the world. Here is something that appeared in a Los Angeles paper.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina has expired.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, here is something that appeared in a Los Angeles paper that you might want to show your constituents. It indicates how the world has been running red with communism. Here we are at this little appendix which you can cover with your finger nail, Korea, where they are challenging the civilized free world. Look at the defeats and the disappointments we have encountered over there. Look how easy it would be if Russia wanted to invade this territory over here. She could circumvent all of Tito's efforts and probably go around the soil of Yugoslavia. But here is an army that I believe will stand and fight and die, not in defense of democracy as we know it and love it, but in defense of their own territory. Tito has got a difficult job. He will try to survive. If he is assassinated or overthrown, or if death comes to him, none of us knows what will happen in Yugoslavia.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COOLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. These experts that are attesting to the Yugoslavia Army are the same experts, are they, that told us France had the best army in the world in 1939?

Mr. COOLEY. I do not know about that. I got this from our ambassador, I got this from our military and air attachés and other officials. I talked to members of the American press. I did not see or meet an American in Yugoslavia who did not believe the Yugoslavia soldier would fight in the defense of Yugoslavia.

Now, you cannot regard the Yugoslav soldier as a West Point graduate. Frankly, they look like a bunch of tramps. It is nothing but a slave army. They are working on the highways and the railways like we work our convicts in North Carolina and other States of this country. They are dirty, unkempt soldiers. But, that does not mean that they do not have courage enough to fight for their own country. Whether they will fight or not, or whether this is a good investment or not, I do not think any of us know, but I think it is a risk that we can afford to take.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COOLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. DAVIS of Georgia. The gentleman from North Carolina and the gentleman from Georgia have raised the question that was raised before about the Greek children. I would like to give, for the benefit of the House, the information that we have in the Committee on Foreign Affairs on that subject.

The Yugoslav Government has stated as of September 1, 1950, there were about 9,500 Greek children in Yugoslavia but that 8,300 of these were living with their parents, most of whom are Slavs from Greek Macedonia who fought with the guerrilla forces and do not now wish to return to Greece; in fact, it is doubtful whether the Greeks want them back. The Yugoslavs reported that the remaining 1,200 children were living in special camps; it is regarding these that the repatriation arrangements have been made and which are now being implemented.

Mr. COOLEY. I think the gentleman has accurate information.

In closing let me suggest this: If we are going to carry out our program of resisting aggression in the world, if you look at this map, then I want to ask you how in the name of high heaven can we carry out such a program? We are woefully weak everywhere in this world. I honestly think that Soviet Russia could walk into Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and take them over by telephone, but for the Yugoslav army and but for our hope of what the Yugoslavs might do. Why, there may be another Korea. I would like to say this about Korea. You talk about getting out of Korea. When you talk about pulling our flag out of Korea, then let me say, if we do then let us bring our men out of West Germany. Let us bring them home from everywhere. We are in this war. It is not a police action. It is a cruel conflict, and our countrymen are dying every hour of the day and night, and our people must be aroused to that fact. Whether we can buy friendship, I do not know. But I will say this, even if we do not give this aid, and I understand 72 percent will come from our surplus commodity supply account—even if we do not give it to him, I do not think Tito can reach back and clasp the hand of Joe Stalin again. Tito may be done with. I do not think he will be able to keep his army through the winter if we do not give him aid.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COOLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON. Accepting the gentleman's statement that the Tito government army is a slave army, does the gentleman think that the United States of America should use such slave troops and, secondly, should supply them with subsistence to keep them in operation in order to be the guardians of freedom in this world of ours?

Mr. COOLEY. Well, I think we ought to do it. I think it is a question of whether we have them in the hills of Yugoslavia or whether we have our own boys there. I have heard talk about the Turkish and the Greek troops. Do you know what a Turkish soldier gets per month? He gets 21 cents per month and one uniform for each season of the year, one for summer, one for winter; not a cake of soap, a razor blade, or pair of socks, but 21 cents a month. If you do not call that a slave army, I do not know what you would call it, and yet I do not mean to reflect on the Turkish soldier, because I think they have given a good account of themselves in Korea.

Mr. FULTON. In talking about the Yugoslav soldier and calling it a slave army, as the gentleman did, does he want to use them as an arm of defense?

Mr. COOLEY. Yes; I would use them, and I would use Tito and anybody else to save the lives of American boys.

American boys cannot fight alone on all the battle fronts of the world nor can American resources alone finance the fighting in all of the vital spots of the world in which we live. If we can help to keep the fighting forces of other nations in the field and on our side, we might be able to save some of our own countrymen. I realize that the thought of giving aid in any shape, form, or fashion to a dictator or to a Communist is somewhat repulsive; but if we have to fight for our own existence, the peoples of other nations must join with us or we will fail in our effort to defend our institutions. I wish that time would permit further detailed discussion of our foreign policy and of our true situation in the world today, but these remarks must be concluded.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON].

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for additional emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia a sum not to exceed \$38,000,000 to remain available for obligation through June 30, 1951.

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BURLESON: On page 1, line 5, beginning with the word "There", strike out all of lines 5, 6, 7, and 8 and insert in lieu thereof: "The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds, heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act."

Mr. BURLESON. Mr. Chairman, to those of you who may be familiar with the so-called McCarran amendment passed in the Senate, this is it. It does two things: It provides a diversion of \$50,000,000 from the existing ECA unallocated and unexpended funds to Yugoslavia. With what has heretofore been done, that is, with the transfer of \$12,200,000 from this fund to the Yugoslav Government, together with funds from the military assistance program and from the Export-Import Bank, making a total of something like \$31,000,000, the amendment actually reduces the total proposal by a figure of \$200,000.

I feel very much as many of you feel. To be realistic about this matter is one thing, and to be emotional and sentimental about it is another. As the gentleman from North Carolina has just said, and while it is fresh in our minds, we are in a situation today which should cause us to look for friends wherever we can find them around this world. I am not kidding myself and I do not think very many of you are kidding yourselves or anybody else. We are taking chances in this action as we have taken all through the aid programs which have passed this Congress.

There is good reason for adopting the amendment I offer. First, there has been some question as to whether or not there was authority for the transfer of the \$12,200,000 from the ECA fund to the Yugoslav Government, making up the \$31,000,000 expended in stop-gap aid while the Congress was in recess. This amendment will remove that doubt. That is another feature worth your consideration.

There will be no need for an additional appropriation of \$38,000,000. That is certainly an attractive thing to all of us.

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURLESON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KEATING. Does the gentleman know under what authority ECA even purported to act in advancing the \$12,000,000?

Mr. BURLESON. I do not. It was an action based on exigencies which was thought to exist at the time, in the judgment of our officials. I do not raise the question of legality, but I do have some doubt about it, and that doubt has been expressed in many quarters. It was thought to be expedient and the use of those funds from sources mentioned was authorized by the executive department.

Again, there may be some question as to the legality of what is here proposed, but it is a realistic approach. Mr. Chairman, as example of the practical and more businesslike approach for providing aid to the Yugoslav Government, by using ECA funds already available to Western Europe. I call your attention particularly to conditions with the British at this time.

From September 1949 to September of 1950 Great Britain's allowance out of the ECA appropriations have been approximately \$700,000,000 and in this same period of time the gold reserves and the dollar reserves of the British Government were approximately \$1,330,000,000.

So, although it is not suggested to be taken out of the fund which has been allocated to the British or to any other European countries, but rather out of the general fund of the ECA appropriation, it seems to me that we now have the opportunity to spread our bets a little thinner around the world. We have been helping a lot of people, hoping to bring about a greater degree of world peace and stability in this troubled and chaotic world, but they should be willing to tighten their belts, even more and more. I am sure they have had their belts pretty tight for a long time. But since we are telling our people it is going to be necessary for us to make some sacrifices under the circumstances in which we find ourselves today, I feel our friends in Europe should be willing to do the same.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURLESON. I yield.

Mr. WHEELER. Am I correct in understanding the gentleman to say that there is \$50,000,000 floating around loose in the ECA appropriation which can be used for this purpose?

Mr. BURLESON. Well, I do not know of any funds floating around loose, but let me say to the gentleman in all seriousness that there is something in the neighborhood of \$500,000,000 to a billion dollars unexpended and unallocated in ECA funds. In other words, no moral obligation has attached to this sum and that is the fund from which money for the purpose of this bill is authorized to be expended.

Mr. WHEELER. I suggest that that money be returned to the Treasury.

Mr. BURLESON. If we could start completely over in all we have done, hindsight would guide us to do many things differently. On the other hand, by reason of the rapidly changing conditions, time is of the essence and the present is always with us.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Vorys: On page 1, at the end of the Burleson amendment, strike out the words "under the authority of this act", and insert a comma and the following: "to be expended upon credit terms as provided in section 111 (C) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, or on a grant basis subject to the following provisions of this act:

"SECTION 3. When any commodity which is not furnished on terms of repayment in dollars is made available under this act, Yugoslavia shall make a commensurate deposit in its currency in a special account to be held and used for such purposes as may be agreed to between Yugoslavia and the Government of the United States."

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, you have just heard the McCarran-Burleson amendment explained. I do not oppose that amendment, although I think that it neither adds to nor subtracts from our problems. It proposes to take \$38,000,000 already appropriated for ECA and spend it for something else. If it cuts down the amount needed for the ECA, we are not getting ahead, and if it comes out of money which might otherwise be saved, we are not getting ahead. However, it is

a device which will prevent the pain of an additional appropriation for this purpose. My amendment, however, proposes to give the President and Tito two alternatives. First, a straight loan with no conditions, just exactly like the Spanish loan provided in Public Law 759, that was the way we have handled the dictators earlier this fall. On the other hand, if they want to make it on a grant basis, it is subject to a deposit of counterpart funds along the line of the Interim Aid Act which we passed in the fall of 1947 in the Eightieth Congress, and subject to all of the other conditions written in this act.

Thus the two alternatives are, a loan like the Spanish loan, without conditions; or on a grant basis, with conditions like the Interim Aid Act, providing for counterpart and any other conditions you want to write into the bill.

The loan will be administered, like the Spanish loan, through the ECA, with approval of the Advisory Council, which is a body about the same as the Export-Import Bank board. ECA has been more lenient about loans than the Export-Import Bank. The Export-Import Bank makes loans for 10 or 12 years. The ECA has made them for 35 years. Yugoslavia already has gotten \$55,000,000 in loans from the Export-Import Bank. Britain, appealed to on this food relief program, has loaned Yugoslavia 3,000,000 pounds, about \$8,400,000, and Yugoslavia has accepted it, according to the papers, in the last few days.

Can Yugoslavia repay? Yes. They have strategic materials, copper, lead, zinc, which we need. Since their supposed break with Stalin they have been exporting them largely to the United States. I will give you their exports in recent years of these strategic materials which our side needs in this struggle. In 1948, \$45,000,000; in 1949, \$37,000,000; the first half of 1950, \$15,700,000 worth.

Will they pay? I think they will. Clematis, who was recently Communist Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, called our attention in Prague in 1947 to the fact that, curiously enough, Communist countries have a practice of repaying their capitalistic loans. He said, "It is only countries like Britain who do not repay." So I think if Yugoslavia takes the loan we can be fairly sure they will repay it. In fact, we know they are not completely loaned up now. In the background material handed us by the State Department, on page 3, it is said that "negotiations were recently resumed with the International Bank by Yugoslavia for other loans, specifically for economic development projects."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Vorys] has expired.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for three additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mr. BATTLE. I do not mean to be facetious, but I would like the gentleman to elaborate on this point that we can be sure that they will repay this loan.

Mr. VORYS. We cannot be sure that any country in Western Europe is going to be able to pay any loan back, because if a third world war is launched they are all going to have quite a long moratorium. If, however, you are optimistic and feel as I do, that out of the troubled indecision in the free world now, we are going to be able to line up the free people in both hemispheres, then Yugoslavia is going to need us and our help to stay away from under Stalin's domination, and we are going to need them strategically. I cannot guarantee that Yugoslavia, or anybody else, is going to repay a loan. I merely say it has a fairly good record on loans so far.

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mr. PATTERSON. As far as this loan goes, is this copper and zinc that Tito would export to the United States going to be collateral for the loan, or will we buy that and also make the loan without collateral, and what would be the conditions of this loan?

Mr. VORYS. They would be fixed by ECA and this National Advisory Council. I have not attempted to spell out the conditions, except merely to state that Tito has strategic materials available to pay it off. At present we are buying these materials for dollars. I would judge that part of the materials would be shipped in payment of the loan, in addition to the amounts that we are buying. I have not attempted to spell out the specific provisions of this loan.

Mr. PATTERSON. Do I correctly understand that Marshal Tito has said he would not accept this loan, or this gift, or whatever it might be called, under any conditions we might think should be added to it?

Mr. VORYS. We have been told by the State Department that they do not want any strings or conditions at all.

My amendment provides first for a loan. They pay us back without other conditions spelled out in the law except reference to the ECA Act. Second, if it is to be a grant, then they must deposit counterpart, that is, deposit their own currency, in a special account to be held and used for such purposes as may be agreed upon between the two countries. Substantially a similar provision is in the Senate bill. I do not attempt to spell out in this amendment any other conditions that will be put upon the grant. Those will be provided in the rest of the bill.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is time we check up and see where we stand now.

The gentleman from Texas [Mr. BURLESON] has offered an amendment which materially changes the bill. As presented by the Foreign Affairs Committee the bill provides \$38,000,000 for relief for Yugoslavia. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas provides that there will be no new authorization and, of course, no new appropriation. Existing surplus funds

from ECA will be diverted and used for the purposes set forth in the bill. In other words, it does not call for another dime of the taxpayers' money. In view of the fact that we have not obtained the cooperation that some of us think we are entitled to from our ECA friends, maybe the approval of the amendment will not only help Yugoslavia but it will awaken some of the ECA recipient countries to the realization that we are not getting all the cooperation we have a right to expect from them. At the same time it will not cost the taxpayers anything. For that reason I will go along with the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas.

The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VORYS] proposes to amend the Burleson amendment to this effect: First, to make it a loan; and, second, to operate through counterpart funds just as ECA does.

Mr. Chairman, it is simply ridiculous to talk about Tito ever paying this money back. He probably will be unable to, even if he wants to.

There is another ground for my objection to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio, and it is this: He seemingly proposes, through the amendment, to make this a long-range program through a counterpart fund arrangement just as is done under ECA. The thing we have been trying to impress upon the House since this bill was first considered is that it provides only for an emergency relief program. Yugoslavia should have no grounds upon which to come back later and say that this Congress started this thing and that we should give them more money later to follow through.

If this House wants to appropriate new money to Yugoslavia to effect this so-called relief, then vote down the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas. If you agree, as I do, that this money could more properly be diverted from existing and surplus ECA funds, then vote up the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas.

If the Members of the House want to leave the implication that this will be a long-range program with counterpart funds set up as they are now set up in ECA, then vote for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio.

I believe you will be doing a bad thing, and I believe you will be doing a disservice to our taxpayers and holding out false hopes to the government of Yugoslavia if you adopt the Vorys amendment.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDS. I yield.

Mr. WHEELER. How would the gentleman divert the ECA funds? I should like to know from which one of these countries or from all of these countries does the gentleman propose we shall divert the funds.

Mr. RICHARDS. From any of them or all of them.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDS. I yield.

Mr. VORYS. The gentleman is aware, I am sure, that the Fulbright amendment

provided for equivalent local currency for this and that it was adopted in the Senate unanimously.

Mr. RICHARDS. That is an entirely different matter. This bill itself provides for counterpart funds. For what? Only to cover the administration of this act in Yugoslavia by our own people. The Fulbright amendment can be taken up on its own merits later. I am talking about the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. VORYS. The gentleman does not say that the Fulbright amendment does not apply to all the relief supplies that are sold for local currency?

Mr. RICHARDS. The Fulbright amendment is not now being considered and is not in the House bill.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDS. I yield to the gentleman from South Dakota.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. If we were to accept the Burleson amendment, would that be a grant or a loan?

Mr. RICHARDS. It would be a grant but a grant of funds already appropriated by the Congress.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Vorys amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I am not forgetting that in connection with the creation of the United Nations Organization there was established a very great piece of machinery known as Bretton Woods which set up a stabilization fund and the Bank for International Credit and this is the bank that should handle these deals. I have never been sympathetic with the Export-Import Bank nosing into this general picture as has been explained here the Export-Import Bank did in connection with Yugoslavia in making loans such as the \$55,000,000 loan referred to previously. I do not think that was a legitimate loan, I may say to my friend from North Carolina [Mr. COOLEY], because I do not think a loan made to a Communist country at the present time can be defended as a legitimate loan under present world conditions. Therefore, I look upon the \$55,000,000 advanced by the Export-Import Bank as an outright gift to Yugoslavia because I do not expect a penny of it will ever be paid back.

Secondly, I am in favor of the Vorys amendment because, as I understand that amendment, it would enable this present proposal to be handled in such a way as to let the funds be taken out of the Marshall plan, ECA funds; is that correct?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Then be extended to Yugoslavia under a grant or under a counterpart fund arrangement.

The last time I was in Tokyo I discussed this question of counterpart funds with Mr. Joseph Dodge, of Detroit, who had been sent over to Japan to balance the Japanese budget. I asked him how he was getting along in balancing the Japanese budget. He said: "We are making great progress." I said, "On what basis?" "On the basis of use of the counterpart funds."

I am going to ask the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Vorys] to check me very care-

fully here. His proposal in connection with the counterpart fund arrangement is that if we give these goods or advance these goods to the Yugoslav Government that Government will in turn sell those goods to its citizens for local currency, and that local currency will be impounded in a fund which is subject to distribution and under the supervision of the joint committee between Yugoslavia and the United States Government; is that correct?

Mr. VORYS. Yes, except as drafted and following the plan, it would also apply to goods that are not sold, that are to be given away. Commensurate deposit is required for everything they do not pay for in our Relief Act of 1947. The same technique is supplied in this. However, the gentleman neglected to mention that Tito is given an alternative under my amendment; that he can get a loan.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I was just coming to that, because we have kind of a double-barreled proposition in this amendment. If we want to make him a loan without any restrictions from ECA funds already provided, we can do so under the Vorys amendment. If you want to put him on a counterpart fund proposition where he will put into a fund controlled by a joint commission, we will call it, a fund of his own currency covering all the goods that we ship him, whether given away or sold through local currency, then that local currency will come under this joint control, and it can then be distributed for such purposes as we deem advisable. Those are the two reasons I am for the Vorys amendment, and I hope it will be carried, and then we can adopt the Burleson amendment and thereby keep this thing tied up in the Marshall-plan funds.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Does the gentleman think we should make a loan to Tito without any conditions whatsoever?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would much prefer that kind of a proposition than the one submitted in this bill. I am against this bill lock, stock, and barrel as presented. I am for the amendment, but I am not for the bill even after it is amended only by this amendment.

Mr. GROSS. Is not a loan without any condition merely a subterfuge?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think the whole thing is subterfuge, even the ECA in many of its phases.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. RICHARDS. I was going to ask the gentleman if the Vorys amendment is adopted and the Burleson amendment is adopted, will the gentleman be for the bill?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No; I would not be for the bill. I assume the bill is going to be passed, and therefore I want to make it as acceptable as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last three words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BURLESON]. In my judgment that amendment will serve several purposes. In the first place it will obviate the necessity of an additional appropriation at this time. We hope to have on the floor of the House on Friday, according to my understanding, a supplemental bill appropriating \$18,000,000,000. This appropriation could not possibly be written into that bill at this time; therefore it is doubtful whether the authorized funds could be appropriated during this session if we attempt to handle the appropriation in the regular manner.

By diverting funds of the ECA for this purpose it will do away with the necessity of consideration by the Committee on Appropriations and will speed up proceedings. It will, moreover, conform our action to that of the Senate.

As all of you know, I have a great deal of interest in the ECA appropriations, having served as chairman of the subcommittee that has handled the foreign-aid appropriations during this session of the Congress. I therefore talked to Mr. William Foster, Administrator of ECA, this morning, and he tells me that he has no objection to taking these funds out of the moneys appropriated to the ECA. He said that there will be ample funds to take care of this particular project. He added, however, that he did want to correct the impression that there are between \$500,000,000 and \$1,000,000,000 of ECA funds that might be diverted to other purposes during this fiscal year. That, he says, is not a fact. It appears that some of the countries are recovering economically more rapidly than had been anticipated and consequently that they will not need all of the funds that have been appropriated for them for this present year. Therefore there will be a sufficient surplus to take care of the \$50,000,000 which is provided for in this bill; the \$12,000,000 which has already been taken from the fund and the \$38,000,000 additional which this bill would provide.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GARY. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. WHEELER. The gentleman just indicated that he had received permission from Mr. Foster to divert these funds. I am wondering if the gentleman also got permission from Mr. Attlee while he was here last week?

Mr. GARY. May I say to the gentleman that he knows me well enough to know that I do not ask anybody for permission for what I do. I am trying to give this House information. In order to give the House accurate information I contacted the Administrator who has charge of handling these funds, because I wanted to know what effect a diversion would have on the funds. I assumed the other Members of the House would like the same information. I am simply trying to give them that information at the present time. The gentleman knows it is not my custom to seek permission

from any of the department heads as to what action I shall take on the floor of the House.

Mr. WHEELER. I did not mean that to be personal.

Mr. GARY. I am certain the gentleman did not mean it that way, but I did want to make it plain that I am simply trying to give the House information.

A short time ago I was quoted correctly in the press as saying that I did not think we should help any dictators, period. I have not changed my position. I say very frankly that I would not raise my hand to help Tito. However, I am tremendously interested in the United States of America and I am going to vote for anything that I think will help the United States of America in this crisis. I cannot help but believe that the passage of this bill will have a good effect.

In October 1947 I had the privilege of visiting Trieste. At that time it was one of the trouble spots of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Virginia be permitted to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

Mr. GARY. Just a few weeks before my visit the Italian peace treaty had gone into effect. Under this treaty we along with the other countries involved were obligated to make some changes in the positions of our troops. We all know what took place. There was an agreement with the Yugoslavs and the Russians that although the treaty went into effect at midnight, if troop movements were completed by 10 o'clock the next morning it would be satisfactory. That night about 8 o'clock we were notified by Yugoslavia that they would expect us to carry out the terms of the treaty to the letter and be in our new positions by midnight. We did so. Then, you remember, the Yugoslavs threatened to take over Trieste, but were stopped by our soldiers. For weeks thereafter it was thought that they would attempt to carry out their threat.

I stood one evening with General Gaither, of Maryland, on one of the balconies of the castle Miramare which was built by Maximilian. The moon was shining on the Gulf of Trieste. To our left shone the lights of the city nestled on the hills. As I gazed upon the scene I said, "General, I think this is one of the most beautiful sights I have ever seen." He replied, "Yes, and to think that Maximilian had all of this, yet he went to Mexico and was killed. With all that I have back in the United States, I stand here tonight, but I hope not for the same purpose." That is how tense the situation was at that time.

There is no crisis at Trieste today. Why? Because something has happened. Then we were facing a threat from Tito. We no longer face that threat because Tito has broken with Russia, and we know that Tito is not going to attempt to attack us as long as he does not have the help of Russia.

If, by extending this aid we can gain his cooperation and help, the situation will be even better for us. In my judgment we are going to need the help of all the forces we can get in this world crisis. I favor this bill, not because I think it will help the dictator Tito, but because I think it will help the United States of America.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute for the Vorys amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. A substitute for the Vorys amendment would be an amendment in the third degree and is therefore not in order. The substitute amendment may be offered to the original amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Then, Mr. Chairman, I offer the amendment as a substitute for the Burleson amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CASE of South Dakota as a substitute for the Burleson amendment: On page 1, beginning with the word "There", strike out all of lines 5, 6, 7, and 8, and insert in lieu thereof: "The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress, for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia to be expended upon credit terms as provided in section III (C) (2) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended, subject to the provisions of this act."

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against the amendment, since I have not had an opportunity to look at it.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, this amendment makes the aid for Yugoslavia come out of the ECA fund and puts it on a strictly loan basis. It picks up the Burleson amendment at the same point that the Vorys amendment picks it up, and drops out the words in the Vorys amendment which read "or on a grant basis," and also leaves out the section which provides for repayment by simply putting up counterpart funds.

Mr. RICHARDS. Is it the essence of this proposition to make this a straight-out loan with any further provisions or conditions?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. The essence of my substitute is to make it a straight-out loan taking the money from the ECA funds the same as the Burleson amendment does.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the reservation of the point of order against the amendment.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I yield.

Mr. JUDD. Did I understand correctly that the gentleman has changed the amount from \$38,000,000 to \$50,000,000?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I picked up the language of the Burleson amendment. The Burleson amendment carries not in excess of \$50,000,000. I picked up the Burleson amendment in the same way that the Vorys amendment does, but

in adding the language of the Vorys amendment I dropped out the words "or on a grant basis."

Mr. JUDD. What it would do is to authorize loans not to exceed a total amount of \$50,000,000?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Not in excess of that amount.

Mr. VORYS. It seems to me we have the various ways of doing this thing presented here.

First is the Burleson amendment, which would use existing ECA funds and not require a new appropriation. No one has objected to that.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. However, that could be with either a grant or on a loan basis?

Mr. VORYS. Yes. Now, I have proposed an alternative of a loan without any conditions, or, if it is a grant, it is to be done on the basis of counterpart, as in previous legislation. The gentleman from South Dakota provides that we use the same Burleson-McCarran amendment for getting the money without a new appropriation, but that it be made a straight loan, subject to the conditions provided in the law. Is that not correct?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. That is exactly the situation. This will resolve some of the problems I have had in my mind in thinking about this legislation and perhaps would for others.

In the first place, it does not require a new appropriation. It has the same merit the Burleson approach has.

In the second place, taking the statement made by the gentleman from Ohio as to the degree to which Yugoslavia has repaid its loans, it gives some possibility of getting the money back under the terms of the loan provision. It avoids giving a direct grant without the promises that some of us would like to get with a grant, and which it does not seem possible to get. Also, it seems to me to avoid the implication that we would authorize an out-and-out grant to a Communist country whose hands are not too clean when you come to the question of civil and religious liberties. It makes it possible simply to make them a straight-out loan, and to get the money from ECA, without an additional drain on the Treasury.

Mr. JONAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I yield.

Mr. JONAS. Who would have to do with fixing the terms of the loan?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. The section in the ECA Act, to which reference is made by the language "when it is determined that assistance should be extended under the provisions of this title, the Administrator shall allocate funds from the Export-Import Bank," et cetera. So it would be as carried in that section of the ECA Act and must be the conditions carried in this bill itself.

Mr. JONAS. Is not the gentleman's amendment entirely incompatible with the message received from the President, that this is to be an out-and-out grant, which Tito does not want?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. It does deny the possibility of an out-and-out

grant, without any strings attached. That I think is its virtue.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. CASE] has expired.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. FEIGHAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, I shall vote for the loan to Yugoslavia for one simple and single reason: the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces says such aid is necessary for our national defense.

On November 24 President Truman asserted:

Yugoslavia is a nation whose strategic location makes it of direct importance to the defense of the North Atlantic area.

The defense of the North Atlantic area, I am convinced, is of direct importance to the defense of America.

It would be a reckless American who, in this hour of national peril, would hamper measures necessary for our country's defense. The more effectively to provide for our national security, I have some suggestions to offer in connection with this aid to Yugoslavia. It would be unfortunate, however, if, in the haste of congressional action, these considerations were not brought to the attention of this body.

There is an inevitable human tendency, which I am afraid we Americans have to an acute degree, to think that everyone in trouble is, after all, not such a bad sort of fellow. We have reached the stage in this country when many people think that Tito is a sort of Balkan Henry Wallace, a pathetic politician who blundered and is endeavoring honestly to find his way home.

Let us face the facts. Josip Broz is an average, if unusually energetic type, of international thug. Where his ideological home is, what his political purposes are, can be easily discovered by his treatment of political opponents and every religious faith.

In line with this "Tito is not such a bad sort of fellow" thing, we have been hearing a good deal lately of the distinction between "good" Communists of the Tito type and "bad" Communists of the Stalin stripe. Let us face the facts. In all the hundreds of thousands of words of mutual abuse that have issued from Moscow and Belgrade since June 28, 1948, when Tito's gang was expelled from the Cominform, there has not been the slightest suggestion of any concrete difference between the Communist regimes of Yugoslavia and of the Soviets—nor any evidence that the people of Yugoslavia resent the oppression under Tito less than the Russians hate their Kremlin masters.

Let us face the facts. Tito is a declared enemy of everything America stands for. Let us not forget that when the United Nations Security Council on June 27 voted to furnish assistance "to repel armed attack"—against the Republic of Korea, "and to restore international peace and security in that

area," the lone vote cast against that resolution was by Tito's talleyrand, Dr. Ales Bebler. With a nice show of impartiality and an embarrassing display of affection for America, Dr. Bebler explained that the war in Korea was the result of dividing geographical areas into spheres of influence. The United States, I suppose, had imperialistic designs on South Korea.

The present Ambassador from Yugoslavia has explicitly accused us of imperialism. Just before leaving for his new post in Washington, Tito's new Ambassador, Vladimir Popovitch, wrote in *Kommunist*, official organ of the central committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, on June 1 of this year, that American foreign policy has been and continues to be imperialistic. Perhaps we are expected to be grateful that Mr. Popovitch included Soviet foreign policy in the range of his hatred. We must not forget to thank Mr. Popovitch today for saying that Soviet foreign policy, too, represents the same danger for the independence of some nations. We should be grateful that we are, at least now, linked with the Soviets as equal imperialists. On February 9, 1947, Tito was shouting that America was the greatest enemy of peace in the world.

We are voting this aid to strengthen our national defense. Let us make sure it is so used. Let us not forget that only last July 17 Tito's propaganda chief, Milovan Djilas, assured the Yugoslav peace conference that his country was neutral in the struggle between the east and the west. At this juncture of history, in this hour of international crisis, such studied neutrality betrays a secret hostility to America.

But whatever the private prejudices of Tito's political group, the people of Yugoslavia are facing a famine and the great humanitarian heart of America cannot refuse them food. Let us face the facts. Such an argument is different from the original justification that our aid is demanded in the interest of our national defense.

Besides, such an argument raises the question of how this food shortage happened. We have heard a lot about a drought in the country. We heard a lot about a drought in the Ukraine in 1923, too, though, as we later learned, Stalin had more to do with the famine than the weather did.

Before the last war Yugoslavia regularly exported 25 percent of its meat and grain to Italy and Germany in exchange for manufactured products. It is my information that food production in Yugoslavia since the Tito tyranny began has never reached 60 percent of prewar totals. Tito's drive for industrialization, to establish, I suppose, the "dictatorship of the proletariat," had dragged, I am told, 1,000,000 young men peasants from the farms to work in the state-owned factories. Moreover, Tito's regimentation of the farmers has occasioned livestock slaughtering and a lower food output in a normally food-exporting country. His much advertised break with the Cominform has hastened this hectic drive to collectivize the small farmer. According to September 1950 figures from

the Yugoslav Agricultural Commission, there are now 6,970 kolkhozes—collective farms—in Titoland. The vast majority of them—5,650—have been created in the last 2 years, or since Tito fell out with his fellow thieves in the Kremlin. Tito is determined—no matter what the price in human misery—to prove that he is a better Communist than Stalin.

We hear a lot these days of Tito's 30 divisions. As we anxiously examine Western Europe's military feebleness, that is a reassuring number of men to have on our side. We understand the need of keeping the muzzles of Europe's largest standing army pointed menacingly against the Soviet aggressors.

But let us ask some questions about that much publicized army. Let us remember that there was a royal Yugoslav Army of impressive numbers we hoped would hold Hitler in 1941. Its effective resistance was overcome in about a week. Tito's present standing army is equipped with captured German and Italian equipment, plus cast-off Soviet matériel. It is manifestly no match for the motorized forces of the satellite countries; not even for the well-trained, well-equipped Hungarian Army.

But wouldn't the army become the center of terrifying guerrilla action from Yugoslavian mountain strongholds? The question supposes that American national defense will be aided appreciably by 100,000 partisans—the number probably loyal to Tito—making raids from the forests.

Before we put too much American defense reliance on Yugoslav military might, let us look a little closer at the armed forces at his disposal. There is the militia serving in each town and village as the armed instrument of the local Soviets or people's committees and associated with the people's courts. These courts and committees, and especially their armed agents, are considered the embodiment of oppression and cruelty. They symbolize Tito's Communist regime in the eyes of the people. The peasants and townfolk of Yugoslavia would not be expected to rally around the 60,000 militia men any more than the Czechs rallied around Hitler's hangman, Heidrich.

Then there are the 48,000 troops of the Defense Corps or UDBA, a secret police force at the disposal of Alexander Rankovitch as the Gestapo was at the disposal of Heinrich Himmler. They arrest Yugoslavs at night, keep camps of slave labor, mobilize the nation for forced service, seize grain and pigs from the peasants—all for Tito's party. Are the Yugoslavs expected to rally around Rankovitch's secret police?

Let us remember that Yugoslavia's conscript army is composed of peasants and workmen, serving under Communist commissars, Communist politicians, and former partisans. Key places are held by thugs formerly belonging to the international Communist conspiracy, and considered by all decent Yugoslavs as foreigners.

You have to live under Communists, it must be remembered, to really hate them. Can this gang of international gangsters be expected to sustain a na-

tional-defense effort? The popularity of a regime has a great deal to do with the morale of a people in wartime, as we learned to our embarrassment in South Korea.

Since, as the President said, Yugoslavia is a nation important for our national defense, we are properly concerned about the morale and equipment of her army. At this moment of America's peril, food is a feeble weapon to repel a possible invasion of Yugoslavia, that would imperil Italy, France, and all of western Europe. With the President calling for support of Tito's army in the interests of our own national defense, I am moved to urge that we carry our aid to Yugoslavia much further.

Why cannot we, in the interests of our own security, send a military mission to Yugoslavia as we have to Greece and Turkey? Why cannot we learn at first hand what the worth of Tito's army is for the defense of the North Atlantic area? If its equipment is outmoded and its morale bad, it would be much better for us to know that now and offer measures to strengthen that army, in the interests always, of course, of our own national defense. I have no doubt that our own military people would promptly report that the system of political commissars indoctrinating conscript soldiers with the hated ideology of communism, interferes with military efficiency and hence would actually harm our national defense.

Since our exclusive concern today in voting this loan to Yugoslavia is with American security, I am not satisfied that we can wash our hands, Pilate-like, of the implications of our actions by proclaiming that our aid does not imply approval of the suppression of political and religious liberties in that country. Such conditions of organized tyranny demonstrably affect the popularity of a regime. They condition the morale of its army. They affect our national security.

The plight of refugees is always an infallible index of popular hatred of a government. We know that North Korea was a typically Communist tyranny, even though we had no observers there, from the fact that 3,000,000 people fled to the protection of South Korea in the year after the puppet regime was organized at Pyongyang. People are fleeing from Yugoslavia to Germany in numbers comparable to the refugees from the Soviet satellite countries, and for the same reason.

It is only last September that a false rumor was started in a remote rural area of Yugoslavia that the government was permitting people to emigrate to the United States. More than 1,500 peasant families, the entire population in that area, besieged the American Embassy in Belgrade for visas. Then the police learned of it and letters of recantation arrived at the Embassy, saying: "I have changed my mind and have no intention of emigrating to the United States any more."

There was one note, significantly unsigned, scrawled in pencil on a small scrap of paper, that said:

I beg to inform you that all persons who have registered as immigrants to the United

States have been arrested and imprisoned by UDBA. We appeal to your urgent assistance, since all of the people concerned only intended to leave Yugoslavia legally.

I submit that such a judgment of the people on the regime inescapably affects our American security.

It is somewhat reassuring to read that the State Department has made efforts to let the Yugoslav people know that the food we are shipping is coming from the American people and not from the Titoist tyrants. It is good to learn that arrangements have been made to observe the distribution of that food. Since our aid is admittedly in the interests of our own national security, I cannot understand why American teams cannot actually distribute the food. We did it once before in a Communist country—in Russia in 1921.

After all, we have had one unhappy experience of seeing food distributed by UNRRA—and paid for largely by American taxpayers—used to strengthen the power of Eastern European Communist administrators hostile to America. Do we propose to allow our food to be used by Tito's party hacks for their own aggrandizement? That would scarcely improve in Yugoslavia the morale so necessary for American security.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot afford in this hour of national peril to appear to be upholding the regime of Tito which is hated by all Yugoslavs. We cannot afford to be identified in the minds of the poor, oppressed people of Yugoslavia as supporters of the tyrant Tito. We must never forget that it is the people of Yugoslavia, not a small gang of alien international terrorists, that we count on to oppose the military might of the Soviets.

No one in Congress is under any illusions about the character of the government in Yugoslavia. It is a crude, standard, all-too-hideously familiar brand of police state. It is a country cursed with concentration camps, secret police, sudden arrests. It is run by a regime that maintains itself by terror. There is in unhappy Yugoslavia today no freedom of the press, no freedom of elections, no freedom of religion, no freedom of speech. The courts have been perverted to nakedly political purposes, as in every other Communist country. There are the same forced "confessions" of "processed" prisoners kept in underground dungeons until produced at Soviet-style "spectacle" trials. Everything down to the small shops has been nationalized. Forty percent of the arable land has been collectivized, and the ruthless expropriations continue at a frantic rate.

Every Member of this House knows these things. Do we forget that everyone in Yugoslavia not only knows them but has to live under them? Do we propose to encourage the perpetuation of this tyrannical system and thus imperil America's national security?

I want to name three Yugoslav democrats, political leaders, now in jail. I chose three names from three different areas of Yugoslavia, men of different religious faiths, united in their devotion to democratic ideal and in their common

fate in Tito's dread prisons. They are Dr. Dragojub Jovanovich, head of the Serbian Agrarian Party; Dr. Boris Furlan, of the Liberal Slovenian Party; and Dr. Tomislav Janchikovich, of the Croatian Peasants' Party.

America needs leaders like these men, alive and free in Yugoslavia today, to tell the people that the people of the United States are their friends; that opposing Soviet aggression is demanded by national interests and human decency—not by any need of saving Tito's hide.

In the interests of our own national defense, I suggest that there should be an amnesty of democratic politicians in Yugoslavia. They are the sincere friends of America and the West.

It would be at least progress, and helpful for American security, if we could return at least to the spirit of Yalta that promised free elections and the right of the people to choose governments freely. These are fundamental freedoms enshrined in the charter of the United Nations, so often called the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Another fundamental freedom concerns religion. The Yugoslav constitution under article 25 asserts:

Citizens are guaranteed freedom of conscience and freedom of religion.

There is no one in this House with any doubt of what a mockery those words are. For, like every Communist regime, Titoism recognizes religion as an allegiance to something larger than merely human purposes and consequently, steadfastly persecutes it.

Members of this House undoubtedly think instantly of the figure of Aloysius Stepinac, the Catholic Archbishop of Zagreb, at the mention of the words "religious persecution." The imprisoned prelate is only a symbol of Tito's relentless war on God, his grinding persecution of all religion. An American Congressman cannot fail to point during this debate to another martyr, the jailed Serbian orthodox bishop, Varnava Nastic of Sarajevo. Bishop Nastic was born in America.

Because it directly affects the morale of the people of Yugoslavia and, consequently, has a bearing on American security, let us spend a few minutes on this issue of religious persecution. We must make sure, I repeat, that America not be listed as a supporter of the oppressive Tito regime—if we hope to have the people fighting on our side.

How shall we calibrate the resentment of the religious people of Yugoslavia at a regime which has confiscated every Catholic school, every Catholic hospital and orphanage and old-folks home, that has dissolved the religious orders freely serving the poor and the sick, that has murdered 378 priests whose names are known, and holds 400 more in prison today? What must be the attitude of the people toward a regime that attaches the penalty of immediate dismissal to the attendance at religious services of any school teacher? Speaking to a priest jeopardizes the job of a soldier or civil servant. Officers of the defense service, police and military may not marry in church or have their children baptized. For civilians, a heavy government tax,

varying from \$15 to \$16 for a wedding and from \$50 to \$100 for a baptism, is assessed for legal registration.

What mockery of freedom of religion exists when the government forbids all voluntary collections for the maintenance of the clergy or ecclesiastic buildings whether taken up inside or outside a church when control of newsprint is manipulated to guarantee the absence of a religious press, when imports regulations are designed to ban the replacement of prayer books and catechisms, when ration permits are refused for wine, wheat, flour, candles, and vestments so that the very possibility of offering mass is endangered, when candidates for the priesthood and their families are terrorized, when religious instruction is allowed only when classes do not conflict with compulsory Communist party programs, inevitably arranged for the same time as religious services. There is no known instance of a child who attended catechism class obtaining the necessary scholarship for higher studies—or even winning admission to a higher school.

The Yugoslav people hate this situation and the Communists responsible for it with all the deep, emotional anger of a peasant people, rooted in religion and devoted to their national traditions. These are the people who must be our allies in opposing Soviet aggression.

It is in the interest of American security that I call attention to the monstrous tyranny oppressing the Yugoslav people. They will never forgive us if our aid only seats Tito more securely on their shoulders.

In the interest of sound, abiding American security in the Balkans, we must, Mr. Chairman, work persistently, realistically, and honestly, for democracy, for fundamental freedoms, for human decency in Yugoslavia.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Vorys and Case amendments.

Mr. Chairman, in all this legislation I believe we have to be realistic. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CRAWFORD] talked about the International Bank. The facts show that at the present time, since the break with Stalin, Yugoslavia has borrowed from the Export-Import Bank some \$55,000,000. Yugoslavia has further borrowed from the international fund \$11,700,000. I think that the House should understand that until this break in the summer of 1948 the entire Yugoslav economy was dovetailed with the economy of Stalin's Russia. During that time all of its business was going east. It lived on its trade with the eastern satellites and Stalin himself. Since 1948 there had to be quite a reorientation, because there was no longer any question of doing business with the Cominform or the nations in the east.

The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VORYS] has told this House that a loan has been taken from England, and why should we not have the same situation apply with reference to the funds that come from the United States of America. The gentleman from Ohio, I am sure, realizes that Yugoslavia and all

European nations have plenty of sterling. The thing that Yugoslavia does not have and which most of the European nations do not have is dollars. What Yugoslavia needs desperately is dollars, and there is no chance of paying this money back. But we know that Yugoslavia has an abundance of strategic materials which we so desperately need and which are flowing into the United States stockpile. The records show that since the spring of 1949 the United States purchased 66 percent of Yugoslavia's copper export, 54 percent of its lead, 35 percent of its quicksilver, and 30 percent of its antimony. These are materials that the United States must have if the United States is to remain strong. Yugoslav economy is very weak.

If the United States is going to make this a grant, or a loan, or an advance from practical considerations, let us be realistic about it; let us give them the money, because basically we are never going to get it back if we lend it to them. We must approach this with a sense of realism.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield.

Mr. FORD. The gentleman gave figures in regard to Yugoslavian exports to this country, and so forth, from 1948 on. Has the gentleman any comparable figures for prior years?

Mr. RIBICOFF. No, I am sorry, I have not.

I should like to point out further that in the exchange of letters between the United States and Yugoslavia over this particular proposed grant an agreement will be entered into and a proposal has been formulated:

That your government will provide the United States with reciprocal assistance by continuing to facilitate the production and transfer to the United States in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed on, of raw and semiprocessed materials required by the United States as a result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources and which may be available in Yugoslavia. Arrangements for such transfers shall give due regard to requirements for domestic use and commercial export of Yugoslavia.

There is no question but that as these materials keep getting in short supply in the United States of America, the United States is going to have to give Yugoslavia or lend to Yugoslavia additional money to get more modern equipment and machinery to increase the production of these most vital materials that the United States so desperately needs.

Mr. LARCADE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, at this point it is difficult to know exactly the final provisions of the bill under consideration. The original bill provided for outright grants, as I understand of either food or money; however, amendments have been introduced which may authorize a loan or loans to Yugoslavia. The amendment under consideration provides for a loan.

Should the final draft of the bill provide that our Government supply Yugoslavia with food or supplies, I desire to

bring to the attention of those charged with the administration of the program the commodities of my district and State which in my opinion, would be desirable to send to Yugoslavia. One of these foods is sweet potatoes. There is a surplus in the United States and the caloric content of sweet potatoes is the next highest of all foods to wheat. Another basic food that is available in my district is rice. This is one of the cheapest foods available and at this time is eagerly sought after by Asia and other countries of the world.

I note from the Washington Food Report of December 2 that under the original plan our Government contemplated supplying Yugoslavia with the following foods: Corn, 125,000 tons; flour, 26,000 tons; oats, 60,000 tons; barley, 50,000 tons; dry peas, 30,000 tons; dry beans, 15,000 tons; rice, 5,000 tons; lard, 5,000 tons; dry skim milk, 6,000 tons; seeds, 18,000 tons.

If the above statement is correct, you will note that provision is not made to use sweet potatoes which is considered one of the finest and most nutritious food available.

It will also be noted that while rice is included in the program, only 5,000 tons of rice is allocated, under what is presumed to be an allocation of \$38,000,000.

As stated above rice is considered a basic food the world over, and since this basic food is also in surplus in the United States and is one of the cheapest foods obtainable in the market at this time, my people feel that there should be included in this program a greater amount of rice than that mentioned in the statement to which I refer. Certainly, rice should be supplied in an amount equal to oats and barley—50,000 to 60,000 tons.

Rice is grown principally in the States of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and California, and present statistics indicate that there is a very large surplus of rice in the United States, and since there is possibly no other market outside of the United States at this time, it seems that since this food is so universally consumed in the world that if the bill under consideration should finally provide for the supplying of food to Yugoslavia that this country should utilize a larger share of this food in the program than that which is indicated in the announcement of the Government, and I am taking this time to place this matter before the committee and the Government officials so that when the time comes for the purchase of food supplies under the bill they will give consideration not only to the purchase of rice, but also to sweet potatoes, both of which are fine and cheap foods.

(Mr. LARCADE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COTTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

Mr. Chairman, during the 4 years of my service in this body I have rarely taken the time of the House for my observations, certainly not on matters which do not come from the committee on which I serve; but I feel that I cannot remain silent longer today.

These amendments offered to the bill now before this committee indicate even more strongly than what transpired here yesterday exactly what we are trying to do, and it seems to me unfortunate if any of us, sincere and honest though we may be, permit ourselves to save our own consciences by trying to hedge this bill about with amendments and think we are justified in supporting it. We are either going to give this money or not, and no amendment can make this any other kind of proposition.

For 4 years I have gone along with all of our foreign policy, with all of the foreign aid, and with all our endeavors to strengthen the western democracies and extend our own influence. But here we have something entirely different. This is not aid to the friends of freedom as was the Marshall plan for the western democracies. We know that this is tribute, hush money, appeasement to an enemy. This is not building up our own strength but is advertising our weakness. This is not creating good will but is inviting the contempt of the world.

Many years ago at a time in our history when we said what we meant and meant what we said, a great American spokesman stated:

Not one cent for tribute but millions for defense.

We have now come to the place, and every one of us knows it, when we have lost the respect of the world. No first-class power in history has ever been so discredited, so disgraced, and so humiliated as has our own country in the last few months. The time has come when out from the American Congress should go the message that we are prepared to make America strong, that we are not spending any more time or effort in appeasing our enemies.

This is nothing but an effort to try to immobilize the power of the Yugoslavian Army, an attempt to buy it off. When the five American fliers were slain by the air power of Yugoslavia, one of those boys came from a town neighboring my own. I remember the day when I talked with his father and his mother. I did not want to permit that experience to affect my judgment on this bill. I wanted to accede to the request of the President, if I could, but the more I have listened the more I have become convinced that the time has come when we should let it be known that we are through with appeasement; we are through with buying our peace; we are ready to make America strong and "not one cent" in the words of that great statesman "for tribute but millions for defense."

Let us win back our own respect and the respect of the world and let us start here and now. I shall vote against this bill.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I just listened to the wise words of the gentleman from New Hampshire and I subscribe to everything he said. It seems to me that the time of appeasement has gone about as far as it can go with people and the newspapers,

political writers, and others, calling our attention to these things.

It seems to me that in a country as great as our country is, a country that has the fundamentals of freedom at heart, it is about time we start worrying about the United States of America and not be worried at all about this so-called communism they are talking about, because this country believes in the Christian religion and we are going to fight for it. We are going to fight for it maybe with bullets or cannons or airplanes, but whatever it may be we are going to fight just the same as the Christians have since the days of the Holy Roman Empire. They cannot beat us.

I talked with one of the most influential men, in my opinion, who has ever served in this Congress for a great many years. I go to him many times for advice. A great many times I do not take it, but I go to him just the same. He says that we are bribing Yugoslavia. That is all we are doing. When did we sink so low, Mr. Chairman, when the great country that we represent here has got to buy people to carry out battles for us? Mr. Chairman, I am only just talking now for the people I know and I have known for 60 years who believe in a representative, constitutional government. I want to say to you that the letters I get from them abhor the idea of trading with the enemy. We will fight our own battles just as we have through the centuries and we will not have to pay somebody to carry our battles for us. Eighty-five million dollars. Does it not make you kind of laugh to sit here and think that we are selling out for \$85,000,000 to some country that has no use for us, that has shot our boys down in the war, and telling us where we could go? Well, they cannot do that to me, Mr. Chairman, and they cannot do it to the people I represent. Eighty-five million dollars. We are just wasting time. There is not a country in this world that does not hate us and there is not a country with any self respect but what has a right to do it, because we are sticking our nose in everybody else's business instead of trying to take care of our own.

Ask me, Mr. Chairman, to appropriate \$100,000,000,000 for this country to provide rifles, tanks, airplanes, whatever it may be, and I will vote for it, just the same as everyone of you will. But, when you attempt to tell somebody in Yugoslavia, or make a trade with them, or China or anyone else, we are not in a position to make trades. They are the ones that should make trades. So, we sit here and waste an afternoon or two afternoons over a paltry \$85,000,000 and tell the world that we are doing it to have some tramp army, as they say, take care of us. Well, we do not have any tramp armies in this country. We have the kind of boys that went to war when I did. I walked up the streets of Liverpool and an old woman said to me, "What are you doing here when the war is all over?" Well, the war was all over for them but it only just started for us in 1917, and now we take on the responsibility of carrying the load of the world on our shoulders.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, in the consideration of this bill, and if you want to know what has happened to the Government of the United States, just walk over to the new House Chambers that are being prepared for us to go into on the 3d day of January and look at the modernistic medallions that are placed over the entrances into the galleries. They are medallions of persons. Now, I will read the names of them to you. I have just now been there and copied them down. I find two Americans among them, and I will give you the entire list: Mason, Poethier, Colbert, Edward I, Alfonso X, Gregory IX, St. Louis, Justinian, Tribonian, Lycurgus, Hammurabi, Moses, Solon, Papinian, Caius, Maimonides, Suleiman, Innocent III, de Montfort, Grotius, Blackstone, Napoleon, and Jefferson.

Mr. O'KONSKI. No Tito?

Mr. HINSHAW. No Tito.

Mr. MASON. No Truman?

Mr. HINSHAW. No Truman.

Mr. WHEELER. No Stalin?

Mr. HINSHAW. No Stalin.

Mr. WHEELER. No Attlee?

Mr. HINSHAW. No Attlee.

Mr. FULTON. No George Washington?

Mr. HINSHAW. No George Washington that I could find anywhere in the Chamber. I understand, however, that his portrait will be returned. Do we not have enough American heroes that we could find a place for them on these medallions? I ask you what has happened to our country. That room, with its lovely pale blue above and its dark wood below, garnished in gold leaf that they are now putting on, looks something like a cross between a business chamber of what the Good Book of Revelations calls the whorl of Babylon and the Roman circuses where early Christians were martyred.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Did they have a place for the American flag or the UN flag?

Mr. HINSHAW. I trust they will have a place for the American flag behind the Speaker's chair as usual.

Mr. Chairman, I am informed that small busts of the men I have listed have been around the House Chamber since early times, but, as any Member will testify, they were hardly noticeable. Now these men stand out all around the Chamber in large modernistic medallions over the gallery doors. They are the most prominent decorations in the place. Why cannot we have such great Americans as the signers of the Constitution or such great American legislators as Webster, Clay, Calhoun, and others in their places?

Mr. CARNAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, we are soon going to vote on these amendments which are to determine whether or not the proposed aid to Yugoslavia is going to be in the form of a loan or is to be a grant. We should give rather careful attention as to just what the economic results would

be of making this a loan instead of a grant.

Yugoslavia, the same as any other country, has only one means of earning dollars and that is through selling us goods, through exporting something to us. In the case of Yugoslavia, they are exporting to us strategic raw materials such as copper, lead, mercury, and zinc. It uses the dollars acquired through these exports to service existing dollar loans, such as the \$55,000,000 in credits which it has obtained from the Export-Import Bank, and to purchase from us raw materials, including cotton and capital goods which it buys from the United States.

If we make this a loan instead of a grant, the only result would be that Yugoslavia's ability to service existing loans and to buy from us other products would be reduced by the amount of the loan.

This bill provides for the shipment of foodstuffs to Yugoslavia. Foodstuffs do not in themselves produce additional capital. This is an entirely different matter from shipping industrial equipment. Industrial equipment would increase Yugoslavia's ability to earn. If these funds were for the shipment of capital equipment, then there would be more reason to insist that it be made a loan, because the loan would result in increased production in Yugoslavia with which to pay off foreign indebtedness.

I am quite in agreement with loans for this purpose from the Export-Import Bank or from the International Bank, but I repeat, it is different from foodstuffs which are not capital producing. We would therefore gain nothing in the long run by insisting on making this a loan instead of a grant.

This bill will find its justification in our strategic and political interests. We are trying to strengthen the capacity of the Yugoslavs to defend themselves against Soviet imperialism. We also hope through this bill to strengthen the ties between the Yugoslav and the American peoples. I assume no one will claim that a loan would be as conducive to the attainment of these ends as would a grant. Let us not lose sight of our main objectives.

Let us not kid ourselves that we have any real possibility of getting back a net \$38,000,000. I am sure all will agree with me that if 10 years from now there has been no war we will be glad to forget the \$38,000,000. If war intervenes we will have no more chance of collecting the loan from Yugoslavia than the proverbial snowball.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, no one who has ever taken upon himself the responsibility of voting on these momentous issues and no one who has studied history could have listened to the words of the gentleman from Massachusetts without feeling there should be some discussion of why the obvious fact which he stated here is a fact. We are approaching the Christmas season. I came on the floor and Members were talking about appropriating \$38,000,000 to feed starving people. I do not believe I would have had any

difficulty in voting for this measure on the basis of Christian charity. It certainly is very little. I do not care how the people who are dominated would get the food. They are human beings. But I find this proposal to feed starving people couched in warlike language. I find that for some reason I must agree with the gentleman from Massachusetts that throughout the world we have but few friends. It is one thing to proclaim that you are a Christian. Sometimes it is quite a different thing to practice Christianity. I want to make a suggestion to explain why we have not won some friends, let us say, in the Orient. We support the United Nations. I do, and I always have. We must uphold its decisions. But I wonder if we have exercised the influence we should exercise in arriving at those decisions. I find in reading current history that France, if she had 40 Joans of Arc and as many divisions, could not protect her own continental borders. Yet we are supporting France in trying to maintain a colonial empire in the Orient. That is only one of many examples. I would like to support this measure on the basis of casting bread upon the waters. But when I come to the point that the very act of passing the measure is in itself because of the tenor of this debate a warlike measure, I sometimes wonder whether or not we are a good deal like Bobby Burns' Holy Willy, when we proclaim our Christianity, but our practice is certainly quite different.

I see in the press a great deal about praying. Almost everybody prays, but some people spell it with an "a" and some people spell it with an "e." Sometimes that causes differences of opinion. In my judgment it may be necessary to pass this bill because of the course we are following. I say I may yet vote for it because being convinced that we will follow that course, it will be better for our country to have cast this bread upon the water with warlike language, than not to have cast it at all. But the course of history does not seem to have been observed by many people. Shall I mention another example? Korea. Certainly Korea was the creature of the United Nations. I do not know all the issues. I am just a country lawyer from out in the Mid-West, but I do know there were some ugly rumors that were going on inside of Korea before the outbreak. I would like to have seen my country appear before the United Nations and call for an investigation to right any injustice, or to determine whether there was any injustice. Then I think we would have been on a much stronger moral ground, if we would have gone in when we went in to uphold the decisions of the United Nations. I wonder how many people had read the history of Korea before the decisions were made.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. JACOBS] has expired.

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for one additional minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. JACOBS. Never since the establishment of Jamestown, save and except the time when the deal was made between this Government under Theodore Roosevelt's administration and Taft with reference to the Philippine Islands, and even before Jamestown was laid out, it had been the consistent historical fact that the Chinese were coming to the aid of the Koreans each time any outsider landed on that peninsula. I wonder how much consideration was given to all these things and to these rumors of injustice in Korea, or consideration given to going before the United Nations and trying to get some decisions based on justice and equity. I do not know. I am not a member of the committee that handles this bill. I may vote for it, simply because I am convinced it is best in the course we are going to take and not because I think it is the best course to take.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. JACOBS] has again expired.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, the question on this particular amendment or group of amendments is whether the amount shall be a grant, which is a gift to Yugoslavia, or whether it will be a loan which she will have to repay. The question comes up whether this is an act of kindness or whether this is a strategic action. For my part, I disagree with the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. JACOBS] and I agree with my colleague the gentleman from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], because he was frank enough to say to me yesterday, in reply to my question, that this was not a humanitarian bill but was a strategic bill, in order to obtain immobilization of 32 divisions in a possible conquest of Western Europe. That is actually what it purports to be.

Then let us see if these people are in dire straits or have the ability to pay. I believe this is a legitimate joint of inquiry, in all fairness to the American taxpayer who is called on to foot the bill.

On page 24 of the hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Perkins of the State Department, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, said in regard to the diet of Yugoslavia:

The normal diet in the past has been 2,800 calories in Yugoslavia. The estimate is that, with the foodstuffs they have on hand, that will drop to about 2,300 calories.

So the current drop is only about 500 calories. In answer to Mr. VORYS' question:

That is, this contemplates no tightening of their belts?

Mr. Perkins says:

About 10 percent of their food ration.

Mr. VORYS. But there has yet been no starvation or any real hunger there?

Mr. PERKINS. No; not up to this moment, if that is what you mean.

Mrs. BOLTON. Do you mean in Yugoslavia?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Let us see what else there is. The gentlewoman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON] on page 68 introduced this in the record of the hearings from a newspaper clipping:

The hunger in Yugoslavia, once the granary of Europe, has its true cause in the foolish and unnatural communistic economic plan

which has been imposed by a minority on the masses of the Yugoslav people against their will.

Mr. Haggerty is a special agricultural assistant for our embassy in Yugoslavia. He has been in Yugoslavia some months making an investigation for this particular bill and this relief program. Mr. Haggerty says this in comment on the newspaper clipping:

I would classify that as a half truth. It is true that during the three-odd years of the Communist administration in Yugoslavia there has been economic deterioration in every phase of the economy, agricultural as well as others. It is still true this year. There has been a degree to apathy on the part of the peasants to produce, those who are in the collective farms, a great many of them having been coerced into joining. They have no great enthusiasm for it. They would just as soon see the collectives fail. Their attitude is "Let Henry do it."

And we might say here: "Let Uncle Sam do it."

Mr. Haggerty goes on to state:

There has been this downward spiral, to put a statistical handle on it—I would not state it as a final judgment—but just to illustrate it, I would say that the fallen production between 1949 and 1950 might be due to the extent of 10 or 15 percent to general economic deterioration and apathy, and the rest of it is due to the drought.

With about an 18 percent drop from 2,800 to 2,300 calories per day, it can be seen that a large part of the cause is the inefficiency of the government even on Mr. Haggerty's own statement.

The question is whether 2,300 calories is sufficient for Yugoslavia during this intervening period until the next crop season. If you will go back to June 4, 1948, page 7384 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD you will find where I had an amendment to increase the daily calory ration of displaced persons in Germany from 1,550 calories that was set up by our Appropriations Committee of this Congress to a mere 2,000 calories. The amendment was voted down 102 to 37 by this Congress; we would not even continue to feed those displaced persons 2,000 calories a day in 1948, on June 4, 1948, when we passed the appropriation bill. The United States policy on Europe, and for that matter, Yugoslav citizens who were displaced persons was far short of the calories now available to Yugoslavia.

Let us see what else there is. Italy has helped out temporarily in this situation in Yugoslavia, in the last few months.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON] has expired.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for three additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield.

Mr. BLATNIK. The gentleman mentioned that collectivization has something to do with the decreased productivity of agriculture.

Mr. FULTON. That is correct. The productivity has been decreasing pro-

gressively, according to the State Department, as the current Yugoslav Government's collectivization program has been pushed against the people's resistance.

Mr. BLATNIK. But will not the gentleman admit that of all the war torn countries of Europe the one that was most devastated both in physical destruction and loss of human life, loss of livestock, which is the mainstay of life and the principal means of transportation, that the destruction was by far more severe in Yugoslavia than in any other part of Europe with one single exception?

Mr. FULTON. That gets away from the issue. The problem here is why Yugoslav current calories available have fallen from 2,800 daily postwar, to a present 2,300 calories. That war destruction did not prevent them from getting back to 2,800 calories postwar, which everybody agrees was satisfactory before the collectivization program was pushed during the last year or so. Let me proceed. I will quote what the caloric intake was for 1948-49 in Greece: It was only 2,468, and in 1947 it was 2,266. This was not as good as Yugoslavia.

In Italy today there is only 2,243 calories a day being used by the peasants, and yet Italy has been asked by us to send aid to Yugoslavia to increase their calories to 2,600 a day. And to the Italians' everlasting credit, despite all the history of trouble over Trieste, and the previous threats from the Yugoslav Government, they promptly complied. Now how about seeing the Italian calory supply is increased to 2,800 daily? We like to see the people of Yugoslavia eat better, and the same should hold true for Italy.

May I point out that in 13 countries of the world, which contain over half of the world's population, the people exist on 2,000 to 2,300 calories a day: Brazil, 2,343; Chile, 2,351; Colombia, 2,283; Peru, 1,925. The South American countries run much less than the current rate of consumption in Yugoslavia. How about helping our South American friends, too? Japan has only 1,834 calories today, and we certainly should encourage them. Yet Yugoslavia, even as they say under present drought conditions, has 2,300 calories. Pakistan has 2,028 and the Philippines are living on 1,908 calories. Burma, 1,986; Ceylon, 1,918; China, 2,115. India lives on only 1,621 calories daily. Yet we refused to help India. We should assist our Indian friends to obtain at least a subsistence standard, and I urge you to consider this problem.

So you can see Yugoslavia is not on a starvation basis because over half of the population of the world gets less calories today than the Yugoslavs have. The Yugoslavs have been able to develop their agriculture and their agricultural commodities until they are living better than one-half of the world's population. This bill is not upon a starvation basis at all as was stated.

This is a matter solely of, "Do you want to pay for 32 dictator's divisions? Do you want to give up principle to do

that?" If you do, you are not destroying your so-called world enemies. You may be destroying yourself.

Feeding deserving people is an entirely different thing from using their sons and forces in a play of power politics. I want the long-suffering people of Yugoslavia and the whole world adequately fed, but the purpose of this bill is expediency and will cut off hope in America from the democratic and younger elements of Yugoslavia.

Mr. BLATNIK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, reference has just been made to the fact that a slight decrease in productivity can be attributed to the collectivization of the agricultural or rural economy of Yugoslavia. That perhaps is true. Other factors were mentioned. But the major factor was completely overlooked.

Of all of the war-torn countries of Europe the country that by far suffered the most severe and devastating and widespread destruction of physical property, means of livelihood, human life and livestock, which is basic to its economy, which is primarily agrarian, that country was Yugoslavia. Other countries, such as Greece, which too suffered frightfully through years of brutal occupation, then rent assunder by internecine guerrilla warfare, Italy, France, England, and others—all of these countries, needed aid, and substantial aid to prevent them from collapsing right after the war. They would have collapsed if they had not received substantial aid from our country. Aid which totals up into the billions of dollars and runs over a period of several years.

The surprising thing is not that there is a serious food crisis in Yugoslavia and quite some economic hardship. The surprising thing is that they have not long ago collapsed. But they are still on their feet. After the economic sanctions and the economic blockade imposed by the eastern satellite countries of Russia, which cut off completely what trade or economic intercourse was then going on, by all of the economic rules in the book Yugoslavia should have completely collapsed, which was the purpose of the economic blockade. It is very much like a doctor putting a thermometer in the patient's mouth and the temperature reads 120 degrees. By all medical rules the patient should be dead, but somehow or other he is alive.

The past record of the Yugoslav people is perfectly clear—they have exerted themselves to the utmost to carry their own weight, and against great handicaps and difficulties and there is no question that they will continue to do everything they can for themselves before calling for an outside helping hand. The drought of the past season, however, was too much and now they do need an outside helping hand. This aid of \$38,000,000 the State Department states has been parred down to the narrowest margin, and even with this plus what other help they may get from other countries, will just enable them to pull through for the coming 6 months of this winter, and

then allow them to go on to their spring planting and then to carry on on their own.

(Mr. BLATNIK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take issue with the gentleman from Minnesota on the question of destruction in Yugoslavia. I traveled extensively throughout some of the countries of Europe which were affected by the war, and I also traveled a good deal through Yugoslavia. I saw less destruction in Yugoslavia than I saw, for instance, in Amsterdam, Holland, or in Frankfurt, Germany or in Warsaw and other parts of Poland, and I think his statement is open to a good deal of question. Of course there was destruction in Yugoslavia but when he says there was more than any other country in Europe I would like to have some figures. I want to tell you a little bit about how some of that destruction came about. The gentleman from Minnesota made a very moving argument here yesterday about how many people were killed in Yugoslavia during the late war and I will not question his figures. But I would like to have a little information about how many hundreds of thousands of those people were killed by Tito or Tito's men. I do know this, that on Easter Sunday in Belgrade during the last year of the war and Easter Sunday in Belgrade does not come on Easter Sunday in the United States because they do not use the same calendar we do—Tito asked that American bombers bomb the city of Belgrade, which was not strategically important; he specified that day and he specified the hour. That day and hour happened, purely by accident I suppose, to be on Easter Sunday when the Serbs were coming out of the orthodox churches. You can still hear about that in Belgrade today and I have more than a little bit of reason to believe that he did it for a purpose, and that purpose was that he wanted the Serbs, who have a natural affinity toward the United States, to hate this country. Tito is like all Communists. He knew at that time and he knows today where he is going and what he wants. There will not be any debate in Belgrade about any conditions regarding any aid we give them. Why, if you read the little bulletin that the Yugoslav ambassador put out, they even tried to explain away the fact that they do not have any elections in Yugoslavia. You go up in front of a whole lot of people, election officials, and you pick up a ballot which says that you are for Tito's ticket, and you put it in that box, or else you pick up a blank ballot which means you are against the regime, and in front of that same group you put it in the other box. The ambassador in this little bulletin says it is probably pretty hard for Americans to understand this as being a democratic election. Well, some of the people in my district who came from Serbia could tell you in far more colorful language than would

be appropriate here it is extremely hard to picture that as being a democratic election. Yet that is the kind of an individual you are dealing with. Oh, yes, I drove down into Serbia a year ago in one instance the old lady in the door of this little peasant cottage told about Tito's men coming to that door and calling the husband out and asking why he had not contributed more, and before he had a chance to answer they shot him down in front of his grandchildren and his children.

For two whole days we traveled through Serbia. I talked to a good many people those 2 days and the rest of the week in Yugoslavia. Not one single person did I find who, when he knew we were Americans, would say he was for Tito or Tito's regime. As a matter of fact, without knowing that they would not be reported, they took their lives in their hands and said, "Tito is no good. Tito is no good." If those people believed that about him, what could anybody else think about him? What is the use of kidding ourselves? You cannot put it on a practical basis. You cannot put it on a Christian basis, may I say to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. JACOBS], much as I should like to go along with him on that, because Tito is an atheist to begin with. He does not believe in God. He does not believe in good deeds. He does not have any morals. You just cannot deal with a man without morals on any basis that a moral people understand. It is just impossible to do it. I think we ought to think about that a little bit before we go too far in committing ourselves on any sacrifice of principle in dealing with a character of that kind.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this section and all amendments thereto close in 15 minutes.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, some of us have been wanting to speak for about an hour now, and we have not had a chance. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word and ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

Mr. SUTTON. Mr. Chairman, ever since this bill came up yesterday I have been on the floor listening to every Member who spoke, with the exception of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. BLATNIK]. I was called to the office and did not get to hear him speak. I was trying to find some justification for supporting this proposal.

Yesterday evening when I went back to the office I called up the Library of Congress and had them browse through the RECORDS of 1938 and 1939 and find the speech our majority leader the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] made on Russia. I wish I had that speech with me today. It is one of the most beautiful speeches I have ever read. It was a condemnation of communism, of all forms of communism. That was at a time when the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] asked that

the Ambassador from Russia be withdrawn. He had logical reasoning then, sound reasoning. It was one of the most logical talks I have ever read in my life. I wish some of you would go to the Library of Congress and read that speech. We who were not privileged to be here at that time missed something. I suggest that you who were not here then read it, and I am sure you will feel just as I do, you will hate communism just as our majority leader did then and as I do and other Members do now.

Let us get down to a little realism. I am like my good friend and neighbor down the hall from me, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF]. Let us stop, think, and listen, and get down to realism. Some have said that this is to be done from a humanitarian standpoint, that we are asking for this \$38,000,000 to go to the aid of a starving people in Yugoslavia.

About 3 weeks ago I had the privilege of being in New York. I had never been down in the Bowery. I had heard so much about it.

It is not an isolated spot. It is not the only spot like it in the United States of America. I spent one entire Sunday afternoon walking through that section of New York, the great metropolitan center of the world. My friends, had you gone through that section as I did, and had you seen those starving people—Americans, true, patriotic Americans, just as patriotic as you and I are—then you would think twice before you sent any money across before taking care of those people here. Then I came back to Washington on Sunday afternoon, and on Monday afternoon I walked through some of the alleys of Washington, D. C., the Nation's Capital, and the Capital of the world today, the place where the entire world is looking for guidance. I went down on Ninth Street. I went through some of the alleys here in Washington, D. C. The Bowery is not an isolated case. I saw men, American men, patriotic citizens of America, digging in the garbage cans right here in Washington, D. C. You have seen them yourselves. Last evening when I was home thinking about this bill I wondered: Are we true to ourselves in appropriating \$38,000,000 for people in Yugoslavia when we are letting our own people starve—people who do not have 2,000 calories a day—and yet we want to build up the calories for the people over in Yugoslavia, which is a Communist country, to more than 2,500 calories a day? I wondered: Are we actually thinking of America first of all?

My friends, from a humanitarian standpoint you do not have to go out of America to spend \$38,000,000. You can go to my district in Tennessee and to the district of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK], or any other district in the United States of America. You will find people starving. So from a humanitarian standpoint you cannot grant this \$38,000,000 for that reason. These 32 divisions—my friends, you cannot buy friends, it is true—because when your money runs out your friends run out on you. If we want to appease somebody, if we want to buy somebody, if you think that American dollars can buy fighting

forces, why do we not appease China? They are fighting and killing our boys today. Why do we not offer them some money? Maybe they will stop killing Americans over in Korea. They are right at our throats now. Not one person on this floor, not one person on this committee, has said that Tito has volunteered in any way to give us any aid at all or any assurance for this \$38,000,000. My friends, on what basis can you offer them the \$38,000,000? They have critical materials that we need; yes. If they want to trade with us—if they want this food so badly, let us trade with them and give them this food which they need for the materials that we need. Let us think of America. We are in a critical stage today, more serious than many American people think, and probably more serious than you and I think. We who are at the age right now where the chances are that we will have to go back should world war III come find this pretty serious. I was just talking to HUGO SIMS a few moments ago. He is 29 years of age and he is going back into the service of his country. Many more of us will have to go back if we get into an all-out war. We have to think about these things. I am thinking about all of America. Thirty-eight million dollars will buy a lot of bullets. Thirty-eight million dollars will buy quite a bit of ammunition for the boys not only in Korea but wherever America might have to fight.

My friends, think of America and may God help America and God help you and to hell with Tito and these enemies of ours.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the pending amendments to section 2 do now close.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VORYS] to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BURLESON].

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment may again be reported.

There being no objection, the Clerk again reported the Vorys amendment.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Is it the parliamentary situation that the vote now comes on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VORYS] to the Burleson amendment, the Burleson amendment being the amendment which takes the money from ECA, and the Vorys amendment making it available either as a loan or a grant? Then, following the vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VORYS], which I assume is in the nature of a perfecting amendment to the Burleson amendment, the vote will then come on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South Dakota as a substitute for the Burleson amendment, either as amended or not?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct in his interpretation.

The question is on the amendment to the amendment.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. VORYS) there were—ayes 43, noes 55.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I ask for tellers.

Tellers were refused.

So the amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. CASE].

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the substitute amendment be again reported.

There being no objection, the Clerk again reported the Case substitute amendment.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. CASE of South Dakota) there were—ayes 54, noes 58.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I ask for tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. CASE of South Dakota and Mr. RICHARDS.

The Committee again divided; and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 80, noes 93.

So the substitute amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BURLESON].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FULTON: On page 1 after the Burleson amendment add "upon express prior assurance by the Government of Yugoslavia—

"(1) to take all necessary action to reduce its relief needs and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies;

"(2) to comply insofar as possible with recommendations of the UN to prevent and resist aggression, and to respect the territorial boundaries of adjoining democratic countries and territories including Austria, Greece, and Trieste;

"(3) to arrange for the release and return under United States and UN supervision of the Greek orphans, as well as all orphans of whatever nationality taken or held by the Yugoslav Government or its agents without legal right;

"(4) to stop imprisonment and persecution of eastern and Roman Catholics, and all persons because of their official position or membership in the church of their choice, or because of their religious beliefs;

"(5) to enforce adequately the provisions of the Yugoslav Constitution to guarantee freedom of speech, religion, press, and assembly;

"(6) to relinquish claim of dual citizenship in respect to nationals who have become citizens of other countries, including the United States;

"(7) to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations."

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I wish to reserve a point of order. May I ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania if he does not think that amendment would come to section 3 rather than section 2?

Mr. FULTON. The point of offering it at this particular place is that before this question comes up the Yugoslavian Government must give assurance as to these seven conditions. It could either be put in under the section 3 agreement or it can be put in preliminarily before you even start to do any talking about an agreement that these conditions must be met by assurance of the Yugoslavian Government.

Mr. RICHARDS. Would not the gentleman offer it to section 3?

Mr. FULTON. I would agree here it can be put on section 3 but I would rather have it right here where you say that there shall be appropriated a certain amount, then say upon the express prior assurance by the Government of Yugoslavia.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation. I have not seen the amendment and I do not know much about it.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is to impose certain conditions upon this aid program. These conditions are the conditions that anyone who is in favor of freedom throughout the world will readily agree to. These conditions are prior conditions on which the Yugoslavian Government must assure our Government before we even go into the subject matter of a written agreement under this act.

The first condition is as follows:

1. To take all necessary action to reduce its relief needs and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

The condition gives the United States the right to say to the recipient government, "Your policies are again running you right into this very same thing, and if you further collectivize and kill initiative by unfair acts you are further making an inefficient government, and we must have assurance you will not do that before entering into an agreement.

The second condition is as follows:

2. To comply insofar as possible with recommendations of the United Nations to prevent and resist aggression, and to respect the territorial boundaries of adjoining democratic countries and territories including Austria, Greece, and Trieste.

As to the second condition, we must have assurance that the Yugoslav Government will clear up the current long-standing disputes they have with their neighbors.

The third condition is as follows:

3. To arrange for the release and return under United States and United Nations supervision of the Greek orphans, as well as all orphans of whatever nationality taken or held by the Yugoslav Government or its agents without legal right.

Under this third condition, the Yugoslav Government must give their assurance on the detained orphans, of whatever nationality, before the United States representatives sit down to agree with them.

The fourth condition is as follows:

4. To stop imprisonment and persecution of eastern and Roman Catholics, and all persons because of their official position or membership in the church of their choice or because of their religious beliefs.

Under this fourth condition, we should insist on release from imprisonment of all those now incarcerated, and freedom of religion, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish.

The fifth condition is as follows:

5. To enforce adequately the provisions of the Yugoslav Constitution to guarantee freedom of speech, religion, press, and assembly.

Under this fifth condition, we must insist upon the Yugoslav Government guaranteeing freedom of speech, religion, press, and assembly. I might also say that that is required of members by the United Nations Charter.

Condition 6 is as follows:

6. To relinquish claim of dual citizenship in respect to nationals who have become citizens of other countries, including the United States.

The Government of Yugoslavia now claims if a person is once a Yugoslav, he is always a Yugoslav. That means that many United States citizens cannot even get out of Yugoslavia to come back to this country. Many of you have that problem of claimed dual citizenship in your districts.

The seventh condition is as follows:

7. To conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations.

The seventh condition is in response to Mr. CASE's suggestion that this be put in as an express condition. Here it is an express condition that we must have the prior assurance that these seven items are met before we sit down and negotiate an agreement with the Yugoslav Government.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. Are those provisions mandatory or elective?

Mr. FULTON. They are mandatory. The Yugoslav Government must give the assurance that it will conform to these steps before we will discuss with them any agreement that the President might make.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. FULTON) there were—ayes 55, noes 66.

Mr. GROSS and Mr. TAURIELLO demanded tellers.

Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. FULTON and Mr. RICHARDS.

The Committee again divided; and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 71, noes 96.

So the amendment was rejected.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating ex-

penses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this act.

(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States.

(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe without restriction the distribution of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

(d) To make equitable distribution to the people of Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this act without discrimination as to race, color, or political or religious belief.

With the following committee amendments:

On page 2, line 12, after the word "States", strike out the period, insert a semicolon and the following: "and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose."

On page 2, line 16, after the word "observe", insert "and supervise."

On page 2, line 17, after the word "distribution", insert "by Yugoslavia."

On page 2, line 22, strike out "of" and insert "in."

On page 2, line 24, after the word "act", insert the following: ", as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources."

On page 3, line 2, strike out the word "color."

The committee amendments were agreed to.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. JUDD: On page 3, after line 2, insert a new subsection (e): "To take all necessary actions to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of foodstuffs within Yugoslavia, and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies."

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, many of us voted against the amendment submitted by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON] because it went too far. It practically dictated in detail what the policies of the Yugoslav Government must be in its internal affairs. I do not believe we have the right to do that with any foreign government, whether we like its policies or not. But when this Nation is called upon to provide funds to assist in a food shortage in another country, which in part results from certain definite governmental policies of that country, then I think it is only a matter of good hard sense, and proper Yankee horse trading to have something to say about changes which must be made in those policies which aggravate the food shortage, if American taxpayers are to help alleviate it.

There are three causes for the food shortage in Yugoslavia. One is the drought. That is an act of God, and we want to help with any suffering resulting from it. The second cause is that Tito in order to get foreign exchange to buy machine tools and other things to build up his armaments and industrialization has been taking food right out of the mouths of his own people and exporting

it. That ought to be stopped, and this amendment would require that he do it. The third and most important is his policy of land collectivization which discourages the peasants from producing to the maximum, and even more, discourages them from selling or putting on the open market any surpluses that they may produce beyond what their own families need. It seems to me that when our Government sits down to make an agreement with Tito under which we are to send supplies to help feed people there who are hungry, we must as a minimum require that during the period when aid is being furnished by the United States under this act, he will agree to suspend those two government policies and any other actions which contribute to the food shortage. As a condition for receiving American aid he must stop exporting food which is needed in the country, and he must stop trying to collectivize the farms which takes away incentive for farmers to produce and sell all that they possibly can. When our Government is advocating land reform and wider distribution in many countries and is urging family-owned and operated farms here in the United States, it ought not to be helping Tito go in exactly the opposite direction in Yugoslavia.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JUDD. I yield.

Mr. RICHARDS. After listening very carefully to the gentleman, although I have not had an opportunity to study his amendment, it appears a good amendment to me and I would like to say that we are willing to accept it on this side.

Mr. JUDD. I appreciate that decision by the acting chairman of our committee and I think it represents the part of wisdom.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

I must necessarily oppose the amendment which has just been offered imposing certain political responsibilities upon Yugoslavia as a prerequisite to receiving funds from our Government, because our people long ago established a policy of never imposing our political governmental system upon any other nation. This amendment amounts to no less than an effort to infiltrate and impose our policies because of our wealth at a time while we are fighting the efforts of Russia to infiltrate in another form—by force. There is very little difference. Every nation should have the sovereign right of its own type of government, and no nation—the United States, Russia, or any other—should ever be authorized to infiltrate its sovereign rights by money or force.

It has not been but a few days since the European recovery program was being discussed on the floor of this House. Today, I fail to hear those who were then hollering long and loud, "The Marshall plan funds are for the purpose of defeating and preventing communism from spreading all over the world." But, today each and every proponent of this bill comes to the floor prefacing his remarks with an apology for supporting such legislation. You hear them in various phrases and in divers manners apol-

ogetically stating in the beginning of their remarks that they are not for Tito; that they are not for Yugoslavia; but that they are realists and necessarily need support this legislation. To do what? To help spread communism in Europe and throughout the world. There can be no other interpretation placed upon this legislation. When insisting upon Marshall plan funds, it was to stamp out communism. Today many of these same Members are providing for the nourishment of communism.

If it be true that this legislation is to assist starving Yugoslavs—however the record upon which these contentions must be based do not reveal these facts—I am wondering the argument for the cause of such a situation in Yugoslavia at a time when a very large percentage of the normal crop yield was produced and gathered this last year. We continuously argue in our democracy that communism will not work; that it is bad; and that only free people can hope to exist and reap the benefits of their entitlements. Where today is that argument about freedom of religion, freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom from Government regimentation, and all the other freedoms which we cherish and contend must be the basis of any government if the people are to advance? The predicament of Yugoslavia is exemplary of our contentions on behalf of democracy. Their system of government has failed and regardless of how much food or money is sent there, you well know that it will never reach the people and will be used by Dictator Tito in trade for war armament to foster the communistic ambitions for world domination.

This bill merely proposes to assist in the building within Europe of a Communist government at a time while we are telling the taxpayers of this country that we need spend billions of dollars in Europe to prevent the spread of communism. You cannot buy friendship, and you know it.

We did in World War II for the father of communism, Joe Stalin, exactly what you now propose to do for his underling, Marshal Tito. However, before we assisted Joe Stalin during World War II he had already committed himself to our ball team. In fact, he had already commenced fighting on our side of the fence before we went to his aid. But today, Tito tells you in sum and substance, and in no too indefinite and uncertain terms, "I am not promising you believers in democracy anything; still I want you to give me, in addition to the \$55,000,000 loan, an additional \$38,000,000 free grant of United States money." None of you has the audacity to predict that Tito would ever fight on the side of democracy, or on the side of any free people. Very few of you would hazard the guess that he will not be supporting our adversary in a time of conflict. You merely insist on a poor gamble while admitting that the cards are stacked against us.

It would be impossible for a committee of three members of this Congress to stay within a small incorporated town of this country composed of two or three hundred people for a period of 3 or 4 days

and be able to ascertain their true convictions concerning the many ramifications of international affairs. Yet, two or three Members of this Congress spent a couple of days with the thousands of people in Yugoslavia; had a conversation with Tito; and came back here advocating assistance to Tito while, at the same time, admitting that he is a dictator of the worst degree; that he and his subjects are full-fledged Communists; that none of them has any faith in our system of government; that all of them think that democracy should be abolished; and that christian ministers, priests, and nuns are jailed merely because of their belief in and advocacy of christianity. These gentlemen well know that the slaves within Yugoslavia could never expect to enhance any proposed benefits from us, even should they be entitled to our efforts.

Just a few days ago our top Government officials met with responsible representatives from Great Britain and came forth with a no-appeasement decision. Can it be contended that this bill is anything short of appeasement? This is an effort to buy what Russia is attempting to gain by force, and yet we are stupid enough to demand no performance by Yugoslavia for the receipt of our funds.

Mr. Chairman, there is no earthly excuse for us to support this measure. I am wondering how all of you who profess to be of the Christian faith and believers in democracy can face your people, knowing as you do of the oppression of the Christian belief and the imprisonment of such advocates in Yugoslavia.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TACKETT. I yield.

Mr. FULTON. I want to compliment the gentleman. May I say this: How can anybody appearing before the Committee on Un-American Activities be asked if he is a Communist if we, by this bill, are supporting communism?

Mr. TACKETT. The proponents of this legislation apologize, Mr. FULTON, for this communistic measure and attempt to circumvent the predicament that you suggest they might find themselves in by merely saying in the beginning they want it generally known that they are not supporters of Tito. That is supposed to make everything all right and hunky-dunky. You know as well as I do—and they should know—that to support this bill is to support a Communist government during our efforts to stop the spread of communism throughout the world.

How are you Members who have been clamoring for the Marshall plan going to explain this to your people when you go back home and they readily recall the speeches you have made about how we have necessarily had to spend billions of dollars to keep communism from spreading?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for three additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. TACKETT. Even though I have realized the necessity of peacetime European aid from this country on behalf of friendly democracies in their efforts to rebuild their war-torn countries which were devastated at a time while they were assisting themselves and us, I have previously voted against aid during peacetime due to the enormous amount involved, sincerely believing that we could not hope to keep our democracy strong while spending on foreign soils more than our economy would allow. At the same time, I must admit that my vote on European aid has given me considerable concern. I have not always known for sure whether my vote was the correct one. It was difficult for me to understand how we could spend so much while receiving so little. My contentions have been pretty well exemplified by the efforts received from even the friendly democracies during the Korean conflict. Some would have us believe that all of the 13 present democracies in Europe would have now been communistic had it not been for our assistance under the European recovery program. I cannot contradict those contentions, neither can the proponents of such contentions sustain their claim. All will admit that we have gained little through the billions of dollars we have spread over the world. It has not precluded war, and we have no defense in Western Europe. I have considered the European recovery program during wartime as a wartime measure and a contribution to our national defense and, therefore, have unhesitatingly voted for the Marshall plan during this emergency as a defense and wartime measure.

After the passage of this legislation, I will be at a loss to know the battle cry for world war III. In World War I and World War II the morale of our men was boosted by the thought that they were fighting for freedom—freedom of religion, freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom from government regimentation—a war to end all wars. What are you going to tell them as a battle cry when we enter world war III? Are we to admit today by this legislation that we have been lying to our fighting military personnel since 1917 by giving millions of dollars to a Communist government that knows and cares nothing about freedom, right or wrong, or lasting peace?

Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe that we are in such a predicament that we need sell the principles which have made this the greatest Nation upon the face of the globe.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TACKETT. I yield.

Mr. CANFIELD. I agree with the gentleman in everything he says, and this is my first break with my Government's foreign policy. I do not know but what Tito today is playing Stalin's game. The whole thing is a big fraud on the free democracies. Will the gentleman say something about that? Who knows? Who knows?

Mr. TACKETT. I wish to read a portion of a news dispatch from Egypt wherein an official of that country is in-

sisting upon his government's maneuvering itself into a position of getting money from the United States Government. The official is quoted as follows:

Britain and America are frightened whenever the eastern block is mentioned. Why should not Egypt use agreements with the eastern block as a bargaining point with Western Powers?

Every nation known to us has awakened to the fact that we are suckers for a pretense of friendship. They merely need hint becoming friendly with Joe Stalin in order to receive funds from us in our efforts to buy friendship.

Tito against Joe Stalin. Joe Stalin against Tito. Now, is not that a laugh? Joe Stalin will take over Tito any time he so desires regardless of the billions of dollars that we are foolish enough to give Tito even if we were willing to protest his abolition. Of course, Joe will delay his taking over Tito until Yugoslavia has been fattened with moneys, food, and military armaments from the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I do not claim to be highly versed on international affairs, but my 10-year-old boy is sufficiently intelligent to vote against this legislation.

Mr. WHITE of Idaho. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, it is interesting after all my experience and service here in the House of Representatives to have the opportunity to follow the man from Arkansas. There are a lot of things that this Congress should know about in connection with this situation in Yugoslavia, the so-called Tito dictatorship. I am going to say to you Democrats—and I have been here 18 years with you as a Democrat—if you want to make the American people protection-minded, this is the best way in the world that you can get across to the American people that they must have protection for their domestic industries. About the only things they have over in these so-called Marshall plan countries, particularly Yugoslavia, to use for commercial trading as between countries are what they can dig out of the ground. They have no factories, they cannot manufacture enough material to supply their own needs, their farming has broken down. So the only thing they can send us is what they dig out of the ground—their minerals.

We are doing everything we can to destroy our domestic mining industry. We are bringing in lead under the ECA plan and under the Stockpiling Act from European countries, the dependencies of the Marshall plan countries, particularly Africa; we are bringing in copper, zinc, and lead from Yugoslavia and when this stockpiling business is over, if peace should come to the world and if plans are worked out so that we can abandon this great rearmament program, the mining industry in the United States would go on the rocks. People in the mining communities will be walking the streets of this country in a starving condition because there would be no price for the metals they might produce. We, by the passage of this bill, will do more to make the American people protection minded than anything else we could do.

Mr. Chairman, there are certain avenues of information open to all of us. Over in the Department of Commerce there are different sections which deal with the commercial and financial activities of these various foreign countries. There is over there what we used to call the British Empire unit, now known as the British section. We have the Eastern European section over there also.

I just called to get some information as to how much of a national debt Yugoslavia has. I had some little difficulty reaching the people because they take these long noon hours, but I finally got the Export-Import Bank. The first thing I found out was that there had been \$55,000,000 loaned by the Export-Import Bank to Yugoslavia, at 3½ percent, that there was \$7,000,000 loaned by Belgium and that Yugoslavia has obtained \$9,000,000 from the International Monetary Fund on which they pay no interest. There is also \$33,000,000 that they owe on the prewar debt, at 3 percent.

How much of a national debt there is in Yugoslavia—that is war debt—I could not obtain. They have a secret act over there which prevents giving out any industrial, commercial, or financial information by anyone except through government channels; so you cannot find out about the conditions in that country.

Their monetary unit is a dinar, which is fifty to our dollar. In voting for this bill I would like to know how many of the bonds of Yugoslavia are in the vaults of London and how many of those bonds of Yugoslavia are in the vaults of New York and how much of this \$38,000,000 we are going to appropriate here will go to maintain the integrity of Yugoslavia and its national debt so that they will not go in default? In other words, are we going to pay interest on our own debt and at the same time contribute money to pay the interest on the national debts of all the Marshall-plan countries, particularly Yugoslavia?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on the pending amendment do now close.

The motion was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Judd].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. Judd) there were—ayes 106, noes 4.

So the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I was amused this afternoon when the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Cooley] compared the appeasement of Tito to the tune of \$38,000,000 with the courting of an American girl in offering her flowers and candy. Now, I have never been entertained by Tito in his luxurious mansion as has the gentleman. However, I know something about the rudeness of Yugoslav troops toward American GI's and American Congressmen, if you please. Of course, it was back in the fall of 1947 before the so-called incurable divorcement of Stalin and Tito, something I

cannot for the life of me believe. I was in Trieste in September 1947 when there were communistic riots in the streets. I could not sleep at night because Tito's partisans were marching up and down the streets singing their favorite songs about Tito. It so happens that on the day I arrived in Trieste two American GI's committed a terrible crime in the mountains outside of Trieste. They stepped over, if you please, a poorly marked boundary line between Yugoslavia and the free zone of Trieste, and they were immediately seized by Tito's troops and jailed. Commanding our forces in Trieste at that time was Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, now superintendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point, N. Y. I learned one of those boys was a New Jersey boy and I discussed the matter with the general and he told me frankly he could not do a thing with the Yugoslav generals toward effecting the release of those GI's. He asked me if I was willing to undertake a mission to go down to road block No. 5 and talk to some of those Yugoslav military leaders. And, I did. I was given the grandest run-around for several hours, one of the Yugoslav officers saying to me, "Is it not too bad, Mr. Congressman, that on the very day your delegation arrives in Trieste from the United States of America that some of your American GI's thought to step over our boundary line? They are now in jail." One of these boys was from New Jersey and the other from Virginia, from Arlington, Va., represented in this Congress by the distinguished gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Smith], who is for this bill. Do you know what they told me when they were released 6 days later? They told me they were briefed hour after hour on the tenets of communism, and they were asked pointed questions hour after hour about the number and disposition of our troops in Trieste. Tito wanted to know. You cannot tell me there is an incurable divorcement between Stalin and Tito.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CANFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RICHARDS. Is not the gentleman talking about something that happened at Trieste several years ago?

Mr. CANFIELD. Yes, in 1947, the very year we were giving Yugoslavia millions of our dollars for food and other aid.

Mr. RICHARDS. That was before Tito broke with the Cominform, was it not?

Mr. CANFIELD. I do not believe there has been such a break. Does the gentleman think that?

Mr. RICHARDS. Sure.

Mr. CANFIELD. Is the gentleman sold on that?

Mr. RICHARDS. Yes, and everybody else is, almost.

Mr. CANFIELD. Wait, then, until you see the vote on this bill in the House of Representatives. Wait then until you see. This bill ought to be defeated here today in the interest of the defense of

the free forces of democracy in this world.

Mr. HESELTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HESELTON: On page 3, line 2, after the word "belief," insert a new section as follows:

"SEC. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities in the possession of the Commodity Credit Corporation."

Mr. HESELTON. Mr. Chairman, this simply expresses what I believe would be the specific intention of Congress. Unfortunately, I tried to place some figures in the RECORD last night so as to make them available to all of you, but they did not reach the printer. Consequently I can give you these figures only hurriedly.

As I understand it, the committee report indicates that in the past program practically all of the commodities that were sent over were taken from the surplus food commodities held by the Commodity Credit Corporation. I understand from the committee report it is anticipated that something like 71 percent of all the food that is sent will come from that source, but I do not think we should be satisfied to leave it just with the committee report and not express our firm and clear intention that this should be done even to a greater extent, if possible.

I am not prepared to discuss the kinds of food that are being chosen or why they were chosen or whether there can be any other arrangement made to avail ourselves of these tremendous stores of food.

But I can say to you that at the end of October we had 1,743,484,890 pounds of butter, cheese, dried milk, dried eggs, dried beans, and dried peas, that cost the taxpayers of this country \$381,838,495.60. But even more important, whether we pass this bill or do not pass it, everyone of us knows we are going to impose upon the great American people greater taxes, greater costs, greater burdens in the days that lie ahead of us. For storing those six commodities alone for only 4 months during the time of the Korean War they paid out \$7,537,153.31.

We can accomplish two things if we will only firm this bill up by adopting this amendment.

We can direct those who are going to administer this program to examine it carefully and carry out this mandate. We will also be taking a bit of the burden off of the taxpayers' back.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HESELTON. I yield.

Mr. RICHARDS. May I say that we do not have any objection to the gentleman's amendment. It might help.

Mr. HESELTON. I thank the gentleman. I am sure that it can help. At least we shall have done all we can at this stage.

For the record, under permission granted me, I want to include a break-

down of the figures as to the six commodities.

	Inventory Oct. 31, 1950	Cost	Carrying charges
	Pounds		
Butter-----	168,889,008	\$104,253,780.07	\$1,567,317.93
Cheese-----	109,319,543	36,819,645.70	1,150,513.34
Dried milk-----	383,500,481	49,409,955.86	1,836,367.63
Dried eggs-----	108,648,358	114,986,624.21	1,021,758.67
Dried beans-----	902,857,100	73,743,837.99	1,668,642.62
Dried peas-----	70,270,400	2,624,651.77	292,553.12
Total-----	1,743,484,890	381,838,495.60	7,537,153.31

LET'S SAVE AMERICA FOR AMERICANS

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. RANKIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, this will probably be the only opportunity I will have to express my opposition to this legislation to give Communist Tito \$38,000,000 out of the pockets of the overburdened American taxpayers.

We have been under the domination in this country, it seems, of wild-eyed internationalists for the last few years. What has it brought us? One ex-serviceman with scars all over him said to me the other day, "We have just been through the most useless war in history. Our boys won the fight, but the victory was turned over to Communist Russia, the worst enemy civilization has ever known."

These wild-eyed internationalists want us to get into a world government. Well, you are in one now, the so-called United Nations; and look at the front page of that paper and see what we are getting out of it. They sent our boys into Korea without consulting the Congress of the United States, which, under the Constitution, is charged with the duties and responsibilities of declaring war. Our boys were sent there to be killed by the thousands, yes, tens of thousands, with instruments and munitions purchased with the money which Congress has given away to the various nations of the earth. And today they are driven off the continent of Asia with tremendous losses and are struggling for dear life to find some method of getting out of Korea.

Already our casualties in Korea are enormous. You talk about the United Nations—where are they? They sent American boys to do the fighting and dying and expect Americans to do the paying, while Tito and Stalin play and laugh behind the lines. Already the casualties in Korea have amounted to more than the casualties in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the War with Mexico, and the War with Spain, all put together. American boys have suffered more casualties than our forces suffered in all four of those wars, as a result of that irresponsible internationalism while we hear some long-nosed individuals denouncing fellows who follow the policy of George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson as "isolationists."

Our boys are being killed with instruments of war which were purchased with

the money that the Congress appropriated, and gave to foreign countries, in my opinion without constitutional authority.

Do not kid yourselves about old Tito. Is not this the same old Communist who murdered our aviators who happened to fly across the line, and buried them without notifying us?

Is not this the same old criminal who murdered Mihailovitch, who protected our boys during the direful days of the Second World War? You are not getting anywhere except heading toward that bankruptcy which Lenin in 1920 said was necessary to bring to the United States in order to bring her down to where we could be conquered by communism.

No—I am not going to vote for this measure. I have taken as much abuse from the Communists of this country, and abroad, as any man who ever served in the Congress of the United States, because of my attitude. I have seen, and I have known, who those Reds are and what they are up to. I say to you that we should not go down into the pockets of the overburdened taxpayers of America—a country which owes more money today than all the rest of the world put together—and dish out money to Tito, to a Communist of the vilest type under the pretenses that he might decide to fight on our side if we get into a European war.

Now the boys are getting back home. They are headed for home now. The so-called United Nations has proved to be a miserable farce. If you do not believe it, just wait until you hear from the people at home. We had better spend our money to build up our own defenses, build up a strong air force, provide an adequate supply of atomic bombs, radar facilities, and every instrument of war to save America and enable America to lead the people of the world to freedom by precept and example. We cannot lead them to it by bribery, or drive them to it with the bayonets.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. RANKIN] has expired.

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

(Mr. ROONEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Chairman, no one can arrive at an accurate appraisal of conditions in present-day Yugoslavia without first being made aware of the religious situation. From a study of the religious situation, it can be determined whether the Yugoslav Government is really democratic, whether as a temporary member of the United Nations Security Council Yugoslavia is keeping its pledge not only to help make the world a more secure place to live in but also whether the Yugoslav Government grants to its own people the fundamental human rights. The issue is not to be judged by a high-minded speech of Marshal Tito or a Yugoslav delegate to the UN. The issue must be judged on the basis of the facts; by what is taking place in Yugoslavia today under the Tito Communist regime.

When the Tito Communist regime took control of Yugoslavia after the Second World War, it was immediately obvious that the regime was fanatically communist, and that the Communist way of life would be forced upon the 16,000,000 of Yugoslavs. The new Government set the Communist machine in motion. There began the ruthless communization of the land, seizure and confiscation of private homes, convents, great amounts of church property. Thousands and thousands of persons who were thought to prove troublesome to the Communist regime in the future were thrown into prison; many were killed. The schools were filled with teachers with instructions to make Marxism the order of the day. The press and radio, completely in the hands of the regime, blared hourly the party line—the voice of freedom was stifled. The Communist regime was determined to bring to its knees all enemies within its borders, and it was thus that the regime vowed to bring to destruction its greatest known enemy, the Catholic Church. Ever since Karl Marx wrote that religion was the opium of the people, Communists knew that Christianity and communism could not stand side by side; one must give way; one must compromise. Tito was convinced that the compromiser would not be he. Priests were arrested; a number were killed. Convents were confiscated and sisters were made homeless. Catholic schools, hospitals, orphanages were appropriated by the state. The Catholic press was destroyed. The amount of religion taught in the state schools was insignificant; it was difficult to teach religion as such in the churches. Police agents were everywhere, taking note of sermons, listening and reporting conversations. What little property remaining to the church after the outrageous agrarian reform was being taxed so highly that bishops and priests were unable to pay what was exacted from them. With all these events behind him, Tito set out to secure the undoing of his greatest Yugoslav opponent. In this, too, Tito met with success. After a mock trial, which shall live in infamy, the beloved shepherd of the Croats, Archbishop Stepinac was committed to prison for 16 years. Protests from this travesty of justice reached the palace of Tito from all over the free world, but Tito turned a deaf ear. Archbishop Stepinac was where he wished him to be—behind prison walls. By striking the shepherd, Tito hoped to scatter the flock.

June 1948 saw the famous Kominform resolution, expelling Tito from the family of communism. To the western world it appeared that the iron curtain was beginning to fray, perhaps this might be the beginning of the end for communism. Some thought that Tito would be the first to admit that communism was not what his people desired. But Tito soon informed the world of his stand. He had parted ways with Stalin, but not with communism. He was a loyal follower of the Marx-Lenin line. Tito claimed that he was the real Communist; Stalin was a deviationist.

In spite of the split with Stalin, there was no appreciable relief given to the

people from the backbreaking requirements of their Communist masters. The persecution of the church continued with so much determination that even in the year 1949 some 100 priests were arrested; most of them without even the benefit of a mock trial. Arrests of priest and seminarians continue in 1950. It is known that two priests died in prison as a result of the treatment received at the hands of their jailers. Religious Orders of Sisters, with the exception of a few small houses, were dissolved in the Republics of Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in the area known as the Backa. In Slovenia, where the people are 95 percent Catholic, some orders of priests were dissolved and their property confiscated. A number of churches have been destroyed. One church was converted into a movie studio; another was given to a non-Catholic sect.

The Communists have not been too clumsy in pursuing their drive on Catholicism. Churches have been allowed to remain open. Visitors, coming to Yugoslavia, seeing that the churches are open, proclaim that religious liberty exists in Yugoslavia. In spite of open churches, verbal orders have been given that no policeman or member of the military service is to go to church. A soldier, who goes to church in spite of this prohibition, is the exception and a tribute should be paid to his personal courage. Government workers who frequent church do so at the peril of losing their jobs and means of livelihood. They are dissuaded from being married in church or having their children baptized. Students in the lower schools have been ridiculed in class by their teachers because they attended mass. University students have been discriminated against and even expelled because they insisted on being practicing Catholics. In order to wean the children away from the influence of the church, excursions are planned for Sunday morning or meetings held which the youth are obliged to attend. Some cinema houses are built near churches and special films are shown on Sunday morning during mass time.

Untold pressure has been brought to bear on priests and bishops to force them to join priests associations. These associations have been founded and aided by the government for the purpose of usurping the authority of the bishops, and to cause confusion in the church by separating priests and bishops. All these things happen in spite of the fact that the Yugoslav constitution guarantees religious freedom by virtue of article 25.

The facts depicted above are not isolated facts of 1946 or 1947; these same things are happening today while Yugoslav delegates are sitting at the Security Council and General Assembly meetings. Yugoslav delegates protest that they are being discriminated against by the Soviet Union and those countries in its power. We deplore this discrimination, but even more we deplore the ruthless persecution imposed upon the Yugoslav nation, while their delegates protest to the world, through the medium of the United Nations, that they seek nothing

but peace. The world press writes little or nothing of the persecution of 16,000,000 Yugoslavs. The voice of the nation is silent through ruthless control.

The question has now arisen of giving unconditional substantial aid to a nation that will be hungry this winter. Any decision taken regarding this aid without considering the facts laid down in the first part of this memorandum is to care little for the destinies of the Yugoslav people. In Yugoslavia today there languishes in prison Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb, Bishop Cule of Mostar, and over 300 Catholic priests. Thousands of Sisters have been made homeless. The prisons are filled with God-fearing Yugoslavs because they are opposed to the communistic regime. In reading the second part of this exposé, section 1 cannot be forgotten.

Christian charity demands that we must help our starving brethren. But the question of placing millions of dollars worth of aid in the hands of the Yugoslav Communist regime poses many difficulties.

First. To help Yugoslavia substantially without exacting certain conditions is to be ignorant of the real situation. Some conditions, which would be welcomed with great joy by the Yugoslav people, would be the granting of freedom from the ruthless control exercised over the people; a sincere recognition of the human rights; a method of food distribution which will ensure that the Yugoslav people are taken into consideration and that the aid given is not monopolized by the Communist leaders, the all-powerful police, and the Yugoslav Army.

Second. Tito demands that unconditional aid be given to him by the United States. The Communist leader has stressed in his speeches that he will not sacrifice his principles to gain aid from the west. Will the alternative find the United States sacrificing her principles by aiding substantially a Communist police state and, by this aid, enable it to stay in power and continue its ruthless control and persecution of 16,000,000 Yugoslavs, a small percentage of whom favor the Tito regime, whose elections, amounting to a farce, follow the Communist pattern?

Third. Let the United States be fully aware that to aid a Communist state is to aid a potential enemy who is vowed by principle to rise up and destroy all non-Communist nations when the moment is opportune. Nowhere has Tito denounced communism. He has been expelled by Stalin from the family of communism. If Tito has rejected Stalin, he has not rejected a founder of communism but only its major prophet. The communism of Tito is the communism of Marx and Lenin, the sworn enemies of Christian civilization and the western way of life; let it not be forgotten that Tito and his henchmen have been trained a la Russe. There is no such thing as good communism as opposed to bad communism, just as there is no such thing as good evil as opposed to bad evil. The national communism of Tito is founded on the doctrines of Marx and Lenin and kept in power by ruthless control and untold murders. Tito regards

himself as the Communist par excellence. The national communism of Tito is dynamic and, being such, it must tend to spread and increase itself. This evil can increase itself only at the cost of a portion of Christian civilization.

Fourth. By giving Yugoslavia enough aid to make her independent of the east and the west even for 6 months, the United States is helping to keep in power a regime which is odious to 90 percent of the Yugoslav people. The Yugoslav people look to the United States as their only hope of salvation. The Yugoslav man on the street seeks something more than food; he seeks freedom from tyrants.

Fifth. Unconditioned substantial aid to Yugoslavia will be a great set-back to the cause of Christianity in this already persecuted country. The Yugoslav Communist regime will be ensconced in power. Will it not be sadly paradoxical to note that America, who depicts herself as the champion of international justice, and the ardent supporter of all those who would throw off tyranny will be largely instrumental, by its policy, in dealing a serious blow to the cause of Christianity in Yugoslavia and the cause of Christianity throughout the globe.

Sixth. It is well to point out that Tito as a loyal follower of communism is a devotee of Communist morality. A Yugoslav publication of 1950, quoting the words of Lenin, explains what is meant by Communist morality:

Morality is that which serves to destroy the old society of exploitation and the union of all the workers building a new Communist society.

In other words, any means taken to destroy Christian civilization is morally good for the Communist. This, then, is the morality professed and practiced by Tito. Tito, as a follower of this morality, shot down American planes, took American lives in 1946, just at a time when millions in aid were pouring into his country, thus evoking the harsh words of then Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson:

These outrageous acts have been perpetrated by a government that professes to be a friendly nation.

There is no doubt that the Yugoslav nation is friendly to the United States, but the Tito regime has nothing but hatred for America. Who, then, shall be helped? The Yugoslav nation, by demanding concessions for the people? Or the Communist Government, who, because of their morality, can be counted on for nothing. To aid substantially the Yugoslav Communist regime without demanding concrete acts of good will on the part of the Government not only toward America but also toward its own people would be a drastic mistake. The word of a Communist amounts to nothing. They are masters of verbiage. Lenin himself said that words meant nothing for him; he was impressed only by action.

Seventh. Responsible leaders of the United States, Members of Congress, into whose hands has been placed the commonweal of so many millions, are faced with a serious decision. The question at stake: Whether Yugoslavia, a Commu-

nist police state, should be given unconditioned aid, or whether substantial aid should be withheld if the Yugoslav Government is not willing to give freedom to its people. Will the Communists be forced to sacrifice their principles or will America be deluded into violating hers.

America was founded on Christian principles; her founding fathers were men who believed that the Christian way of life must be the sturdy support of the country. As long as tyranny exists any place on the globe the American way of life is faced with a threat. For America to foster tyranny—and that is what unconditioned aid to Yugoslavia would mean—would set a precedent which would result in the utter despair of millions of people in Eastern Europe and Asia who see in America the immovable Statue of Liberty and the unquenchable light of freedom. The task of America is clear; the decision may not be easy. The Tito Communist regime is not only un-Christian, it is anti-Christian; it is not only a moral, it is immoral; it is not only undemocratic, it is antidemocratic; it is not only un-American, it is anti-American. To sacrifice Christian principles so as to preserve the Communist principles of Tito is to betray the sacred trust placed in the hands of American lawmakers by the Christian, God-fearing, liberty-loving, anticommunistic American people. If the policy of the United States is built on the insecure groundwork of expediency, then the Yugoslav question poses a problem. If, as it is hoped, American policy is built on the unshakeable foundation of Christianity, then, with God's help, the decision taken regarding aid to the Yugoslav Communist regime should afford no anxiety to Christendom.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on the pending amendment do now close.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Mr. Chairman, I object. I have an amendment to the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN to the amendment offered by Mr. HESELTON: After the word "commodities" insert "at Government cost."

[Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, we will accept the gentleman's amendment to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and the amendment thereto do now close.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment to the amendment.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. RIBICOFF: Page 2, after line 2, insert a new section as follows:

"Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty; and the Yugoslav government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act."

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is being offered on behalf of the gentleman from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the gentleman from New York [Mr. JAVITS], and myself.

I think it is time that we introduce a note of sanity into the present debate. Frankly, no bill that has come out of the Foreign Affairs Committee or before the House has been supported with as little enthusiasm as the measure before us today.

It is true that Tito is a Communist; Tito is a dictator. None of us approve Tito or what he stands for; neither do we condone nor do we approve the religious, civil, and political persecution that has taken place in Yugoslavia.

The purpose of this amendment is to point out to Yugoslavians the complete disapproval of their past conduct and what the American people think of this conduct.

But there is another matter which I think is important to bring to the attention of the House and something which was touched upon yesterday. It is so important for us to understand in the world today that we must be realistic.

Basically, the prime purpose of a nation's foreign policy, if it is to have any value, is to see to it that the nation itself survives and is strengthened. All of us understand the principles for which the United States of America stands, all of us believe in democracy and representative government and the great liberties that have made this country great. But no nation can achieve its ends in the world unless it also exercises power in the world, not power in the concept of naked aggression or indifference to the rights of other people, but power in itself for the purpose of achieving the ends for which that nation stands. A nation to exercise this power must be militarily strong, a nation to have this power must have aligned with it other people. A nation such as America must make sure that those forces in this world that help strengthen the forces of the United States of America receive the assistance of this Nation. Keep in mind that the nation which travels alone travels on a road of tragedy. It is understood, and we must understand, that the main purpose of Russia's imperialism is to isolate the United States of America either in peace or at war, to place the United States of America in the position where 150,000,000 people must stand up against 2,150,000,000 other people in the world.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RICHARDS. May I say that I have no objection to the amendment, and I do not think any other member of the committee has any objection to his amendment.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. FEIGHAN. I am in hearty accord with the objectives of the amendment, but I believe also that our State Department should go further, as was expressed in my speech made earlier in the afternoon.

Mr. RIBICOFF. That has been the contention of our committee. In executive session of our committee we have urged upon the representatives of the State Department who are in charge of Yugoslavian affairs to make definite and strong representations of our disapproval of the tactics of Yugoslavia which have been against religion and the clergy. We have urged upon them to mitigate the punishment and to free various Catholic priests and bishops, the various elements of the Orthodox faith, as well as the Protestant clergy who are in the prisons of Yugoslavia. We told them that they cannot expect to come back to the people of this Nation and ask for assistance as long as they disregard those ideals and principles which the people of America hold so dear to themselves and the western philosophy.

We sincerely hope that because of the representations of the State Department and this Congress you will find a gradual change in the philosophy of the Yugoslavian Government. American after American tells us now when he goes to Yugoslavia that the attitude of the people of Yugoslavia is completely different from what it has been in previous years. They are opening up their nation to American newspapermen and American visitors. We are told that the American is appreciated and respected. I hope that because of this amendment the ends sought by the gentleman from Ohio, and I am sure every other Member of this House, will be attained and bring about a good and lasting influence in Yugoslavia.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the pending amendment.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. NICHOLSON. May I ask the gentleman from New York if this section is the Connally amendment in the Senate?

Mr. JAVITS. This section is the McMahon amendment in the Senate.

Mr. NICHOLSON. It says that "nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing the measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia."

Mr. JAVITS. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLSON. That we cannot do this if they destroy the religious, political, or economic liberties that we enjoy?

Mr. JAVITS. What is says is that nothing in the relief which we are giving shall be deemed in any way as condoning or endorsing what Yugoslavia is doing in respect to religious freedom.

Mr. NICHOLSON. And we tell Yugoslavia that these conditions that we pass here today are on the premise that we are telling Yugoslavia what to do?

Mr. JAVITS. If the gentleman will let me continue for a minute I think I can make that clear. As the gentleman from Connecticut has said, this amendment is offered also on the part of the gentleman from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and myself.

I rise to add one further word. When I spoke on this bill yesterday I said that it can only be taken as a measure of economic warfare. If we were taking it as other than a form of economic warfare we would have to attach far more conditions than even contained in the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON]. What we are doing now in treating this measure as one of economic warfare, is to give the United States Government an opportunity to make this aid to Yugoslavia as useful to us in our struggle against the Communists as possible, and to make it as harmful to the Kremlin as possible.

But, that does not mean that we should not serve notice on Tito and the Yugoslav people of the fact that this in no way represents any abandonment or weakening of our demands for justice in Yugoslavia already made and reiterated. That it is necessary that religious freedom be assured in Yugoslavia by releasing religious prisoners, such as Archbishop Stepinac and the nuns and priests, who have been incarcerated; that we further give notice that Yugoslavia still has not done anything nearly like it ought to do in regard to the return of the thousands of Greek children abducted by the Communists. I have protested this strongly in the House before. The House itself passed a resolution of protest with respect to this situation upon the motion of the gentleman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON] and myself, only a few short months ago. I think it is extremely necessary that we do this, and while this bill is economic warfare and therefore we are not imposing as set conditions these matters, we should serve notice that it is not our intention to forego one single issue that we have expressed as demanding rectification and just treatment in Yugoslavia. What we can do here, is put forward a medium that will ultimately get us the very things that we are demanding because we are getting directly into a country, and a situation in Yugoslavia which was heretofore closed to us behind the iron curtain, and for the first time we get a chance to do something to assure our getting results on the issues of religious freedom and imprisoning of Archbishop Stepinac and other priests, the return of the Greek children, the status of United States citizens in Yugoslavia and Yugoslav relations with Greece and Austria and in Trieste.

Mr. NICHOLSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. NICHOLSON. I would like to ask if the State Department is going to tell

Yugoslavia what is in this amendment.

Mr. JAVITS. The gentlemen will note that the amendment itself requires as part of this act, when we pass it, that the State Department do that very thing.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, in this booklet here in my hand on Yugoslavia, which must all be true because I received it from the Ambassador of Yugoslavia, it says on the page dealing with the constitution: "Freedom of speech, religion, press, and assembly, is guaranteed."

In committee I offered an amendment which would require measures to carry out those guaranties provided in the Constitution, but it was voted down. Instead, we have this amendment before us which is a new low in timidity, or something. On religious persecution we do not say "stop it"; we do not say "We do not like it"; but we attempt a kind of thought control by telling people of another nation what thoughts they must have about our actions. We say to Tito and the people over there, "You must not interpret this as being what it looks like, an endorsement of persecution." I will go along with it, but I wish to point out what a craven way this is for the great Republic of the United States to stand up for the fundamental freedoms.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. CANFIELD. Could not this be called a flowers-and-candy amendment?

Mr. VORYS. Perhaps.

Mr. KUNKEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. KUNKEL. Is not this amendment a confession of inefficiency on our part?

Mr. VORYS. Well, you can call it what you want. I am going to vote for it. This is the nearest we can get to a mild hint, not a slap on the wrist, but a gentle touch on the shoulder, with reference to the persecution going on over there.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this section close in 3 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. MULTER].

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Chairman, I am supporting this amendment. I would like to see stronger language used. Much as I dislike to give aid or even simulated approval to any kind of totalitarianism, I feel constrained to vote for this bill. It represents a calculated risk as part of an over-all plan for self-preservation.

During the past year or two we have been told and we have had presented to us some evidence indicating that Yugoslavia has shown a growing inclination to cooperate with the western democracies, and particularly with our own United States. We have traveled a long

way since 1946 when the relations between our country and Yugoslavia were so strained that they were on the verge of a complete rupture of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

During these 4 years we have patiently made repeated efforts to convince the people of Yugoslavia that the people of the United States are their friends. We have done that in the hope of veering Yugoslavia away from the orbit of Communist Moscow, and I believe that we have attained a certain measure of success in that direction. With a little more patience and endurance we may achieve final success, so that in the not-too-distant future the people of Yugoslavia will be fully and finally aligned with the free nations of the world.

It is for this reason that I support today the effect to extend aid to Yugoslavia at a time when aid is most needed. A friend in need is a friend indeed, is the way the old saying goes. I fervently hope that the people of Yugoslavia will not forget this outstretched hand that is coming to them from the United States at a time when across their immediate borders they see the outstretched rifles and bayonets of Russia's Communist armies in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, I feel that it should not be a one-way street of all give and no return. Although I dislike to make such aid conditional or to use pressure because of the bad feelings such pressure tactics will arouse, I think we ought to make several things clear to Tito and to the people of Yugoslavia. I have in mind specifically two things:

First, the question of religious freedom in Yugoslavia. What concerns me a great deal—and, I believe, it concerns all of us who are seriously interested in the freedom to worship the faith in which we believe and whose tenets we practice—is the fact that, up until this time, Tito has made no effort to extend to the people of Yugoslavia the right of religious freedom, the right to worship their God in accordance with the dictates of their conscience.

The outstanding example is the case of Archbishop Stepinac, who has been imprisoned now for more than 4 years on trumped-up charges. The Stepinac incident is a tragic commentary on our times, due, to a large extent, to the godlessness of our age. This particular instance can be ascribed directly to a regime which refuses to recognize the meaning of religious freedom and seeks to eradicate all traces thereof. In the modern dictatorships, whether of the left or of the right, oppression is practiced against all who are loyal to their faith—against Catholics, against Protestants, and against Jews. No man with religion in his heart is immune from this persecution. No man who openly espouses his faith is able to avert the wrath of the dictators.

Today, the leaders and the people of Yugoslavia find that they have been double-crossed by Moscow—as many other nations have discovered in recent years, and still more will discover in the future. They have turned to us anxiously seeking our friendship. Up to

now their leaders have failed to learn the lesson of religious freedom.

Is it asking too much, when in our willingness to aid Yugoslavia we ask in return that its leaders extend to their own people a basic democratic concept—freedom from religious persecution?

The other question I wish to raise concerns human rights. When the declaration of human rights came up for a final vote in the General Assembly of the United Nations just 2 years ago in December 1948, it won the wholehearted approval of 48 member nations and 8 others abstained on that vote. Yugoslavia was one of the nations which abstained.

That was most regrettable. The declaration of human rights is recognized throughout most of the world as a goal toward which all nations must aspire. It is unique in human history because the rights it declares are applicable to all peoples everywhere on the face of the earth. Human rights are described as the substance of the "moral and intellectual solidarity of mankind." They are a necessary foundation of world peace and respect for justice, law, and order. Those rights belong to every individual, not because of race, nationality, or religion, but because he is a member of the human family.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the Government of Yugoslavia should at once declare its recognition and adherence to the declaration of human rights and to the principles enunciated in that historic document. Coming at this time, it would serve as a source of moral encouragement to the free nations of the world, it would enhance the prestige of Yugoslavia in the eyes of all freedom-loving peoples everywhere, and it would align Yugoslavia on the side of those forces who are fighting for human dignity and a decent approach to world-wide peace.

I believe that if we bring these matters to the attention of Yugoslavia's leaders in a forthright manner and in clear and unmistakable terms they will realize their true significance and their value for their own people, for us, and for the whole free world.

(Mr. MULTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. MANSFIELD: On page 3, after line 2, insert a new section as follows:

"At the termination of each 3-month period after aid has been extended under this act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said 3-month reports shall not be limited to but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, there is not much that needs to be said about this amendment. I am not the author of it. It is the second of the McMahon amendments which have already been adopted by the Senate. The first amendment, offered by my colleague, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. RIBICOFF] has already been approved by the House. I think this amendment gives us further safeguards in the consideration of this bill to the extent that the Congress must be furnished with a report every 3 months as to how the stipulations contained in this act are being carried out. I urge the House to give its approval to this amendment so that we may have a better and more frequent check on the administration of and the application of this measure.

Mr. TAURIELLO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I have been sitting here the past 2 days listening to the debate on this very important legislation and trying to get all the information necessary from the different Members of this House who have spoken in favor of or against the legislation. There have been some grave doubts in my mind as to whether or not I would support legislation of this kind, and whether it would be a grant or whether it would be a loan to Yugoslavia. I debated back and forth not knowing what course to follow. I finally took it upon myself to wire two men who I think are not only responsible in a particular city, but are looked upon as leaders in religious and civic affairs throughout the Nation. I asked them for their reaction to this type of legislation.

Much has been said about religious freedom in Yugoslavia, and that is one of the biggest questions that has been bothering me as far as this legislation is concerned.

I think it is only fair that the Members of this House should know what these two leaders of the Catholic Church said in answering my wire. One of them is the bishop of Buffalo, the Most Reverend Bishop John F. O'Hara, former president of Notre Dame University. The other is the auxiliary bishop, the Most Reverend Joseph Burke, of Buffalo. The telegrams are as follows:

BUFFALO, N. Y., December 12, 1950.
Congressman TAURIELLO,
Washington, D. C.:

On proposed aid to Yugoslavia I hope Congress will be guided by the law of charity. We don't want people to starve anywhere. We should give American supervision with our aid to make sure it will not be used to feed only Communists while anti-Communists starve. We should press our claim for the release from prison or from work camps of bishops, priests, and nuns whose only offense is recognizing God as the source of human rights as our forefathers did in the Declaration of Independence. We should also investigate the possibility of aiding with the rice crop from Formosa those parts of China that are now said to be suffering famine as a punishment for opposing communism.

Bishop JOHN F. O'HARA,
Bishop of Buffalo.

BUFFALO, N. Y., December 13, 1950.
Hon. A. TAURIELLO,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.:

Favor grant to Yugoslavia under following conditions: If needed to avert famine but not for stockpiling; if distribution of grant is made under strict American supervision to insure no discrimination because of religious beliefs; if Tito will manifest spirit of American justice and humanitarianism by freeing political prisoners, especially Archbishop Stepinac.

Bishop BURKE of Buffalo.

I think this legislation specifically states this aid will only be given under the strictest kind of supervision by men sent there from this country.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TAURIELLO. I yield.

Mr. CANFIELD. Does the gentleman now addressing the House think this legislation contains the guarantees that the bishops ask for in their telegrams which he has just read?

Mr. TAURIELLO. I think it does in spirit. I think if this grant or loan is made this Government will follow that spirit.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TAURIELLO. I yield.

Mr. FULTON. Did the gentleman vote for my amendment which put in those seven conditions which were in line with what the bishops had asked for?

Mr. TAURIELLO. Yes, I did; I supported the gentleman's amendment. I want to remind the gentleman from Pennsylvania I asked for a teller vote on his amendment and supported it.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the contents of these two telegrams I received from these eminent churchmen should help a great number of the Members of the committee to decide how they will vote on this important legislation.

As for myself, I hate communism and the very word, especially since I had the opportunity to visit Poland and Czechoslovakia last year with a select committee of Members of this House. I saw communism in operation there.

In supporting this legislation I am thinking in terms of what is best for the United States and what we can do to weaken the position of Russia. If we can pull nations away from Russia and to our side, then certainly we are doing what is best for the United States of America. We must take the lesser of two evils, and for all of these reasons I will support this legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD].

The amendment was agreed to.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 4. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so

transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

SEC. 5. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this act without charge against appropriated funds.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BONNER:

On page 3, line 18, strike out the figure "5" and insert in lieu thereof the figure "6."

On page 3, after line 18, insert a new section reading as follows:

"SEC. 5. At least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry-bulk carriers and dry-cargo liners) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels."

On page 3, line 19, strike out the figure "6" and insert in lieu thereof the figure "7."

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that we have passed the section which the gentleman is attempting to amend.

Mr. BONNER. The gentleman is mistaken. The Clerk just finished reading section 5.

Mr. VORYS. I may be corrected by the chairman, but I understood the Clerk had passed that section.

The CHAIRMAN. The amendment may be inserted after section 5. Does the gentleman desire to insert the amendment after section 5?

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent, then, to return to the end of section 4.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I realize the futility of this, but because the gentleman from West Virginia, Judge KEE, and I have always opposed this attempt to make relief measures for foreigners into relief measures for the merchant marine, I am constrained to object. I will not aid in any way in getting this into this bill.

Mr. BONNER. Mr. Chairman, I offer the amendment as a new section after section 5, with the necessary changes.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. BONNER: Page 3, after line 18, insert the following new section:

"At least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this act and transported on ocean vessels computed separately for dry-bulk carriers and dry cargo liners shall be transported on United States-flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels."

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I am willing to accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. FULTON: Page 3, line 18, add a new subsection as follows:

"When the Government of Yugoslavia sells such relief supplies for local currency, (a) the amounts of such local currency shall be deposited by it in a special account; (b) such funds shall be used within such country with the approval of a duly authorized representative of the United States for relief and work-relief purposes."

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, I will explain this amendment shortly, and will not take the full time. This is what is known as the counterpart amendment. It is the provision that allows you to again use that money for relief purposes that the Yugoslav Government may collect for selling this produce in Yugoslavia. For example, this amendment requires when the Yugoslav Government sells this produce in Yugoslavia and collects local Yugoslavia currency, then that currency collected shall be put into a joint account, subject to the joint control of the Yugoslav Government and the United States representative, so that we shall then use it again for relief, and work-relief purposes.

If this amendment is not adopted, you are putting into the hands of the Yugoslav Government this money that it collects when it sells the produce in Yugoslavia, and that Government then uses it for any purpose it wants to. If you really want to use this money for further relief, and make the Yugoslav Government do likewise, on any proceeds it gets from the sale of this food in Yugoslavia, you should vote for this amendment and Yugoslavia will be able to use it subject to United States control. You will recall that under Public Law 84, which is the law that provided funds and relief for countries devastated by the war, we used just this sort of provision.

In addition to that, we used this provision for counterpart funds under ECA. It is our regular practice and the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. VORYS] will tell you it has been the practice. He and I believe, and many Democratic members of the Foreign Affairs Committee have likewise insisted that the money collected within those recipient countries on the sale of the produce provided, is used for the right purposes and not just thrown into the general support of a dictatorship government. This is a protection and a benefit to the good people of Yugoslavia.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FULTON. I yield.

Mr. VORYS. Is not the gentleman's amendment closely patterned after the Fulbright amendment which was unanimously adopted in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and is now in the Senate bill?

Mr. FULTON. That is correct; it is along the same lines.

Mr. VORYS. It is not exactly the same, but similar in purpose.

Mr. FULTON. The only difference between this and the Fulbright amendment is that this is the form that the Congress has used consistently, and is the legislative language used for that purpose, while the Fulbright amendment

is in new language and not tested by experience.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FULTON] has expired.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, this is one amendment that I am not going to agree to. It is the old counterpart proposition. It is, in fact, a part of the same proposition that was voted down awhile ago in the Vorys amendment. It envisions a long-range program just like UNRRA was, like ECA was and still is. If you want to make a long-range program out of this and set up counterpart funds, and imply to Yugoslavia that we going to keep this up in years to come, go ahead and pass this amendment. Otherwise, vote it down.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. FULTON) there were—ayes 18, noes 69.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, so far as I know there are no other amendments pending.

There have been questions about the motion to recommit. I shall offer the motion to recommit and shall be able to qualify to offer it without qualification. I am opposed to this bill in the form in which it now is.

The motion to recommit will provide for a loan rather than for grants and will be in substantially the language of the Case substitute which was considered earlier in the day. There are slight changes, but the motion to recommit will provide for a loan such as we made to Spain, using practically the language out of the Spanish-loan provision.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. I yield.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. It does not change the provision that is now in the bill that the money comes out of the presently appropriated ECA funds.

Mr. VORYS. No; that provision has been adopted. My motion does not change the McCarran or Burleson amendment which is, of course, in the bill. The money will come out of ECA funds. But if the motion to recommit is adopted the assistance will be in the form of a loan.

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, during the 2 days of debate on this measure to give additional millions of dollars of aid to Yugoslavia not a single member of the Foreign Affairs Committee or a single Member of this House has been able to cite a single assurance, much less a guaranty, that Dictator Tito will give definite and specific aid to the United States in time of need.

Virtually every speaker in behalf of this measure has prefaced his or her remarks with an apology and an attempted disclaimer for supporting Tito.

an avowed Communist, and the head of a government as dictatorial, ruthless, and brutal as there is in existence on this earth today.

The specious argument is made that somehow we can bribe or buy the friendship of this dictator; that this is another of those calculated risks upon which we must spend millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money.

This Republic was not built and it will not endure on the basis of bribed or purchased friendship. There is no such thing.

And I am one of those who is becoming nauseated by the use of this phrase, calculated risk. It is used whenever there is no adequate explanation for an action that is being taken. In the name of all that is fair and decent, how many more billions of dollars and how much more evil is to be committed in the name of calculated risk?

There are those who have attempted to say there is a food shortage emergency in Yugoslavia. The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. DAVIS] answered that argument in a well-documented statement earlier this afternoon. He offered facts and figures to show you that production of most of the major crops in Yugoslavia is from 70 to 100 percent of normal.

There are those supporting this measure who contend that Dictator Tito has "broken" with another dictator by the name of "Dear Old Joe" Stalin. Where is there any convincing evidence that there is more than a propaganda cleavage between these two? There is not a shred of evidence of a genuine rupture between Moscow and Belgrade.

Is there the slightest reason to believe that if real hatred existed between Tito and Stalin that the Yugoslav dictator would not have been put out of the way long ago? Have we forgotten the assassination of Trotsky in Mexico after he broke with Stalin? Have we forgotten that Masaryk, the Czechoslovakian patriot, died in a fall from a window after he publicly announced he would not betray his people and his country by cravenly becoming a puppet in the hands of the Communist regime in his native country?

Are we gullible enough to believe that Stalin and his hirelings could not arrange the exit of Tito and then, perhaps, hang his assassins and place him in the position of a martyr?

I say to you that I am wholly unconvinced that there has been a complete break between Tito and Stalin.

This bill represents another foreign fraud that is being perpetrated upon the American people by an administration that is steadily bringing this Republic to the brink of destruction.

I refuse to be a party to the support of human slavery in Yugoslavia and I refuse to support the Truman administration in its sordid deals and moral sell-outs to such international crooks as Tito.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, we have had 2 days of debate on this very important measure.

I think I should be the last person in the world to criticize the motives of anyone who differs with me on this matter, but I do want to give voice to one or two thoughts that are uppermost in my mind before this debate is finally closed. I think just as you do—that we are in a very deplorable condition as far as the world situation is concerned. I should not be presumptuous enough to undertake to say that I know the answers, but there are certain things that I do know in my own common sense and common judgment. Mistakes have been made. Some of you think it would be a mistake if we were to go through with this recommendation, but I call your attention to the fact that it would have been far better from our point of view if this matter had never been debated before the Congress than for it to be debated and then relief denied. I hold no brief for Tito any more than I hold a brief for Stalin. I hope I will not be too intemperate in my language when I say that I differ with some Members who talk about Tito as a Communist. I think Tito is the same type of Communist that Stalin is. They are both ruthless dictators; they are both political adventurers; they are both looking after themselves and using communism as a front to gain their own end.

Now, what are we up against here? We are up against the proposition of whether we are going to make a grant or a loan. It does not make any difference, for that matter, which it is, and I do not agree with the gentleman from Ohio on that. If we are going to do this, let us do it graciously and get everything we can out of it. You know as well as I know that you cannot satisfy yourself or your conscience, politically or otherwise, with the thought that you are going to make this a loan rather than a grant. You are not going to get it paid back, just like you are not going to get back these other millions.

I want to be very realistic about this thing, and I hope I may have the attention of these gentlemen over here for whatever my view may be worth. As I pointed out yesterday, this is a gamble, yes, but it is such a small gamble. There are many people who believe that Tito is on our side. There are some who believe he is not on our side. To the best of our knowledge and information to far he is not going along with the Kremlin.

We have an opportunity here. Somebody said we have already given them three or four hundred million dollars. For the comparatively small sum of \$38,000,000, as I pointed out, the cost of a dozen modern bombers or the cost of 5 hours of World War II, we have an opportunity to hold what we have over there and to try to keep him on our side. I rather pride myself that my committee was among the first to advocate a firm policy of dealing with Stalin and I pointed out what we were up against 5½ years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. COLMER. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for one additional minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Chairman, I took this floor during World War II and defended assistance to Stalin and to Russia in that crisis. I would do it again because we are up against a realistic proposition, now faced with a Communist world headed by Stalin, as we were faced then with a Fascist world headed by Hitler. Let us not get into any religious or any political or any other kind of motives about this problem. For if we lose out to Stalin, there will be no religion permitted here and there will be only one party here—the Communist party. It is purely a selfish proposition and, in my humble judgment the gamble is worth the taking. We are gambling with a comparatively small stake for the assistance of 32 Yugoslav divisions on our side against our and other free peoples' number one enemy.

Mr. JUDD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. COLMER] has so well stated, we are indeed in a deplorable condition so far as the world situation is concerned. The problem is how to deal with it so that we can save our country and freedom and Christian decency in the world. We can perhaps gain some help on how to decide the tough question of whether or not to aid the Yugoslavs and thereby aid their oppressor, Tito, by studying how we got where we are. I think the one miscalculation above all others which is responsible for the trouble we are in was this sort of faulty reasoning with regard to another Communist dictatorship, the Kremlin. The pseudo-syllogism went like this: We are fighting Hitler; we are a democracy. The Soviet Union is fighting Hitler; therefore, it is a democracy. That was the erroneous conclusion on which our Government based its whole postwar foreign policy. That is why we are in such peril.

I agree with the gentleman from Mississippi that it was proper for us to aid Stalin during the war. I do not have a single regret about the \$11,000,000,000 lend-lease we gave to Soviet Russia as a war policy. It saved thousands of American lives. But it was a mistake to put our chips on Russian cooperation and friendship as a peace policy.

During the war we had two enemies in Europe. The first was Hitler, the second was the Kremlin. It was right to help the second enemy overcome the first. It was wrong to believe that because the Soviets were also fighting Hitler, they were therefore a peace-loving democracy and wanted the kind of world we want, and would cooperate with us to build that kind of a world.

Now we are in a situation where our first enemy is the Kremlin's conspiracy, to conquer the world. The enemy is not communism as an economic theory or system, or communism in Yugoslavia. It is the world-wide armed Communist conspiracy dedicated to conquest of every free people and with ourselves as its main target, because we are all that

stands between it and victory. It merely uses communism as a weapon to confuse, mislead and soften other peoples up preparatory to hitting them with armed violence from within as from without. Since our first enemy is the conspiracy directed from the Kremlin, our first concern must be to weaken that conspiracy. Surely no one believes that Tito is a friend of the kind of world we want any more than Stalin ever was. But Tito is not a threat to our security and Stalin's power is. Tito is not on our side but he is not on the side of our No. 1 enemy either.

Whatever weakens the conspiracy that threatens the survival of the United States helps us. To keep Yugoslavia independent weakens that conspiracy, therefore it is in our interest, in my judgment, to help him keep independent of and hostile to that conspiracy, thereby depriving it of Yugoslavia's potential strength and strategic location, and forcing Stalin to tie down part of forces in that area.

It is not a question trying to gain the favor of Tito or of making a friend out of him, as some have suggested. It is a question of making as much trouble as we can for our No. 1 enemy, Stalin's gang, and thereby reducing their threat to ourselves.

The question is not whether Tito deserves our aid. Of course he does not deserve our aid. The question is whether American boys deserve the better chance to survive, which keeping Tito in the right against Stalin may give them. In this bill we are not trying to buy a friend; that cannot be done. We are trying to make as much trouble as possible for our enemy in order to keep the main threat to our world as divided and weakened as possible. It is solely on the basis of this hard-headed concern for our own youth and our own country that I feel we ought to help keep independent a force, which no matter how undemocratic, is weakening Stalin's conspiracy which unless frustrated can lead to our own destruction. On this basis I believe the bill should be passed.

The Clerk read as follows:

SEC. 6. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this act, or is diverting from the purpose of this act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution of both Houses, finds termination is desirable.

Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this act and not yet delivered.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 4, line 6, strike out "of both Houses."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, no Member appreciates more than I do the thoughts that are running through the minds of each and every Member of the House. No matter how any Member may vote, I want them to know that I thoroughly respect the fine motives which prompt them to vote in accordance with their judgment. For 15 years I have vigorously fought communism in and out of the House of Representatives as well as prior to that, and I have a long line of speeches on other occasions testifying to that fact. The Foreign Agent Registration Act is the McCormack Act. The provisions of the Smith bill, under which the 11 Communists were indicted and convicted in New York, were first recommended by a special committee of which I was chairman. I said as long as 3 years ago that Russia was using communism, and the ideology of communism, as a smoke screen for imperialism taking over country after country, then following it up militarily, and ultimately aimed at the United States of America. I have condemned Tito, and I condemn him now.

At this time and in connection with this bill, I am thinking of the United States of America. That is my first interest. During World War II we were dealing with one devil, we were crossing the bridge with one devil, as my friend from Minnesota in other language well said a few minutes ago. We had to help one devil to lick the other devil. If we did not lick the first devil first we would not be seated here today facing the second devil, so to speak, not only descriptively but in expressing my thoughts in relation to Stalin.

Looking at it from the angle of the United States of America and our own national interest, the question is what should we do, not as a policy, not as a principle, but as a matter of expediency.

You and I and this generation of Americans are faced with one of the most trying periods not only in our constitutional history but in the known history of time. We are the guardians of the future. Whether we like it or not, and I wish it were otherwise, we are the guardians of the future, because what we do in these days will determine what the future will be not only for the world, maybe, but at least for the United States of America.

As an American I want to see my country strong as quickly as possible. I have repeatedly said on this floor and off this floor that there is one thing that Stalin and his gang respect, and that is what they fear. The only thing they fear is power greater than themselves. We have the potential power, and we had better develop it just as quickly as we can, not only for a future decent world but for our first job, the best interests of the United States. You and I of these days are and must make our contribution toward preserving the Union which we inherited and passing it on to future generations for their benefit.

As I view this situation, there are two aspects of it. There is the national interest of the United States, based upon expediency. I have publicly stated the only justification we have to deal with Tito is on the ground of expediency in the national interest of the United

States, not "expediency" alone, but "expediency" in the national interest of the United States." The question is now whether or not this bill, as amended, is expedient in the national interest of our country.

The second reason is human charity, to which the bishops referred in their telegrams read by the gentleman from New York [Mr. TAURIELLO]. If millions of human beings were starving in China, even people subject to Mao, and there was a bill before this body to try to bring them relief from suffering, it would have to be a cold heart that would say "no," provided there were proper supervision by the American Government. I would agree that to give relief to be administered by a Communist leader would be a mistake, but if there were proper supervision by our Government, as a result of which we would be able to supervise the relief given the human beings, I think it would be a mighty good thing to do, and it would be in accordance with those principles that God himself has given to us, faith, hope, and charity, the greatest of which is charity.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. McCORMACK. In Yugoslavia at least 95 percent of the people believe in God, just as you and I and the other Members of this body do. Their only misfortune is that they were born over there and not here. If I were able to read the minds of the two bishops on the question of charity, I am strongly inclined to think that they had that very important message from Christ Himself running through their minds, that the greatest gift of all is the gift of charity.

Looking at it in the light of our own national interest, what follows? We have supervision. It is provided in the bill. It says, "to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this act." Our policy of containment is over. We know that. This is a rapidly changing world. We have to adjust ourselves and think in the light of the practicalities and realities. Unfortunately we have to think in the light of expediency, too. That is the situation which confronts us.

Whatever policy of containment we had is over; that was scrapped in China, and crystallized in Korea. We have to make ourselves strong, and then still try to penetrate behind the iron curtain. Suppose Tito was tied up with Stalin. Assume that Stalin and Tito were embracing one another, and we are trying to get behind the iron curtain. We would spend much more than \$38,000,000 if we could do anything in Yugoslavia to weaken those who dominate and control. It is not a question of what we like. We want the people of Yugoslavia to have their own form of government, freely se-

lected. But they are not in the position to do that. I will agree that at least 90 percent of them are against Tito from the information I have received. But as between Stalin and Tito I think Tito represents to them the lesser of two evils. In the light of that situation, having in mind our own expediency in the national interest of the United States, what is the proper thing for us to do? It seems to me, with the world situation as it exists today, with the opportunity of our Government through its officials to go in there with that penetration, a great deal of good can come. If it is actual supervision as it should be, and I hope the Committee on Foreign Affairs, if this bill becomes law, will follow it up and see that it is actual supervision, a tremendous amount of good can come to us and to the national interests of our country and a tremendous amount of good can flow from it, from a world-wide angle.

Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCORMACK. I yield.

Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania. How does he justify the encouragement and continuance of communism any place in the world?

Mr. McCORMACK. There is no justification of communism. This is not a justification. My position is not a justification of communism. I am surprised the gentleman should ask that question. He ought to know that.

Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania. Does the gentleman think this bill will strengthen communism in Yugoslavia?

Mr. McCORMACK. This bill, as I see it, will help prevent Stalin from taking over Yugoslavia.

Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania. Will it strengthen the continuance of communism in Yugoslavia?

Mr. McCORMACK. Let me ask you: What about the national interests of the United States?

Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania. I have asked the gentleman a question.

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes, and I have answered the question in the course of my remarks.

Mr. SIMPSON of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman agree that this will strengthen communism in Yugoslavia?

Mr. McCORMACK. In my opinion, it will undermine it with American officials going over there and supervising and going in there freely, together with all of the amendments which have been adopted. I am confident it will tend to swing the leaders of that country more and more toward the Western World, and if not it will enable us to penetrate into Yugoslavia, and it is in the best interests of the United States of America and from the broad angle based upon expediency the passage of this bill is to the best interests of our country.

Every one of us are in complete agreement about the viciousness of the religious and civil persecutions that have gone on in Yugoslavia. Every one of us expects and shall demand that any relief given under this bill, if it passes, shall be given to all persons without regard to their religious or political convictions, and there shall be no discrimi-

nation in particular against non-Communists. Tito and his government will and should be watched very closely. I might say that if he needs aid in the future that the granting of it by our Government will depend upon what Tito does during the next several months. A continuance of his persecutions will not be tolerated by us. He should release at once Archbishop Stepinac and the other Catholic priests, as well as the archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church and the priests of his church who have been imprisoned, as well as the nuns, and permit religious freedom to again exist in Yugoslavia. He should also stop the collectivization of the farm lands of his country. He will have to do this from our angle; he should do it from his own angle. He ought to know now that Stalin will not deal with him; that Stalin will liquidate him if he can. He should realize that his future best interests lie with the Western World, and he should, and, so far as we are concerned, must make internal adjustments in Yugoslavia accordingly.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word, and I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, committee work prevented me yesterday from listening to the debate. It was my privilege, however, this morning to read the record of the debate that took place yesterday.

As I understand that debate the argument that was made by those who advocated the adoption of this bill—and every one of the speakers, if I read correctly, apologized for supporting it—was that there were two vicious, murdering, communistic crooks in Europe and we should hire one of them to fight and weaken the other.

The gentleman from Minnesota, Dr. Judd, who made as logical and convincing an argument as I think can be made in support of this bill, followed that same line as did the remarks of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK].

The gentleman from Minnesota, Dr. Judd, said that our first consideration should be for the youth of our land, the security of the Nation. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] said that our consideration—and I assume that he meant the same thing as the gentleman from Minnesota, Dr. Judd—was for the future welfare of our Nation. Both were right. No thoughtful man can even consider any other objective.

We have spent billions upon billions of dollars in other countries in an effort to purchase friendship and military aid should there come a time of need. It is now apparent that, while the expenditure of those billions may have accomplished something, England has, even though it injured us, strengthened our enemies, continued to trade with Russia and China, made it easier for the Communists to kill our men.

There is neither in the United Nations nor in those nations which have sub-

scribed to the Atlantic Pact, one single nation which will go all out for the United States of America. After all the sacrifices we have made—after thousands of our men have died in Korea—England, to save Hong Kong, would desert us in Asia, take into the UN an avowed enemy.

If we continue to follow the foreign policy which we have had for the last 10 years, is it not true that we will not only find ourselves committed to fight in world war III, but that we will be forced to carry the burden of that war; and if during that war our interests come in conflict with those of France or Britain, will they not desert us and leave us to stand alone?

If that be true, and that seems to be the opinion of our people, then is not the first question for us this: What prospect have we of winning world war III; of successfully waging that war not only all through Asia, but of going up into Russia, attempting to conquer Russia? Is it not enough that our wounded men have frozen and, because of the cold, died, in Korea? Must others be sent to follow that long, long trail into and through Siberia? Perhaps to lie unburied along the route followed by Napoleon's armies?

Shall our young men beat out their lives against the unsurmountable barriers of cold and hunger which have destroyed every army which ever went north into Russia?

Can we, if we stand alone—and mark well my words, we will, before the end is reached, stand alone—win world war III without destroying the Republic? That is the practical question. Can we win? If we win will we be a free nation? A nation of free people? To my mind it is a question that should be answered before we commit ourselves to follow along with this foreign policy which has given us this disaster in Korea; taken the lives of thousands of our men. A foreign policy which is calling, as the armed services called this morning, for 80,000 young men in January and another 80,000 in February, and which, comes the end, will take every physically and mentally qualified young man, except those required for production, into the armed services.

Is it not time that we count our young men, count our resources, and determine whether or not we should now go on into world war III and fight it, perhaps alone. Determine today, before we go further, whether we can in Asia and in Russia win a world-wide war?

Is it not about time, as the gentleman from Minnesota, Dr. Judd, said, that we think about our youth; and, as the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] said, that we think about the security of the Republic?

Is it not about time that we consolidated our battle lines, and here in the Americas—take in South America, if you wish—build a defense which will prove to be effective against any nation or any combination of nations?

Is it not our duty to first think of, to first protect, the welfare of the United States of America? To think first of the Republic, its security?

I cannot go along with a policy which will involve us in a war which I do not believe we can win. I cannot go along with a war which will destroy the freedom of our people. A war which will leave us weak and exhausted, easy prey for a dictator. Let us get out of Korea, out of Asia, and, unless England, France, and Western Europe, not only profess to be willing to carry the brunt of the war but give concrete evidence of doing so, I would get out of Europe.

The welfare of my people, the security of the Republic, always has been, is now and always will be, my first concern. I owe allegiance to no other people, to no other nation—no, not even to that heterogeneous collection—United Nations—self-satisfied, ambitious world politicians, who, like leeches, have attached themselves to our Nation and, by forcing our people's sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers into this war, are sucking the lifeblood from our Republic.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. McSWEENEY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 9853) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, pursuant to House Resolution 878, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them in gross.

The amendments were agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?

Mr. VORYS. I am, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman qualifies. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. VORYS moves to recommit H. R. 9853 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs with instructions to report it back forthwith with the following amendments:

"After section 2 insert a new section 3 as follows:

"SEC. 3. Such assistance shall be extended on credit terms as provided in section III C2 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 as amended, subject to the provisions of this act."

"Renumber the following sections."

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the motion to recommit.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. Vorys) there were—ayes 76, noes 173.

So the motion to recommit was rejected.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 225, nays 142, not voting 62, as follows:

[Roll No. 295]

YEAS—225

Abbott	Gathings	Murdock
Abernethy	Gordon	Murphy
Addonizio	Gore	Murray, Tenn.
Allen, Calif.	Gossett	Noland
Allen, La.	Granahan	Norblad
Andrews	Granger	Norton
Angell	Grant	O'Hara, Ill.
Aspinall	Gregory	O'Neill
Bailey	Guill	O'Sullivan
Barrett, Pa.	Hagen	Pace
Bates, Ky.	Hale	Passman
Battle	Hall	Patman
Beall	Leonard W.	Patterson
Beckworth	Hardy	Perkins
Bennett, Fla.	Harrison	Peterson
Bentsen	Havener	Phillips, Tenn.
Blatnik	Hays, Ark.	Polk
Boggs, La.	Hedrick	Preston
Bolling	Heller	Price
Bolton, Ohio	Herlong	Priest
Bonner	Heseltun	Rabaut
Boykin	Hobbs	Rains
Breen	Holifield	Ramsay
Brooks	Holmes	Redden
Brown, Ga.	Hope	Regan
Bryson	Howell	Rhodes
Buchanan	Huber	Ribicoff
Buckley, N. Y.	Jackson, Wash.	Richards
Burke	Javits	Riehlman
Burleson	Johnson	Rivers
Burnside	Jones, Mo.	Rodino
Burton	Jones	Roosevelt
Byrne, N. Y.	Hamilton C.	Sadlak
Camp	Jones	Sadowski
Cannon	Woodrow W.	Sasser
Carnahan	Judd	Scott, Hardie
Carroll	Karst	Scott
Case, N. J.	Karsten	Hugh D., Jr.
Case, S. Dak.	Kean	Shelley
Celler	Kearney	Sikes
Chelf	Keating	Sims
Christopher	Kelly, N. Y.	Smathers
Chudoff	Keough	Smith, Va.
Cole, Kans.	Kilday	Spence
Colmer	King	Staggers
Cooley	Kirwan	Steed
Cooper	Klein	Stigler
Corbett	Lane	Stockman
Coudert	Linehan	Sullivan
Davenport	Lucas	Tauriello
Davies, N. Y.	Lyle	Taylor
Davis, Tenn.	Lynch	Thomas
Dawson	McCormack	Thompson
Deane	McKinnon	Thornberry
DeGraffenried	McMillan, S. C.	Trimble
Denton	McSweeney	Underwood
Dollinger	Mack, Ill.	Vinson
Dolliver	Mack, Wash.	Wadsworth
Donohue	Madden	Wagner
Douglas	Magee	Walsh
Doyle	Mahon	Walter
Durham	Mansfield	Welch
Eberhart	Marshall	Whittington
Elliott	Marshall	Wickersham
Engle, Calif.	Martin, Mass.	Wier
Evins	Morrow	Wigglesworth
Feighan	Michener	Willis
Fernandez	Miles	Wilson, Okla.
Fisher	Miller, Calif.	Wilson, Tex.
Flood	Mills	Wolverton
Forand	Mitchell	Woodhouse
Ford	Monroney	Woodruff
Frazier	Morgan	Yates
Fugate	Morrison	Young
Gamble	Morton	Zablocki
Garmatz	Moulder	
Gary	Multer	

NAYS—142

Albert	Baring	Burdick
Allen, Ill.	Barrett, Wyo.	Byrnes, Wis.
Andersen	Bates, Mass.	Canfield
H. Carl	Bennett, Mich.	Carlyle
Anderson, Calif.	Bishop	Chapfield
Andresen	Blackney	Clemente
August H.	Boggs, Del.	Clevenger
Arends	Bolton, Md.	Cotton
Auchincloss	Bosone	Cox
Barden	Brown, Ohio	Crawford

Cunningham	Hull	Poulson
Curtis	Jackson, Calif.	Quinn
Dague	James	Rankin
Davis, Ga.	Jenison	Reed, Ill.
Davis, Wis.	Jenkins	Reed, N. Y.
Delaney	Jensen	Rees
D'Ewart	Jonas	Robeson
Dondero	Kearns	Rogers, Fla.
Doughton	Kelley, Pa.	Rogers, Mass.
Ellsworth	Kilburn	Rooney
Elston	Kunkel	St. George
Fallon	Lanham	Sanborn
Fellows	Latham	Saylor
Fenton	LeCompte	Secrest
Fulton	LeFevre	Shafer
Furcolo	Lind	Short
George	Lovre	Simpson, Ill.
Gilmer	McConnell	Simpson, Pa.
Golden	McCulloch	Smith, Kans.
Goodwin	McDonough	Smith, Wis.
Graham	McGregor	Stefan
Green	McGuire	Sutton
Gross	Marcantonio	Taber
Gwinn	Martin, Iowa	Tackett
Hall	Mason	Towe
Edwin Arthur	Miller, Nebr.	Velde
Halleck	Morris	Vorys
Hand	Murray, Wis.	Vursell
Harden	Nelson	Weichel
Harris	Nicholson	Wheeler
Harvey	Norrell	White, Calif.
Hays, Ohio	O'Brien, Mich.	White, Idaho
Heffernan	O'Hara, Minn.	Williams
Hill	O'Konski	Wilson, Ind.
Hinshaw	Patten	Winstead
Hoeven	Philbin	Withrow
Hoffman, Ill.	Phillips, Calif.	Wolcott
Hoffman, Mich.	Pickett	
Horan	Potter	

NOT VOTING—62

Biemiller	Jacobs	Poage
Bramblett	Jennings	Powell
Brehm	Jones, Ala.	Rich
Buckley, Ill.	Kee	Sabath
Cavalcante	Keefe	Scrivner
Chatham	Kennedy	Scudder
Chesney	Kerr	Sheppard
Cole, N. Y.	Kruse	Smith, Ohio
Combs	Larcade	Stanley
Crook	Lichtenwalter	Talle
Crosser	Lodge	Teague
Dingell	McCarthy	Tollefson
Eaton	McGrath	Van Zandt
Engel, Mich.	McMillen, Ill.	Werdel
Fogarty	Macy	Whitaker
Gavin	Miller, Md.	Whitten
Gillette	O'Brien, Ill.	Widnall
Gorski	O'Toole	Wood
Hare	Pfeifer	
Hart	Joseph L.	
Hébert	Pfeiffer	
Herter	William L.	
Irving	Plumley	

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Cole of New York for, with Mr. Smith of Ohio against.

Mr. Herter for, with Mr. Miller of Maryland against.

Mr. Eaton for, with Mr. Lichtenwalter against.

Mr. Poage for, with Mr. Werdel against.

Mr. Hébert for, with Mr. Jacobs against.

Mr. Kerr for, with Mr. Hare against.

Until further notice:

Mr. O'Toole with Mr. Macy.

Mr. Wood with Mr. Jennings.

Mr. Chatham with Mr. Van Zandt.

Mr. Gorski with Mr. Gavin.

Mr. Hart with Mr. Bramblett.

Mr. Biemiller with Mr. Brehm.

Mr. Crook with Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Crosser with Mr. McMillen of Illinois.

Mr. Dingell with Mr. William L. Pfeiffer.

Mr. Whitten with Mr. Scrivner.

Mr. Whitaker with Mr. Scudder.

Mr. Fogarty with Mr. Rich.

Mr. Stanley with Mr. Gillette.

Mr. Teague with Mr. Talle.

Mr. Sabath with Mr. Plumley.

Mr. Powell with Mr. Tollefson.

Mr. Kee with Mr. Engel of Michigan.

Mr. McGrath with Mr. Widnall.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, and to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the provisions of H. R. 9853, as passed by the House.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RICHARDS]?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That this act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950."

SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Administration Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act.

SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings by Yugoslavia and any other undertakings the President may find desirable and appropriate:

(a) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States.

(b) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe without restriction the distribution of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication facilities.

(c) To make equitable distribution to the people of Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this act without discrimination as to race, color, or political or religious belief.

(d) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance to Yugoslavia.

(e) Whenever relief supplies furnished under this act are sold for local currency by the Government of Yugoslavia, to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children, and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be mutually agreed upon.

SEC. 4. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this act may be transferred by the President to any Department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law not inconsistent with this act applicable to the departments or agencies concerned.

SEC. 5. At least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers, dry cargo liners and tankers) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels if available.

SEC. 6. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 of this act may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this act without charge against appropriated funds.

SEC. 7. All or any part of the assistance provided under this act shall be promptly terminated by the President—

(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this act, or is diverting from the purpose of this act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution of both Houses, finds termination is desirable.

Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this act and not yet delivered.

SEC. 8. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

SEC. 9. At the termination of each 3-month period after aid has been extended under this act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said 3-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. RICHARDS: Strike out all after the enacting clause of the bill S. 4234 and insert in lieu thereof the provisions of H. R. 9853, as passed by the House, as follows: "That this act may be cited as the 'Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950.'"

"Whereas the Government of Yugoslavia has urgently requested relief due to drought conditions, and has expressed an intention to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations.

"SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act.

"SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

"(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this act.

"(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States; and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.

"(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

"(d) To make equitable distribution to the people in Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this act, as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources, without discrimination as to race or political or religious belief.

"(e) To take all necessary actions to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of foodstuffs within Yugoslavia and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

"SEC. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities at Government cost in the possession of the Commodity Credit Corporation.

"SEC. 5. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

"SEC. 6. At the termination of each 3-month period after aid has been extended under this act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said 3-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

"SEC. 7. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

"SEC. 8. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this act without charge against appropriated funds.

"SEC. 9. At least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels.

"SEC. 10. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

"(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this act, or is diverting from the purpose of this act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

"(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds termination is desirable.

"Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this act and not yet delivered."

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The proceedings whereby the bill H. R. 9853 was passed were vacated, and the bill was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the Clerk will be authorized to correct section numbers.

There was no objection.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill, S. 4234, together with a House amendment thereto, insist on the amendment of the House, and ask for a conference with the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and appoints the following conferees: Mr. RICHARDS, Mrs. DOUGLAS, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. EATON, and Mr. VORYS.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have five legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

HEARING ON REAPPORTIONMENT TUESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 10 A. M.

Mr. BYRNE of New York. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for one-half minute to make an announcement.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. BYRNE of New York. Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday next, at 10 o'clock a. m. a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary will hold a meeting in room 346, Old House Office Building, for the purpose of hearing Members of Congress who desire to be heard regarding reapportionment. We shall have very little time, of course, in this particular session for that matter; nevertheless, on Tuesday morning next at 10 o'clock the subcommittee will be there to hear all those Members who may wish to be heard on this very important matter.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. BRYSON asked and was given permission to address to the House for 30 minutes on tomorrow, Thursday, following the legislative business of the day and any special orders heretofore entered.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. PATTERSON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan asked and was given permission to extend in the

Appendix of the RECORD certain remarks previously inserted.

Mr. WIDNALL (at the request of Mr. CANFIELD) was given permission to extend his remarks in three instances, in each to include extraneous matter.

Mr. JAVITS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in four instances, and in each to include extraneous matter.

Mr. HESELTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend the remarks he made in the Committee of the Whole and to include copies of certain correspondence and tabulations.

Mr. PHILBIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances.

Mr. KEOGH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article that appeared in the Brooklyn Barrister.

Mr. MURDOCK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two separate instances.

Mr. DELANEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an address by Dr. Joseph F. Thorning, associate editor of the Americas.

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and in each to include extraneous matter.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in three separate instances and in each to include extraneous matter.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend the remarks he made in the Committee of the Whole today.

[Omitted from Record of December 12, 1950]

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

A joint resolution of the Senate was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. J. Res. 209. Joint resolution to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows:

To Mr. HART (at the request of Mr. KLEIN), for today, on account of official business.

To Mr. O'TOOLE (at the request of Mr. DELANEY), for the balance of the week, on account of official business.

To Mr. WIDNALL (at the request of Mr. CANFIELD), indefinitely, on account of illness.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 43 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, December 14, 1950, at 12 o'clock noon.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. SPENCE: Committee on Banking and Currency. H. R. 9802. A bill to grant succession to the War Damage Corporation; with amendment (Rept. No. 3186). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DOLLIVER:

H. R. 9907. A bill to amend the act incorporating The American Legion so as to redefine (a) the powers of said corporation, (b) the right to the use of the name "The American Legion" and "American Legion"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 9908. A bill to amend the act incorporating The American Legion so as to redefine eligibility for membership therein; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LECOMPTE:

H. R. 9909. A bill to amend the act incorporating The American Legion so as to redefine (a) the powers of said corporation, (b) the right to the use of the name "The American Legion" and "American Legion"; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 9910. A bill to amend the act incorporating The American Legion so as to redefine eligibility for membership therein; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RANKIN (by request):

H. R. 9911. A bill to authorize the payment by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs of a gratuitous indemnity to survivors of members of the Armed Forces who die in active service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin:

H. R. 9912. A bill to limit the retroactive application of the income tax to employees of the United States working in the possessions or in the Canal Zone to October 1, 1950; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CURTIS:

H. R. 9913. A bill to prevent penalties and additions to tax in case of failure to meet requirements with respect to estimated tax by reason of increases imposed by the Revenue Act of 1950; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. PRIEST:

H. R. 9914. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize assistance to States and political subdivisions in the development and maintenance of local public health units, particularly in national defense areas, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. RANKIN (by request):

H. R. 9915. A bill to provide that the House of Representatives shall be composed of 450 Members, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ZABLOCKI:

H. R. 9916. A bill to amend section 1700 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code so as to restore the exemptions from admissions tax which applied during World War II with respect to members of the Armed Forces and to theaters operated on military installations; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CLEMENTE:

H. Res. 881. Resolution calling upon Attorney General and Postmaster General to investigate television service racket; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

Mr. WALTER introduced a bill (H. R. 9917) for the relief of Peter V. Bishop, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

nature of a plea for national unity, delivered by him at a dinner of the Democratic National Committee in New York City on December 12, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

INVESTIGATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME— STATEMENT BY SENATOR KEFAUVER

[Mr. KEFAUVER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a statement prepared by him calling attention to the assistance extended by the American Bar Association to the Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE RUGGED PATH AHEAD—ADDRESS BY ERLE COCKE, JR.

[Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "The Rugged Path Ahead," taken from an address by Erle Cocke, Jr., national commander of the American Legion, before the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA—ARTICLE BY ANSEL E. TALBERT

[Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article regarding the United States Air Force in Korea, by Ansel E. Talbert, chief of the New York Herald Tribune Bureau in Tokyo, which appears in the Appendix.]

A SERIOUS HOUR IN THE NATION'S HIS- TORY—EDITORIAL BY GEORGE LANG

[Mr. HILL asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial in the form of a letter to his fellow Rotarians, written by Dr. George Lang, professor of philosophy at the University of Alabama and district governor of rotary for the district of Alabama, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY—ARTICLE BY WALTER MONFRIED

[Mr. AIKEN asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article by Walter Monfried entitled "Seaway to the Midwest," published in the Eagles' national magazine for November 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

MR. ACHESON'S TROUBLES—ARTICLE BY WALTER LIPPMANN

[Mr. THYE asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Mr. Acheson's Troubles," written by Walter Lippmann, and published in the Washington Post of December 14, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

CITIZENS' PENSIONS: AN AMERICAN PLAN—ARTICLE FROM THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE

[Mr. BUTLER asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article by Emily C. Hammond entitled "Citizens' Pensions: An American Plan," published in the New York Herald Tribune September 30, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

THE TRUMAN-ATTLEE CONFERENCE— EDITORIAL FROM THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

[Mr. WATKINS asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "The People's Voice," published in the Washington Daily News of December 7, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES—COMMUNICATION FROM EM- ERSON-HOVEY POST, NO. 168, VETER- ANS OF FOREIGN WARS

[Mr. TOBEY asked and obtained consent to have printed in the RECORD a letter from Arlo I. Pierce, commander of Emerson-Hovey Post, No. 168, Veterans of Foreign Wars, of

Portsmouth, N. H., with enclosed communication from the post to President Truman, which appears in the Appendix.]

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate the following amendment of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, together with a message from the House insisting upon its amendment, and requesting a conference with the Senate thereon.

Resolved, That the bill from the Senate (S. 4234) entitled "An act to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia" do pass with the following amendment.

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

"That this act may be cited as the 'Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950.'

"Whereas the Government of Yugoslavia has urgently requested relief due to drought conditions, and has expressed an intention to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations.

"SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, 81st Cong.), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this act.

"SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

"(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this act.

"(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States; and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.

"(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

"(d) To make equitable distribution to the people in Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this act, as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources, without discrimination as to race or political or religious belief.

"(e) To take all necessary actions to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of foodstuffs within Yugoslavia and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

"SEC. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities at Government cost in the pos-

session of the Commodity Credit Corporation.

"SEC. 5. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

"SEC. 6. At the termination of each 3-month period after aid has been extended under this act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said 3-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this act; (2) information as to any development in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

"SEC. 7. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

"SEC. 8. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this act without charge against appropriated funds.

"SEC. 9. At least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels.

"SEC. 10. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

"(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this act, or is diverting from the purpose of this act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

"(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds termination is desirable.

"Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this act and not yet delivered."

Mr. CONNALLY. Mr. President, I move that the Senate disagree to the amendment of the House of Representatives; agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The motion was agreed to, and the President pro tempore appointed Mr. CONNALLY, Mr. McMAHON, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. WILEY, and Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, conferees on the part of the Senate.

ORDER FOR RECESS UNTIL TOMORROW

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate concludes its business this after-

noon it stand in recess until tomorrow at 12 o'clock.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

PRESIDENT RENNER, OF AUSTRIA

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, this is the eightieth birthday of one of Europe's most far-sighted and most courageous statesmen, Dr. Karl Renner, President of the Republic of Austria.

The son of a small farmer, Dr. Renner worked his way up to become Austria's first citizen and to play a leading role in the eventful history of his country. His political career encompasses not less than 50 years, during which time Dr. Renner witnessed his country's transformation from a world power of 50,000,000 inhabitants to a small nation of 7,000,000. He was elected to the Austrian Parliament in 1907 during the reign of Emperor Franz Joseph. In 1918 Dr. Renner headed, as Chancellor, the first government of the new Austrian Republic, and again in 1945 after the Nazis were driven out of Austria it was Dr. Renner to whom the Austrian people turned in their moment of great need and in their desire to rebuild their war-shattered country. Vienna at that time was occupied by the Soviet Union exclusively, and the Western Powers had a hard enough time to assume their position as co-occupants of the Austrian capital.

It was in this atmosphere of want and of fear that Dr. Renner, heading Austria's first and provisional postwar government, had to lay the foundation upon which a sound and democratic nation could be rebuilt. It would have been easy and almost natural for a man of lesser stature to become the willing tool of the occupying Soviet commander. Yet Dr. Renner, with all the wisdom of his age and with the extraordinary experience gained in almost half a century of political life, stood his ground. In September 1945 the Western Powers finally succeeded in entering Vienna to share in the four-power occupation of the Austrian capital. Free and unfettered elections were held and a full-fledged Austrian Government came into power, and Dr. Karl Renner was unanimously elected President of his country. It is a tribute to Dr. Renner's courage and wisdom, displayed under most trying circumstances, that the legislation enacted by his provisional government could be accepted in full by the freely elected Austrian Parliament.

I would like to extend to President Renner sincere and warm greetings on his eightieth birthday, and I would like to congratulate him as one of Western Europe's great democratic statesmen for his outstanding contribution to the cause of democracy. May his courage and wisdom and may the courage of the small Austrian nation be soon rewarded by giving Austria peace and by returning to her her full freedom through the conclusion of her treaty of independence for which the Austrian Government has striven so courageously during those last years.

THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY

IT IS THE TIME OF DECISION

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, this is the time of decision. Let us start with the obvious conclusion that our real objectives is the ultimate security and safety of the United States of America.

THIS NATION NEVER DEFEATED

This Nation has never been defeated in a war—and there is no likelihood that it ever will be defeated if we maintain our economic strength and understand our objectives, bolstered by a definite foreign and domestic policy directed to that end.

Lincoln once said that "as a Nation we must live for all time or die by suicide."

Diplomatically, we have lost World War II. As usual we won the war but lost the peace.

THE SHIFTY SHADOWS OF ACHESON—YALTA, TEHRAN, AND POTSDAM

We have fumbled ourselves into a position of defending the self-interest of almost every nation in the world at the expense of our own. We have been soft-talked into apologizing that the appropriations passed on the floor of the Senate for the benefit of foreign nations, are not larger—and if someone inadvertently mentions our own best interests, he is immediately branded an isolationist.

The shifty shadows from Tehran and Yalta and Potsdam still play across our foreign policy. We have no accurate knowledge of the definite commitments made by our leaders at these conferences, except the vague, uncertain, and changing foreign programs that uphold the dead-hand of colonialism and the selfish trade interests or military ambitions of other nations.

WE SUPPLY THE WEAPONS TO FIGHT AGAINST US

We are at war with the Chinese Communists—those agrarian reformers that our present Secretary of Defense discovered early in 1946 in China—while our so-called European allies are sending them the supplies and equipment they need to slaughter our badly outnumbered troops in Korea, paid for through the Marshall plan countries of Europe by our own taxpayers, the parents of the boys being murdered.

Mr. President, I desire to refer to a dispatch in the Journal of Commerce, to show that this is nothing new. It was public information for many, many months—in fact, this has been going on for 3 years at least.

The dispatch was filed at Frankfurt, Germany, December 12, 1950, by the Associated Press. It adds up to the arming of Russia and the satellite countries by the 16 Marshall plan nations. The dispatch reads as follows:

SOVIET BLOC CONTINUES TO GET STRATEGIC ITEMS IN WESTERN EUROPE

FRANKFURT, December 12.—Highly strategic war materials are flowing behind the Soviet iron curtain from West Germany, and the western allies are powerless to stop them.

Such crucial articles as machine tools, ball bearings, optical supplies, steel tubing, and raw steel are being moved secretly into the Soviet satellite bloc.

Allied officials believe that much, or most, of this material finds its way directly to Russia.

ARMY SUPPLIES

It is authoritatively believed also that quantities of rolling stock purchased from United States Army surplus has been previously shipped to Soviet satellites for relay to Russia.

The western allies find themselves helpless. They have export licensing power only over certain specific strategic materials. The rest are licensed by the West German Government. It does not have the power or means to police the ultimate destination of purchased products.

Allied sources said they have no way of determining the exact amount of contraband that has gone to the Soviets. But we feel it was and is of sufficient quantity to make a substantial contribution to the Communist bloc's war potential, one source added.

Allied sources who declined to be identified explained how the East—at a time when United Nations are sorely upset in Korea, acquires vital materials from the West.

EXAMPLE CITED

A Ruhr firm, for example, exports steel to West Berlin buyers who ostensibly are legitimate. But after the steel reaches Berlin it disappears. The allies believe it is easily taken to East Berlin and from there shipped either directly to Russia, or to one of her satellites.

Officials said perhaps as much as \$6,000,000 to \$8,000,000 worth of steel has been illegally shipped to the East thus far in 1950.

Another source said a shipment of American lead which arrived in the Netherlands went down the Rhine to Switzerland. The lead then went on to Stetten, Poland. American officials were aware of the transaction but were unable to interfere. Switzerland, until yesterday, had no export controls and had become a favored spot for international speculators. The little nation's decision yesterday to impose export and import controls may close that avenue.

Initial receivers of contraband slipping under the iron curtain have been Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Allied officials said, but they make no bones that they are convinced Russia ultimately gets the lion's share.

Recently the Allied High Commission asked West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to have his Government take steps to stop these movements of strategic materials to the East. Some officials say the Germans don't have adequate border police to halt the movement of contraband.

These are some of the ways, officials say, that illicit shipments are made:

Some contraband goes east under false papers. Other shipments are sold through Communist intermediaries who have set up dummy firms in West Germany. These are busy milking the strategic industries of the West German Republic.

These dummy firms are "fronts" for other intermediaries in Switzerland, Sweden, or the Netherlands whose job is to see that such shipments roll to Russia and its satellites.

Some authoritative quarters believe that at least a portion of United States Army surplus stocks have been sent to the east.

In this, too, their hands are all but tied.

THE NINETY-SIX TRADE TREATIES

Mr. President, beginning in March 1948 the junior Senator from Nevada started placing excerpts from foreign trade treaties in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD which were in full force and effect. They were not contraband. They were open and aboveboard.

EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

DECEMBER 15, 1950.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. RICHARDS, from the committee of conference, submitted the following

CONFERENCE REPORT

[To accompany S. 4234]

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:

That this Act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950".

SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this Act.

SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this Act.

(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished

by the United States; and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.

(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this Act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

(d) To make equitable distribution to the people in Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this Act, as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources, without discrimination as to race or political or religious belief.

(e) Whenever relief supplies furnished under this Act are sold for local currency by the Government of Yugoslavia, to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children, and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be mutually agreed upon.

(f) To take all appropriate economic measures to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of food stuffs within Yugoslavia, and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

SEC. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this Act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities in the possession of the Commodity Credit Corporation at prices authorized by section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

SEC. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this Act.

SEC. 6. At the termination of each three-month period after aid has been extended under this Act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said three-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this Act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

SEC. 7. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this Act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

SEC. 8. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this Act without charge against appropriated funds.

SEC. 9. At least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this Act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States-flag

commercial vessels at market rates for United States-flag commercial vessels, if available.

SEC. 10. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this Act, or is diverting from the purpose of this Act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds termination is desirable.

Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered.

And the House agree to the same.

JAS. P. RICHARDS,
HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS,
MIKE MANSFIELD,
CHARLES A. EATON,
JOHN M. VORYS,
Managers on the Part of the House.

TOM CONNALLY,
J. W. FULBRIGHT,
H. ALEXANDER SMITH,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 4234), to furnish emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the committee of conference and recommended in the accompanying conference report.

The House struck out all of the Senate bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute amendment. The committee of conference has agreed to a substitute for both the Senate bill and the House amendment. Except for the differences noted below and except for clarifying, clerical, and necessary conforming changes, the conference substitute is the same as the House version.

The preamble.—The House amendment contained a preamble, pointing out that Yugoslavia has urgently requested relief because of a drought and that it has expressed an intention to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations. The Senate bill contained no such preamble. The conference agreement strikes out this language. In the opinion of the committee of conference, the legislative history of the bill is clear that the first idea expressed here is already part of the legislation. The second idea is not sufficiently established as a fact to include it in this bill.

The "counterpart" provision.—One of the conditions of aid is that whenever relief supplies are furnished by the United States under this act and are sold for local currency in Yugoslavia, the Government of Yugoslavia must undertake to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be agreed upon between Yugoslavia and the United States. This provision was not in the House amendment. The House receded.

The theory of this provision is contained in a number of acts of Congress providing relief and assistance to foreign countries, such as Public Law 84, Eightieth Congress, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended. It has become known as the "counterpart" principle.

One of the purposes of this provision is to make every dollar of United States assistance count for as much as possible. This provision makes the American dollar do double duty. One of the important elements in the consideration of the bill in the House was the concern that United States assistance reach all those who need it and that the United States get the maximum return from the use of its resources.

Appropriate economic measures by Yugoslavia.—Another undertaking by Yugoslavia set forth in the House version was its agreement to take all necessary actions to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of food stuffs within Yugoslavia, and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies. This was not in the Senate version. It was the view of the House in adopting this pro-

vision that relief from the United States was only half of the picture. Action by the United States could be effective only if supplemented by self-help measures by Yugoslavia to meet its own crisis. The words "necessary actions" in the House version were designed to make the self-help feature of the program explicit. It was the view of the committee of conference, in adopting the language "appropriate economic measures", that this phrase more nearly conforms to this purpose. The language of the conference agreement paraphrases the language of Public Law 84, Eightieth Congress, in this respect. The requirement as now expressed in the conference agreement thus conforms to past practice.

The cost formula for the purchase of commodities.—The House version provided that the funds appropriated for the Yugoslav program shall be utilized as far as possible in the purchase of surplus commodities held by the Government. The purchase price was defined as "at Government cost." The Senate bill contained no such provision. The conference agreement provides that the price formula governing the sale of surplus commodities shall be the same as that already contained in section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

The House version required a price formula at variance with existing law under which surplus commodities have been furnished for foreign relief programs since 1948. The effect of the House language was to require an entirely different pricing arrangement than that now prevailing for ECA and any other foreign assistance program. The conference agreement makes it certain that this program will not receive any preferential treatment. It brings this program into line with the procedure already approved by the Congress on previous occasions.

Ocean transportation.—Both the House and Senate versions contain the provision requiring that at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of the aid supplied under the bill be transported on United States flag commercial vessels. The major point of difference concerned the words "if available" which were in the Senate version but not in the House version. The House receded. The absence of these words could result in a situation where shipment of the supplies might be held up because sufficient United States flag commercial vessels were not available. The retention of the words "if available" removes this possibility and affords greater flexibility.

JAS. P. RICHARDS,
HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS,
MIKE MANSFIELD,
CHARLES A. EATON,
JOHN M. VORYS,
Managers on the Part of the House.





September 30, 1950, the penalties prescribed by this section shall not be applicable if the taxpayer failed to meet the requirements of section 294 (relating to substantial under-estimate of estimated tax), by reason of the increase in tax on individuals imposed by the Revenue Act of 1950."

SEC. 2. Subparagraph (2) of subsection (d) of section 294 of the Internal Revenue Code is amended by adding at the end of subparagraph (2) a new sentence reading as follows: "In the case of taxable years beginning prior to October 1, 1950, and ending after September 30, 1950, the additions to tax prescribed by this subsection shall not be applicable if the taxpayer failed to meet the 80-percent and 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ -percent requirements of this section by reason of the increase in tax on individuals imposed by the Revenue Act of 1950."

With the following committee amendment:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the following: "That section 145 of the Internal Revenue Code (relating to penalties with respect to failure to file returns, pay tax, etc.) is amended by relettering subsection (e) as subsection (f) and by adding after subsection (d) a new subsection (e), as follows:

"(e) In the case of taxable years beginning prior to October 1, 1950, and ending after September 30, 1950, the penalties prescribed by this section shall not be applicable if the taxpayer failed to meet the requirements of section 294 (d) (2) (relating to substantial underestimate of estimated tax), by reason of the increase in normal tax and surtax on individuals imposed by section 101 of the Revenue Act of 1950."

"SEC. 2. Paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of section 294 of the Internal Revenue Code is amended by adding at the end of paragraph (2) a new sentence reading, as follows: 'In the case of taxable years beginning prior to October 1, 1950, and ending after September 30, 1950, the additions to tax prescribed by this subsection shall not be applicable if the taxpayer failed to meet the 80-percent and 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ -percent requirements of this paragraph by reason of the increase in normal tax and surtax on individuals imposed by section 101 of the Revenue Act of 1950.'"

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

(Mr. CURTIS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, the present law requires a taxpayer to estimate his income in advance and pay the tax currently. If during the year he finds that he has underestimated his tax, the law contains provisions for filing an amended estimate. If a taxpayer fails to estimate and pay an amount which is not equal to 80 percent of the tax finally found to be due, he is subject to a penalty.

H. R. 9913 provides in substance that if the taxpayer's estimate or declaration is in an amount sufficient to be 80 percent of the tax that would be found due under the tax rates that existed prior to the increase in rates provided in the Revenue Act of 1950, that no penalty will be assessed.

The purpose of this act is to make it unnecessary for a taxpayer to file an amended estimate or declaration if his

declaration already filed would not be subject to penalty under the tax rates that existed prior to the 1950 Revenue Act. The passage of this measure will save trouble and expense for millions of taxpayers. It will mean a saving of considerable sums to the Government in that these amended estimates will not have to be received and processed. There will be no loss in revenue to the Treasury. The additional amount of taxes due from an individual will be paid when he files his final return on or before March 15.

AMENDMENT OF SECTION 313 (B) OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (H. R. 8344) to amend section 313 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That section 313 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 be amended to read as follows:

"(b) Substitution for draw-back purposes: If imported duty-paid sugar; nonferrous metal; ore containing nonferrous metal; flaxseed and/or linseed, and oil, and duty-free or domestic merchandise of the same kind and quality are used in the manufacture or production of articles within a period not to exceed 1 year from the receipt of such imported merchandise by the manufacturer or producer of such articles, there shall be allowed upon the exportation of any such articles, notwithstanding the fact that none of the imported merchandise may actually have been used in the manufacture or production of the exported articles, an amount of draw-back equal to that which would have been allowable had the sugar; nonferrous metal; ore containing nonferrous metal; flaxseed and/or linseed, and oil, used therein been imported; but the total amount of draw-back allowed upon the exportation of such articles, together with the total amount of draw-back allowed in respect of such imported merchandise, under any other provision of law, shall not exceed 99 percent of the duty paid on such imported merchandise."

With the following committee amendment:

Page 1, line 7, strike out "flaxseed and/or linseed, and oil", and insert "flaxseed and linseed, and flaxseed and linseed oil."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. JENKINS: On page 2, line 7, strike out "flaxseed and/or linseed, and oil", and insert "flaxseed and linseed, and flaxseed and linseed oil."

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, as reported out unanimously by the Committee on Ways and Means, the committee amendment at page 1, line 7, applies on page 2, line 7.

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

YUGOSLAV EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ACT

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers on the part of the House may have until midnight tonight to file a report on the bill S. 4234.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. RICHARDS submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. 3204)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:

"That this Act may be cited as the 'Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950.'"

"SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this Act.

"SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

"(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this Act.

"(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States; and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.

"(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this Act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

"(d) To make equitable distribution to the people in Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this Act, as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources, without dis-

crimination as to race or political or religious belief.

"(e) Whenever relief supplies furnished under this Act are sold for local currency by the Government of Yugoslavia, to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children, and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be mutually agreed upon.

"(f) To take all appropriate economic measures to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of food stuffs within Yugoslavia, and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

"Sec. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this Act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities in the possession of the Commodity Credit Corporation at prices authorized by section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

"Sec. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this act.

"Sec. 6. At the termination of each three-month period after aid has been extended under this Act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said three-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this Act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

"Sec. 7. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this Act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

"Sec. 8. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this Act without charge against appropriated funds.

"Sec. 9. At least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this Act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States-flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States-flag commercial vessels, if available.

"Sec. 10. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

"(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this Act, or is diverting from the purpose of this Act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

"(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds termination is desirable.

"Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termina-

tion of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered."

And the House agree to the same.

JAS. P. RICHARDS,
HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS,
MIKE MANSFIELD,
CHARLES A. EATON,
JOHN M. VORYS,

Managers on the Part of the House.

TOM CONNALLY,
J. W. FULBRIGHT,
H. ALEXANDER SMITH,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 4234), to furnish emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the committee of conference and recommended in the accompanying conference report.

The House struck out all of the Senate bill after the enacting clause and inserted a substitute amendment. The committee of conference has agreed to a substitute for both the Senate bill and the House amendment. Except for the differences noted below and except for clarifying, clerical, and necessary conforming changes the conference substitute is the same as the House version.

The preamble: The House amendment contained a preamble, pointing out that Yugoslavia has urgently requested relief because of a drought and that it has expressed an intention to conform to its obligations as a member nation of the United Nations. The Senate bill contained no such preamble. The conference agreement strikes out this language. In the opinion of the committee of conference the legislative history of the bill is clear that the first idea expressed here is already part of the legislation. The second idea is not sufficiently established as a fact to include it in this bill.

The "counterpart" provision: One of the conditions of aid is that whenever relief supplies are furnished by the United States under this act and are sold for local currency in Yugoslavia, the Government of Yugoslavia must undertake to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be agreed upon between Yugoslavia and the United States. This provision was not in the House amendment. The House receded.

The theory of this provision is contained in a number of acts of Congress providing relief and assistance to foreign countries, such as Public Law 84, Eightieth Congress, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended. It has become known as the "counterpart" principle.

One of the purposes of this provision is to make every dollar of United States assistance count for as much as possible. This provision makes the American dollar do double duty. One of the important elements in the consideration of the bill in the House was the concern that United States assistance reach all those who need it and that the United States get the maximum return from the use of its resources.

Appropriate economic measures by Yugoslavia: Another undertaking by Yugoslavia set forth in the House version was its agreement to take all necessary actions to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of food-stuffs within Yugoslavia, and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies. This was not in the Senate version. It was the view of the House in adopting this provision that relief from the United States was only half of the picture. Action by the United

States could be effective only if supplemented by self-help measures by Yugoslavia to meet its own crisis. The words "necessary actions" in the House version were designed to make the self-help feature of the program explicit. It was the view of the committee of conference, in adopting the language "appropriate economic measures," that this phrase more nearly conforms to this purpose. The language of the conference agreement paraphrases the language of Public Law 84, Eightieth Congress, in this respect. The requirement as now expressed in the conference agreement thus conforms to past practice.

The cost formula for the purchase of commodities: The House version provided that the funds appropriated for the Yugoslav program shall be utilized as far as possible in the purchase of surplus commodities held by the Government. The purchase price was defined as "at Government cost". The Senate bill contained no such provision. The conference agreement provides that the price formula governing the sale of surplus commodities shall be the same as that already contained in section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

The House version required a price formula at variance with existing law under which surplus commodities have been furnished for foreign relief programs since 1948. The effect of the House language was to require an entirely different pricing arrangement than that now prevailing for ECA and any other foreign assistance program. The conference agreement makes it certain that this program will not receive any preferential treatment. It brings this program into line with the procedure already approved by the Congress on previous occasions.

Ocean transportation: Both the House and Senate versions contained the provision requiring that at least 50 percent of the gross tonnage of the aid supplied under the bill be transported on United States flag commercial vessels. The major point of difference concerned the words "if available" which were in the Senate version but not in the House version. The House receded. The absence of these words could result in a situation where shipment of the supplies might be held up because sufficient United States flag commercial vessels were not available. The retention of the words "if available" removes this possibility and affords greater flexibility.

JAS. P. RICHARDS,
HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS,
MIKE MANSFIELD,
CHARLES A. EATON,
JOHN M. VORYS,

Managers on the Part of the House.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

CANADIAN RIVER RECLAMATION PROJECT, TEXAS

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, I take this one-fourth minute in order to express my deepest gratitude to the Speaker and to Chairman J. HARDIN PETERSON, of the House Committee on Public Lands, and to Mr. McCORMACK, the majority leader, and to Speaker JOE MARTIN, the minority leader, and to Mr. CRAWFORD and Mr. D'EWART, and all members of the Committee on Public Lands and to the House membership on both sides of the aisle for the favorable action taken today on the

statement on the bill (H. R. 5244) for the relief of Lt. Col. Charles J. Trees, Army of the United States:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. 3205)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (H. R. 5244) a bill for the relief of Charles J. Trees, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum inserted by the Senate amendment on page 1, line 4, insert "\$9,448.86"; and the Senate agree to the same.

WILLIAM T. BYRNE,
WINFIELD K. DENTON,
Managers on the Part of the House.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
By W. E. JENNER,
W. E. JENNER,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 5244) for the relief of Lt. Col. Charles J. Trees, Army of the United States, submit the following statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conferees and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

This bill as passed the House would confer jurisdiction upon the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis division, to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Lt. Col. Charles J. Trees for damages allegedly sustained as the result of court-martial sentence of November 29, 1945, and nullified July 22, 1946.

The bill was originally introduced to appropriate the sum of \$21,948.86. The Senate amended the bill to appropriate the sum of \$21,948.86, as was originally introduced and, in view of the fact that a large amount of this appropriation was to compensate him for mental anguish, the conferees are of the opinion that this should not be allowed. However, the records indicate that he had an out-of-pocket expense of \$9,448.86 and should be reimbursed this amount, and at the conference the sum of \$9,448.86 was agreed upon.

WILLIAM T. BYRNE,
WINFIELD K. DENTON,
Managers on the Part of the House.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

PRAYER AND SUPPLICATION FOR PEACE AND DIVINE GUIDANCE

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, our Christmas joy is shadowed by a solemn sense of gloom, urgency, and emergency. Our Nation has girded itself for action to meet a situation threatening its very existence.

We are all at war, let us make no mistake about that—at war with the most ruthless and diabolical power which has ever cowed the good earth and whose purpose of world domination has been evident now for a long time. This power

is acting without conscience and guided by a Godless ideology and is threatening to the very survival of our cherished institutions.

America is the one and only hope of the world. Without us all free peoples would be crushed, ours is an awesome responsibility. In spite of our dire danger this is no time for panic and defeatism. If our Nation throws her all in this global test she is invincible.

Business as usual has been sidetracked and the material resources of this Nation have been mobilized to meet this destructive threat. The fate of the world will be settled by America.

While we are mobilizing our material resources in this hour of danger, we are deeply conscious of the fact that the moral and spiritual resources of our people constitute the Nation's great bulwark in times of national crisis and that the churches of the Nation of all creeds and faiths are the instruments through which our moral and spiritual resources can best be marshalled and given strength. Our greatest weapon is spiritual. America rests on spiritual verities. The spiritual forces of our Nation must be mobilized for this crisis.

I, therefore, introduced in the House on Friday House Resolution 886, calling upon the churches of the Nation of all creeds, beliefs, and faiths to observe, set aside and dedicate Sunday, December 24, as a time for prayer and supplication for peace and for divine guidance to the men and women, elected and appointed, civilian and military, on whose shoulders rest the responsibility for leadership in this time of great crisis, and for strength and unity to enable our people to persevere, with other freedom-loving people, in bringing about a lasting and permanent peace in the world.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ARE PATRIOTIC

Mr. O'HARA of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I was not on the floor the other day at the moment my friend and distinguished colleague from Illinois [Mr. VELDE], spoke on the subject of the city of Chicago and the State of Illinois. I have since read the context of his remarks as they appear on page 16569 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of December 11, 1950. I have never had occasion of feeling anything but pride in the State of Lincoln and Douglas, of Grant and Logan, of Altgeld and Dunne and Horner, of Oglesby and Yates, and Lowden. No State in the Union has more brilliantly proved its loyalty under the test of battle in the war with Mexico, the war of the sixties, the Spanish-American War, and World Wars I and II. Mr. Ellixor Libonati, the national chairman of the Americanization Committee of the American Legion, informs me that that great

organization which has gone exhaustively into the problem of communism places the maximum number of Communists in the entire State of Illinois, including the city of Chicago, at 8,000. I sincerely hope that my distinguished colleague in his zeal for uncovering the misdeeds and the twisted philosophy of the 8,000 did not intend to reflect upon the fine patriotism of the many millions of men and women of Illinois whose love of country is unsurpassed by that obtaining in any State in the Union.

CORRECTION OF RECORD

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, in my remarks as shown in the RECORD of Friday, December 15, there is a misquotation as to certain figures. I ask unanimous consent to have the RECORD corrected to show the right figures.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

THE JUDITH COPLON TRIAL

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill to correct a situation which, if allowed to continue, may seriously imperil the safety of our country.

This measure would permit the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and certain investigative agencies of the armed services to wire tap or intercept certain communications which they have due cause to believe would produce evidence or lead to the production of evidence by which saboteurs, traitors, and enemy agents might be apprehended and convicted of their crimes against this country.

Under the laws of our land at present, as interpreted by the courts, interception and divulgence of any communication is forbidden. Hence any evidence or information leading to the arrest of a person which has been obtained by means of wire tapping is not admissible in court. As a practical matter, if the FBI and other governmental investigative agencies are to operate efficiently and effectively to protect our national security, they must have the legal right to tap wires. Otherwise, we are saying to spies that they are free to use telephones in their espionage activities, but the Government is forbidden to tap those wires in its counterespionage work. What an absurd and dangerous result.

Of course, indiscriminate wire tapping must not be allowed nor practiced and any grant of authority to use these measures to apprehend specific types of criminals must be hedged about with strict protective measures so that the civil rights of our citizens shall be guarded at all times. Thus, it is provided in the

measure I have suggested that before intercepting communications, the investigational agency must obtain a permit from a Federal judge upon a showing of reasonable cause to believe that the communications may contain information which would assist in the conduct of such investigations.

But the recent case of Judith Coplon points up the present unfortunate predicament very clearly. Since the FBI had used the means of wire tapping to obtain evidence against her, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals felt compelled to rule against the Government, although, as the court decision said, her guilt was clear.

I fully realize that the time may be too short at this session to complete action on such a bill, but I intend to reintroduce a similar bill in the next Congress, since I am convinced that such authorized, limited use of wire tapping is an indispensable weapon in our fight to protect fully our national security. Speedy enactment of this or similar legislation is essential. We must not tie the hands of our investigative agencies in safeguarding our country against enemy spies.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. PLUMLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Vermont?

There was no objection.

RETIREMENT OF HON. CHARLES A. PLUMLEY

Mr. PLUMLEY. Mr. Speaker, circumstances over which I have no control may determine the early hour of my departure from these Halls and these surroundings and from my friends on both sides of the aisle. May I be privileged in these hours of terrific personal responsibility which I shirk, to hope and pray for each and every one of you, and all of us, that for now and forever the day may break and all shadows flee.

That is the symposium of the responsibility of those of you who must see to it that democracy survives. God love you as I leave you.

PERMISSION TO ADDRESS THE HOUSE

Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

(Mr. RICH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

SEXUAL PERVERTS IN GOVERNMENT EMPLOY

Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, I have just read an article about the number of sexual perverts in the employ of the Government. I never thought there were so many homosexuals in the whole United States. According to the article, the committee that has been investigating this matter has found that 574

such persons have quit their jobs and that 420 have been fired. Does it not amaze you to think of all these people they have in the Government? What we need is a thorough housecleaning and the quicker the better.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes today, tomorrow, and Wednesday, at the conclusion of the legislative program and following any special orders heretofore entered.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. WICKERSHAM asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a radio address.

Mr. BAILEY (at the request of Mr. WIER) was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article from the Clarksburg News, of Clarksburg, W. Va.

Mr. BONNER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances, in one to include a digest of the inaugural address of President Gordon Gray, of the Consolidated University of North Carolina; and in the other to include a newspaper article on the anniversary of the Wright inaugural flight at Kitty Hawk, N. C.

Mr. CARNAHAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. LANE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include newspaper items.

Mr. ELLIOTT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include extraneous matter.

Mr. BENTSEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a newspaper article.

Mr. HUBER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include two newspaper articles.

Mr. O'HARA of Minnesota asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in seven instances and include in one an address by William L. Hutchinson.

Mr. MASON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article.

Mr. COTTON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include extraneous matter.

Mr. PLUMLEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include extraneous matter.

Mr. AUCHINCLOSS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an address by Governor Dewey, notwithstanding the fact that it will exceed two pages of the RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$184.50.

Mr. HARVEY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial appearing in the Indianapolis News.

Mr. CLEVINGER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and include editorials.

Mr. FORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include two editorials.

Mr. DAVIS of Wisconsin asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a copy of a letter from the manager of the Veterans' Administration regional office of Milwaukee.

Mr. POTTER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. MCCORMACK asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include certain information.

Mr. MCGREGOR asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. RICH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article appearing in the Times-Herald entitled "Perverts in Official Agencies Called Peril to the United States Security."

Mr. HARRISON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

EMERGENCY RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the managers on the part of the House be read in lieu of the report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the statement.

(For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of December 15, 1950.)

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, may I say for the information of the House that there were few important differences between the Senate bill and the House bill, and I believe I will be joined in this statement by the ranking minority Member on the other side.

I see no reason for extended debate on the conference report. It speaks for itself.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDS. I yield.

Mr. VORYS. This is a unanimous conference report, is it not?

Mr. RICHARDS. That is correct.

Mr. VORYS. The bill now reflects the so-called counterpart funds principle in the Fulbright amendment, providing that when relief supplies are sold for local currency, an equivalent amount of such currency shall be used for mutually agreed purposes. Is that not correct?

Mr. RICHARDS. The bill contains at least part of the principle for which the gentleman from Ohio fought on the floor of the House the other day. It provides a local currency fund for relief to needy persons, children, and for charitable and medical purposes.

Mr. VORYS. In any case it contains the so-called Fulbright amendment?

Mr. RICHARDS. That is correct.

Mr. VORYS. And it also preserves the House amendment on self-help, with clarifying changes, which would require appropriate economic measures to reduce relief needs, such as marking time on collectivization while this program is going on?

Mr. RICHARDS. That is substantially correct.

Mr. VORYS. I think it is a better bill than when it left the House floor, and I approve of the conference report.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The conference report was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CONSENT CALENDAR

The SPEAKER. This is Consent Calendar day. The Clerk will call the first bill on the Consent Calendar.

PRESERVING COMPENSATION AND LEAVE BENEFITS FOR POST-OFFICE CUSTODIAL EMPLOYEES

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 8711) relating to the compensation and leave benefits of officers and employees in the custodial service of the Post Office Department transferred to the General Services Administration under Reorganization Plan No. 18 of 1950.

Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?

There was no objection.

AMENDING SECTION 17 OF THE CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 8883) to amend section 17 of the Contract Settlement Act of 1944 so as to authorize the payment of fair compensation to persons contracting to deliver certain strategic or critical minerals or metals in cases of failure to recover reasonable costs, and for other purposes.

Mr. TRIMBLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

AMENDING THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 7789) to amend the Railway Labor Act to authorize agreements providing for union membership and agreements for deductions from the wages of carriers' employees for certain purposes and under certain conditions.

Mr. RICH. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

AID TO NEEDY AMERICANS FOR THEIR REPATRIATION

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 8927) to authorize aid to needy American nationals in connection with their repatriation from foreign countries, and for other purposes.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is their objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

AMENDING SECTION 9 (a) OF THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT

The Clerk called the bill (S. 1837) to amend the Trading With the Enemy Act.

Mr. ASPINALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Colorado?

There was no objection.

AMENDING SECTION 1205 OF TITLE XII OF THE MERCHANT MARINE ACT, 1936, AS AMENDED

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 9715) to amend section 1205 of title XII of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that this bill be passed over without prejudice.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

GRANTING VETERANS' PREFERENCE TO MOTHERS OF CERTAIN VETERANS

The Clerk called the bill (S. 3263) to amend Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 with respect to certain mothers of veterans.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That section 2 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, as amended (5 U. S. C. 851), is amended by striking out clauses 5 and 6 and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(5) mothers of deceased ex-servicemen or ex-servicewomen who lost their lives, under honorable conditions while on active duty in any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States during any war, or in any campaign or expedition (for which a campaign badge has been authorized), or of service-connected permanently and totally disabled ex-servicemen or ex-servicewomen who were separated from such Armed Forces under honorable conditions if—

(A) the father is totally and permanently disabled, or

(B) the mother was widowed, divorced, or separated from the father and—

(1) has not remarried, or

(2) has remarried but (i) her husband is totally and permanently disabled or (ii) she is divorced or legally separated from her husband or such husband is dead at the time preference is claimed."

SEC. 2. (a) Section 3 of such act, as amended, is amended by striking out "(5) and (6)" and inserting in lieu thereof "and (5)"

(b) Section 10 of such act is amended by striking out "(5) and (6)" and inserting in lieu thereof "and (5)."

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ACCUMULATION OF COMPENSATORY TIME IN THE POSTAL SERVICE

The Clerk called the bill (S. 3354) to amend section 3 of the Postal Salary Act of July 6, 1945.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That section 3 of the act entitled "An act to reclassify the salaries of postmasters, officers, and employees of the Postal Service; to establish uniform procedures for computing compensation; and for other purposes," approved July 6, 1945 (59 Stat. 435), as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. (a) When the needs of the service require employees to perform service on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, such employees shall be allowed compensatory time for such service on 1 day within 5 working days next succeeding the Saturday or Sunday and within 30 days next succeeding the holiday.

"(b) If the service so performed on Saturdays and Sundays is less than 8 hours, such service may, in the discretion of the Postmaster General, be carried forward and combined with similar service performed on other Saturdays and Sundays, and such employees may be allowed compensatory time for such combined service or any part thereof at any time, except that, whenever at least 8 hours of such service has been accumulated, such employees shall be allowed 8 hours compensatory time on 1 day within 5 working days next succeeding the Saturday or Sunday on which the total accumulated service was at least 8 hours.

"(c) The Postmaster General may, if the exigencies of the service require, authorize the payment of overtime to employees other than supervisory employees whose base salaries, exclusive of longevity salary, are more than \$4,170 per annum, for services performed on Saturdays, Sundays, and Christmas Day during the month of December, in lieu of compensatory time.

"(d) Supervisory employees shall be allowed compensatory time for services performed in excess of 8 hours per day, and those whose base salaries, exclusive of longevity salary, are more than \$4,170 per annum shall be allowed compensatory time for services performed on Saturdays, Sundays, and on Christmas Day during the month of December, within 180 days from the days such service was performed.

"(e) The provisions of this section shall not apply to employees in the Postal Transportation Service; post-office inspectors; rural carriers; traveling mechanics; examiners of equipment and supplies; clerks in third-class post offices; and employees paid on an hourly basis."

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

INCLUDING TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES OF SENATE AND HOUSE UNDER PROVISIONS OF CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT ACT

The Clerk called the bill (S. 3672) to amend section 3 (c) of the Civil Service Retirement Act so as to make the exclusion from such act of temporary employees of the Senate and House of Representatives inapplicable to such employees with one or more years of service.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That section 3 (c) of the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended by section 3 of the act of January 24, 1942, as amended is further amended by inserting after the words "The provisions of this act shall not apply to employees of the Senate or the House of Representatives whose employment is temporary or of uncertain duration" the words "unless and until such employees shall have served continuously in such employment for at least 1 year: *Provided*, That chairmen of committees shall give notice in writing to the disbursing office concerned on or before the date when the services of such employees are to commence or terminate, or when salary changes are to become effective."

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ASSIGNMENT OF SURPLUS CLERKS IN THE POSTAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

The Clerk called the bill (S. 3910) relating to the assignment of surplus clerks in the postal transportation service.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the paragraph headed "Railway Mail Service" in the act entitled "An act making appropriations for the service of the Post Office Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1918, and for other purposes" approved March 3, 1917, as amended, is amended by inserting after the second proviso thereof (62 Stat. 575; 39 U. S. C. 632) the following: "*Provided further*, That when a surplus clerk cannot be placed in a position of his grade without giving him preference over a clerk with a longer continuous postal transportation service record, he may be relegated to a lower-grade position in his own organization or transferred elsewhere to any grade that may be available for a regular clerk of his standing, under such regulations as the Postmaster General may prescribe."

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CONTRACTS FOR TRANSMISSION OF MAIL BY PNEUMATIC TUBES

The Clerk called the bill (S. 4102) relating to contracts for the transmission of mail by pneumatic tubes or other mechanical devices.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Postmaster General may enter into contracts, for terms not exceeding 10 years, for the transmission of mail by pneumatic tubes or other mechanical devices.

Sec. 2. Contracts for the transmission of mail by pneumatic tubes or other mechanical devices shall be subject to the provisions of laws relating to the letting of mail contracts, except as otherwise provided in this act. Advertisements shall state in general terms only the requirements of the service and shall be in the form best calculated to invite competitive bidding. The Postmaster General may reject any and all bids. No contract shall be awarded except to the lowest responsible bidder tendering full and sufficient guaranties to the satisfaction of the Postmaster General of his ability to perform satisfactory service.

Sec. 3. In the city of New York, including the Borough of Brooklyn, the annual rate of expenditure for the transmission of mail

by pneumatic tubes shall not exceed \$15,500 per mile per annum of double line pneumatic-tube facilities for a period of 10 years, after which time the annual rate of expenditures per mile shall not exceed \$12,000. This rate shall be inclusive of maintenance expenses but shall be exclusive of all operating expenses.

SEC. 4. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent or in conflict with this act are hereby repealed. This shall include, but is not limited to, the following laws:

(a) The provisions of the acts of April 21, 1902; March 2, 1907; May 27, 1908; and June 19, 1922 (39 U. S. C. 423), relating to contracts for transmission of mail by pneumatic tubes; and

(b) The act entitled "An act to provide for certain administrative expenses in the Post Office Department, including retainerment of pneumatic-tube systems, and for other purposes," approved June 30, 1948 (62 Stat. 1163).

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

AUTHORIZING RELIEF OF CERTAIN AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICERS

The Clerk called the bill (H. R. 9828) to authorize relief of authorized certifying officers of terminated war agencies in liquidation by the Department of Labor.

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Comptroller General of the United States is authorized and directed to allow credit in the accounts of authorized certifying officers of terminated war agencies, in process of liquidation by the Department of Labor at the time of the enactment of this act, for the amounts of suspensions and disallowances, which have been, or may be, raised by the General Accounting Office on account of payments made in accordance with vouchers certified by such certifying officers: *Provided*, That the Secretary of Labor or his authorized representative shall certify that in his opinion there is no evidence of fraud or collusion on the part of the certifying officers in connection with the payments.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

The SPEAKER. That is the last eligible bill on the calendar.

REDEFINING ELIGIBILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. CELLER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's desk the bill (S. 4240) to amend the act incorporating the American Legion so as to redefine eligibility for membership therein, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That section 5 of the act approved September 16, 1919 (41 Stat. 285; U. S. C. of 1946, title 36, sec. 45), entitled "An act to incorporate The American Legion," as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 5. That no person shall be a member of this corporation unless he served in the naval or military services of the United

States at some time during any of the following periods: April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1918; December 7, 1941, to September 2, 1945; June 25, 1950, to the date of cessation of hostilities, as determined by the United States Government; all dates inclusive, or, who being citizens of the United States at the time of entry therein, served in the military or naval services of any of the governments associated with the United States during said wars or hostilities: *Provided, however*, That such person shall have an honorable discharge or separation from such service or continues to serve honorably after any of the aforesaid terminal dates."

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

A similar House bill was laid on the table.

ELIGIBILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN AMVETS

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (S. 4254) to redefine eligibility for membership in AMVETS—American Veterans of World War II.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That section 6 of the act approved July 23, 1947, Public Law 216, Eightieth Congress (61 Stat. 407; 36 U. S. C. 67e), is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 6. Any person who served in the Armed Forces of the United States of America or any American citizen who served in the armed forces of an allied nation of the United States on or after September 16, 1940, and before the legal termination of World War II, is eligible for regular membership in AMVETS, provided such service when terminated by discharge or release from active duty be by honorable discharge or separation. No person who is a member of, or who advocates the principles of, any organization believing in, or working for, the overthrow of the United States Government by force, and no person who refuses to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, shall be privileged to become, or continue to be, a member of this organization."

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

TO AMEND INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND FEDERAL ALCOHOL ADMINISTRATION ACT

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (H. R. 3229) to amend the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That section 2806 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"(d) All distilled spirits found in any cask or package, and any bottled distilled spirits found in any case, without having upon such

By Mr. McCARRAN:

S. 4267. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to provide better facilities for the enforcement of the customs and immigration laws," approved June 26, 1930, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(Mr. CHAPMAN (for Mr. KEFAUVER), from the Committee on Armed Services, reported an original bill (S. 4268) to authorize a Federal civil defense program, and for other purposes, which was ordered to be placed on the calendar, and appears under a separate heading.)

AMENDMENT OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF FIRST WAR POWERS ACT, 1941—AMENDMENTS

Mr. McCLELLAN submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 4264) to amend and extend certain provisions of the First War Powers Act, 1941, which were referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, and ordered to be printed.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles, and referred, as indicated:

H. R. 3229. An act to amend the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, as amended; and

H. R. 9911. An act to authorize the payment by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs of a gratuitous indemnity to survivors of members of the Armed Forces who die in active service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.

H. R. 8848. An act to provide for a study of the mental and physical sequelae of malnutrition and starvation suffered by prisoners of war and civilian internees during World War II; and

H. R. 9828. An act to authorize relief of authorized certifying officers of terminated war agencies in liquidation by the Department of Labor; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE—REPORT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GEORGE C. MARSHALL

[Mr. O'CONOR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD portions of a report by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, entitled "For the Common Defense," which appears in the Appendix.]

EULOGY OF ENSIGN JESSE L. BROWN BY ROSCOE SIMMONS

[Mr. O'CONOR asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD a eulogy of Ensign Jesse L. Brown, of Mississippi, by Roscoe Simmons, published in the Washington Times-Herald, Sunday, December 17, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

OUR BURNED FINGERS—EDITORIAL FROM THE OMAHA MORNING WORLD-HERALD

[Mr. WHERRY asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Our Burned Fingers," published in the December 15, 1950, issue of the Omaha Morning World-Herald, which appears in the Appendix.]

FUTILITY OF EFFORTS TO BUY FRIENDSHIP OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES—ARTICLE BY GEORGE SOKOLSKY

[Mr. KEM asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article regarding the attempted purchase of friendship abroad, by George Sokolsky, published in the Washington Times-Herald, December 19, 1950, which appears in the Appendix.]

CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY AND THE CITIZEN—ARTICLE BY NATHAN BOONE WILLIAMS

[Mr. HUNT asked and obtained leave to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "Congressional Immunity and the Citizen," written by Nathan Boone Williams, and published in the current issue of the District of Columbia Bar Association Journal, which appears in the Appendix.]

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

As in executive session,

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

One hundred and sixty-two postmasters.

NOMINATION OF ANNA M. ROSENBERG TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE—EXECUTIVE REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

Mr. BYRD, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted a report (Ex. Rept. No. 16) on the nomination of Anna M. Rosenberg, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense, which was ordered to be printed.

MILLARD E. TYDINGS

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I should like to read into the body of the RECORD a resolution which was adopted unanimously this morning by the Armed Services Committee. The purpose of resolution will become clear when I read it. It reads as follows:

MILLARD E. TYDINGS

To do proper honor to him and in recognition of his long and distinguished service to his State and Nation, we, his colleagues on the Senate Armed Services Committee, are privileged to present to MILLARD E. TYDINGS, our departing chairman, this commemorative scroll.

A statesman and a patriot, he has at all times labored diligently and unselfishly for his country's welfare. His 35 years of congressional service, following distinguished and heroic participation in World War I, have been marked by his clear awareness of the need for vigilance and preparedness. His wisdom in fighting tirelessly for adequate defense measures is impressively borne out against the backdrop of world tension and conflict today.

It has indeed been fortunate for our Nation that MILLARD E. TYDINGS' leadership of the Senate Armed Services Committee has so effectively promoted those principles of preparedness in which he and we so strongly believe. He has guided with skill and rare ability the work of this committee during these past two critical years. His wide experience and keen judgment have been of inestimable value to his colleagues as they have faced the great and grave problems that have so often arisen.

As he has been friend to us as well as chairman, we have been honored by warm, personal association with him. His absence will hence be felt the more keenly. Our sincere good wishes go with him in all future undertakings. With a sense of high privilege

we here set down our signatures in testimony of our respect and friendship for MILLARD E. TYDINGS.

RICHARD B. RUSSELL, HARRY FLOOD BYRD, VIRGIL M. CHAPMAN, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, ESTES KEFAUVER, LESTER C. HUNT, STYLES BRIDGES, CHAN GURNEY, LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, WAYNE MORSE, WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, HARRY P. CAIN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 14, 1950.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Snader, its assistant reading clerk, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the following enrolled bills and joint resolution, and they were signed by the Vice President:

S. 3263. An act to amend Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 with respect to certain mothers of veterans;

S. 3654. An act to amend section 3 of the Postal Salary Act of July 6, 1945;

S. 3672. An act to amend section 3 (c) of the Civil Service Retirement Act so as to make the exclusion from such act of temporary employees of the Senate and House of Representatives inapplicable to such employees with one or more years of service;

S. 3910. An act relating to the assignment of surplus clerks in the Postal Transportation Service;

S. 4102. An act relating to contracts for the transmission of mail by pneumatic tubes or other mechanical devices;

S. 4229. An act to extend to certain persons who served in the military, naval, or air service on or after June 27, 1950, the benefits of Public Law No. 16, Seventy-eighth Congress, as amended;

S. 4240. An act to amend the act incorporating the American Legion so as to redefine eligibility for membership therein;

S. 4254. An act to redefine eligibility for membership in AMVETS (American Veterans of World War II);

H. R. 2093. An act authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to execute a quitclaim deed to property owned by Jacob F. Riedel;

H. R. 2733. An act to authorize the construction, operation, and maintenance by the Secretary of the Interior of the Canadian River reclamation project, Texas;

H. R. 4579. An act to amend section 333 of title 28 of the United States Code to provide for the attendance at judicial conferences of their respective circuits of the district judges in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, Hawaii, and Alaska;

H. R. 5487. An act to provide for the review of orders of the Federal Communications Commission under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and of certain orders of the Secretary of Agriculture made under the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended, and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930, as amended, and of orders of the United States Maritime Commission, or the Federal Maritime Board or the Maritime Administration under the Shipping Act, 1916, as amended, and the Intercoastal Shipping Act, 1933, as amended;

H. R. 5902. An act for the relief of the Pan American Union;

H. R. 6228. An act for the relief of Dr. Chao-jen Chen, Dr. Janet Wang Chen, and Eleanor Chen;

H. R. 7735. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Army to grant to the Southern California Edison Co. an easement and right-of-way for electric-transmission-line purposes in the Santa Fe flood-control basin and the San Gabriel River improvement, California;

H. R. 8821. An act authorizing payment to certain States amounts withheld from grazing fees on public lands;

H. R. 8834. An act for the relief of Yama-guchi Michiko;

H. R. 8851. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to transfer by quitclaim deed to the Browns Point Improvement Club a portion of a small strip of land at Coast Guard light station facility, Browns Point, Pierce County, Wash., and to transfer by quitclaim deed the remaining portion of such strip to the county of Pierce, State of Washington;

H. R. 9284. An act to amend the act entitled "An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States," approved July 1, 1898, and acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto;

H. R. 9475. An act for the relief of Mrs. Enid Louise Noble Romick, Jr.;

H. R. 9681. An act to authorize the waiver of the navigation and vessel-inspection laws; and

S. J. Res. 209. Joint resolution to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended.

ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, December 19, 1950, he presented to the President of the United States the following enrolled bills and joint resolution:

S. 3263. An act to amend Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 with respect to certain mothers of veterans;

S. 3654. An act to amend section 3 of the Postal Salary Act of July 6, 1945;

S. 3672. An act to amend section 3 (c) of the Civil Service Retirement Act so as to make the exclusion from such act of temporary employees of the Senate and House of Representatives inapplicable to such employees with one or more years of service;

S. 3910. An act relating to the assignment of surplus clerks in the Postal Transportation Service;

S. 4102. An act relating to contracts for the transmission of mail by pneumatic tubes or other mechanical devices;

S. 4229. An act to extend to certain persons who served in the military, naval, or air service on or after June 27, 1950, the benefits of Public Law No. 16, Seventy-eighth Congress, as amended;

S. 4240. An act to amend the act incorporating The American Legion so as to redefine eligibility for membership therein;

S. 4254. An act to redefine eligibility for membership in AMVETS (American Veterans of World War II); and

S. J. Res. 209. Joint resolution to amend and extend the provisions of the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act, as amended.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

On his own request, and by unanimous consent, Mr. TOBEY was excused from attendance on the remainder of the session of the Senate today.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO YUGOSLAVIA—CONFERENCE REPORT

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, with the understanding that it is without prejudice to the right of the Senator from North Dakota to the floor, I ask unanimous consent to call up the conference report on Senate bill 4234, to provide aid to Yugoslavia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I submit a conference report on the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general

welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, and I ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina in the chair). The report will be read for the information of the Senate.

The report was read by the legislative clerk, as follows:

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House to the bill (S. 4234) to promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:

"That this Act may be cited as the 'Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950'.

"SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this Act.

"SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

"(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this Act.

"(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States; and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.

"(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this Act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

"(d) To make equitable distribution to the people in Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this Act, as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources, without discrimination as to race or political or religious belief.

"(e) Whenever relief supplies furnished under this Act are sold for local currency by the Government of Yugoslavia, to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children, and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be mutually agreed upon.

"(f) To take all appropriate economic measures to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of foodstuffs within Yugoslavia, and to

lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

"Sec. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this Act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities in the possession of the Commodity Credit Corporation at prices authorized by section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

"Sec. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this Act.

"Sec. 6. At the termination of each three-month period after aid has been extended under this Act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said three-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this Act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

"Sec. 7. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this Act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

"Sec. 8. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this Act without charge against appropriated funds.

"SEC. 9. At least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this Act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States-flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States-flag commercial vessels, if available.

"SEC. 10. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

"(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this act, or is diverting from the purpose of this act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

"(b) Whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds termination is desirable.

"Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this act and not yet delivered."

And the House agree to the same.

TOM CONNALLY,

J. W. FULBRIGHT,

H. ALEXANDER SMITH,

Managers on the Part of the Senate.

JAS. P. RICHARDS,

HELEN GAHAGAN DOUGLAS,

MIKE MANSFIELD,

CHARLES A. EATON,

JOHN M. VORYS,

Managers on the Part of the House.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the conference report?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is upon agreeing to the conference report.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, I should merely like to have the Senator from Arkansas call attention briefly, for the RECORD, to the differences between the Senate and House, and also to explain the nature of the compromise.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I may say to the minority leader that we had a very amicable conference with the House conferees. There was no real controversy. There are perhaps three points which may be of interest. One had to do with the counterpart provision, which was inserted by the Senate committee and adopted on the floor, which provided that whenever any of the goods were sold for local currencies, they should be subject to disposal by mutual agreement. It is a provision very similar to that which is in effect in ECA. As to this provision the House receded, and went along without any difficulty.

The next most important difference, I think, was with regard to the cost formula for the purchase of commodities. The conference agreed that the House provision might work very great difficulty in connection with the administration, and that the provision of section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended, should be adopted. It is exactly the same procedure which was followed in the setting of prices on commodities under the existing aid bill. The House agreed to that.

There was one other point. The Senate had provided that the words "if available" be included in the provision requiring 50 percent of the shipments to be in American bottoms. The House had stricken the words "if available." The conference reinserted the two words, to make the language conform to the Senate version.

In the conference, a paragraph of the preamble which had been inserted by the House was eliminated. The conferees agreed that it was unnecessary and would create certain implications unwarranted by the facts.

There was one other provision which is perhaps worthy of notice. I refer to the language requiring Yugoslavia to take appropriate economic measures to assist in the production of their own food supply, and in the elimination of certain difficulties which they have encountered as a result of the drought.

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I have no doubt that the conferees, in view of this measure having passed both Houses, have worked out what they conceived to be the very best possible bill to carry out the measure's announced objectives. It is not my purpose to criticize the report of the conferees, but I feel that this measure is a mistake of such magnitude that I should be derelict in my duty to my country were I not to raise my voice again in opposition to its final enactment. I certainly criticize no one who may disagree with me and who may

hold views contrary to those that I shall express.

It is not my purpose to criticize them, but in this critical period in the history of the world, in this emergency in which our Nation is facing a crisis unparalleled in its history, at a time when we are, in all probability and from every indication we shall be compelled to draw upon all our resources, manpower, material, and economic resources, to the very limit to produce the maximum strength we can develop to resist communism and the aggression of communism, Mr. President, it is the height of stupidity for this Congress and for this Government to give \$38,000,000, \$50,000,000 or any other material assistance to any Communist dictator, Tito or any other Communist ruler or government.

Mr. President, this is supposed to be a relief bill. It is, in truth and in fact, a military assistance bill. I know, Mr. President, that when this bill came before the Senate it was passed by a vote of 60 to 21. The House, after 2 days of debate, passed it by a vote of 225 to 142. I am not unmindful, Mr. President, that my efforts now will fail, but I want this record clear. I do not believe that any impartial person can read the record of debate on this measure, or read the reports filed by the respective committees, and come to any conclusion other than that it is simply an attempt to coddle and to appease another Communist dictator.

Mr. President, to speak for this bill one has to concede, as all who supported it and advocated it did concede, that in the enactment of this measure we are taking what is termed a calculated risk. Mr. President, on the other side of it, this measure constitutes a calculated fraud instigated by Tito and being perpetrated on the American people. It is not even a gamble—we haven't a chance—we are the loser before we start.

What do we hope to gain? This bill is not necessary. The aid provided in it is not needed to prevent people from starving. It is needed only to enable Dictator Tito to carry out an industrial program for military purposes.

Let us see, Mr. President, if it is imperative that such legislation be enacted to help to prevent people from starving. Let us see if it is necessary to relieve the hungry and the distressed.

Mr. President, the records show, and I think these figures are undisputed, that notwithstanding the drought that has been represented to us to be so severe in Yugoslavia this year, Yugoslavia has produced 108 percent of her normal crop of sugar; she has produced 100 percent of her normal rice crop, 88 percent of wheat; 87 percent of barley, 83 percent of rye, 79 percent of oats, and 59 percent of her normal corn production.

Mr. President, we in America have suffered such reductions in normal crops in the past, and no one starved here, although our standard of production may have been higher.

Let us see what we are proposing to do. It is said, and I assume these statistics are not controverted—I have not found that they are disputed anywhere in the debate on the measure—it is said

that in the postwar years, with millions of dollars, approximately \$421,000,000 of direct aid from our country to Yugoslavia, she raised her daily calorie consumption per capita to 2,800. It is now agreed that even with the shortage in crops, her present food supply in agricultural products, without any aid from us, Yugoslavia has and can provide 2,300 calories daily for each person.

Mr. President, is that such a deficiency in food that it recommends to this Government in the present world crisis that we should provide by gift to Yugoslavia money and food sufficient to raise those calories up to 2,600 per person as this measure is intended to do? Mr. President, if that justifies this expenditure, then let us see where else we may have similar and even more pressing obligations, because, Mr. President, 2,300 calories is more abundant than the number of calories now consumed by half the populations of the world.

Brazil, our neighbor to the south, is consuming only 2,343 calories per capita daily; Chile is consuming only 2,351; Colombia, 2,283; Peru, 1,925; Japan, 1,834; Pakistan, 2,028; the Philippines, 1,908; Burma, 1,986; China, 2,115; India, 1,621.

Some of those nations certainly are our friends. Some of their people surely believe in liberty and in democracy and are opposed to dictator rule. If we are fighting the cause of freedom, Mr. President, and want to strengthen nations and give aid where it will be received with gratitude and used to help stem the tide of communistic aggression, we can better consider some of those countries, and give aid that might be appreciated by governments friendly to us and not an enemy as is the government and ruler of Yugoslavia.

Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. Does the Senator from Arkansas have in mind that at the meetings of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, in Dublin, in September, to which a delegation from this body was sent and of which the Senator from Maine is a member, representatives of India, Ceylon, and Burma announced that we were in favor of colonialism and had given aid in the matter of food to other nations when their standard was very much higher than their own, and we had not given aid to them? In other words, apparently Communist propaganda had made very great inroads among their people, if we are to credit their representatives, to the proposition that our aid was wholly a matter, not of humanitarian sympathy, but of power and military expediency; that otherwise we should, as the Senator from Arkansas has pointed out, consider assisting the other suffering peoples of the world, and that we are cultivating a very great deal of distrust and suspicion by the manner in which our program is being carried out.

Mr. McCLELLAN. I wish to say to the able Senator from Maine that we have heard frequently on the floor of the Senate remarks to the effect that we must be careful in what we are doing so as not to give Communists an opportu-

nity to make use of our actions for propaganda purposes. What will be thought by other peoples of the world whose distress is greater and whose purposes and hopes of liberty, freedom, independence, and democracy are in accord with ours when we, as the champions of freedom, direct aid to a military communistic dictator, who has disregarded, violated, and trampled upon every principle of righteousness for which we stand, in order to gain the power he holds today. Shall we provide Yugoslavia with 2,600 calories for her people and at the same time not turn a hand to aid those who are with us and not against us, and who are now living on far less than Yugoslavia already has?

Mr. President, by this act, innocent though it may be on the part of those who support it, we would definitely help a Communist dictator. With what benefit in mind to us shall we do it? That possibly, Mr. President—if Stalin moves, Tito will furnish some opposition. I may say, Mr. President, as I said in my remarks when the bill was up for consideration in the Senate:

If Stalin decides to move and does not decide to move directly against Tito, he will simply bypass Tito. In that case, Tito will not be in the way and will not come to our assistance or to the assistance of Europe. He will not come to our assistance until such time as we have the war so nearly won that he will want to jump in on the winning side, as Mussolini thought he was doing in World War II.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I yield.

Mr. KEM. In that connection, I should like to ask the Senator from Arkansas how many troops Tito or Yugoslavia has sent to Korea during the present engagements there.

Mr. McCLELLAN. The able Senator from Missouri is a moment ahead of me. I started to draw the example that we are in a crisis, with our boys being killed by the hordes of communism, to whose ideology and principles and purposes Tito subscribes. Mr. President, although Yugoslavia is a member of the United Nations, although the United Nations is the defender in Korea, not one soldier has Yugoslavia supplied. Not one soldier, Mr. President, not one single piece of armament will she supply when Stalin starts to march against the western powers. What are we doing? With this aid we would simply be building up Yugoslavia's economic strength. We would make it possible for her to continue her so-called 5-year industrial program without serious interruption. That 5-year program, of course, is to build up her industries, which is a commendable thing for any country to do. However, with the need for rehabilitation of the free world, in the name of heaven why should we, under the economic strain under which we shall have to labor to meet the crisis which confronts us, further weaken ourselves and expend our resources to help a Communist dictator upon whom we cannot rely?

Someone has said that by aiding Tito we would be taking a calculated risk. Mr. President, it would be necessary to calculate a long string of figures until it would be possible to get down to the point where we would not be taking a complete risk.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. McCLELLAN. I am glad to yield.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator whether the importance of creating a feeling of solidarity among the countries of the Western Hemisphere has not often been pointed out. In that connection I should like to say to the Senator from Arkansas that within the last month I had occasion to visit five countries in Central America and also Mexico. In each one of the countries our party was frequently asked about the Marshall plan. It was pointed out to us that their countries had to meet the same conditions which Western Europe had to meet and for which the Marshall plan was intended as an alleviating factor. The people in those countries pointed out to us that they have difficulty in keeping up their standards of living. They pointed out to us that they are faced with the threat of Communist infiltration. They said to us, "The United States is sending these millions and millions of dollars all over Western Europe. Why is it that you do not realize our problems here right at home?"

Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the remarks of the Senator from Missouri. I do not wish unduly to extend my remarks. I simply wish to say that in this fight against communism, if this is the occasion when the blue chips are down, in all probability it will take all the resources that our Nation can marshal. Will we not learn from history? Are we to continue to repeat mistake after mistake?

Mr. President, the time has come for us to get away from the idea that every time it is proposed to give away some money we ought to go along with the suggestion on the basis of the calculated risk that somewhere in the future, somewhere down the line, we shall get some benefit from it.

Mr. President, if Tito needs food, let us buy something from Tito. Let us buy from him what he has to sell. Let us buy metals, ore, and the raw materials which his country produces and exports. Let us exchange food for such materials. Let us get something in return. Let us not tax the American people to hand out gratuities to murderers, to world bandits, and to those who subscribe to the philosophy that force will finally dominate our civilization.

Mr. President, others may do it but I shall not be a party to it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the RECORD at this point a further statement on the subject entitled "Yugoslavia and Tito."

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

YUGOSLAVIA AND TITO

The area of the country of Yugoslavia is 95,557 square miles, nearly the same area as

that of the State of Oregon. The country is made up largely of what were the former Balkan states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Serbia.

The population is approximately 16,000,000. This was the official figure for 1940, but it has increased very little due to large numbers of refugees and the fact that an estimated 1,700,000 have been killed during the wars since 1940. These peoples are made up of about 8,000,000 Serbs, 4,000,000 Croats, 1,250,000 Slovenes, and the remainder of the 16,000,000 being a mixed population of Germans, Hungarians, Albanians, and Russians. In the book *Tito's Imperial Communism*, by the journalist, R. H. Markham, there is this comment on the peoples of Yugoslavia:

"There was no fixed ruling class in Yugoslavia, no submerged proletariat, no exploitation of one social stratum by another, but just political 'ins' and political 'outs.'"

"There were about 16,000,000 common, hard-working men and women, most peasants, among whom were small groups and cliques and gangs of strong men, good and bad, struggling to decoy peasant votes in order to seize and maintain state power. These masters, who were peasants or the sons of peasants, used power partly for their own advantages and partly for the good of the people. As the state grew stronger and richer the might of these knights became greater and their takings vaster. In the same proportion the struggle of the outsiders to get inside increased in ferocity."

"I do not mean to condemn all Yugoslav politicians. They were like politicians in many other lands. Among them were good men who tried to serve the people and did serve the people. But I want to emphasize that the reports of a classic class struggle in Yugoslavia are largely a myth. The main struggle was and is for state power. What Tito and his Communists wanted, acquired, and are determined to hold is state power. Every other aspect of the new regime is of minor importance."

When Hitler occupied Yugoslavia, he found two distinct classes, one headed by Mihailovich and the other by Tito. Tito headed the Communists and Mihailovich the anti-Communists. The pact between Stalin and Hitler in 1939 is described by Markham as having the following effect upon the Communists in Yugoslavia:

"So, from the day Stalin and Hitler signed their pact in 1939, the Yugoslav Communists sprang into activity. Of course they were not against Germany. And naturally, they were not with England or France. Neither were they for Yugoslav unity. They were for the universal upheaval, following the guiding star of Russia and nothing else, serving Russia and no other power. They denounced the Allies in furious terms. They portrayed the war as exclusively a fight between blood-thirsty empires. They excoriated the whole capitalistic order and joyfully predicted its imminent collapse. They poured out streams of invectives against the Yugoslav Government and Regent and Army."

"As 1938 passed and 1940 passed and 1941 came, making the world situation more dangerous, the Communists stood, taut and tense, by day and by night, as racers waiting for the pistol shot. Their ears were strained to hear the signal giver, Moscow."

"When March 27 came, with all Serbians defying Hitler, the Communists at first ignored it as a futile bourgeois act, and then on March 28 attempted a futile counterrevolution. But their great moment had not yet come. The conspiratorial network was not created for the banal task of saving the fatherland, Yugoslavia. They had seven more weeks to wait for the clock of destiny to strike. Then Hitler attacked Russia. The detestable war between capitalist empires was transformed into a holy crusade. The

day had dawned in preparation for which the Yugoslav Communists had spent their lives. They began their epochal role with a heroism and fanaticism rarely equaled in the heroic, fanatical Balkans.

"The breaking out of that struggle would be as the coming of the bridegroom; for it every bridesmaid kept her lamp burning and filled with oil. That was as basic in the faith of Yugoslav Communists as the Resurrection and Easter Day were in the faith of their Christian brothers. Many special signs had indicated that 'the hour' was approaching, and for it the Yugoslav Communists had put their conspiratorial machine in readiness. Couriers were on their toes to dash away with messages to every part of the kingdom. Communist officers in the Yugoslav Army were designated for certain key positions in the revolutionary army and leading civilian Communists were prepared to fill other military posts. The chief commissars were appointed, definite campaign plans had been agreed upon, methods for getting weapons had been worked out, local cells in vital points of operation were on the alert. The Communist underground machine was an armored locomotive resting on a hidden track under full steam. When the great day of June 22 came, the whistle blew and the locomotive sped to the attack.

"The forces of Mihailovitch operated in a different manner. In the first place they launched no revolution, since they considered their activity a function of the long-existing state and a continuation of the official anti-Hitler fight which was begun on March 27. They flew the Yugoslav flag and regular regimental banners, reestablished local Serbian authorities, sought to revive Serbian faith and courage, reassembled units of the Serbian Army, urged Serbs not to serve Germans, tried to prevent the Germans from confiscating Serbian stocks of food, restricted the movement of Germans, blew up vital military installations, and killed German agents.

"Mihailovitch and his Chetniks did not care to waste their forces in trying to take large cities in open battles. They preferred to avoid head-on clashes. They wanted to reorganize their shattered nation and prepare it for long, effective, wise resistance.

"Since these forces of Mihailovitch and Tito were fighting in a fairly small area, they soon found themselves in contact. And to avert clashes the leaders met. Mihailovitch and Tito conferred. They sought a plan for common action, but failed in their efforts. Tito wanted a separate revolutionary command for his forces; Mihailovitch demanded that all forces comprise a single army under one command, his own. So they disagreed, separated, and fought. Their soldiers began to kill each other; Yugoslavs shot Yugoslavs, as the German invaders cheered."

If Mihailovitch and Tito's forces could have continued to work together there might have been an entirely different story, but the issues between them were basic and could not be resolved. Most of the people of Serbia were peasants and artisans and had struggled for centuries for freedom, especially against the Turks. They therefore resisted the plans of Tito to convert them to communism and make them subservient to Moscow. The effect of this situation is described by Markham in this way:

"Of course, that meant civil war. Tito after long preparation had pulled a Fort Sumter. From the end of the summer of 1941, civil war raged in Yugoslavia, along with the war between Yugoslavs and Germans. The main struggle in Yugoslavia, after Tito's fateful invasion of Serbia, was the civil struggle between the Communists and anti-Communists. There were many dramatic secondary fights—indeed Yugo-

slav developments were as a labyrinth containing a dozen spots of intense interest—but the supreme struggle dominating all others, giving meaning to all others, providing an unchanging pattern in the chaos, was the fight between Communist totalitarianism and its opponents.

"Naturally, the civil war which Tito provoked in Siberia facilitated the work of the Germans. During the early fall of 1941 new Nazi divisions crushed both Serbian resistance forces with terrible cruelty, left towns and villages smoking ruins, and massacred civilians by the scores of thousands."

Although by 1939 there were at the most one-half million Communists, they were well organized and better equipped to attract aid from the Allies.

"The main motive of Tito and his Communist comrades in fighting the Germans was their hope that through fighting they would obtain control of the Yugoslav state. Their chief aim was political power. And Tito did not delay taking steps toward forming a country-wide political organization that would develop into a reorganization of the state. In fact, he and the other leading Communists began taking such steps long before the war broke out. As we retrace their activity we see that they moved toward their goal with great steadfastness and skill."

Regardless of the fact that Tito was about to obtain material aid from America and Britain, his attitude toward his former allies was described in 1946 by Markham as follows:

"No force in the western world since VEDay has shown itself so hostile to Britain and America as have Tito and his partisans. Although no statesman in the world did more to place Tito in power than Winston Churchill, excepting Stalin alone, Tito has treated Britain as a mortal enemy. In 1944 the British and Americans actually saved Tito personally from the Germans. For a long period they clothed, fed, and equipped his army. They maintained scores of thousands of Yugoslav women and children in Italy and Egypt. The British protected him with their fleet on the island of Vis. Yet at that very time Tito and his partisans defied the British. They openly offended the British in Italy, stirred up the Greek EAM against the British, encouraged the Albanian partisans to threaten the lives of British liaison officers. I write all this from personal knowledge. As the British and Americans were maintaining and training partisan armies in Africa and Italy, Tito surreptitiously left Vis and flew off to Moscow. His associates refused to let the British forces land on the Dalmatian coast, after the Allies had forced the Germans to evacuate it, and they seized practically all British property in Yugoslavia on the pretext that its owners had collaborated with the Germans. Rarely in its long history has Great Britain been so humiliated even by a great power as it was repeatedly insulted by Balkan partisans that were incited by Tito. And that hostility continues unabated.

"Toward America, Tito and his regime may be even more hostile, perhaps because America is more of a world factor. America is not only treated officially as an enemy but the Yugoslav Government appears to go out of its way to compromise, offend, and actually injure America. Tito acts as though he were serving as a light brigade, or an advance guard, for Soviet Russia in fighting the United States. He seems to be testing out how far he can wear America down or how much America will take. He seems to lead the shock troops of communism and Slavdom against the United States.

"For example, he kept a number of Americans as 'slave laborers' and long refused to give even civil attention to United States notes about them. It is true that this dispute was two-sided, because some of those Americans may have been of German origin with unfavorable war records, but Tito

treated the United States Government; when protecting American citizens, as though he were dealing with an enemy, not an ally daily giving enormous aid to Yugoslavia.

"More flagrant than any of these things was the shooting down of two American planes and the killing of five American soldiers. There seems to be no doubt that this was done deliberately. It is true that Tito considered himself provoked. He charged America with air spying. But at that moment America was feeding literally millions of Yugoslavs. America was Tito's ally and we were all trying to make peace. Yet Tito's army deliberately killed Americans. It is difficult to interpret that shooting as anything but the act of a rash and irresponsible statesman, in whose hands Balkan peace is not safe. It may be that the Americans were technically at fault in touching Yugoslav air, but is there any conceivable justification of Tito's blotting out such Americans in time of peace? Tito is engaged in a kind of war with America—and a war of aggression."

And this attitude in 1947 was described in an oration by a prominent Czech Communist when he said: "Let the world know that our frontiers do not end at the eastern border. They extend from the Adriatic and the Bulgaro-Greek border over thousands and thousands of miles to the Pacific. These are our frontiers—the Slav frontiers. Within that territory live 250,000,000 Slavs who would defend our frontiers if anyone were to threaten them."

Markham concludes: "This grand and sweeping picture places Yugoslavia in a united Communist realm stretching from the Adriatic and northern Greece, across the Balkans, eastern Europe and Russia to Japan. That fact fixes Yugoslavia's place in contemporary history. In that grandiose, monolithic Slav world, Yugoslavia is a key outpost and a cornerstone.

"This opinion of a leading spokesman for world communism and for Slavdom regarding Yugoslavia's alignment confirms what Tito himself and his leading comrades have said many times. Yugoslavia is a unit in a continent-spanning, world-threatening political system. With each passing month the cracks and seams in the Communist-dominated Slav monolith are being filled and smoothed by drastic purges and a general tightening of the Communist Party. During the month of May alone, Soviet Russia and its Communist affiliates announced 'reactionary plots' in every Communist-governed Balkan land, including Yugoslavia, and all the 'plots' resulted in police action against non-Communist leaders."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Ellender	Knowland
Anderson	Fulbright	Langer
Benton	George	Lehman
Brewster	Gurney	Long
Bricker	Hayden	Lucas
Bridges	Hendrickson	McCarran
Butler	Hickenlooper	McCarthy
Byrd	Hill	McClellan
Capehart	Hoey	McFarland
Carlson	Holland	McKellar
Chapman	Humphrey	McMahon
Chavez	Hunt	Magnuson
Clements	Ives	Malone
Connally	Jenner	Martin
Cordon	Johnson, Colo.	Maybank
Donnell	Johnson, Tex.	Millikin
Douglas	Johnston, S. C.	Morse
Dworshak	Kem	Mundt
Eastland	Kerr	Murray
Eaton	Kilgore	Myers

Neely	Schoeppel	Thye
Nixon	Smith, Maine	Tobey
O'Connor	Smith, N. J.	Tydings
O'Mahoney	Smith, N. C.	Watkins
Pastore	Stennis	Wherry
Pepper	Taft	Wiley
Robertson	Taylor	Williams
Russell	Thomas, Okla.	Young
Saltonstall	Thomas, Utah	

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

The question is on agreeing to the conference report on Senate bill 4234.

The report was agreed to.

EXCESS PROFITS TAX BILL MADE THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, out of order, I ask that Calendar Order 2676, the bill (H. R. 9827) to provide revenue by imposing a corporate excess-profits tax, and for other purposes, be made the unfinished business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STENNIS in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. LUCAS. Mr. President, I might add—and I think the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, will agree—that we shall not proceed to the consideration of this bill until tomorrow, at 12 o'clock, but that, after the convening of the Senate tomorrow, we shall immediately proceed to the consideration of this measure.

FARM-PRODUCT PRICES

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER] is recognized.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my distinguished colleague may yield to me to make a statement lasting not more than 15 minutes; and I ask unanimous consent that it be understood that in doing so, my colleague will not jeopardize his right to the floor.

Mr. LANGER. I yield, providing there is that understanding.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG] is recognized.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, in this morning's Washington Post there appears an article entitled "Farm Lobby Cracks Price Law." The article is by Drew Pearson, and it reads, in part, as follows:

FARM LOBBY CRACKS PRICE LAW (By Drew Pearson)

It looks as if the cost of certain key items isn't going to be controlled very soon, after all.

Price Administrator Mike Di Salle, who came to Washington prepared to do a job for the housewife, got a rude shock when he read the price-control law thoroughly. For the farm lobby had neatly inserted certain exceptions to price control, and one of them is grain. In brief, Di Salle has no power whatsoever to control the price of grain or any food made from grain.

So Di Salle will have to go back to Congress in January and get the law rewritten.

Aside from this, the new price czar—

And then the article goes on to refer to other matters.

Mr. President, that article is erroneous, deceiving, and misleading. I think

it is designed primarily to make the farmer the goat again in the present price situation.

It leaves the impression that farm-commodity prices are unreasonably high and that they are exempt from price control.

I think a few facts should be called to the attention of the Senate. I have obtained comparative figures from the Department of Agriculture. They give a comparison between the parity-price situation as of November 15, 1950, and the parity-price situation as of a year before, as of November 15, 1949.

Let me say in passing that parity is based upon a Government formula which is designed to insure farmers of their fair share of the national income. In other words, when a farm commodity is selling at parity the farmer is only receiving for what he produces a price which has a fair relationship to that received by industry and labor for what they produce.

Mr. President, in the last year labor has received at least two rounds of wage increases, and about four rounds of wage increases since the war. During this same period farm prices have dropped by anywhere from 25 percent to as much as 50 percent, and more.

Let me read some comparative figures:

On November 15, 1949, wheat was selling at 90 percent of parity. Now, as of November 15, 1950, wheat was selling at 85 percent of parity. It is true that in the last week the price of wheat has risen some 5 or 6 cents a bushel or some 2 or 3 percent of parity.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. YOUNG. I am glad to yield.

Mr. MAYBANK. Does the Senator desire to complete his statement before he yields?

Mr. YOUNG. I prefer to finish reading these comparative figures.

Mr. MAYBANK. Very well.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, a year ago, rye was selling at 73 percent of parity. As of November 15, 1950, it was selling at 75 percent of parity.

A year ago, corn was selling at 67 percent of parity; now it is selling at 83 percent of parity.

A year ago, oats were selling at 70 percent of parity; now they are selling at 82 percent of parity.

A year ago, barley was selling at 74 percent of parity; now it is selling at 75 percent of parity.

A year ago, grain sorghums were selling at 57 percent of parity; now they are selling at 60 percent of parity.

A year ago, hogs were selling at 90 percent of parity; now they are selling at 90 percent of parity.

A year ago, soybeans were selling at 85 percent of parity; now they are selling at 97 percent of parity.

A year ago, beef cattle were selling at 148 percent of parity; now beef cattle are selling at 140 percent of parity.

A year ago, veal calves were selling at 147 percent of parity; now they are selling at 141 percent of parity.

A year ago, lambs were selling at 152 percent of parity; now they are selling at 136 percent of parity.

A year ago, chickens were selling at 85 percent of parity; now they are selling at 75 percent of parity.

A year ago, turkeys were selling at 100 percent of parity; now they are selling at 86 percent of parity.

A year ago, eggs were selling at 77 percent of parity; as of November 15, 1950, they were selling at 74 percent of parity. Of course, in the case of eggs, since November 15 there has been a speculative market, when I think a few persons obtained a corner on the market; and the price went up unreasonably.

I am glad to yield now to the distinguished Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator's courtesy in yielding to me. I have asked him to yield for the reason that he talked to me this morning about the article to which he has referred, and we were talking about it in the Appropriations Committee. Other persons have called it to my attention.

One of the troubles seems to be, as the Senator from North Dakota has so ably stated, that if anything goes wrong, many persons want to blame the poor old farmer. There is no reason why anyone should undertake to blame the farmer and try to avoid responsibility for a law that we passed in September or October, and which should have been placed in force a long time ago. So I requested the staff of the Banking and Currency Committee to look into the law and the facts so that I would be certain of what I am about to state, with the kind permission of the distinguished Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. YOUNG. I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from South Carolina for that purpose.

Mr. MAYBANK. The statement is as follows:

I intend no criticism of Mr. Pearson. He is reporting what some people, perhaps in high places, are saying. Actually a thorough study of the act and some knowledge of farm prices and agricultural production would reveal that the committee, not any lobby, unanimously agreed on the price-control provisions relating to agricultural commodities. These sections of the act, in effect, provide that price controls on farm commodities should be in fair relationship to the prices of other commodities and the prices existing during the period May 24 to June 24, 1950. It would be manifestly unfair, for example, to fix a price on a farm commodity at a price existing today, when that price had changed hardly at all over the last 6 months, while the prices of numerous other nonfarm commodities had moved up from 25 to 50 percent in some cases.

Let me comment here that the Senator from North Dakota has given the parity figures.

In view of the actual statistics on farm prices and nonfarm prices during the last 6 months, it appears that someone seems to be looking very hard for a scapegoat to blame for the current failure to control prices. Why all the concern about controlling grain prices at this moment, when the price of grain over the past 6 months has practically remained stationary?

Mr. President, I take my hat off to the distinguished Senator from North Dakota and to other Senators on his side of the aisle, who know more about grain

[PUBLIC LAW 897—81ST CONGRESS]

[CHAPTER 1182—2D SESSION]

[S. 4234]

AN ACT

To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Yugoslav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950".

SEC. 2. The President is hereby authorized to expend not in excess of \$50,000,000 of the funds heretofore appropriated for expenses necessary to carry out the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended (Public Law 759, Eighty-first Congress), for the purpose of providing emergency relief assistance to Yugoslavia under the authority of this Act.

SEC. 3. No assistance under authority of this Act shall be made available nor shall any funds appropriated hereunder be expended until an agreement is entered into between Yugoslavia and the United States containing the following undertakings, and any others the President may determine to be desirable, on the part of Yugoslavia:

(a) To make available to the Government of the United States local currency in amounts required by it to meet its local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance supplied under this Act.

(b) To give full and continuous publicity through the press, radio, and all other available media in Yugoslavia to the assistance furnished by the United States; and to allow to the United States, in cooperation with Yugoslavia, the use of such media as may be required to accomplish this purpose.

(c) To permit persons designated by the Government of the United States to observe and supervise without restriction the distribution by Yugoslavia of commodities and other assistance made available under the authority of this Act, and to the extent necessary for this purpose to permit full freedom of movement of such persons within Yugoslavia and full access to communication and information facilities.

(d) To make equitable distribution to the people in Yugoslavia of the commodities made available under this Act, as well as similar commodities produced locally or imported from outside sources, without discrimination as to race or political or religious belief.

(e) Whenever relief supplies furnished under this Act are sold for local currency by the Government of Yugoslavia, to use an equivalent amount of such currency to provide relief to needy persons and to children, and for charitable, medical, and such other purposes as may be mutually agreed upon.

(f) To take all appropriate economic measures to reduce its relief needs, to encourage increased production and distribution of food

stuffs within Yugoslavia and to lessen the danger of similar future emergencies.

SEC. 4. All of the funds made available under authority of this Act shall be utilized to the fullest practicable extent in the purchase of the commodities from the surplus commodities in the possession of the Commodity Credit Corporation at prices authorized by section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, as amended.

SEC. 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as endorsing measures undertaken by the present Government of Yugoslavia which suppress or destroy religious, political, and economic liberty, and the Yugoslav Government shall be so notified when aid is furnished under this Act.

SEC. 6. At the termination of each three-month period after aid has been extended under this Act the Secretary of State shall make a full and detailed report to the Congress. Said three-month reports shall not be limited to, but shall include (1) information as to whether or not Yugoslavia is abiding by the agreement as provided for under section 3 of this Act; (2) information as to any developments in the attitude of Yugoslavia with respect to basic human rights.

SEC. 7. All or any portion of the funds made available under authority of this Act may be transferred by the President to any department or agency of the executive branch of the Government to be expended for the purpose of this Act. Funds so transferred may be expended under the authority of any provisions of law, not inconsistent with this Act, applicable to the departments or agencies concerned, except that funds so transferred shall not be commingled with other funds of such departments or agencies and shall be accounted for separately.

SEC. 8. Local currency made available to the United States by Yugoslavia under the provisions of the agreement required by section 3 may be used for local currency administrative and operating expenses in Yugoslavia in connection with assistance provided by this Act without charge against appropriated funds.

SEC. 9. At least 50 per centum of the gross tonnage of any equipment, materials, or commodities made available under the provisions of this Act and transported on ocean vessels (computed separately for dry bulk carriers and dry cargo liners) shall be transported on United States flag commercial vessels at market rates for United States flag commercial vessels, if available.

SEC. 10. All or any part of the assistance provided hereunder shall be promptly terminated by the President—

(a) whenever he determines that (1) Yugoslavia is not complying fully with the undertakings in the agreement entered into under section 3 of this Act, or is diverting from the purpose of this Act assistance provided hereunder; or (2) because of changed conditions, continuance of assistance is unnecessary or undesirable, or no longer consistent with the national interest or the foreign policy of the United States;

(b) whenever the Congress, by concurrent resolution, finds termination is desirable.

Termination of assistance to Yugoslavia under this section shall include the termination of deliveries of all supplies scheduled under this Act and not yet delivered.

Approved December 29, 1950.

